JUDGMENT : SMT. V.K. TAHILRAMANI, J : 1. Heard Learned Counsel for the petitioner and Learned APP for State. The petitioner/detenue Nagesh Laxman Takmoge has preferred this petition questioning the preventive detention order passed against him on 30th July, 2016 by respondent no.1 i.e. Commissioner of Police, Solapur. The detention order has been passed in exercise of powers under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers and persons engaged in Black-marketing of essential Commodities Act, 1981 (for short “the M.P.D.A. Act), as the detenue is a dangerous person, as well as, a slumlord. The said order of detention is based on one C.R. i.e. C.R. No. 311 of 2016 of Vijapur Naka Police Station, Solapur and two in-camera statements of Witness “A” and Witness “B”. The order of detention, grounds of detention alongwith accompanying documents were served on the detenue on 29th January, 2017. 2. Though a number of grounds have been raised in the present petition, whereby the detention order has been assailed, however, the Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has pressed only one ground before us i.e. Ground-F. Briefly stated, in Ground-F, it is averred that the detaining authority has detained the detenue as he is subjectively satisfied that the detenue is a “dangerous person” and “slumlord”. However, there is no material disclosed in the grounds of detention to show that the detenue can be detained as a slumlord. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that, though in the grounds of detention, it is averred that the detenue is a slumlord, there is nothing in the grounds of detention to show that the activities of the detenue as a slumlord were in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Mr. Tripathi, contended that under the provisions of the M.P.D.A Act, the detaining authority must show, firstly that the detenue is a slumlord as averred in the grounds of detention and thereafter should show that the activities of the detenue as a slumlord were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Mr. Tripathi, thus contended that only if it can be shown that the detenue is a slumlord and in addition his activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, only then a person can be detained under the M.P.D.A. Act as a slumlord. 3. Mr. Mr. Tripathi, thus contended that only if it can be shown that the detenue is a slumlord and in addition his activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, only then a person can be detained under the M.P.D.A. Act as a slumlord. 3. Mr. Tripathi, thus contended that, if there is no material to show that the activities of the detenue as a slumlord are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, then a detention order detaining the detenue as a slumlord cannot be sustained. To support his contention, Mr. Tripathi, placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Edvin Moses Palanna @ Palana Vs. Commissioner of Police & Anr. (dated 10th October, 1988 in Cri. Writ Petition NO. 957 of 1988)(Coram :- Jahgirdar & Tipnis, JJ). In the said decision, it is observed that the detaining authority has to bear in mind, the distinction between a person being a slumlord and his activities as a slumlord being prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It was further observed as under :- “That a person is a slumlord itself is not enough to attract exercise of the power under Section 3 of the 1981 Act. Besides, being a slumlord, in his capacity as a slumlord a person must pose a threat to the maintenance of the public order. It is only when his activities as a slumlord affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order that a person can be detained under the said Act.” In the above case, as there was no material to show that the activities of the detenue therein as a slumlord were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it was held that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that, it is necessary to detain the detenue as he is a slumlord, is not supported by any material. Hence, the detention order was quashed. 4. Thus, it is seen that before taking action of detaining a person as a slumlord, two conditions precedent must exist. One is that, the proposed detenue must be a slumlord, that is, he must be covered by the definition of “slumlord” as stated in the MPDA Act and secondly, his activities in that character must cause harm, alarm, danger or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or a section thereof. 5. One is that, the proposed detenue must be a slumlord, that is, he must be covered by the definition of “slumlord” as stated in the MPDA Act and secondly, his activities in that character must cause harm, alarm, danger or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or a section thereof. 5. On a perusal of the scheme of the said Act, it therefore appears that to detain a person as a “slumlord” the Detaining Authority has to establish two premises in order to arrive at his subjective satisfaction that it was necessary to detain a person as a 'slumlord'; firstly, that the said person was a slumlord and secondly, that his activities in such character were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 6. The question as to whether particular incidents are such as to result in the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to take action under the relevant detention law cannot be gone into by the Court unless it is demonstrated that the subjective satisfaction is clearly unsupportable by the material relied upon by the detaining authority. As far as the present case is concerned, there are two conditions precedent before the taking of action under Section 3 of the Act. As we have already mentioned above, a person must firstly be a slumlord, but this by itself is not sufficient to support an action under Section 3 of the MPDA Act. In addition, the activities of a particular person as a “Slumlord” must affect the maintenance of public order. If the detaining authority decides to act under Section 3, then he must be satisfied that considering the activities of the slumlord which affect public order, it is necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. In order to be satisfied that it is necessary to detain a person with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order, naturally the authority will have to consider those incidents which have a bearing upon the maintenance of public order. To repeat, merely because a particular person is a slumlord, is not a factor which has a bearing upon the maintenance of public order. To repeat, merely because a particular person is a slumlord, is not a factor which has a bearing upon the maintenance of public order. It is only when any of his activities as a slumlord affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order that the subjective satisfaction mentioned in Section 3 can legitimately be arrived at. These peculiar features of this Act must, therefore, be clearly borne in mind. 7. Therefore, it is necessary for the detaining authority to satisfy himself not only that a particular person is a slumlord but further that the activities of that slumlord affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. It is then alone that the subjective satisfaction mentioned in Section 3 of the said Act can be legitimately arrived at by the Detaining authority. 8. Turning to the facts of the instant case, we find that the order of detention is based on one C.R. i.e. C.R. No. 311 of 2016 of Vijapur Naka Police Station. The said incident has nothing to do with the activities of the detenue as a slumlord. This C.R. arises out of the fact that the car of the detenue was stopped during nakabandhi. The driver of the car told the police officers that, don't they know that the car belongs to the petitioner. However, the car driver was fined Rs.200/-. Thereafter, the detenue came to the spot and abused the police constable as to why his driver was made to pay fine. Hence, C.R. No. 311 of 2016 came to be registered against the detenue. As far as the two incidents relating to Witness “A” and Witness “B” are concerned, they also have nothing to do with the activities of the detenue as a slumlord. In relation to the incident pertaining to Witness “A”, Witness “A” has stated that in the third week of February, 2016, five to six unknown persons came to his shop. They told him, that they are the people of Nagesh Takmoghe (detenue). These people told Witness “A” that he had not paid the hafta for the month. The witness informed them, that due to difficulties the shop was closed for a month, hence, he would pay the amount in two days. However, those persons pulled witness “A” out of the shop and started assaulting him. These people told Witness “A” that he had not paid the hafta for the month. The witness informed them, that due to difficulties the shop was closed for a month, hence, he would pay the amount in two days. However, those persons pulled witness “A” out of the shop and started assaulting him. When some persons gathered at the spot, the detenue holding hockey sticks ran towards them. Hence, the people ran helter-skelter. It is pertinent to note that, it is not the case of Witness “A” that his shop was an unauthorised structure or an illegal tenancy created by the detenue or that his shop was on any government land or that of local authority or any other person nor the detenue was seeking any money in relation to the shop. Thus, it is seen that, this incident had nothing to do with the activities of the detenue as a slumlord. 9. As far as witness “B” is concerned, witness “B” has stated that in the first week of February, 2016, six to seven persons got down from a jeep holding hockey sticks and lathis. The detenue was sitting in the front seat of the jeep. Those persons entered into the house of witness “B” and demanded Rs.3,000/- for Shiv Jayanti Utsav. Thus, it is seen that, this incident also had nothing to do with the activities of the detenue as a slumlord. 10. The question which is posed before us, is whether in the three cases in which the detenue was involved, his activities as a “slumlord” led to a disturbance of the life of the community/society so as to amount to disturbance of public order. On scrutinising the three incidents, we are of the view that, none of these incidents relate to the activities of the detenue as a slumlord. In other words, none of the incidents are such that, they led to disturbance of public order by the detenue in his capacity as a “slumlord”. Thus, it can be safely said that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that, it is necessary, to detain the detenue as a slumlord is clearly unsupportable by any material relied upon by the detaining authority to issue the order of detention. Thus, it can be safely said that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that, it is necessary, to detain the detenue as a slumlord is clearly unsupportable by any material relied upon by the detaining authority to issue the order of detention. As stated earlier, that a person is a slumlord is by itself not enough to issue the order of detention against a person as a slumlord but the activities of the person as a slumlord must pose a threat to the maintenance of public order. Assuming that the detenue is a slumlord, there is no material in the present case to show that, the activities of the detenue as a slumlord, are such as to affect the maintenance of public order. Hence, we find considerable merit in the submission of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner, that no material is disclosed in the grounds of detention to show that the activities of the detenue as a slumlord caused disturbance of public order. On this count alone, we are inclined to allow the petition and to set aside the order of detention passed against the petitioner. 11. In the result, the petition must succeed. The detention order is quashed. Rule is made absolute in above terms.