JUDGMENT & ORDER : Questioning the legality of the order dated 19-7-2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No.4, West Tripura in Title Suit No.33 of 2015 accepting the written statement of the respondents after the lapse of about 7 months, this revision is preferred by the petitioners/plaintiffs. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the case of the petitioners is that they instituted Title Suit No.33 of 2015 before the said Civil Court against the respondents for declaration their title, confirmation of their possession and perpetual injunction. The suit was fixed on 21-7-2015 for filing of written statement by the respondents. On 30-5-2015, on the prayer of the respondents, the Court allowed time till 17-6-2015 to file their written statement. On their prayer, further time was granted by the court till 21-7-2015. On 21-7-2015, no written statement was filed, but, on the prayer of the respondents, further time granted to them till 17-8-2015. On 17-8-2015, the respondents failed to file the written statement and were again granted time till 26-9-2015 to file their written statement. However, on requisition, the record of the suit was sent to the learned District Judge, West Tripura in Misc. Appeal No.22 of 2015. The record was received back by the trial Court on 30-6-2016 whereupon the trial Court fixed 13-7-2016 for order. The case was again listed on 13-7-2016 and 18-7-2016, but no written statement was filed by the respondents. However, the written statement was filed thereafter. On 19-7-2016, the trial Court heard both the counsel for the parties on whether to accept the written statement so filed or not. Ultimately, the trial Court passed the impugned order accepting the written statement of the respondents. Aggrieved by this, the revision petition has been filed. 3. Before proceeding further, I may proceed to reproduce hereunder the relevant portions of the impugned order, which reads thus: “In this case, the defendants have submitted W/S beyond statutory period of 90 days and as per case record, it is found that the Court has allowed time to the defendants for filing of W/S and the fact was within the knowledge of the plaintiff but the plaintiff in very inception has not given any objection or has not preferred any appeal in the appropriate forum against the granting of time by the court. Only after a belated stage i.e. after lapse of seven months the plaintiff has filed a petition not to accept the W/S of the defendants. In this respect the, decision passed in AIR 2010 Gauhati 155 is worth mentioning because in that case it was categorically mentioned in para 15 & 16 of the judgment that there is nothing on record to show that the defendant had not assigned good reasons for seeking extension of time and since the Court itself allowed the defendant to file W/S beyond statutory period the same cannot be refused on the ground of delay and the W/S can be allowed to be filed. So, following the letter and spirit of the above judgment and on (sic) of the above discussion, I am of the considered opinion that for fair ends of justice and for giving the party real opportunity for contesting the case, I accept W/S of the defendants No.1 to 5 at this stage.” 4. Order VIII, Rule 1, CPC deals with the provision relating to written statement of the defendant, which reads thus: “1. Written statement.—The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence: Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the written statement on such other day, as may be specified by the court, for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as the court deems fit, but which shall not be later than one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons and on expiry of one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record.” 5. A number of decisions have been cited at the bar to substantiate their respective contentions, but suffice it to refer to the decision of the three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Kailash v. Nanku and others, (2005) 4 SCC 480 where the scope of Order VIII, Rule 1 CPC, in the light of the insertion of the proviso by the amended Act 22 of 2002 (w.e.f. 1-7-2002), came up for consideration before the Apex Court and after elaborately examining the provisions, the Apex Court laid down the following principles: “41. Considering the object and purpose behind enacting Rule 1 of Order 8 in the present form and the context in which the provision is placed, we are of the opinion that the provision has to be construed as directory and not mandatory. In exceptional situations, the court may extend the time for filing the written statement though the period of 30 days and 90 days, referred to in the provision, has expired. However, we may not be misunderstood as nullifying the entire force and impact — the entire life and vigour — of the provision. The delaying tactics adopted by the defendants in law courts are now proverbial as they do stand to gain by delay. This is more so in election disputes because by delaying the trial of election petition, the successful candidate may succeed in enjoying the substantial part, if not in its entirety, the term for which he was elected even though he may lose the battle at the end. Therefore, the judge trying the case must handle the prayer for adjournment with firmness. The defendant seeking extension of time beyond the limits laid down by the provision may not ordinarily be shown indulgence. 42. Ordinarily, the time schedule prescribed by Order 8 Rule 1 has to be honoured. The defendant should be vigilant. No sooner the writ of summons is served on him he should take steps for drafting his defence and filing the written statement on the appointed date of hearing without waiting for the arrival of the date appointed in the summons for his appearance in the court. The defendant should be vigilant. No sooner the writ of summons is served on him he should take steps for drafting his defence and filing the written statement on the appointed date of hearing without waiting for the arrival of the date appointed in the summons for his appearance in the court. The extension of time sought for by the defendant from the court whether within 30 days or 90 days, as the case may be, should not be granted just as a matter of routine and merely for the asking, more so, when the period of 90 days has expired. The extension can be only by way of an exception and for reasons assigned by the defendant and also recorded in writing by the court to its satisfaction. It must be spelled out that a departure from the time schedule prescribed by Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code was being allowed to be made because the circumstances were exceptional, occasioned by reasons beyond the control of the defendant and such extension was required in the interest of justice, and grave injustice would be occasioned if the time was not extended. 43. A prayer seeking time beyond 90 days for filing the written statement ought to be made in writing. In its judicial discretion exercised on well settled parameters, the court may indeed put the defendants on terms including imposition of compensatory costs and may also insist on an affidavit, medical certificate or other documentary evidence (depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case) being annexed with the application seeking extension of time so as to convince the court that the prayer was founded on grounds which do exist. 44. The extension of time shall be only by way of exception and for reasons to be recorded in writing, howsoever brief they may be, by the court. In no case, shall the defendant be permitted to seek extension of time when the court is satisfied that it is a case of laxity or gross negligence on the part of the defendant or his counsel. The court may impose costs for dual purpose: (i) to deter the defendant from seeking any extension of time just for the asking, and (ii) to compensate the plaintiff for the delay and inconvenience caused to him.” (Italics for emphasis) 6. The court may impose costs for dual purpose: (i) to deter the defendant from seeking any extension of time just for the asking, and (ii) to compensate the plaintiff for the delay and inconvenience caused to him.” (Italics for emphasis) 6. As already noticed, in the instant case, summons was issued by the trial Court on 14-4-2015 returnable on 30-5-2015. On 30-5-2015, the respondents entered their appearance but did not file their written statement and were granted time till 17-6-2015 to file the written statement. On 17-6-2015, further time till 21-7-2015 was granted to them to file their written statement. On 21-7-2015 also, no written statement was filed, but the trial Court liberally granted some more time till 17-8-2015. Even on 17-8-2015, no written statement was filed by the respondents. Again, on the prayer of the respondents, the trial Court granted them time till 26-9-2015 to file their written statement. However, on 19-9-2015, the leaned District Judge, West Tripura called for the record in c/w Misc. Appeal No. 22/15. The suit was thus kept in cold freeze in the trial Court till 30-6-2016. No written statement was, however, filed on 30-6-2016 or 13-7-2016 or 18-7-2016. It was apparently sometime after 18-7-2016 that the written statement was filed. On 19-7-2016, the trial Court heard the parties on whether the written statement filed by the respondents was to be accepted or not and passed the impugned order accepting the written statement. 7. From the sequence of Court events referred to above, it becomes obvious that the statutorily prescribed period of 30 days had expired, at any rate, on 17-6-2015 and that no written application was ever filed by the respondents for extension of time to file the written statement after 17-6-2015. Neither was any reason, much less, exceptional reasons, assigned by the respondents. Time after time was granted just as a matter of routine and merely for the asking though the Apex Court in Kailash case (supra) categorically held that the filing of written statement should be recorded in writing indicating therein exceptional circumstances preventing them from filing the written statement beyond the time prescribed by law. Even after the case record was received back from the learned District Judge, no attempt was immediately made by the respondents to file the written statement. In my opinion, it is simply a case of laxity or gross negligence on the part of the respondents. Even after the case record was received back from the learned District Judge, no attempt was immediately made by the respondents to file the written statement. In my opinion, it is simply a case of laxity or gross negligence on the part of the respondents. As observed by the Apex Court in Kailash case (supra), the purpose of providing the time schedule for filing the written statement under Order VIII, Rule 1 CPC is to expedite and not to scuttle the hearing. The provision being in the domain of procedural law, it has to be held directory and not mandatory. In other words, the power of the court to extend time for filing the written statement beyond the time schedule provided by Order VIII, Rule 1, CPC is not completely taken away. In the instant case, I have the sneaking suspicion that the respondents are not serious in defending their case, and are merely interested in delaying the disposal of the suit. However, for the time being, I prefer to give them the benefit of doubt so that they are not left defenceless even before the commencement of the trial but this shall be subject to payment of deterrent and compensatory cost. In this view of the matter, I refrain from interfering with the impugned order with the rider indicated above. 8. The result of the foregoing discussion is that this civil revision is disposed of by directing the learned Civil Judge to accept the written statement belatedly filed by the respondents only on the condition that they pay a cost of Rs. 20,000/- to the petitioners both for future deterrent and to compensate the petitioners within thirty days from today. If no such payment is made within time, the trial Court will proceed with the suit in accordance with Order VIII, Rule 5(2), CPC. Interim order, if any stands vacated.