JUDGMENT : 1. The present second appeal has been heard on the following substantial question of law: Whether findings of both the courts below that the suit land in the hands of the defendant was his self acquired property although it has been brought on record that the property was originally owned by his ancestors and it was received by him in partition is correct? If yes, whether a decree for specific performance in respect of the suit property in which the other members of the joint family have shares, could have been passed ? 2. The appellant is the original defendant who is aggrieved by the decree for specific performance passed by the trial Court which decree has been affirmed by the appellate Court. It is the case of the respondent – plaintiff that the appellant – defendant was the owner of field Survey No.36/3 – 36/1 admeasuring 2 Hectares 30R. On 17-9-1997, the defendant agreed to sell 1 Hectare 21 R land to the plaintiff for a total consideration of Rs.1,05,000/-. The amount of Rs.60,000/- was paid as part consideration and it was agreed that the sale deed will be executed by 10-6-1998. Though the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement, the defendant avoided to execute the sale deed. Hence, the suit for specific performance came to be filed on 24-7-1998. 3. The defendant in his written statement denied the agreement. According to him, the document in question was a forged document and as the plaintiff had borrowed sum of Rs.l0,000/- from the defendant said document was got executed. It was further pleaded that the suit property was ancestral property and his other family members had share therein. It was also pleaded that the defendant was addicted to various vices. 4. The trial Court on consideration of the evidence on record held the agreement to be duly proved. It further held that the plaintiff was ready to perform his part of the agreement. It was also held that the defendant was competent to alienate the suit property. The appellate Court after reconsidering the evidence on record dismissed the appeal filed by the defendant. 5. Shri P. R. Agrawal, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that as per the document at Exhibit36 dated 29-2-1936, the appellant's grandfather had purchased the suit property. It was also held that the defendant was competent to alienate the suit property. The appellate Court after reconsidering the evidence on record dismissed the appeal filed by the defendant. 5. Shri P. R. Agrawal, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that as per the document at Exhibit36 dated 29-2-1936, the appellant's grandfather had purchased the suit property. The appellant had succeeded to the same after the death of his father and therefore, all members of his family had a share in the same. According to him, the defendant alone did not have any right to enter into said agreement as the other coparceners of his branch had a share therein. In that regard he placed reliance on the decision in Smt. Dipo v. Wassan Singh and others AIR 1983 Supreme Court 846, Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder Singh and Ors. AIR 2013 SC 3225, Ashwinkumar Manilal Shah and others v. Chhotabhai Jethabai Patel and others AIR 2001 Gujarat 90, Balmukand v. Kamla Wati and others AIR 1964 SC 1385 and Dharmarao Sidhappa Shetgar v. Gopal Shriniwas Shirsikar and Ors AIR 2006 Bombay 228. He submitted that the finding recorded against issue No.4 by the trial Court and confirmed by the appellate Court was incorrect. He then submitted that the plaintiff without making any necessary enquiries and only on the basis of 7/12 extract dated 12-6-1998 – Exhibit-27 entered into the agreement. The defense that the transaction was a money lending transaction was fortified by this fact. It was then submitted that there was no evidence with regard to legal necessity on the part of the defendant to alienate the suit property. According to the learned Counsel only on the basis of the stray admission in the cross-examination that the defendant had received the suit property in partition his case had been disbelieved. According to him, such stray admission could not have been relied upon. He relied on the decision in Chikkam Koteswara Rao v. Chikkam Subbarao and others AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1542 and judgment of learned Single Judge in Sameersingh Sureshsingh Suryawanshi v. Savita Sameersingh Suryawanshi 2008(1) Mh.L.J. 13 . In the alternate, it was submitted that the decree as passed would only bind the share of the defendant and not other family members. 6. Shri N. R. Saboo, learned Counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment. In the alternate, it was submitted that the decree as passed would only bind the share of the defendant and not other family members. 6. Shri N. R. Saboo, learned Counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment. According to him, the agreement dated 17-9-1997 has been held to be proved by both the Courts. The defendant had clearly admitted that he had received the suit property in partition and that the remaining land of 18R was also sold during pendency of the appeal. According to him, if the defendant received the land in partition, he was competent to transfer the same. He then submitted that the alleged compromise of the suit filed by the other family members of the defendant against him was not binding on the plaintiff. It only showed that the defendant intended to avoid the decree of specific performance in any manner whosoever. The learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision in Uttam v Saubhag Singh and others (2016) 4 Supreme Court Cases 68. 7. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and have perused the records of the case. It is not in dispute that the suit property was initially purchased by the appellant's grandfather on 29-2-1936 (Exhibit-36). The agreement dated 17-9-1997 (Exhibit-26) has been held to have been proved by both the Courts. The defence as raised with regard to the document being executed as a money lending transaction has not been accepted by both the Courts. The finding in that regard being based on the evidence available on record, the same deserves to be accepted. 8. As regards competence of the defendant to enter into the agreement and alienate the suit property, it is to be seen that the entire land was purchased by the defendant's grandfather and the defendant succeeded to the same. The defendant came up with the defence that he was addicted to vices and hence, had taken loan of Rs.10,000/- from the plaintiff. This defence has not been proved inasmuch as the defendant admitted that not a single case either under the Bombay Prohibition Act or the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act was filed against him. In his cross-examination, he has categorically stated “I have become the owner of the suit field as I received the same in partition”. This defence has not been proved inasmuch as the defendant admitted that not a single case either under the Bombay Prohibition Act or the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act was filed against him. In his cross-examination, he has categorically stated “I have become the owner of the suit field as I received the same in partition”. According to the learned Counsel for the defendant this was a stray admission in his cross-examination and it could not have been relied upon. In Chikkam Koteswara Rao (supra), it was held that before the right of a party is sought to be defeated on the basis of alleged admission, such statement should be clear and conclusive. There should not be any doubt or ambiguity about such admission. The plea that this admission of the defendant was a stray admission has not been raised before the first appellate Court. It is also to be noted that as per the provisions of Section 137 of the Evidence Act, it was open to have the reexamination of the defendant for clarifying the alleged ambiguity in his cross-examination. As observed in Rammio alias Rameshwar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1999 SC 3544 any explanation required of any matter referred to in Cross-examination can be sought in reexamination. This opportunity was not availed. If according to the defendant he had received the suit property in partition then he was clearly competent to transfer the same by entering into an agreement. It is noticed that as per the 7/12 Extract (Exhibit-27) it is only the name of the defendant which is shown as the owner of the suit land. On consideration of the entire material on record, this admission cannot be treated as a stray admission. In this backdrop, the ratio of the decision in Sameersingh (supra) cannot assist the case of the defendant. 9. It is also to be noted that during pendency of the proceedings the wife and children of the defendant had filed suit for partition and separate of the aforesaid property being Regular Civil Suit No.1/2006. Though the original plaintiff was added as defendant no.2 therein, the proceedings were compromised between the family members of the defendant on one side and the defendant on the other. Though the original plaintiff was added as defendant no.2 therein, the proceedings were compromised between the family members of the defendant on one side and the defendant on the other. The admission of the defendant in these proceedings that the other family members had a share cannot bind the plaintiff as he was not a party to the said compromise. The aforesaid merely reflects the intent of the defendant to defeat the agreement in any manner. 10. In so far as the legal position that the coparceners had a right in the property of the father as sought to be urged by the defendant by relying upon the decisions in Smt. Dipo and Rohit Chauhan (supra) is concerned, said legal position is not in dispute. However, when it is seen that the defendant has admitted that he had received the suit property in partition, it is not necessary in the facts of the present case to go into said aspect. Moreover, as observed by the appellate Court the defendant during pendency of the appeal had sold away remaining portion of the suit field. Hence, the other decisions relied upon on the aspect of legal necessity to alienate the property do not assist the case of the appellant. 11. Hence, on consideration of the entire evidence on record, the substantial question of law is answered against the appellant. The decree passed by the trial Court, therefore, stands confirmed. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. 12. At this stage, the learned Counsel for the appellant seeks stay to the execution of the decree for specific performance for a period of eight weeks. This request is opposed by the learned Counsel for the respondent. In the facts of the case the execution of the impugned decree shall remain stayed for a period of eight weeks. This direction shall come to an end automatically after the said period.