JUDGMENT : This writ petition is filed by the petitioner, who is a member of the 3rd respondent society seeking to quash Ext.P6 order passed by the 1st respondent dated 14.6.2017rescinding Ext.P4 order passed by the Disciplinary Subcommittee constituted by the 3rd respondent bank and dismissing the 4th respondent from the services of the bank and for other related reliefs. Material facts for the disposal of the writ petition are as follows; 2. Petitioner is an A class member of the 3rd respondent bank. Fourth respondent was dismissed from service by the sub committee after conducting a detailed enquiry, as per Ext.P4 order. The 4th respondent instead of filing an appeal against Ext.P4 order as is provided under rule 198(4) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969, hereinafter called “the Rules”, filed a petition before the 1st respondent under rule 176 for rescinding Ext.P4 order. According to the petitioner, as per the settled position of law, 1st respondent has no power to entertain any petition seeking to invoke rule 176 to rescind the resolution, especially when power is conferred under section 69 (2) (d) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies operative Societies Act enabling the 4th respondent top refer a suit, 1st respondent entertained the said petition and has passed Ext.P6 order rescinding Ext.P4 decision of the disciplinary sub committee dismissing the 4th respondent from the service of the 3rd respondent bank. It is the contention of the petitioner that, petitioner being a member of the 3rd respondent bank is interested in its activities and therefore, he is entitled as of right to challenge Ext.P6 order and therefore seeks to quash Ext.P6 order passed by the 1st respondent. 3. Fourth respondent has filed a detailed counter affidavit refuting the allegations and claims and demands raised by the petitioner. The paramount contention advanced by the 4th respondent is that, petitioner has no locus standi to challengeExt.P6 order. In fact the said order was challenged by the Vice President of the Managing Committee of the society in W.P.(C)No.20239/2017 and this court at the admission stage issued an order of interim stay on all further proceedings in the matter. In the said writ petition 4th respondent has filed a detailed counter affidavit stating that, the society need not have any grievance regarding the orders issued by the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies. In the said writ petition 4th respondent has filed a detailed counter affidavit stating that, the society need not have any grievance regarding the orders issued by the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The society at no point of time has raised any objection before the Joint Registrar regarding the maintainability of the petition filed by the 4th respondent. The 4th respondent was constrained to move before the 1st respondent since there is total illegality in the matter of initiation of the disciplinary proceedings so also passing of the final order. It is also contended that, the disciplinary committee has no power, authority or jurisdiction to issue memo of charges and it is for the appointing authority to issue the memo of charges and seek explanation from the employee and if the explanation is found not satisfactory, then only the disciplinary committee can be constituted to conduct enquiry. However, contentions are also raised with respect to the power conferred on the sub committee or the executive committee of the society under rule 198.Therefore, according to the 4th respondent, 4th respondent was justified in approaching the 1st respondent invoking the power conferred under rules 176 of Rules, 1969. That apart it is submitted that, the writ petitioner is none else but the brother of Sri. Narayanan, who is the husband of Smt. Sreekala, who is the alleged Chairperson of the disciplinary sub committee. It is also contended that, taking note of the contentions raised in W.P.(C)No.20239/2017, the interim order granted was vacated as perExt.R4(a) order. Therefore, according to the 4th respondent, there is no bonafide in the reliefs sought for by the petitioner and seeks dismissal of the same. 4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Senior Government Pleader, learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent and perused the pleadings and the documents on record. 5. The sole question that emerges for consideration in this writ petition is whether the 1st respondent is vested with power sunder rule 176 of the Rules, 1969 in order to rescind Ext.P4 decision of the disciplinary sub committee imposing punishment on the 4th respondent by dismissing from the service after conducting an enquiry as is contemplated under rule 198 of Rules, 1969. Rule 176 of Rules 1969 read thus: 176. Rule 176 of Rules 1969 read thus: 176. Registrar's power to rescind resolution:-Notwithstanding anything contained in the bye-laws of a registered society, it shall be competent for the Registrar to rescind any resolution of any meeting of any society or the committee of any society, if it appears to him that such resolution is ultra vires of the objects of the society, or is against the provisions of the Act, Rules, Bye-laws or of any direction or instructions issued by the Department, or calculated to disturb the peaceful and orderly working of the society or is contrary to the better interest of the society.” 6. On a reading of rule 176, it is categoric and clear that, the power vested with the 1st respondent is to rescind any resolution of any meeting of any society or the committee of any society if it appears that, such resolution is ultra vires of the objects of the society, or is against the provisions of the Act, Rules, Bye-laws or of any direction or instructions issued by the Department, or calculated to disturb the peaceful and orderly working of the society or is contrary to the better interest of the society. Therefore the significant component of rule 176 to exercise power by the 1st respondent is a resolution adopted by a society or the committee of any society. Here is a case where disciplinary action was initiated against the 4th respondent. A disciplinary committee was constituted, the committee conducted an enquiry and report was drawn, based on which a punishment is imposed. Ext.P4 order is passed by the disciplinary sub committee on the basis of the enquiry conducted. The said order can never be treated as resolution of any meeting of any society or committee of any society. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the Registrar did not have any power to entertain a petition from the 4th respondent invoking the power conferred under rule 176. This is exactly the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner with respect to rule 176 and he has invited my attention to the judgments of this court in Thrissur Taluk Co-operative College Educational Society Ltd. v. Joint Registrar [ 2012(1) KLT 503 ] and Kanjoor Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies (General) [2016(3)KLT 73] to canvass the said proposition. In Thrissur Taluk Co-operative College Educational Society Limited supra, it is held in paragraph 9 and 12 as follows: 9. The next question is as to whether the Joint Registrar has jurisdiction to entertain Ext.P7series petitions seeking to invoke R.176 of the Rules. The reliefs sought in Ext.P7 series petitions fall within the ambit of any disputearising in connection with employment under S.69(2)(d) of the Act. The last limb of S.69(1)further mandates that 'no other court or other authority shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of such dispute'. Thus there is a statutory exclusion for the Joint Registrar to entertain Ext.P7 series petitions seeking to invoke R.176 of the Rules. 12. I have no hesitation to hold that Exts.P4 andP6 notices issued on Ext.P7 series petitions filed seeking to invoke R.176 of the Rules are non-est in law. There is a statutory exclusion for the Joint Registrar to deal with Ext.P7 series petitions relating to the employment of respondents 2 to 4. I therefore quash Exts.P4 and P6 notices and allow the Writ Petition however without costs. This is of course without prejudice to the right of respondents 2 to 4 to invoke other remedy known to law. 7. In Kanjoor Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. supra again a learned Single Judge of this court interpreting rule 176 held that, the Joint Registrar cannot in exercise of his powers conferred under the Rules interfere with or deal with a dispute overriding the exclusion of his authority by virtue of the provisions contained in the Act, by adopting summary procedure under Rule 176, by rescinding resolution of the petitioner Co-operative societies. Paragraph 7 of the said judgment is relevant in the said context, which read thus: “7. Therefore the jurisdiction to decide the disputes is not restricted to those disputes provided in clauses (a) to (d) alone of sub-section(2) of S.69. An inclusive meaning given to the term dispute does not in any manner take away the jurisdiction to decide the disputes covered by sub-section (1) of S.69 cannot be interpreted to mean an employee envisaged under S.80 of the Act and included in the Appendix. An inclusive meaning given to the term dispute does not in any manner take away the jurisdiction to decide the disputes covered by sub-section (1) of S.69 cannot be interpreted to mean an employee envisaged under S.80 of the Act and included in the Appendix. As long as the petitioner employer and the 2nd respondent do not dispute that the 2nd respondent was employed under them as Collection agent, the complaint of the 2nd respondent against his removal or disengagement can only be one coming under S.69 (1)(c) of the Act, which is necessarily to be decided by the Arbitration Court. The collection agent was employed by the 1st respondent. He was removed from the society. He complains that an inquiry was not conducted. His engagement and dis-engagement are not disputed. Therefore, by virtue of S.69,which starts with the non-obstante clause providing that the disputes as mentioned there in has to be referred to Arbitration Court/Registrar in respect of non-monetary/monetary disputes and hence barring the authority of any other forum to deal with those disputes, the removal of the 2nd respondent is a matter which requires to be dealt with by the Arbitration Court and the Joint Registrar has no authority to deal with the same in any manner because of the specific ouster contained in S.69(1) of the Act. At any rate, the Joint Registrar cannot in exercise of his powers conferred under the Rules interfere with or deal with a dispute overriding the exclusion of his authority by virtue of the provisions contained in the Act, by adopting summary procedure under R.176, by rescinding resolution of the petitioner Co-operative Societies.” 8. Moreover, the resolution is defined the Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Edition as “a formal action by a co-operative board of directors or other corporate body authorizing a particular act, transaction, or appointment.” 9. Taking into account the totality of the circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that, the power exercised by the 1st respondent under rule 176 to rescind Ext.P4 order passed by the disciplinary sub committee cannot be sustained under law. Taking into account the totality of the circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that, the power exercised by the 1st respondent under rule 176 to rescind Ext.P4 order passed by the disciplinary sub committee cannot be sustained under law. In my considered opinion, there is every right vested with the 4th respondent to invoke section 69(2)(d), if the 4th respondent is aggrieved by Ext.P4 order, which read thus: “Any dispute arising in connection with employment of officers and servants of the different classes of societies specified in sub-section (1) of Sec.80, including their promotion and inter se seniority.” 10. So also section 69 of the Act, 1969 starts with a non-obstante clause to the effect that, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force if a dispute arises:- Therefore, it is clear that, when a dispute arises by and between the society and any of its employees in connection with employment, then necessarily the 4th respondent is to invoke the right conferred under sub-section 2(d) there under. 11. Yet another contention advanced by learned counsel for the 4th respondent is that, petitioner, merely a member of the society is not vested with any power or locus standi to challengeExt.P6 order passed by the disciplinary committee. In that regard, learned counsel for petitioner has invited my attention to the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Jomon Augustinev. State of Kerala (in W.P.(C) No.23239/2010 dated 21.3.2016)wherein self same question was considered. Paragraphs 29 and30 of the said judgment is relevant, which read thus: 29. Viewed from the above perspective, there is a semblance of justification in the respondent's contention that the rights of petitioners 1 and 2 have not been affected. It cannot, however, be said so as regards their interest. In elaboration, I may hold that petitioners 1 and 2, being the members of the respondent Society—the employer, have sufficient interest in its affairs. For the Society, notwithstanding its distinct legal character, represents the interests of all its members collectively. Extending the same logic a little further, I reckon it is easy to hold that petitioners 1 and 2 as members are, in a sense, co-employers. 30. For the Society, notwithstanding its distinct legal character, represents the interests of all its members collectively. Extending the same logic a little further, I reckon it is easy to hold that petitioners 1 and 2 as members are, in a sense, co-employers. 30. Summing up, I am of the view that petitioners 1 and 2 have their interest affected, if not their rights, because of the method and manner adopted by the Society in effecting the appointments to the posts in the Society. The Society adhering to a strict procedure, and recruiting the best of the personnel is in its interest, that is, in the interest of its constituents, the members, who include petitioners 1 and 2, too.” 12. I am in respectful agreement with the proposition of law so laid down by this court in the said judgment in order to conclude that the petitioner has a duty to protect the interest of the society. I have also gone through Ext.P1 charge memo and finds that, allegations are made against the 4th respondent with respect to financial indiscipline on the part of the 4th respondent among other charges. Therefore, definitely petitioner being an A class member of the society has interest in the affairs of the society. In that view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that, the challenge made by the 4th respondent in respect of the locus standi of the petitioner cannot be sustained under law. On a reading of Ext.P6 order also, it is categoric and evident that, the findings of the 1st respondent is that, disciplinary committee was not constituted properly, there was no appointment of the chairman to the disciplinary committee and the disciplinary committee has not taken into account the objection raised by the 4th respondent etc. etc. It is also found inExt.P6 that, imposition of punishment of dismissal on the 4th respondent is disproportionate to the charges alleged and 1st respondent has even went to the extent of exercising the power conferred under rule 198 Which thus also means, illegality is attributed in Ext.P6 order, against Ext.P4 decision of the disciplinary committee, which is only susceptible to challenge under the provisions of Section 69 of Act, 1969. In my considered opinion, 1st respondent has no manner of power to invoke rule 198 while exercising powers under rule 176 of Rules, 1969 in the fact situation on hand. 13. In my considered opinion, 1st respondent has no manner of power to invoke rule 198 while exercising powers under rule 176 of Rules, 1969 in the fact situation on hand. 13. As I have pointed out earlier, if the 4th respondent has any grievance against Ext.P4 order of the sub committee, the 4th respondent is conferred with a remedy to file appeal against the order in accordance with sub-rule 4 of rule 198 before the Board of Management and also to institute any proceedings in accordance with section 69(2)(d) of Act, 1969. Apart from all these, when a statute prescribes a particular modality and procedure, the authority constituted there under shall confine himself to the power conferred there under. Learned counsel for petitioner has also invited my attention to the judgment of a Division Bench of this court is State of Kerala and others v. Shree Navangar Sadavrat Trust [ILR 2017(3) Kerala 838], to counter the contention that, there is an appeal remedy against the order impugned. Paragraph 14 is relevant which read thus: “We would first start with the contention as raised by the State. The first contention we would deal with is the question of alternative remedy provided by Section 11 of the Act. No doubt, it is a remedy provided by the Statute. But as is well-settled that where the order has been passed by an authority wholly without jurisdiction, the question of alternative remedy does not arise. It is submitted that there were no facts to justify the assumption of jurisdiction. To the contrary, the enquiry report of the Tahsildar, which formed the basis of the order of the District Collector to assume jurisdiction and initiate proceedings, would itself show that the property belonged to the trust and all taxes were being paid by Shree Navanagar Sadavrat Trust and was being maintained by the Trust. If that be so, then where is the question of property belonging to a person who died without heirs. But the District Collector having no other materials before him, accepted the report of the Tahsildar and still choose to assume jurisdiction which he lacks in the facts aforesaid. If this be correct, then the District Collector clearly acted without jurisdiction and that being so, the alternative remedy would be no bar in entertaining the original petition and the learned Single Judge did no wrong in entertaining the original petition.” 14. If this be correct, then the District Collector clearly acted without jurisdiction and that being so, the alternative remedy would be no bar in entertaining the original petition and the learned Single Judge did no wrong in entertaining the original petition.” 14. Accordingly, I am of the considered opinion that, action of the 1st respondent is lacking jurisdiction, and therefore, illegal and arbitrary. Viewed in that regard, availability of alternative remedy will not stand in the way of the petitioner invoking the discretionary remedy conferred on this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. Assimilating the fact situations and reckoning the law, in my view, 1st respondent has usurped the power conferred under rule 176 of the Rules, 1969 and therefore, petitioner is entitled to succeed in the writ petition, consequently, I quashExt.P6 order passed by the 1st respondent, however, leaving open the liberty of the 4th respondent to proceed in accordance with law. It is made clear that, the findings and observations contained above shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the matter or rival interest of the parties. Writ petition is allowed accordingly.