JUDGMENT : C.T.Ravikumar, J. The question arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether the Chief Executive Officer (for short 'the CEO') of the Waqf Board whose powers are specified under various provisions of the Waqf Act, 1995 (for short 'the Act') is empowered to deal with and decide any matter or issue involved in a petition pending consideration before the Waqf Board, even if it is for the purpose of granting an interim relief or order? For a proper consideration of the said issues and to answer the aforesaid question, it is only appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions under the Act delineating the powers of the Waqf Board and the CEO. The said question emerged for consideration from the facts stated infra. 2. Respondents 3 to 9 herein filed O.P.No.93 of 2016 before the Kerala State Waqf Board, Ernakulam. It is still pending consideration. The writ petitioners herein are the respondents therein. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to hereafter in this judgment, in accordance with their status and rank, in this writ petition. Respondents 3 to 9 herein filed the said original petition seeking the following reliefs:- (a) To direct the respondents to register the Waqf or take steps for suo moto registration of the Waqf under the Waqf Act. (b) To prosecute the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 for the failure to register the Waqf to conceal the existence of the Waqf. (c) To Audit the accounts of the respondents committee for the last 6 years. (d) To frame a scheme for the administration of the respondent Waqf. (e) To appoint an Advocate Commissioner to conduct an election to the office bears of the respondents committee as per the bye law. (f) To direct the respondents to pay the cost of this case, and (g) To allow other reliefs which is arising during the trial of this case.” 3. As per order dated 1.3.2016 in O.P.No.93 of 2016, the second respondent, the Waqf Board directed to audit the accounts of the Waqf. After passing such an order on 1.3.2016, the 2nd respondent posted the matter to 19.07.2017 as per its proceedings dated 9.5.2017. Before the said posting date, when the Board was not in session, respondents 3 to 9 herein moved I.A.Nos.74/2017 and 75/2017 before the 1st respondent, the Chief Executive Officer of the 2nd respondent -Waqf Board. After passing such an order on 1.3.2016, the 2nd respondent posted the matter to 19.07.2017 as per its proceedings dated 9.5.2017. Before the said posting date, when the Board was not in session, respondents 3 to 9 herein moved I.A.Nos.74/2017 and 75/2017 before the 1st respondent, the Chief Executive Officer of the 2nd respondent -Waqf Board. I.A.No.74/2017 was filed with a prayer to number the interlocutory application emergently (evidently, I.A.No.75/2017 which was not then numbered) and to hear the matter by the Executive Officer by using the power of the Waqf Board since the Waqf Board was not in session. The IA referred to in IA.No.74/2017 which was sought to be numbered and taken up for hearing carried a prayer to restrain the writ petitioners from conducting a general body on 2.7.2017 or later for electing new office bearers to the respondent committee and from conducting election to the Working Committee until O.P.No.93/2016 is finally disposed. Obviously, the 1st respondent, the Chief Executive Officer, after numbering the application referred to therein as I.A.No.75/2017, proceeded to consider the matter and then passed an order on 29.06.2017 in the said I.A. in O.P.No.93/2016. In fact, the prayer in I.A.No.75/2017 was allowed to certain extent. The specific case of the writ petitioners is that copies of I.A.Nos.74/2017 and 75/2017 were not served on them. Pursuant to the directions issued by this Court the copies of the said interlocutory applications were produced along with a memo by the Standing Counsel for the 2nd respondent -Waqf Board. From the copy of the I.A.No.74/2017 in O.P.No.93/2016 produced along with a memo, it is evident that on 29.06.2017 an order was passed on I.A.No.74/2017 by the Chief Executive Officer. Before referring to that order, it is only profitable to extract the prayer made in I.A.No.74/2017, by respondents 3 to 9 herein and it reads thus:- “For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Board may be place to number I.A. emergently and hear the matter by the Chief Executive Officer by using the power of the Board in the absence of sitting of the Board.” (underline supplied). In the said I.A, the following order was passed by the Chief Executive Officer as hereunder:- “I.A.74/2017 is partly allowed, since the prayer in the I.A is seen to be unsustainable.” (underline supplied) 4. In the said I.A, the following order was passed by the Chief Executive Officer as hereunder:- “I.A.74/2017 is partly allowed, since the prayer in the I.A is seen to be unsustainable.” (underline supplied) 4. It is to be noted that after passing such an order in I.A.No.74/2017 especially to the effect that the prayer in the I.A is seen to be unsustainable the 1st respondent evidently got the latter I.A. numbered as I.A.No.75/2017 and then considered the same and passed Ext.P1 order. A perusal of Ext.P1 would reveal that taking into consideration of the factual contentions taken up in the affidavit accompanying I.A.No.75/2017, the 1st respondent had formed an opinion regarding the urgency and necessity to pass an order and then passed Ext.P1 order. Its operative portion reads thus:- “Petitioner had made out a prima facie case. Taking into consideration of the averments of the petitioner the respondents are hereby restrain from conducting a general body meeting on 02.07.2017 or later for electing new office bearers to the respondent committee and from conducting election to the respondent committee until an order is passed by the Board in this matter on 19.07.2017. The file is to be placed before the Board meeting to be held on 19.07.2017 for considering I.A.75/17 and for ratification of this Board. Taking into consideration the urgency of this matter the Divisional Officer, Kannur is directed to serve the copy of the order through special messenger.” (underline supplied) 5. The revision petitioners felt aggrieved and filed this writ petition challenging Ext.P1 order. 6. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners, the Standing Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 and also the learned counsel appearing for respondents 3 to 9. Before adverting to the rival contentions, it is only appropriate to refer to various Sections of the Act to know the actual scope of power of the CEO. Going by Section 25 (3) of the Act, the CEO shall be ex-offico Secretary of the Board and shall be under the administrative control of the Board. Section 25 deals with the duties and powers of the Chief Executive Officer and it reads thus:- “25. Going by Section 25 (3) of the Act, the CEO shall be ex-offico Secretary of the Board and shall be under the administrative control of the Board. Section 25 deals with the duties and powers of the Chief Executive Officer and it reads thus:- “25. Duties and powers of Chief Executive Officer.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of the rules made thereunder and the directions of the Board, functions of the Chief Executive Officer shall include- (a) investigating the nature and extent of [auqaf] and [waqf] properties and calling whenever necessary, an inventory of waqf properties and calling, from time to time, for accounts, returns and information from mutawallis; (b) inspecting or causing inspection of waqf properties and account, records, deeds or documents relating thereto; (c) doing generally of such acts as may be necessary for the control, maintenance and superintendence of auqaf. (2) In exercising the powers of giving directions under sub-section (1) in respect of any waqf, the Board shall act in conformity with the directions by the waqf in the deed of the waqf, the purpose of waqf and such usage and customs of the waqf as are sanctioned by the school of Muslim law to which the waqf belongs. (3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Chief Executive Officer shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be assigned to him or delegated to him under this Act.” 7. Section 29 of the Act confers powers on the CEO or any officer of the Board duly authorised by him to inspect in any public office any record, register or other document relating to Waqf or movable or immovable properties which are Waqf properties or are claimed to be Waqf properties. Section 33 of the Act empowers the Chief Executive Officer to inspect any movable or immovable Waqf property, with the prior approval of the Board, in order to find out whether, by reason of any failure or negligence on the part of mutawalli in the performance of his executive or administrative duties, any loss or damage has been caused to any Waqf property. Section 54 of the Act empowers the CEO for the removal of encroachment from Waqf property and Section 55 of the Act lays down the procedure for enforcement of orders made under Section 54 of the Act. 8. Section 54 of the Act empowers the CEO for the removal of encroachment from Waqf property and Section 55 of the Act lays down the procedure for enforcement of orders made under Section 54 of the Act. 8. Section 14 of the Act deals with the composition of the Waqf Board. Section 32 which deals with the powers and functions of the Board reads thus: 32. Powers and functions of the Board. -(1) Subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, the general superintendence of all auqaf in a State shall vest in the Board established or the State; and it shall be the duty of the Board so to exercise its powers under this Act as to ensure that the auqaf under its superintendence are properly maintained, controlled and administered and the income thereof is duly applied to the objects and for the purposes for which such auqaf were created or intended: Provided that in exercising its powers under this Act in respect of any waqf, the Board shall act in conformity with the directions of the waqf the purposes of the waqf and any usage or custom of the waqf sanctioned by the school of Muslim law to which the waqf belongs. Explanation.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that in this sub-section, waqf includes a waqf in relation to which any scheme has been made by any court of law, whether before or after the commencement of this Act. Explanation.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that in this sub-section, waqf includes a waqf in relation to which any scheme has been made by any court of law, whether before or after the commencement of this Act. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, the functions of the Board shall be- (a) to maintain a record containing information relating to the origin, income, object and beneficiaries of every waqf; (b) to ensure that the income and other property of auqaf are applied to the objects and for the purposes for which such 3[auqaf] were intended or created; (c) to give directions for the administration of auqaf; (d) to settle schemes of management for a waqf: Provided that no such settlement shall be made without giving the parties affected an opportunity of being heard; (e) to direct- (i) the utilisation of the surplus income of a waqf consistent with the objects of waqf (ii) in what manner the income of a waqf, the objects of which are not evident from any written instrument, shall be utilised; (iii) in any case where any object of waqf has ceased to exist or has become incapable of achievement, that so much of the income of the waqf as was previously applied to that object shall be applied to any other object, which shall be similar, or nearly similar or to the original object or for the benefit of the poor or for the purpose of promotion of knowledge and learning in the Muslim community: Provided that no direction shall be given under this clause without giving the parties affected, an opportunity of being heard. Explanation-For the purposes of this clause, the powers of the Board shall be exercised- (i) in the case of a Sunni waqf by the Sunni members of the Board only; and (ii) in the case of a Shia 1[waqf], by the Shia members of the Board only: Provided that where having regard to the number of the Sunni or Shia members in the board and other circumstances, it appears to the Board that the power should not be exercised by such members only, it may co-opt such other Muslims being Sunnis or Shias, as the case may be, as it thinks fit, to be temporary members of the Board for exercising its powers under this clause; (f) to scrutinise and approve the budgets submitted by mutawallis and to arrange for auditing of account of auqaf; (g) to appoint and remove mutawallis in accordance with the provisions of this Act; (h) to take measures for the recovery of lost properties of any waqf; (i) to institute and defend suits and proceedings relating to auqaf; (j) to sanction lease of any immovable property of a waqf in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder: Provided that no such sanction shall be given unless a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Board present cast their vote in favour of such transaction: 19 Provided further that where no such sanction is given by the Board, the reasons for doing so shall be recorded in writing.] (k) to administer the Waqf Fund; (l) to call for such returns, statistics, accounts and other information from the mutawallis with respect to the waqf property as the Board may, from time to time, require; (m) to inspect, or cause inspection of, 1[waqf] properties, accounts, records or deeds and documents relating thereto; (n) to investigate and determine the nature and extent of waqf and waqf property, and to cause, whenever necessary, a survey of such 1waqf]property; (na) to determine or cause to be determined, in such manner as may be specified by the Board, market rent of the waqf land or building; (o) generally do all such acts as may be necessary for the control, maintenance and administration of auqaf. (3) Where the Board has settled any scheme of management under clause (d) or given any direction under clause (e) of sub-section (2), any person interested in the waqf or affected by such settlement or direction may institute a suit in a Tribunal for setting aside such settlement or directions and the decision of the Tribunal thereon shall be final. (4) Where the Board is satisfied that any waqf land, which is a waqf property, has the potential for development as an educational institution, shopping centre, market, housing or residential flats and the like], market, housing flats and the like, it may serve upon the mutawalli of the concerned waqf a notice requiring him within such time, but not less than sixty days, as may be specified in the notice, to convey its decision whether he is willing to execute the development works specified in the notice. (5) On consideration of the reply, if any, received to the notice issued under sub-section (4), the Board, if it is satisfied that the mutawalli is not willing or is not capable of executing the works required to be executed in terms of the notice, it may, take over the property, clear it of any building or structure thereon, which, in the opinion of the Board is necessary for execution of the works and execute such works from waqf funds or from the finances which may be raised on the security of the properties of the 1[waqf] concerned, and control and manage the properties till such time as all expenses incurred by the Board under this section, together with interest thereon, the expenditure on maintenance of such works and other legitimate charges incurred on the property are recovered from the income derived from the property: Provided that the Board shall compensate annually the mutawalli of the concerned waqf to the extent of the average annual net income derived from the property during the three years immediately preceding the taking over of the property by the Board. (6) After all the expenses as enumerated in sub-section (5) have been recouped from the income of the developed properties, the developed properties shall be handed over to mutawalli of the concerned waqf. “ 9. (6) After all the expenses as enumerated in sub-section (5) have been recouped from the income of the developed properties, the developed properties shall be handed over to mutawalli of the concerned waqf. “ 9. The aforementioned provisions dealing with the powers and duties of the Waqf Board and other related provisions under the Act would reveal there may be many acts which may be done by the Board. Among them, some are obviously administrative in nature. But, when the Board is called upon to decide a lis which falls within its jurisdiction and has to be done based on the materials made available before it, after hearing the parties and its decision has far reaching repercussion on the rights of the parties, it has a quasi-judicial function. (See the decision in Puthencode Juma -ath Committee v. Abdul Rahiman, 2011 (3) KLT (SN) 155). A quasi-judicial function is an administrative function which the law requires to be exercised in some respects as if it were judicial. It is subject to some measure of judicial procedure. As regards quasi-judicial functions, they cannot be delegated unless the authority concerned is enabled to do so expressly or by necessary implication. The general principle is that where any kind of a decision on a lis has to be made, it must be made by the authority empowered by the statute concerned and by no one else. We will deal with the same further, a little later. 10. Evidently, the 1st respondent, the Chief Executive Officer of the Waqf Board as per order in I.A.No.74/2017 found that the prayer thereunder is unsustainable. Strictly speaking I.A.No.74/2017 contained only one prayer viz., the prayer to number the other I.A emergently and to hear the Chief Executive Officer by using the power of the Board as it is not in Session. In fact, the prayer in the other I.A which was then to be numbered and numbered as I.A No.75/2017 was to restrain the revision petitioners from conducting a general body meeting on 02.07.2017 or later or from conducting election to the respondent committee and electing new office bearers to the respondent committee until the O.P.No.93/2016 is finally disposed. In fact, the prayer in the other I.A which was then to be numbered and numbered as I.A No.75/2017 was to restrain the revision petitioners from conducting a general body meeting on 02.07.2017 or later or from conducting election to the respondent committee and electing new office bearers to the respondent committee until the O.P.No.93/2016 is finally disposed. In such circumstances, the order in I.A.No.74/2017 viz., 'partly allowed' has to be understood as one partially allowing the same as relates numbering of the other I.A. moved for restraining respondents therein viz., the revision petitioners from conducting general body meeting on 02.07.2017 or later. However, the latter limb of the order in I.A.No.74/2017 is to the effect that it is allowed partially “since the prayer in the I.A is seen to be unsustainable” The learned Standing Counsel would submit that the 1st respondent Chief Executive Officer had actually taken the latter limb of the prayer as one requesting to hear O.P.No.93/2016 itself by him using the power of the Board as the Board was not in session. Evidently, the attempt is to canvass the position that it was based on such understanding that the prayer in the I.A (I.A.No.74/2017) was held as unsustainable. The question is whether it could have been or should have construed in that manner. In that context, it is only appropriate to refer to the following recital in the affidavit accompanying I.A.No.74/2017:- “Meanwhile the respondents are trying to convene a general body on 2.7.2017 to elect the new office bears for the mutawalli committee and it is against their counter and submission before the Board on previous hearing date. If they conduct general body and elect a new committee on 2-7-2017, the purpose of the original suit will be destroyed. Hence the petitioner filed a petition to stay the general and election without the consent of the Waqf Board. And the petition is to be numbered emergently otherwise this petitioner could not restrain the respondents from conducting general body and election. Therefore, it is most respectfully prayed that this Honourable Board may be pleased to number the petition emergently and taken by the Chief Executive Officer by using the authorised power of the Board in the absence of sitting.” (underline supplied) 11. Therefore, it is most respectfully prayed that this Honourable Board may be pleased to number the petition emergently and taken by the Chief Executive Officer by using the authorised power of the Board in the absence of sitting.” (underline supplied) 11. In view of the afore-extracted, unambiguous statement in the affidavit how can it be taken that the prayer in I.A.No.74/2017 was to hear O.P.No.93/2016 by using the authorised power of the Board in the absence of sitting. Certainly, in such circumstances, the prayer in I.A.No.74/2017 could have been and should have been taken only as a prayer to number the other I.A.(which was later numbered as I.A.No.75/2017). The prayer in I.A No.75/2017 will fortify our view. The prayer therein was 'to restrain the respondents therein (the revision petitioners) from conducting a general body on 2-7-2017 or later for electing new office bears to the respondent committee and from conducting election to the respondent committee until the O.P.93/2016 is finally disposed', by using the power of the Board in the absence of the sitting of the Board. The clause 'until the O.P.93/2016 is finally disposed' used in I.A.No.75/2017 would make the position clear. Evidently, after passing an order in I.A.No.74/2017 on the aforementioned lines the CEO proceeded to consider the other application, after numbering it as I.A.No.75/2017 and passed Ext.P1 order. In this context, the affidavit filed by the first respondent in this writ petition is also worthy for reference. It is stated in paragraph 2 therein thus:-”The said I.A 74/2017 was partly allowed to the extend of numbering the I.A and hearing the matter by the CEO. The prayer to use the power of the Board in the absence of the sitting of the Board was dismissed and I.A 75/2017 was considered by the CEO within the frame of power granted to the CEO in Waqf Act, 1995”. 12. Ext.P1 would show that it is in purported exercise of powers under Section 25(1)(c) of the Act that Ext.P1 order was passed. Section 25(1)(c) empowers the 1st respondent, the Chief Executive Officer for “doing generally such acts as may be necessary for the control, maintenance and superintendence of Auqf”. But the question is whether it would take in the power to pass an order in a lis pending consideration before the Waqf Board. 13. In the aforesaid context, Section 27 of the Act also assumes relevance. But the question is whether it would take in the power to pass an order in a lis pending consideration before the Waqf Board. 13. In the aforesaid context, Section 27 of the Act also assumes relevance. It deals with delegation of powers by Board and it reads thus:- “Section 27. Delegation of powers by the Board. -The Board may, by a general or special order in writing, delegate to the Chairperson, any other member, the Chief Executive Officer or any other officer or servant of the Board or any area committee, subject to such conditions and limitations as may be specified in the said order, such of its powers and duties under this Act, as it may deem necessary, except the powers and functions of the Board mentioned under clauses (c), (d), (g) and (j) of sub-section (2) of section 32 and section 110.]” (underline supplied) 14. It is also worthy to refer to Section 25(3) of the Act in the contextual situation and it reads thus:- “(3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Chief Executive Officer shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be assigned to him or delegated to him under this Act.” 15. Section 25(3) empowers the Chief Executive Officer to exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be assigned to him or delegated to him under the Act. Section 27 empowers the Board to delegate its powers either by general or special order in writing, subject to such conditions and limitations, as may be specified in the order, such of its powers and duties under the Act, as it may deem necessary, except mentioned under Clause (c)(d)(g) and (j) of Section 32(2) and Section 110 of the Act. Clause (c) of Section 32(2) is the power available to the Board to give directions for the administration of auqaf. Clause (d) is the power of the Board to settle schemes of management of a Waqf subject to the conditions under the proviso. Clause (g) thereunder is the power of the Board to appoint and remove mutawallis in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Clause (j) thereunder is the power available to the board to sanction lease of any immovable property of a Waqf in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. Clause (g) thereunder is the power of the Board to appoint and remove mutawallis in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Clause (j) thereunder is the power available to the board to sanction lease of any immovable property of a Waqf in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. A bare perusal of Section 27 would thus reveal that though the provisions thereunder empowers the Board to delegate its powers and duties, there is a clear interdiction as regards delegation of powers mentioned under clauses (c), (d), (g) and Clause (j) of sub Section 32(2) and Section 110 of the Act. In short, in view of Section 27, even if it is taken the issue involved in the aforesaid I.A. was pertaining to the administration of Waqf, which is the power under Clause (c) available with the Board to issue to give directions for the administration of the Waqf, it could not have been delegated. In fact, the affidavit filed by the first respondent would reveal that there is no case for the CEO that the power of the Board, in respect of matters like the one involved the O.P.No.93/2016, was delegated. So also, there is no case that the power to entertain applications whenever the Board was not in session, was delegated to the CEO by a general order. The specific case, as is evident from Ext.P1 order as also the aforesaid affidavit, is that Ext.P1 order was passed invoking the power of the CEO under Section 25 (1) (c) of the Act. Even otherwise, the power of the Board to decide a lis like O.P.No.93/2016, being a quasi-judicial function cannot be delegated to the CEO. 16. The question therefore, is whether after passing orders in I.A.No.74/2017 on the aforesaid lines, the Chief Executive Officer was justified, rather correct, in hearing I.A.No.75/2017 and passing Ext.P1 order. As noticed herein-before, the very prayer of respondents 3 to 9 herein was to consider the matter or hear the I.A.No.75/2017 by the Chief Executive Officer by using the power of the Board. As noticed herein-before, the very prayer of respondents 3 to 9 herein was to consider the matter or hear the I.A.No.75/2017 by the Chief Executive Officer by using the power of the Board. Obviously, such a prayer was made by respondents 3 to 9 herein, taking that the order sought for, is on a matter touching the administration of the Waqf and therefore, a matter falling within the purview of the powers of the Board and that is why they themselves called upon the Chief Executive Officer to use, virtually to usurp the powers of the Board and to pass orders thereon. 17. A reading of Ext.P1 would reveal that the Chief Executive Officer on perusing the affidavit accompanying I.A.No.75/2017 found that respondents therein had taken a decision to convene a general body meeting on 02.07.2017 for the purpose of conducting election. Evidently, the Chief Executive Officer took note of the fact that O.P.No.93/2017 was posted to 19.07.2017 and more particularly of the fact that the said O.P. pending before the Board was one regarding administration of the Waqf. Thereupon, holding the view that if the general body and election is conducted on 02.07.2017, it would adversely effect the interest of the parties before the Board and further that in such, eventuality, it might result in multiplicity of proceedings passed the impugned order, restraining the respondents there in/the writ petitioners from conducting general body meeting on 2.7.2017 or later, for electing new office bearers through the respondent committee and also from conducting election to the respondent committee until an order is passed by the Board in the matter on 19.07.2017. Further it was ordered thereunder to place the file before the Board on 19.07.2017 for considering the I.A.No.75/2017 and for ratification of Ext.P1 order. It further directed thereunder to serve the copy of Ext.P1 order through special messenger to the Division Officer, Kannur. In the light of the aforesaid nature of the directions contained in Ext.P1 several questions crop up for consideration. 18. Going by Ext.P1, the Chief Executive Officer passed order on I.A.No.75/2017 invoking his power available under Section 25(1)(C) of the Act. As noticed hereinbefore, Section 25(1)(c) of the Act only empowers the CEO to do generally such acts which may be necessary for the control, maintenance and superintendence of auqaf. 18. Going by Ext.P1, the Chief Executive Officer passed order on I.A.No.75/2017 invoking his power available under Section 25(1)(C) of the Act. As noticed hereinbefore, Section 25(1)(c) of the Act only empowers the CEO to do generally such acts which may be necessary for the control, maintenance and superintendence of auqaf. It is pertinent to note that Ext.P1 itself would reveal that the CEO himself took note of the fact that OP No.93/2017 which is pending before the Board is one relating administration of the Board. It is thereafter that he had passed Ext.P1 in the aforesaid manner. It cannot therefore, be treated as an order passed invoking the power under Section 25 (1) (c) of the Act and hence, it can only be an order passed invoking the power of the Board. The following from Ext.P1 would reveal that Ext.P1 order was passed after realising the fact that in original petition regarding administration of the Waqf in question is pending before the Board. “Taking into consideration of the fact that O.P. pending before the Board regarding administration of the Waqf and if the general body and election is conducted on 2.7.2017, it will adversely affect the interest of the parties before the Board, which may result in multiplicity of proceedings. Taking into consideration the above mentioned facts, it is highly necessary to pass an order invoking the powers conferred under Section 25(1)(c) of the Waqf Act, 1995.” 19. In fact, it is the very original petition pending on the issue that he passed Ext.P1 order. 20. We have already adverted to Section 32 of the Act dealing with delegation of powers by the Board. Clause (c) therein, as noticed herein-before, is the one that empowers the Board to give directions for the administration of the Waqf. When the O.P. itself is one regarding the administration of the Waqf and that fact is perfectly understood by the Chief Executive Officer, as is evident from the afore-extracted recital the question is whether he was justified in passing orders in I.A.No.75/2014 in O.P.No.93/2016, when there is clear statutory interdiction even for delegation of powers in respect of Clause (c) of Section 32(2)under Section 27 of the Act. Thus, it is a fact that the Chief Executive Officer even after realising the fact that he was virtually passing an order in an original petition viz; 93/2016 filed touching the administration of the Waqf in question, allegedly invoked the power available to him for passing orders necessary for the control, maintenance and superintendence for passing the aforesaid order. 21. However, in a bid to justify the action in issuing the impugned Ext.P1 order, the learned counsel appearing for the 1st and 2nd respondents contended that the order in Ext.P1 on the aforesaid lines has to be construed as an order passed by the Chief Executive Officer in a particular circumstance necessitating him to issue the same to control or for the control, maintenance and superintendence of auqaf. However, Ext.P1 itself would reveal that it cannot be the stand of the CEO and he in fact correctly understood the issue pending before the Board as one pertaining to the administration of the Waqf. Conduct of an election by convening a general body is essentially a matter touching the administration of a Waqf. In such circumstances, issuing direction to convene a general body meeting to conduct election or restraining convening of such a meeting proposed to be held for conducting the election would essentially be a matter touching the administration of the Waqf concerned and it cannot be an order to control or for the control, maintenance and superintendence of a Waqf. When there is a statutory inhibition even for delegating the power of the Board under Section 27 of the Act, how can the very same purpose could be achieved indirectly invoking any other power meant for a different purpose? 22. The learned counsel appearing for respondents 3 to 9 handed over a copy of the notification issued by the Kerala State Waqf Board bearing No.CI-1833/84/9.05.2014. On perusal, it is evident that it is a notification issued in exercise of powers conferred under Section 27 of the Waqf Act by the Board delegating certain powers of the Board to chairman, Chief Executive Officer and other officers of the Board. It is evident from that the Board had delegated various powers and functions of the Board to Chairman including power and duties under Section 32(2)(c) as well. It is evident from that the Board had delegated various powers and functions of the Board to Chairman including power and duties under Section 32(2)(c) as well. In this context, It is to be noted that Section 27 of the Act was substituted as per the Act 27 of 2013 with effect from 1.11.2013. The said substantial provision which came into force with effect from 1.11.2013, as noticed herein-before, carries a specific inhibition for delegating the powers of the Board mentioned under Clause (c) of Section 32(2) of the Act. When there is a specific inhibition for delegating the powers and functions of the Board mentioned under Section 32(2)(c) how can the Board issue a notification conferring or delegating the power which could not be delegated, by virtue of operation of the said statutory provision. In such circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that notification dated 9.5.2014 cannot over ride the statutory provisions contained under Section 27 of the Act and in such circumstances, the said notification dated 9.5.2014 cannot legalise the order in Ext.P1. When an order is passed beyond the scope of powers it has to be held ultra vires. Admittedly, in this case, the CEO passed such an order in a lis touching the administration of the Waqf in question viz; O.P.No.93/2016, a matter which is pending before the Waqf Board. Certainly, in O.P.No.93/2016, the Waqf Board is called upon to decide a lis and it has to pass an order therein based on the materials made available and to be made available, after hearing the parties in exercise of a quasi judicial function. The said power is not at all delegated to the CEO of the Waqf and in fact, it is non-delegable in view of the interdiction on delegation of powers of the Board under Clause (c) Section 32 (2) of the Act and also in view of absence of any other provision empowering for delegating the said quasi-judicial function to the CEO. 23. Now, it is only apropos to refer to certain development in the matter. When the captioned writ petition came up for consideration before this Court on 13.7.2017, this Court admitted the writ petition and notice was ordered to respondents. On behalf of respondents 1 and 2, the Standing Counsel took notice. 23. Now, it is only apropos to refer to certain development in the matter. When the captioned writ petition came up for consideration before this Court on 13.7.2017, this Court admitted the writ petition and notice was ordered to respondents. On behalf of respondents 1 and 2, the Standing Counsel took notice. As per the order dated 13.7.2017, the 1st respondent was directed to file an affidavit as to under what authority an order of the nature of Ext.P1 order could be passed? Complying with the above said direction, an affidavit was placed on record. In the affidavit filed by the 1st respondent it is stated that the prayer in I.A. No.75/2017 to use the power of the Board in the absence of sitting of the Board was dismissed and I.A. No.75/2017 was considered by him within the frame of power granted to the CEO in Waqf Act, 1995. Thus, going by the affidavit as also discernible from Ext.P1, the prayer of the respondents 3 to 9 herein viz; the petitioners therein was to hear the matter by the Chief Executive Officer by using the power of the Board above in the absence of its sitting was dismissed by the CEO. It can only be taken that the CEO understood the limitation of his power and realised the position that the power of the Board in respect of a lis is not exercisable by him. At the same time, even after realising that the issue involved in O.P.93/2016 is relating administration of the Waqf in question and the non-availability of power to hear the prayers in I.A.75/2017 using the power of the Board, the CEO continued with the consideration of the said I.A., citing the reason that the Board was not then in session. After perusing the affidavit placed on record pursuant to the order dated 13.7.2017 and dissatisfied with the explanation contained therein, this Court passed another order on 18.07.2017. This Court took note of the fact that after passing Ext.P1 order, the 1st respondent Chief Executive Officer ordered to place I.A.No.75/2017 upon which he had already passed an order under Ext.P1, before the Board on 19.07.2017 for ratification. This Court took note of the fact that after passing Ext.P1 order, the 1st respondent Chief Executive Officer ordered to place I.A.No.75/2017 upon which he had already passed an order under Ext.P1, before the Board on 19.07.2017 for ratification. In such circumstances this Court passed order on 18.07.2017 as hereunder:- “Ext.P1 would further reveal that after passing an interim order in I.A.No.75/2017, the Chief Executive Officer ordered the said interlocutory application to be listed before the Board on 19.7.2017 for its ratification. Since the issue to be resolved in this writ petition is whether the Chief Executive Officer is legally entitled to pass an order in the nature of Ext.P1 by invoking the power under Section 25(1) (c) of the Act Waqf Act 1995, we are of the view that any order by the Board ratifying the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer in I.ANo.75/2017 would impede and interfere with the proper consideration of this writ petition, on the aforesaid question. In the said circumstances, while making it clear that this writ petition is admitted solely for the purpose of considering the validity of Ext.P1 and in that matter, to consider the scope and power vested with the Chief Executive Officer under Section 25 (1) (c) of the Waqf Act, 1995, it is ordered that the Board shall not take up and pass any order on I.A No.75/17.” 24. Thus, it is obvious that as per order dated 18.7.2017, it was ordered that the Board shall not pass any orders on I.A. 75/2017. True that it was also made clear that the pendency of the writ petition would not be a bar for considering or for taking up O.P.93/2016 and to pass appropriate orders or interim orders in accordance with law. It is evident from the aforesaid recital in the order dated 18.07.2017 that the Board was virtually interdicted from passing any orders, ratifying the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer in I.A. No.75/2017. The said order was passed on 18.07.2017 and on the same day itself, it appears that respondents 3 to 9 herein moved the Waqf Board by filing I.A.No.99/2017 in O.P. 93/2016. The said order was passed on 18.07.2017 and on the same day itself, it appears that respondents 3 to 9 herein moved the Waqf Board by filing I.A.No.99/2017 in O.P. 93/2016. It is relevant to note that in paragraph 3 of the affidavit accompanying the said interlocutory application, they have specifically stated that they were constrained to move interlocutory application before the Chief Executive Officer during the pendency of OP No.93/2016 before the Board, for the purpose of getting restrained the respondents therein from conducting general body on 2.7.2017. It is also specifically stated thereunder that the Chief Executive Officer there upon, after hearing them, passed an interim order in I.A. No.75/2017 and the respondents were restrained from conducting general body meeting on 2.7.2017 or later for electing the new officer bearers for the respondent committee and from conducting election to the respondent committee until an order is passed by the Board in the matter on 19.7.2017. It is thus evident from the affidavit that the Chief Executive Officer passed the said order in I.A.No.75/2017 only after hearing them. In such circumstances, the writ petitioners are justified in contending that Ext.P1 order was passed without hearing them. We are at a loss to understand as to how, in a pending matter, an order could be passed (if at all the first respondent was competent) only after hearing one side and even without notice to the other side. 25. It is also evident that in paragraph 4 of the affidavit filed by respondents 3 to 9 herein in I.A.No.99 of 2017, which is produced here as Ext. P14, it is stated specifically that the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer is under challenge before this Court in W.P.(C) No.23150/2017 and it is pending consideration to decide the power of Chief Executive Officer to pass interim order in the nature of Ext.P1 in a matter pending before the Board merely because the Board is not in session. At the same time, they stated thereunder that this Court had not stayed the proceedings of the Executive officer or the Board and this Court had not interfered with the exercise of power by the Board. In such circumstances, they sought for restraining the respondents therein from conducting election to the respondent committee without prior permission of the Board or until an election is conducted by the Advocate Commissioner appointed by the Court. In such circumstances, they sought for restraining the respondents therein from conducting election to the respondent committee without prior permission of the Board or until an election is conducted by the Advocate Commissioner appointed by the Court. Thereupon, the Board has passed an order in I.A. No.99/2017 viz, Ext.P15 whereby and whereunder therein viz, the petitioners herein were restrained from conducting election to the Jama-ath. It is ordered in Ext.P15 thus:-”The respondent committee is hereby restrained from conducting election to the Jama-ath without prior permission of the Board.” 26. The sustainability of Ext.P15 has to be decided in the light of interim order passed by this Court. Ext.P15 is essentially, an indirect ratification of Ext.P1 order passed by the CEO. As per order dated 18.7.2017, this Court had specifically ordered that passing of any order ratifying the order of the Chief Executive Officer in I.A. No.75/2015 would impede and interfere with the proper consideration of W.P.(C) No.23150/2017. True that, as per the said order dated 18.7.2017, this Court also made it clear that pendency of the captioned writ petition would not be a bar for the Waqf Board to consider or to take up O.P. No.93/2016 and pass appropriate orders/interim orders in accordance with law. Technically, it can be said that the Board had not taken up I.A. No.75/2017 and passed any order ratifying the same. But at the same time, it is to be noted that this Court had specifically made clear in the order dated 18.7.2017 that passing of any order by the Board ratifying the order would imped and interfere with the proper consideration of the captioned writ petition. In such circumstances and when it was specifically brought to the notice of the Board through the affidavit filed in I.A.No.99/2017 the Board should have refrained from passing any order that would impede or interfere with the proper consideration of the aforementioned question in the writ petition. A bare perusal of Ext.P15 order would reveal that it is having an impact and effect of ratification of the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer in Ext.P1 viz, the I.A.No.75/2015. A bare perusal of Ext.P15 order would reveal that it is having an impact and effect of ratification of the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer in Ext.P1 viz, the I.A.No.75/2015. The learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2 submitted that such an order happened to be passed by the Board taking into account the observation made by this Court in the order dated 18.7.2017 that the pendency of the writ petition W.P.(C) No.23150/2017 would not be a bar to consider or take up O.P. No.93/2018 and pass appropriate orders/interim orders in accordance with law. The meaning of the words 'pass appropriate orders/interim orders in accordance with law' in the context of the case on hand appears to have been ignored by the Board while passing Ext.P15 said order. In view of the observation in the order dated 18.7.2017, the Board should not have passed any order having the effect of ratifying the order on Ext.P1 passed by the Chief Executive Officer in I.A.75/2017. Hence, the Board should have a cautious approach while passing orders on I.A.No.99/2017 in O.P.No.93/2016. As per Ext.P1 order, the Chief Executive Officer restrained the writ petitioners/respondents in O.P.93/2016 from conducting election through the committee of the Jama -ath until an order is passed by the Board in O.P.No.93/2016. In such circumstances, Ext.P15 order of the Board passed in I.A.No.99/2016 restraining the respondents from conducting election to the Jama-ath without prior permission, would virtually amount to confirmation of the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer, even though the expression 'ratification' as such was not used. At any rate, it is an order serving the very purpose of Ext.P1 order. In such circumstances, the action on the part of the Board in passing Ext.P15 order in the aforesaid manner is only to be deprecated. Nonetheless, in view of the order which we propose to pass in this writ petition, we do not think it necessary to delve into the said issue any further. 27. In such circumstances, the action on the part of the Board in passing Ext.P15 order in the aforesaid manner is only to be deprecated. Nonetheless, in view of the order which we propose to pass in this writ petition, we do not think it necessary to delve into the said issue any further. 27. Now, we will revert to the question posed for consideration viz; whether in any pending matter before the Board, having the nature of a lis where the Board is called upon to decide the same, based on the materials made available and to be made available, after hearing the parties and in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, the Chief Executive Officer could pass an order solely assigning reason that the Board is not in session. On a careful analysis of the provisions under Sections 25 and 32 of the Act, we have already arrived at a conclusion that the power of the Chief Executive Officer is different from the powers conferred on the Board. We have also found that Waqf Board has to perform quasi-judicial function in deciding a lis in matters like the one involved in O.P.No.93/2016. Merely because the issue involved in a lis is touching the administration of a waqf cannot confer any right or power on the CEO to pass any order in a matter pending before the Board even on the ground that the Board is not in session. One of the reasons is that though Section 27 enables the Board to delegate certain powers the power of the Board under clause (c) of Section 32(2) could not be delegated in view of the interdiction in Section 27 itself. When the Chief Executive Officer realised and specifically took note of the fact that OP 93/2016 pending before the Waqf Board is regarding the administration of a Waqf, in view of the provisions under Section 27 of the Act, he ought not to have entertained the matter and the action of the CEO in passing orders on such a matter would tantamount to overreaching the statutory inhibition and an indirect discharge of the quasi-judicial function of the Board. Since the quasi-judicial function of the Board is not delegable even under Section 27 of the Act, it can only hold that in respect of lis calling for exercise quasi-judicial function, the CEO is not clothed any power to pass any order on the ground that the Board is not in session. Simultaneous exercise such quasi-judicial function in respect of a lis, based on materials made available, by the Waqf Board and CEO is not contemplated by the Waqf Act and the repository of the power in such matters is only the Waqf Board. In the contextual situation, it is worthwhile to refer to the decision in Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan reported in AIR 1989 SC 1582 . The Hon'ble Apex Court held in paragraph 28 of the said decision thus:- These principles of ratification governing transactions of a company where the general body is the repository of all powers cannot be extended to the present case. We were also referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board, (1953) I AII ER 1113 and in particular the observation of Denning L.J. (at p.p 1118 and 1119) While an administrative function can often be delegated a judicial function rarely can be. No judicial tribunal can delegate its functions unless it is enabled to do so expressly or by necessary implication. In Local Government Board v. Arlidge the power to delegate was given by necessary implication, but there is nothing in this scheme authorising the board to delegate this function and it cannot be implied. It was suggested that it would be impracticable for the board to sit as a board to decide all these cases, but I see nothing impracticable in that. They have only to fix their quorum at two members and arrange for two members, one from each side, employers and workers to be responsible for one week at a time. Next it was suggested that, even if the board could not delegate their functions, at any rate they could raify the actions of the port manager, but if the board have no power to delegate their functions to the power manager, they can have no power to ratify what he has already done. Next it was suggested that, even if the board could not delegate their functions, at any rate they could raify the actions of the port manager, but if the board have no power to delegate their functions to the power manager, they can have no power to ratify what he has already done. The effect of ratification is to make it equal to a prior command, but as a prior command, in the shape of delegation, would be useless, so also is a ratification.” 28. As per the said decision when the authority concerned got no power to delegate its function it could not either directly or indirectly, ratify the action of another authority done in exercise of that non-delegable power as the effect of ratification would make it equal to a prior command in the shape of delegation. In such circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that the order in Ext.P1 to put the said order before the Board for ratification also would be having no legal effect even on ratification of the same by the Board. In such circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that by passing Ext.P1 order in an interlocutory application in O.P.No.93/2016, the Chief Executive Officer had stepped beyond his power. Consequently, it is set aside. 29. As noticed herein before, as per Ext.P15 order the Waqf Board restrained the respondents therein/revision petitioners from conducting election to the committee of the Jama-ath without prior permission. We have already deprecated the action of the Board in passing such an order, in the light of the earlier order passed by this Court on 18.7.2017 in the captioned writ petition. However, the factual position admitted before us is that election to the Jama ath is not yet started. Going by clause 11.5 of Ext.P2 byelaw, election of the administration committee of the Waqf is to be conducted annually. The terms of the lastly elected committee had already expired on 23.06.2009. In such circumstances, though we have expressed our displeasure in the action of the Board in passing Ext.P15 order, we are of the view that this writ petition can be disposed of leaving liberty to the writ petitioners to move the Waqf Board with appropriate application seeking permission to conduct the election, in accordance with law. In such circumstances, though we have expressed our displeasure in the action of the Board in passing Ext.P15 order, we are of the view that this writ petition can be disposed of leaving liberty to the writ petitioners to move the Waqf Board with appropriate application seeking permission to conduct the election, in accordance with law. Hence, it is ordered that in case the writ petitioners move such an application before the Board, taking into account the provisions under Ext.P2 byelaw, as also taking note of the fact that the tenure of the lastly elected committee had expired long before and it is only desirable to permit a democratically elected committee to assume power, the Board shall pass appropriate orders thereon expeditiously. It will also be open to the Waqf Board to take up O.P.No.93/2016 itself and dispose of it if it can be done expeditiously, and without any undue delay. This writ petition is disposed of, accordingly.