JUDGMENT : Sathish Ninan, J. 1. An order negativing the challenge against the jurisdiction of the Family Court at Kollam to entertain the Original Petition under the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 (for short, “the Act”) is under challenge by the respondent in the Original Petition. 2. On 22.08.1987, the since estranged couple who were Indian Nationals got married in accordance with the Hindu religious rites, the community to which they belong, at the Sri Vidhydhiraja NSS Auditorium, Anandavalleswaram, Kollam. Both of them acquired American citizenship. On 10.12.2005, a boy child, Kiran Vidyuth Nair, was born to them. It appears that the relationship between the parties got strained, and on 28.07.2006 the wife came back to India to her native place at Kollam with the child. Though the husband/appellant would contend that prior to that he had instituted a custody petition regarding the child before the Family Court in the State of New York, the wife would contend that she was then not aware of the proceedings. Anyhow, it is not in dispute that there were no prohibitory or custody orders from any court at the time when the wife flew to India with the child. It is also undisputed that the wife came to India with the child with the permission of the husband, though according to him it was on an understanding that she would return to the United States on 03.11.2006. Thereafter on 20.11.2006, the husband instituted proceedings before the Family Court, New York, for custody of the child. On 18.05.2007 the Family Court at New York passed an order for joint custody. While so, on 19.10.2007 the wife filed O.P. No.620 of 2007 before the Family Court at Kollam, for divorce. On 10.11.2008 the divorce petition was decreed ex parte. On 03.03.2009, the wife instituted the present proceedings, viz., O.P(G&W) No.257 of 2009 before the Family Court, Kollam, for guardianship of the child. On 06.03.2009 an interim order was passed in the Original Petition restraining the husband from forcefully taking away the ward from the custody of the wife. On 10.11.2008 the divorce petition was decreed ex parte. On 03.03.2009, the wife instituted the present proceedings, viz., O.P(G&W) No.257 of 2009 before the Family Court, Kollam, for guardianship of the child. On 06.03.2009 an interim order was passed in the Original Petition restraining the husband from forcefully taking away the ward from the custody of the wife. On 13.03.2009, the husband, stated to be on getting information regarding the visit of the wife to the United States, moved for a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the Family Court at New York, wherein an order was passed on 13.03.2009 to the effect that the wife shall not leave the United States of America with the child. It is contended by the respondent-wife that on or around the said date, though she had landed at the Chicago airport did not or rather could not go out of the airport because of intervention by FBI agents and came back to India. On 26.10.2009, the Family Court at New York granted sole custody of the child to the father, with visitation rights to the wife. Thereafter the husband approached this Court in W.P (Crl.) No.247 of 2010 for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus alleging that in spite of the orders passed by the Family Court at New York, the child is under the illegal detention of the wife. This Court taking note of the fact that O.P.(G&W) No.257 of 2009 is pending before the Family Court, Kollam, relegated the parties to the said court. The contention of the husband regarding lack of jurisdiction of the Family Court, Kollam to entertain the Guardian and Wards proceedings was left open to be urged in the said proceeding. The Family Court at Kollam has pursuant thereto passed the impugned order holding that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Original Petition. 3. Heard Shri R. Sanjith, learned counsel for the appellant-husband and learned Senior counsel Smt.Sumathi Dandapani for the respondent-wife. 4. The Family Court at Kollam has pursuant thereto passed the impugned order holding that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Original Petition. 3. Heard Shri R. Sanjith, learned counsel for the appellant-husband and learned Senior counsel Smt.Sumathi Dandapani for the respondent-wife. 4. Resting his submissions on the judgment of the Apex Court in Surya Vadanan v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others ([2015] 5 SCC 450) and Arathi Bandi and Others v. Bandi Jagadrakshaka Rao and Others ([2013] 15 SCC 790) the learned counsel for the appellant-husband would contend that the wife has approached the Court in India in violation of the orders passed by the court of competent jurisdiction in United States of America and that the Indian courts lack jurisdiction to entertain the Original Petition. The learned counsel with reference to the decision in Surya Vadanan's case (supra), highlighted the concepts of "comity of courts", "most intimate contact" and also the principle of "first strike". The learned counsel would contend that the courts in India should refrain from exercising jurisdiction with regard to the custody of the ward who has been forcefully removed from the jurisdiction of a foreign court which was in seizin of a subject. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-wife would on the other hand contend that in guardianship matters what is to weigh with the court is the principle of “best interest and welfare of the child”, that the mere existence of orders, if any, passed by the foreign court by itself is not a ground to refuse exercise of jurisdiction by the courts in India. It is further submitted that the child was not removed from the United States of America in violation of any orders passed by any court, but that the child was brought down with the consent of the father. All the orders said to have been passed by the Family Court at New York were when the wife was in India and the orders have been passed ex parte. The enforcement of the said orders would not be in the best interests of the child, submits the learned Senior Counsel. 5. The challenge regarding jurisdiction of the Family Court at Kollam is two pronged: (1) The parties being American citizens, the Family Court at Kollam does not have jurisdiction to entertain the guardianship application. The enforcement of the said orders would not be in the best interests of the child, submits the learned Senior Counsel. 5. The challenge regarding jurisdiction of the Family Court at Kollam is two pronged: (1) The parties being American citizens, the Family Court at Kollam does not have jurisdiction to entertain the guardianship application. (2) A foreign court of competent jurisdiction is already in seizin of the matter and has passed orders in the matter regarding custody of the ward. Hence the Family Court at Kollam lacks jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings. 6. Unlike the exercise of other jurisdictions, the courts all over are uniform on the principle that the court as parens patriae is duty bound to act as the guardian in law, and protect the interest and welfare of the children within its jurisdiction. The courts have exercised jurisdiction over minors present within its jurisdiction irrespective of their nationality or domicile. The presence of the child within its jurisdiction vested on the court a duty to exercise the parens patriae doctrine. However we must add a note of caution that the parens patriae jurisdiction available to a Writ Court may not on all fours apply while considering the issue of jurisdiction of a Family Court to entertain a proceeding of guardianship under the Act. As held by the Apex Court in Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo ([2011] 6 SCC 479), the writ court's jurisdiction arises no sooner it is found that the alleged detenu is within its territorial jurisdiction. The Family Court has to determine on its jurisdiction with reference to Section 9 of the Act. Section 9 (1) of the Act runs as follows: “9. Court having jurisdiction to entertain application.- (1) If the application is with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor, it shall be made to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides.” Therefore, the solitary test for determining jurisdiction of the Family Court over a ward is the "ordinary residence" of the minor. Whether the minor is ordinary resident at a particular place is more of a factual issue. The meaning and import of the term 'ordinary resident' has been a subject of deliberation in umpteen number of decisions. The Apex Court in Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo's case (supra) has considered the same in detail. Whether the minor is ordinary resident at a particular place is more of a factual issue. The meaning and import of the term 'ordinary resident' has been a subject of deliberation in umpteen number of decisions. The Apex Court in Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo's case (supra) has considered the same in detail. It would be relevant to refer to the discussions in paragraphs 26 to 31 of the judgment which read thus: “26. We may before doing so examine the true purpose of the expression “ordinarily resident” appearing in Section 9(1). This expression has been used in different contexts and statutes and has often come up for interpretation. Since liberal interpretation is the first and the foremost rule of interpretation it would be useful to understand the literal meaning of the two words that comprise the expression. The word “ordinary” has been defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as follows: “Ordinary (adj.).—Regular; usual; normal; common; often recurring; according to established order; settled; customary; reasonable; not characterised by peculiar or unusual circumstances; belonging to, exercised by, or characteristic of, the normal or average individual.” The word “reside” has been explained similarly as under: “Reside.—Live, dwell, abide, sojourn, stay, remain, lodge. (Western-Knapp Engg. Co. v. Gilbank, F 2d at p. 136.) To settle oneself or a thing in a place, to be stationed, to remain or stay, to dwell permanently or continuously, to have a settled abode for a time, to have one’s residence or domicile; specifically, to be in residence, to have an abiding place, to be present as an element, to inhere as a quality, to be vested as a right. (Bowden v. Jensen, SW 2d at p. 349.)” 27. In Webster’s Dictionary also the word “reside” finds a similar meaning, which may be gainfully extracted: “1. To dwell for a considerable time; to make one’s home; live. 2. To exist as an attribute or quality with in. 3. To be vested: with in.” 28. In Annie Besant v. G. Narayaniah the infants had been residing in the district of Chingleput in the Madras Presidency. They were given in custody of Mrs Annie Besant for the purpose of education and were getting their education in England at the University of Oxford. A case was, however, filed in the District Court of Chingleput for the custody where according to the plaintiff the minors had permanently resided. They were given in custody of Mrs Annie Besant for the purpose of education and were getting their education in England at the University of Oxford. A case was, however, filed in the District Court of Chingleput for the custody where according to the plaintiff the minors had permanently resided. Repeating the plea that the Chingleput Court was competent to entertain the application Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed: (IA p. 322) “… The District Court in which the suit was instituted had no jurisdiction over the infants except such jurisdiction as was conferred by the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. By the 9th section of that Act the jurisdiction of the court is confined to infants ordinarily resident in the district. It is in Their Lordships’ opinion impossible to hold that infants who had months previously left India with a view to being educated in England and going to the University of Oxford were ordinarily resident in the district of Chingleput.” 29. In Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh this Court was dealing with a case under Section 488 CrPC and the question of jurisdiction of the court to entertain a petition for maintenance. The Court noticed a near unanimity of opinion as to what is meant by the use of the word “resides” appearing in the provision and held that “resides” implied something more than a flying visit to, or casual stay at a particular place. The legal position was summed up in the following words: (AIR p. 1524, para 8) “8. … Having regard to the object sought to be achieved, the meaning implicit in the words used, and the construction placed by decided cases thereon, we would define the word ‘resides’ thus: a person resides in a place if he through choice makes it his abode permanently or even temporarily; whether a person has chosen to make a particular place his abode depends upon the facts of each case.” 30. In Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India the expression “ordinary residence” as used in the Representation of the People Act, 1950 fell for interpretation. This Court observed: (SCC p. 96, paras 243-46) “243. Lexicon refers to Cicutti v. Suffolk County Council6 to denote that the word ‘ordinarily’ is primarily directed not to duration but to purpose. In Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India the expression “ordinary residence” as used in the Representation of the People Act, 1950 fell for interpretation. This Court observed: (SCC p. 96, paras 243-46) “243. Lexicon refers to Cicutti v. Suffolk County Council6 to denote that the word ‘ordinarily’ is primarily directed not to duration but to purpose. In this sense the question is not so much where the person is to be found ‘ordinarily’, in the sense of usually or habitually and with some degree of continuity, but whether the quality of residence is ‘ordinary’ and general, rather than merely for some special or limited purpose. 244. The words ‘ordinarily’ and ‘resident’ have been used together in other statutory provisions as well and as per Law Lexicon they have been construed as not to require that the person should be one who is always resident or carries on business in the particular place. 245. The expression coined by joining the two words has to be interpreted with reference to the point of time requisite for the purposes of the provision, in the case of Section 20 of the RP Act, 1950 it being the date on which a person seeks to be registered as an elector in a particular constituency. 246. Thus, residence is a concept that may also be transitory. Even when qualified by the word ‘ordinarily’ the word ‘resident’ would not result in a construction having the effect of a requirement of the person using a particular place for dwelling always or on permanent uninterrupted basis. Thus understood, even the requirement of a person being ‘ordinarily resident’ at a particular place is incapable of ensuring nexus between him and the place in question.” 31. Reference may be made to Bhagyalakshmi v. K. Narayana Rao, Aparna Banerjee v. Tapan Banerjee, Ram Sarup v. Chimman Lal, Vimla Devi v. Maya Devi and Giovanni Marco Muzzu (Dr.), In re, in which the High Courts have dealt with the meaning and purport of the expressions like “ordinary resident” and “ordinarily resides” and taken the view that the question whether one is ordinarily residing at a given place depends so much on the intention to make that place one’s ordinary abode. Therefore, “ordinary residence” implies residence at a particular place with the intention to make it as the ordinary place of abode. 7. Therefore, “ordinary residence” implies residence at a particular place with the intention to make it as the ordinary place of abode. 7. From the facts obtaining in the present case it could not be disputed that the wife and the child left to India from United States of America in July 2006 and ever since have been ordinarily residents at Kollam with her parents. From the affidavit filed by the wife before this Court it is revealed that steps have been initiated by the wife for acquiring Indian citizenship for her and the child. It has also come out that the wife and the child are Overseas Citizens of India under Section 7A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, with registration numbers A060992 and A060993, respectively. The child has been in India within the jurisdiction of the Family Court at Kollam for a period of more than ten years. In the above circumstances, we do not think that there is any occasion to deliberate upon as to the place of “ordinary residence” of the child. There is no reason to hold that the Family Court, Kollam lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition. 8. Coming to the contention regarding lack of jurisdiction by virtue of the proceedings and orders passed by the Family Court at New York, the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant founded on the theory of comity of courts, principle of first strike etc., need to be dealt with. However before we consider it in detail, it needs to be mentioned that law is too well settled that in matters relating to custody of ward the theory of 'best interest of the child' over shadows all other principles. As observed by the Apex Court in State of Tamil Nadu and Others' case (supra), it is not that the theory of welfare of the child contradicts the other principles, but they are to be understood and applied in order to arrive at the final goal namely, 'welfare of the child'. 9. As observed by the Apex Court in State of Tamil Nadu and Others' case (supra), it is not that the theory of welfare of the child contradicts the other principles, but they are to be understood and applied in order to arrive at the final goal namely, 'welfare of the child'. 9. Though it is the contention of the appellant-husband that the ward was taken away by the wife and kept in India in defiance of the orders passed by the Family Court at New York, from the facts as stated supra, we find that at the time when the wife with the child proceeded to India from the Unites States of America, there were no prohibitory or guardianship orders by any courts in the said country. Further, as noticed supra, admittedly the wife and child proceeded to India on the consent of the husband. It is only thereafter that the legal feud between the parties actually commenced. The orders regarding joint custody later modified as exclusive custody with the father, etc., were made by the Family Court at New York in the absence of the mother while she was in India. It could not be said that she acted in defiance of the said orders of the foreign court. While it is true that it is the duty of courts in all countries to see that a parent doing wrong by removing a child out of the country does not gain any advantage by his or her wrong doing, it is also the duty to see that the interest and welfare of the child is not given a go by. At any rate, in the case at hand there is no reason to infer that it was with the object of evading from the process of the court at United States of America that the wife, with the child, proceeded to India. As noticed supra, the custodial orders were passed by the Family Court at New York while the wife and the ward were in India within the jurisdiction of the Family Court at Kollam. 10. As regards the exercise of jurisdiction by the domestic court in the background of existence of proceedings or orders by foreign courts, the most celebrated judgment is of the Privy Council in McKee v. McKee ( 1951 AC 352 [PC]). 10. As regards the exercise of jurisdiction by the domestic court in the background of existence of proceedings or orders by foreign courts, the most celebrated judgment is of the Privy Council in McKee v. McKee ( 1951 AC 352 [PC]). In that case, the ward was removed from the jurisdiction of one court to another country. The Privy Council held that the order of the court from which the ward was removed is to yield to the welfare of the child; that the welfare and happiness of the infant was of paramount consideration and that the order of the foreign court was only one of the facts which is to be taken into consideration. It was held that comity of courts demanded not the enforcement of the order of the foreign court, but its grave consideration. This view was upheld by the Court of Appeal in L.(Minors) (Wardship : Jurisdiction), In re, (1974) 1 WLR 250 (CA). It was held that the court to which the child was removed could conduct, (a) a summary inquiry, or (b) an elaborate inquiry, on the question of custody. The “summary jurisdiction” is invoked in circumstances like, where the child is removed to a place divorced from language, social customs, accustomed contacts, interrupting education and educational system, etc., which could psychologically disturb the child. The exercise of jurisdiction is further subject to a rider that the court to which the child has been removed is moved promptly and quickly, the reason being that the child would by passage of time develop roots in the country to which it is removed. As regards “elaborate inquiry” it was held to be an inquiry on the merits having regard to the facts, the time that has elapsed after the removal of the child and as to whether it would be in the interests of the child not to return it to the country from where it has been removed. Here it needs to be noticed that the Hague Convention of 1980 on “Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction” provide for returning the child to the country from where it was removed, if the application is made to the concerned authority within a period of one year. India is not so far a signatory to the same. Here it needs to be noticed that the Hague Convention of 1980 on “Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction” provide for returning the child to the country from where it was removed, if the application is made to the concerned authority within a period of one year. India is not so far a signatory to the same. The Apex Court in Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde ([1998] 1 SCC 112) considered this in detail and at paragraph 33 held thus: “So far as non-convention countries are concerned, or where the removal related to a period before adopting the Convention, the law is that the court in the country to which the child is removed will consider the question on merits bearing the welfare of the child as of paramount importance and consider the order of the foreign court as only a factor to be thinks it fit to exercise summary jurisdiction in the interests of the child and its prompt return is for its welfare, as explained ion L., Re (12 [1974] 1 All ER 913, CA). As recently as 1996-1997, it has been held in P (A minor) (Child Abduction: Non-Convention Country), Re by Ward, L.J. (1996 Current Law Year Book, pp 165-166) that in deciding whether to order the return of a child who has been abducted from his or her country of habitual residence - which was not a party to the Hague Convention, 1980, - the court's overriding consideration must be the child's welfare. There is no need for the Judge to attempt to apply the provisions of Article 13 of the Convention by ordering the child's return unless a grave risk of harm was established. See also A (A minor) (Abduction: Non-Convention Country) [Re. The Times 3-7-97 by Ward L.J. (CA) (quoted in Current Law, August 1997, p.13]. This answers the contention relating to removal of the child from USA.” The view was endorsed by the Apex Court in V. Ravi Chandran (2) v. Union of India ([2010] 1 SCC 174) and Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State (NCT of Delhi) ([2017] 8 SCC 454). As regards the exercise of “summary jurisdiction', in Nithya Anand Raghavan's case (supra) the Apex Court held, “Again the summary jurisdiction be exercised only if the court to which the child has been removed is moved promptly and quickly”. As regards the exercise of “summary jurisdiction', in Nithya Anand Raghavan's case (supra) the Apex Court held, “Again the summary jurisdiction be exercised only if the court to which the child has been removed is moved promptly and quickly”. In Surya Vadanan's case (supra) which is mainly relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Apex Court gave primacy to the theory of 'comity of courts' and the principle of 'first strike'. The court after considering the various judgments on the issue was rather in favour of the view that when the jurisdiction of a foreign court is invoked first, primacy needs to be given to the order of that court. However, in Nithya Anand Raghavan's case (supra) the three-Judge Bench held that the view in Surya Vadanan's case (supra) on comity of courts tends to drift away from the position of law as enunciated in McKee's case (supra) which had been accepted by the Apex Court in Dhanwanti Joshi' case (supra) and approved by a three-judge bench in V. Ravi Chandran's case (supra). The Court, further, in paragraph 42 of the judgment held thus: “42. The consistent view of this Court is that if the child has been brought within India, the courts in India may conduct: (a) summary inquiry; or (b) an elaborate enquiry on the question of custody. In the case of a summary inquiry, the court may deem it fit to order return of the child to the country from where he/she was removed unless such return is shown to be harmful to the child. In other words, even in the matter of a summary inquiry, it is open to the court to decline the relief of return of the child by a foreign court. In an elaborate enquiry, the court is obliged to examine the merits as to where the paramount interests and welfare of the child lay and reckon the fact of a pre-existing order of the foreign court for return of the child as only one of the circumstances. In either case, the crucial question to be considered by the court (in the country to which the child is removed) is to answer the issue according to the child's welfare. That has to be done bearing in mind the totality of facts and circumstances of each case independently. In either case, the crucial question to be considered by the court (in the country to which the child is removed) is to answer the issue according to the child's welfare. That has to be done bearing in mind the totality of facts and circumstances of each case independently. Even on close scrutiny of the several decisions pressed before us, we do not find any contra view in this behalf. To put it differently, the principle of comity of courts cannot be given primacy or more weightage for deciding the matter of custody or for return of the child to the native State.” It was also held that a pre-existing order of a foreign court can be reckoned only as one of the factors to be taken into consideration. The principle of “first strike” laid down in Surya Vadanan's case (supra) was expressly dissented to by the bench of three-Judges and it was held thus in paragraph 66: “66. The invocation of first strike principle as a decisive factor, in our opinion, would undermine and whittle down the wholesome principle of the duty of the court having jurisdiction to consider the best interests and welfare of the child, which is of paramount importance. If the Court is convinced in that regard, the fact that there is already an order passed by a foreign court in existence may not be so significant as it must yield to the welfare of the child. That is only one of the factors to be taken into consideration. The interests and welfare of the child are paramount consideration. The principle of comity of courts as observed in Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde, (1998) 1 SCC 112 ), in relation to non-Convention countries is that the court in the country to which the child is removed will consider the question on merits bearing the welfare of the child as of paramount importance and consider the order of the foreign court as only a factor to be taken into consideration. While considering that aspect, the court may reckon the fact that the child was abducted from his or her country of habitual residence but the court's overriding consideration must be child's welfare.” 11. As noticed supra, this is not a case of removal of a ward from the custody of the court in violation of the orders of the court. While considering that aspect, the court may reckon the fact that the child was abducted from his or her country of habitual residence but the court's overriding consideration must be child's welfare.” 11. As noticed supra, this is not a case of removal of a ward from the custody of the court in violation of the orders of the court. The child has been in India and within the jurisdiction of the Family Court at Kollam since the year 2006. He is presently aged 12 years out of which 11½ years he has been within the jurisdiction. The child is in its developing age. His maternal grand parents are here. He is accustomed to the living habits here. Added to all these, though the child was brought to Kerala (India) in the year 2006, the appellant approached the court in India for the first time only in the year 2010 by filing W.P (Crl.) 247 of 2010. As held by the Apex Court in Nithya Anand Raghavan's case and referred to supra, the summary jurisdiction is to be exercised only if the court to whose jurisdiction the child has been removed is moved promptly and quickly. That has not been done in the case at hand. We do not think that this is a case where just by holding the process of a summary inquiry the parties should be relegated to work out their remedies before the Family Court at New York. This is a fit case where an elaborate inquiry needs to be conducted as regards the question of custody of the ward. We do not think that any other course would be in the best interest and welfare of the child. The finding of the court below that it has jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate on the lis, is liable to be confirmed and we do so. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant-husband submits that it would be convenient for the husband to conduct the case if the same is transferred to the Family Court at Ernakulam. The said course is acceptable to both sides. In view of the submissions by the learned counsel on either side, we invoke the power under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure and withdraw O.P(G&W) No.257 of 2009 on the files of the Family Court, Kollam and transfer it to the Family Court at Ernakulam. The said course is acceptable to both sides. In view of the submissions by the learned counsel on either side, we invoke the power under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure and withdraw O.P(G&W) No.257 of 2009 on the files of the Family Court, Kollam and transfer it to the Family Court at Ernakulam. For the sake convenience we notify the parties to appear before the Family Court at Ernakulam for further proceedings on 15th of November 2017. The appearance could be made on the said date either in person or through counsel. The Appeal is disposed of as above.