JUDGMENT : Vinit Kumar Mathur, J. The present appeal has been preferred against the order dated 21.07.2015 passed by learned Single Bench in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.479/2000, whereby the writ petition of the petitioner (respondent herein) was allowed while setting aside the impugned order of punishment dated 27.07.1999, forfeiting the pension of the petitioner (respondent herein). 2. Briefly, the facts in the matter are that vide order dated 27.07.1999, in pursuance to a charge-sheet issued, the disciplinary authority has ordered withholding of 100% pension of the petitioner Jagmal Singh in view of the Enquiry Officer’s report holding all the 27 charges as proved. The petitioner Jagmal Singh was appointed as Lower Division Clerk with the respondent (appellant herein) Department on 13.06.1960. He was promoted to the post of Inspector on 27.10.1960 and subsequently to the posts of Naib Tehsildar and Tehsildar on 06.01.1963 and 03.01.1976, respectively. Thereafter, the petitioner was granted Junior Scale of Rajasthan Administrative Services on 01.07.1986 and later on, was promoted to Senior Scale of Rajasthan Administrative Services w.e.f. 16.02.1992. However, he was placed under suspension on 05.11.1992 but no charge-sheet was served upon him for almost 06 months. Accordingly, he was reinstated in service on 31.07.1993 and superannuated on the same day i.e. 31.07.1993. After his retirement, a notice was issued to him on 30.08.1993 asking him to file reply to the charge-sheet which is purported to have been sent on 30.07.1993. The petitioner (respondent herein) immediately vide his letter dated 10.09.1993, responded to the notice by stating therein that he has not received the chargesheet. Hence, another charge-sheet was handed over to him on 13.10.1993. The petitioner duly submitted his reply to the chargesheet. The Enquiry Officer held him guilty of all the 27 charges vide his enquiry report. Thereafter, the State Government vide Notice dated 11.09.1998 asked the petitioner to submit his representation which he duly submitted on 06.10.1998. However, his representation was rejected and the respondent authorities passed an Order dated 27.07.1999 withholding the entire pension of the petitioner (respondent herein). 3. Mr. Thereafter, the State Government vide Notice dated 11.09.1998 asked the petitioner to submit his representation which he duly submitted on 06.10.1998. However, his representation was rejected and the respondent authorities passed an Order dated 27.07.1999 withholding the entire pension of the petitioner (respondent herein). 3. Mr. P.R. Singh, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the appellants vehemently supported the order dated 27.07.1999 on the strength that in pursuance to validly issued charge-sheet the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated and completed against the petitioner (respondent herein) in absolute compliance of the principles of natural justice and the enquiry has been completed in accordance with procedure established by law. Mr. P.R. Singh has also submitted that there were serious allegations of misconduct against the petitioner (respondent herein) and, therefore, on all the 27 charges, the Enquiry Officer has found the charges leveled against the petitioner(respondent herein) to be proved. Therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Bench is not correct and required to be interfered with. Further, the order of punishment dated 27.07.1999 passed by the disciplinary authority is just, proper and correct. Mr. P.R. Singh has further submitted that as per Section 170 of the Rajasthan Services Rules, 1951, the departmental proceedings can also be initiated if it is found that an officer is guilty of misconduct or negligence during the period of his service and, therefore, merely pecuniary loss caused to the State is not the only ground to proceed against a Government servant under Section 170 of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951. He further submits that as per Rule 7 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1996, the State can also take recourse to proceed against the Government servant, if he is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of his service. Learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the petitioner(respondent herein) while acting as a quasi judicial authority has failed to observe the relevant provisions/Rules while passing the orders therein and was passing the orders in violations of the instructions thereby misusing the authority vested in him, resultantly causing loss to the State. Therefore, in these circumstances the order passed by the learned Single Bench is required to be interfered with and the order of disciplinary authority dated 27.07.1999 should be upheld. 4. To buttress the contention raised, Mr. Therefore, in these circumstances the order passed by the learned Single Bench is required to be interfered with and the order of disciplinary authority dated 27.07.1999 should be upheld. 4. To buttress the contention raised, Mr. P.R. Singh relied upon a judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court delivered in Union of India & Ors. Vs. K.K. Dhawan; (1993) 2 SCC 56 . 5. Mr. M.R. Singhvi, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Dilip Singh Rajvi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, while opposing the submissions of learned Additional Advocate General, has supported the order passed by learned Single Bench and has submitted that finding arrived at by learned Single Bench is absolutely in accordance with the provisions of law and in conformity with the judgments of this Hon’ble Court as well as of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is further contended that as far as the orders passed by the petitioner (respondent herein) is concerned the same were passed absolutely in accordance with the law on the basis of material placed before him and there is no question of any misuse of the authority as the orders passed by the petitioner (respondent herein) has never been challenged before the higher forum by way of filing appeal or revision petition. It was open for the State that if a wrong order has been passed in violation of the provision then the same is required to be assailed before the higher forum. He further submitted that as far as the allegations of ulterior motive or misappropriation or embezzlement or anything related to his integrity is concerned, there is nothing on record to show or suggest that the charges in those terms have ever been framed against him. Learned Senior counsel further submitted that for coming to the conclusion of a particular charge with respect to integrity/embezzlement or misappropriation, there has to be a definite charge with specific assertion to that effect in the charges framed or explained thereto. Unless the same is there, the delinquent officer is not in a position to defend and, therefore, there cannot be any finding to that effect by any authority much less the disciplinary authority. 6. Heard learned counsels for the parties. 7. Unless the same is there, the delinquent officer is not in a position to defend and, therefore, there cannot be any finding to that effect by any authority much less the disciplinary authority. 6. Heard learned counsels for the parties. 7. In order to appreciate the factual matrix, we have gone through the entire record and it will be worthwhile to reproduce the charge No.1 in its vernacular which is as follows:- ^^vkjksi la[;k 1 ;g fd mDr Jh txeky flag] vkj-,-,l- fnukad 14-6-90 ls 9-9-91 rd mi[k.M vf/kdkjh jk;falg uxj ftyk Jhxaxkuxj ds in ij dk;Zjr Fks rc mUgksaus izdj.k la- ---------@86 ljdkj cuke cukjlh nkl esa vkns’k fnuakd 31-7-90 ,oa 4-10-90 }kjk nks ckj izdj.k vne gktjh esa [kkfjt fd;k ,oa izkFkhZx.k ds izkFkZuk i= izLrqr djus ij vkaoVu lykgdkj lfefr dh jk; ls fnukad 20-12-90 dks mUgksaus 15-00 ch?kk dek.M 10 ch?kk vudek.M Hkwfe dk ckfyx iq=ksa ds fy, cus fu;eksa ds rgr vkaoVu fd;kaA ckfyx iq=ksa dks Hkwfe vkaoVu fu;e 1975 ds :y 13¼5½¼ch½ esa fn;k x;k gSA ;g izko/kku dsoy mUgha ekeyks esa ykxw gksrk gS ftuesa muds firk ds dCtk dk’r esa 1965 ls iwoZ vkjth dk’r dks Hkwfe gks rFkk firk dks mldh ik=rk dh lhek rd vkaoVu dj ljIyl ?kksf"kr dh xbZ gksA mDr izdj.k esa vkaoVu 'kklu dh vf/klwpuk fnuakd 9-9-86 ds vuqlj.k esa cktkj Hkko ls fd;k tkuk pkfg, Fkk tc fd muds }kjk jdck vkjf{kr nj ls vkaoVu fd;k x;kA ,slk dj mUgksuas vius in dk nq:i;ksx djrs gq, fu;e fo:) dk;Z fd;k x;k gS ,oa jkT; fgr dks uqdlku igqapk;k gS tSlk fd layXu vkjksi fooj.k la- 1 esa of.kZr gSA** 8. We are not reproducing all 27 charges for the reasons that all other charges are almost on the same lines and the basis or foundation of the allegations is that, ^^,slk dj mUgksuas vius in dk nq:i;ksx djrs gq, fu;e fo:) dk;Z fd;k x;k gS ,oa jkT; fgr dks uqdlku igqapk;k gS tSlk fd layXu vkjksi fooj.k la- 1 esa of.kZr gSA** 9. It is further relevant to reproduce the finding of disciplinary authority recorded on charges No. 1, 3, 4 & 6 in its order dated 27.07.1999. It is further relevant to reproduce the finding of disciplinary authority recorded on charges No. 1, 3, 4 & 6 in its order dated 27.07.1999. ^^pkjks vkjksiksa esa rF; ,d gh leku gS vkSj ,d gh rjg dh vfu;ferrk vyx&vyx ekeyksa esa dh xbZ gS] ftlds vuqlkj izdj.k la[;k 254@86] 226@86] 237@86 ,oa 19@90 esa fuEukuqlkj Hkwfe dk vkoaVu fd;k x;k%& izdj.k la[;k vkaoVh vkoafVr Hkwfe 254@86 cukjlhnkl 25 ch?kk 226@86 euksgj yky 24 ch?kk 237@86 nsohyky 3-162 gsDVs;j 19@90 gjyky 25 ch?kk tkap vf/kdkjh us bu vkjksiaksa ds lanHkZ esa ik;k gS fd bu Hkwfe;ksa ij vkoaVh vfrØe.k dh gSfl;r ls Fkk vkSj jktLFkku mifuos’ku ¼bfUnjk xka/kh ugj ifj;kstuk {ks= esa vkoaVu o foØ;½ fu;e] 1975 ds fu;e 13 ds mifu;e 5¼[k½ ds vuqlkj ;fn firk dk’rdkj gks rks ml tehu ds firk dks vkoaVu djus ds i’pkr Hkh dksbZ tehu vkoaVu ls 'ks"k jgh gks] vLFkkbZ vkoaVu ds :i esa dk’r dh tk jgh ml tehu esa ls] mlds o;Ld yM+dksa dks tehu vkoaVu dh tk ldrh gSA bl izdkj vLFkkbZ :i ls dk'r fd;k tkuk ,sls vkoaVu ds fy;s vko’;d gS ysfdu uktk;t dk’rdkj dks ,sls vkoaVu dk gdnkj ugha cuk;k tk ldrk vFkkZr vfrØeh gksus dh lwjr esa vkjf{kr nj ij vkoaVu ugha fd;k tk ldrkA vkoaVh dk dCtk 15-10-52 ls yxkrkj gksus dk izek.k Hkh is’k ugha fd;k x;k gS jkT; ljdkj ds ifji= i- 10¼jkt@mi@75½ ikVZ t;iqj fnukad 10-8-90 ds vuqlkj ckfyx iq=ksa dk fopkjk/khu i=kofy;ksa esa ;FkkfLFkfr j[kus ds vkns’k fn;s x;s Fks] ysfdu bu vkns’kksa ds ckotwn vkjksih }kjk Hkwfe dk vkoaVu fd;k x;kA jkT; ljdkj dks foHkkx ds ifji= fnukad 9-9-86 ds vuqlkj bafnjk xka/kh ugj ifj;kstuk {ks= esa 1-1-71 ds iwoZ tks O;fDr yxkrkj dCtk fd;s gq, gS rFkk vfrØeh gS] pkgs muesa ls dksbZ vLFkkbZ@LFkkbZ iV~Vk /kkjd iwoZ eas jgk gks] ysfdu mDr iV~Vk fujLr gks tkus ls ogka vfrØeh gks x;k gks ,sls O;fDr;ksa ds laca/k eas tks dfri; funsZ’k fn;s x;s gS] muesa dk’r dh Hkwfe ds fy;s cktkj nj fy;k tkuk vko’;d ekuk x;k gS tcfd ;g vkoaVu vkjf{kr nj ij fd;k x;k gSa bl izdkj jkT; ljdkj dks foÙkh; gkfu igaqpk;h x;h gSA vr% ;g vkjksi vkjksih ds iw.kZr% fl) gksrk gSA Jh txeky flag us vius vH;kosnu esa dFku fd;k gS fd mUgksusa vkoaVu dh dk;Zokgh fu;e 13¼5½¼tk½ ds Li"Vhdj.k ^lh* rFkk fu;e 2¼1½¼16½ ds lanHkZ esa dh] ftlesa cktkj nj dh dksbZ dYiuk ugah dh FkhA Jh ;kno dk dFku fu;eksa esa vkSj jktdh; vkns’kksa ds lanHkZ esa mfpr izrhr ugha gksrk gS D;ksafd mifuns’ku foHkkx ds ifji= fnukad 9-9-86 }kjk vfrØeh] tks vLFkkbZ iV~Vk/kkjd iwoZ esa jgk gks] mlls Hkwfe ds fy;s cktkj nj fy;k tkuk vko’;d gSA jkT; ljdkj ds ifji= fnukad 10-8-90 ds vuqlkj Hkh ;s funsZ’k fn;s x;s Fks fd ckfyx iq=ksa dh fopkjk/khu i=kofy;ksa esa ;FkkfLFkfr j[kh tk, ysfdu vkns’kksa ds ckotwn Hkh Jh ;kno }kjk Hkwfe dk vkoaVu fd;k x;kA vr% tkap vf/kdkjh ds fu"d"kZ ls lger gksus ds i;kZIr dkj.k o vk/kkj gSA Jh txeky flag us fu;e fo:) vkoaVu dj vkoafV;ksa dks ykHk igaqpk;k vkSj jkT; fgr dks gkfu igqapkbZ vr% vkjksi 1] 3] 4] 6 izekf.kr gksrk gSA** 10. Findings of all other charges are same, therefore, the same are not being reproduced here. 11. We find that all the 27 charges are with respect to the orders passed by the petitioner (respondent herein) in its quasi judicial authority. It is also worth-mentioning here that almost on the same lines the explanation to the charges which is annexed with the charge-sheet also describes the charges on similar lines without therein any further elaboration or details. The enquiry which was conducted by the Enquiry Officer also reveals that on the evidence adduced therein the charges are held to have been proved against the petitioner (respondent herein). The entire record does not show or suggest that the petitioner (respondent herein) was ever faced with the charge of misconduct/embezzlement and has misused his authority for the wrongful gains in the matter which he had decided. Neither there is any charge to that effect nor in the explanation part it has come and even there is no evidence to that effect in the entire matter. 12. We are of the opinion that there is difference between passing a wrong order or interpreting a particular provision in a particular manner which may not be correct and passing a wrong order with ulterior motive or malafide or in order to have the wrongful gains or even to put a loss to the State exchequer deliberately. 13. The fundamental principle while dealing such issues is the foundation and the mens-rea, if a wrong order has been passed without there being any ulterior motive then certainly an officer cannot be punished and there is no question of proceeding against authority or officer in the circumstances. If that be so then every wrong order passed by an officer will be proceeded with by the disciplinary action. 14. In nutshell to conduct disciplinary enquiry the touch-stone should be and is that if an order has been passed malafidely for illegal gratification or embezzlement of money or with ulterior motive, surely the authority is required to be proceeded with and not otherwise. 15. 14. In nutshell to conduct disciplinary enquiry the touch-stone should be and is that if an order has been passed malafidely for illegal gratification or embezzlement of money or with ulterior motive, surely the authority is required to be proceeded with and not otherwise. 15. In the present case there is no material, much less there is no allegation in the charges itself that the petitioner-respondent has in any way committed an embezzlement or misappropriation of public money or with ulterior motive has put loss to the State and, therefore, learned Single Bench was absolutely right in quashing the order of punishment dated 27.07.1999. We are in complete agreement with the finding recorded by the learned Single Bench in the relevant paras as under: “In the present case, the allegation was that the petitioner has passed the orders of allotment illegally by misusing his authority and in violation of the instructions. The correctness of the orders passed by the petitioner has been questioned here in a departmental enquiry without availing the remedy of appeal and revision against such orders, whereas, even a correct order can be passed with ulterior motive. Hence, it is necessary to frame the charge of ulterior motive etc. before concluding that it has been passed with wrong intention. A wrong order in itself cannot be held as passed with ulterior motive. There was no such charge against the petitioner regarding his integrity, embezzlement or misappropriation. Thus, he had no opportunity to defend himself. If a delinquent employee is not clear about the charges against him, he cannot possibly imagine the same against himself. Hence, he cannot properly defend himself. Therefore, order impugned deserves to be quashed on this ground alone. As already noticed above, in the absence of any specific charge that the petitioner acted in a malafide manner or for illegal gratification, there was no evidence led from either side either to prove or defend the said charge. It amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity to defend himself. To conclude otherwise in absence of any such charge or evidence is unjust, unfair, arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice. No evidence worth the name that the same was on account of malafides or for illegal gratification or he adopted corrupt practice was produced. Therefore, a finding that the said actions were malafide cannot be sustained. To conclude otherwise in absence of any such charge or evidence is unjust, unfair, arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice. No evidence worth the name that the same was on account of malafides or for illegal gratification or he adopted corrupt practice was produced. Therefore, a finding that the said actions were malafide cannot be sustained. The findings of the enquiry become more doubtful in the face of the admitted fact that no appeal or revision was filed against the orders passed by the petitioner in his official capacity. All the orders passed by the petitioner, which were subject matter of the charges, are either appealable or revisable. However, the department has never challenged the same till date. Under these circumstances, the said quasi judicial orders attained finality. There being no allegation of corrupt motive against the petitioner, the entire disciplinary action for passing the orders was, therefore, not called for. In view of the well settled proposition of law, it is impossible for this Court to take any other view. There is not an iota of evidence of malafide or extraneous consideration against the petitioner. Therefore, to pass an order of withholding the entire pension for having passed the orders while exercising his quasi judicial orders without the charge of having passed them with ulterior or malafide motive is not only a dangerous trend but shall put fear in the mind of an officer not to act without favour or fear. Once this Court is satisfied that the order withholding the entire pension is unsustainable, it need not go into the remaining questions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that as to whether the punishment was in violation of provisions of Rule 170 of the Rules of 1951 or whether the same could be passed under Rule 7 of the Rules of 1996 and the question as to whether the disciplinary authority has passed the impugned order without application of mind and without taking into account the evidence, record and the representation of the petitioner. Accordingly, the present writ petition is allowed. The impugned Order dated 27.07.1999 is set aside. The petitioner is held entitled to the payment of his full pension. The arrears of pension shall be released to him forthwith.” 16. Accordingly, the present writ petition is allowed. The impugned Order dated 27.07.1999 is set aside. The petitioner is held entitled to the payment of his full pension. The arrears of pension shall be released to him forthwith.” 16. If any error while deciding a case in the quasi judicial jurisdiction is not an outcome of malafides or ulterior motive, then the same does not constitute any misconduct. 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs. Union of Inaia & Ors.; AIR 1999 SCC 2881 has held as under:- “43. If, every error of law were to constitute a charge of misconduct, it would impinge upon the independent functioning of quasi judicial officers like the appellant. Since in sum and substance misconduct is sought to be inferred by the appellant having committed an error of law, the charge-sheet on the face of it does not proceed on any legal premise rendering it liable to be quashed. In other words, to maintain any charge-sheet against a quasi judicial authority something more has to be alleged than a mere mistake or law, e.g., in the nature of some extraneous consideration influencing the quasi judicial order. Since nothing of the sort is alleged herein the impugned charge-sheet is rendered illegal. The charge-sheet, if sustained, with thus impinge upon the confidence and independent functioning of a quasi judicial authority. The entire system of administrative adjudication whereunder quasi judicial powers are conferred on administrative authorities would fall into disrepute if officers performing such functions are inhibited in performing their functions without fear or favour because of the constant threat of disciplinary proceedings.” 18. From perusal of the allegations in the charge-sheet, the explanation thereto in the statement of charge and the evidence and the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer as well as the order passed by the disciplinary authority in the present case shows that at the most petitioner can be termed to be guilty of committing a judicial error and such error by no stretch of imagination can be alleged as misconduct under the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958. As it has already been discussed in the preceding paras, there is no allegations against the petitioner with respect to any corrupt practice, ulterior motive, embezzlement or misappropriation then in these circumstances proceedings against the petitioner and awarding a penalty of stoppage of entire withholding of 100% pension is absolutely uncalled for, much less the same cannot be termed as misconduct. 19. The reliance has been placed by Mr. P.R. Singh on the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court delivered in Union of India & Ors. Vs. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC 56 , the relevant paras of the said judgment are reproduced as under:- “26. In the case on hand, article of charge clearly mentions that the nine assessments covered by the article of charge were completed: (i) in an irregular manner, (ii) in undue haste, and (iii) apparently with a view to confer undue favour upon the assessee concerned. (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, the allegation of conferring undue favour is very much there unlike Civil Appeal No. 560/91. If that be so, certainly disciplinary action is warranted. This Court had occasion to examine the position. In Union of India v. A. N. Saxena to which one of us (Mohan, J.) was a party, it was held as under (SCC pp 127-28, Paras 7 and 8) "It was urged before us by learned counsel for the respondent that as the respondent was performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions in making the assessment orders in question even if his actions were wrong they could be corrected in an appeal or in revision and no disciplinary proceedings could be taken regarding such actions. In our view, an argument that no disciplinary action can be taken in regard to actions taken or purported to be done in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings is not correct. It is true that when an officer is performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions disciplinary proceedings regarding any of his actions in the course of such proceedings should be taken only after great caution and a close scrutiny of his actions and only if the circumstances so warrant. The Initiation of such proceedings, it is true, is likely to shake the confidence of the public in the officer concerned and also if lightly taken likely to undermine his independence. The Initiation of such proceedings, it is true, is likely to shake the confidence of the public in the officer concerned and also if lightly taken likely to undermine his independence. Hence the need for extreme care and caution before initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions in respect of his actions in the discharge or purported to discharge his functions. But it is not as if such action cannot be taken at all. Where the actions of such an officer indicate culpability, namely a desire to oblige himself or unduly favour one of the parties or an improper motive there is no reason why disciplinary action should not be taken." 27. This dictum fully supports the stand of the appellant. There is a great reason and justice for holding in such cases that the disciplinary action could be taken. It is one of the cardinal principles of administration of justice that it must be free from bias of any kind. 28. Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a Judge. Accordingly, the contention of the respondent has to be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the decision of the respondent but the conduct of the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer. The legality of the orders with reference to the nine assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that the Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. The legality of the orders with reference to the nine assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that the Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. Thus, we conclude that the disciplinary action can be taken in the following cases: (i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty; (ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty; (iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a government servant; (iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers; (v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party; (vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however, small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago "though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great.” 20. The judgment relied upon is clearly distinguishable on the facts of the present case as there is no allegation of any integrity or recklessness or misconduct in discharge of his duties and there is no malafide intention of causing loss to the State. Therefore, principles which has been enunciated in the abovesaid judgment are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 21. Needless to say, unless, the action of the officer discharging quasi judicial authority is based on ulterior motive or strenuous consideration or embezzlement then certainly the recourse to disciplinary proceedings is available to the State Government. In the present case, neither there is any foundation nor there is any allegation to that effect. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the finding arrived at by the learned Single Bench is required to be upheld. 22. Resultantly, the appeal has no merit, the same is hereby dismissed and the order dated 21.07.2015 passed by learned Single Bench is upheld. 23. Since the matter is very old and the petitioner (herein respondent) is also a person of old age, the State Government is directed to pay the entire amount admissible to the petitioner, as per the order dated 21.07.2015, passed by learned Single Bench within a period of two months from today. 23. Since the matter is very old and the petitioner (herein respondent) is also a person of old age, the State Government is directed to pay the entire amount admissible to the petitioner, as per the order dated 21.07.2015, passed by learned Single Bench within a period of two months from today. No order as to costs.