ORDER : Dr. S. Vimala, J. 1. Money is neither clear nor dirty, per se, but becomes tainted as it moves from the legal economy across legal-illegal boundary into the underground economy. Alleging that the accused persons also contributed for the underground economy, a complaint has been laid by IDBI Bank Limited. Criminal Original Petition No. 20423 of 2016 has been filed by the petitioner/first accused, Farouk Irani, (Ex-Managing Director of First Leasing Company), (aged 75 years), the accused in C.C. No. 63 of 2016 before the Special Court, Chennai, in respect of the offence under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as "the PMLA"), seeking the relief of bail. 1.1. Criminal Original Petition No. 20454 of 2016 has been filed by the petitioner, L. Sivaramakrishnan, (aged 50 years) (Ex- Chief Finance Officer), the fourth accused in Crime No. ECIR/CEZO/10/2015 on the file of the respondent, in respect of the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA, seeking the relief of bail. 1.2. Criminal Original Petition No. 20581 of 2016 has been filed by the petitioner, S. Dilliraj, (aged 48 years), (Ex-Senior Vice President), the third accused in Crime No. ECIR/CEZO/10/2015 on the file of the respondent, in respect of the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA, seeking the relief of bail. Brief facts:- 2. The transaction involves two companies, i.e., a Non-Banking Financial Company and a Banking Financial Company and the allegation is that the Non-Banking Financial Company has availed loans from a consortium of banks, over a period of time, skillfully masking the real financial health of the company, through fudged accounts and manipulated balance sheets. 2.1. A complaint has been preferred by IDBI Limited, a company registered under Companies Act, 1956, which is a banking company, within the meaning of Section 5(c) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. 2.2. First leasing company is a non-banking financial company (NBFC) incorporated under the Companies Act, which sought financial assistance, for the purpose of working capital in the year 2005, from the IDBI Limited. Based on the audited financial report as well as credit rating assigned by CARE, for the previous three years, initially loan was granted for Rs. 18 crores. 2.3. Based on the continuous demands towards enhancement of working capital, the loan was increased to Rs. 30 crores, then to Rs. 55 crores. 2.4. Based on the audited financial report as well as credit rating assigned by CARE, for the previous three years, initially loan was granted for Rs. 18 crores. 2.3. Based on the continuous demands towards enhancement of working capital, the loan was increased to Rs. 30 crores, then to Rs. 55 crores. 2.4. As a security for repayment of the loan, assets of the company were hypothecated and later, a charge was also created on the hypothecated assets. Gradually, the loan was being increased to Rs. 76 crores, then to Rs. 109 crores, then to Rs. 150 crores, then to Rs. 185 crores, then to Rs. 250 crores and then finally to Rs. 300 crores. Consistently, the company had been executing supplementary agreements in favour of the Bank as well as hypothecation agreements. 2.5. It is the case of the Bank that there had been representations on behalf of the company by the first accused, Farouk Irani and the Managing Director, Dilli Raj, and other employees of the company regarding the financial position of the company; in support of the same, letters were also given by the accused, Dilli Raj; audited financial report was submitted by Dilli Raj; CARE Rating Letters, dated 11.10.2012, 04.07.2013 and 09.11.2011, all assigning AA rating were produced. 2.6. The company was making repayment of the debts till 13.09.2013. 2.7. The Reserve Bank of India, a supervisory body of NBFC, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 45N of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, inspected the records of the company during 2013; it was found that there was serious irregularities in the business operations of the company; the income was highly inflated; current asset of the company was over stated; large scale diversion of funds by the Chairman and the Managing Director to 15 satellite companies incorporated by them; the Directors of those companies were the employees of First Leasing Company; the Reserve Bank of India ordered forensic investigation into the affairs of the company and appointed Ex-CBI Officers, Shri. R.K. Raghavan, to do forensic audit and appointed Shri. N.C. Rajagopal, Chartered Accountant, to do special audit; immediately after this directive, the Credit Rating went down and later on, trading was suspended from 21.09.2013. 2.8. 2.8. During September 2013, Farouk M. Irani, divulged the manner in which the affairs of the company were mismanaged and the accounts of the company were prepared by inflating/falsifying entries on profit, cash flow income and its state of affairs. 2.9. Because of the failure of the company to pay the outstanding, the Bank has declared the liabilities of the company as NPA, on 31.12.2013 and has ordered the following measures for recovery of dues:- "(a) The Bank by the letter dated 21.05.2014 has recalled various facilities sanctioned to the company. (b) IDBI Limited has initiated recovery proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, in Chennai, against the company. (c) It has also joined in the winding up petition filed by ICICI Bank against the borrower company." 2.10. Alleging that the total amount involved in the fraudulent act of the company was to the tune of Rs. 2,73,99,90,071/-, including interest, as on 02.09.2014, a prosecution has been launched by the Bank as against First Leasing Company and seven others, which includes Ex-Chairman, Ex-Managing Director, Senior Vice President, CFO of the company, Chartered Accountants, Internal Auditors of the Company, etc., 3. There are common contentions for the grant of bail in respect of all the three applications, even though there are specific grounds urged in respect of each of the petitioners. 3.1. Apart from the legal aspects, in respect of the first accused, it is alleged that he is a septuagenarian, senior citizen, aged 75 years, suffering incarceration for a period of 295 days with various health ailments. 3.2. So far as the accused No. 4 is concerned, it is stated that no offence is made out as against the fourth accused, as in the remand report itself, it has been specifically mentioned that the proceeds of crime derived by L. Sivaramakrishnan is yet to be ascertained. 3.3. The amount shown as Rs. 70,11,620/- is the salary received from 2005-2006 to 2013-14 and therefore, it cannot be the subject matter of proceedings under the PMLA. 4.4. So far as the third accused is concerned, he resigned from the company in the year January 2008 and thereafter, he had been employed at Bharath Financial Inclusions Limited, Hyderabad, and on the date when the IDBI Limited sanctioned loan of Rs. 273.99 crores, on 14.03.2013, he was not even an employee of the First Leasing Company. 3.4.1. 4.4. So far as the third accused is concerned, he resigned from the company in the year January 2008 and thereafter, he had been employed at Bharath Financial Inclusions Limited, Hyderabad, and on the date when the IDBI Limited sanctioned loan of Rs. 273.99 crores, on 14.03.2013, he was not even an employee of the First Leasing Company. 3.4.1. It was also alleged that he was not a key managerial personnel employed in the said company and never attended any Board Meetings, where policy decisions were taken. 4. The specific grounds sought for in respect of each of the petitioners, over and above the common contentions, merit consideration, if common contentions are accepted. 5. The common contentions raised are: "(i) The offence of money-laundering as contemplated under Section 3 of the PMLA requires material to be placed showing the following three ingredients: (i) there must be proceeds of crime resulting from the criminal activity; (b) the criminal activity must relate to a scheduled offence; (ii) the accused, directly or indirectly, attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly was a party or was actually involved in any process or activity connected with proceeds of crime, which includes its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projected or claimed it as untainted property. " 5.1. But, there are no materials to show that there were proceeds of crime resulting from the scheduled offence. In other words, at the time when the Prevention of Money Laundering Act was enacted, the offences alleged in the IDBI Limited's complaint, i.e., Sections 120B r/w 460, 471 and 477A IPC were not included in the schedule, except Section 468 of the PMLA. They were brought into the schedule only at a later point of time, by virtue of the amendment to Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2013. (iii) The penal law cannot be retrospectively applied to make a person an offender and it would be violative of Article 20 of the Constitution of India. (iv) The restrictions imposed in Section 45 (1) of the Act is only for the scheduled offence under Part A and it is not for the offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA. (iv) The restrictions imposed in Section 45 (1) of the Act is only for the scheduled offence under Part A and it is not for the offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA. (v) After the dismissal of the earlier Bail Applications, there is total change in circumstances, i.e., investigation has been completed and final report has been filed and hence, it is a case for grant of bail, in order to enable the accused to rebut the presumption raised against the accused under the Act." 6. In order to appreciate the contentions raised, it is necessary to consider the definition of Money Laundering and other related terms/provisions, touching Money Laundering, apart from considering the specific provisions regarding grant of bail. 6.1. Section 45 of the PMLA deals with grant of bail: "45. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of more than three years under Part A of the Schedule shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless- (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail: Provided that a person who is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm, may be released on bail, if the special court so directs: Provided further that the Special Court shall not take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 4 except upon a complaint in writing made by- (i) the Director; or (ii) any officer of the Central Government or State Government authorised in writing in this behalf by the Central Government by a general or a special order made in this behalf by that Government. (1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other provision of this Act, no police officer shall investigate into an offence under this Act unless specifically authorised, by the Central Government by a general or special order, and, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. (1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other provision of this Act, no police officer shall investigate into an offence under this Act unless specifically authorised, by the Central Government by a general or special order, and, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. (2) The limitation on granting of bail specified in sub-section (1) is in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail." 6.2. Section 45 of the PMLA starts with a non obstinate clause which indicates that the provisions laid down in Section 45 of the PMLA will have overriding effect on the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in case of conflict between them. Section 45 of the PMLA imposes following two conditions for grant of bail to any person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of more than three years under Part-A of the Schedule of the PMLA: "(i) That the prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail; and (ii) That the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused person is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail." 6.3. Money Laundering is the process of conversion of such proceeds of crime, the 'dirty money', to make it appear as legitimate' money. Definition of Money-Laundering: 6.4. As per Section 3 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), the offence of Money- Laundering is defined as under: "Whosoever, directly or indirectly, attempts to indulge, or knowingly assists, or knowingly is party, or is actually involved in any process, or activity connected, with the Proceeds of Crime, including its Concealment, Possession, Acquisition or use; and Projecting or Claiming it as Untainted Property shall be guilty of offence of Money-Laundering." 6.5. Section 2(1)(u) defining, proceeds of crime, reads as under:- "Proceeds of crime" means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property. 6.6. Section 2(1)(u) defining, proceeds of crime, reads as under:- "Proceeds of crime" means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property. 6.6. Section 2(1)(y) of the Act, detailing, Scheduled Offence, reads thus: "The offences listed in the Schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 are scheduled offences in terms of Section 2(1)(y) of the Act. The scheduled offences are divided into two parts - Part A & Part C." 6.7. In part A, offences to the Schedule have been listed in 28 paragraphs and it comprises of offences under Indian Penal Code, offences under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, offences under Explosive Substances Act, offences under Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, offences under Arms Act, offences under Wild Life (Protection) Act, offences under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, offences under the Explosives Act, offences under Antiquities & Arts Treasures Act, etc. 6.8. Part 'C' deals with trans-border crimes, and is a vital step in tackling Money Laundering across International Boundaries. Prior to 15th February, 2013, i.e., the date of notification of the amendments carried out in PMLA, the Schedule also had Part B for scheduled offences where the monetary threshold of Rupees Thirty Lakhs was relevant for initiating investigations for the offence of money laundering. However, all these scheduled offences, hitherto in Part B of the Schedule, have now been included in Part A of Schedule w.e.f. 15.02.2013. Consequently, there is no monetary threshold to initiate investigations under PMLA. 6.9. On the date when the complaint was preferred by the IDBI Bank Limited, on 10.09.2015, the predicate offence now alleged were in Part B of the schedule and not in Part A of the schedule. Therefore, the preconditions for grant of bail under Section 45 of the PMLA would not apply. However, assuming that Section 45 would apply, whether the accused persons are entitled to bail is a matter to be considered, as it is contended by the learned Special Public Prosecutor that Section 45 of the PMLA would be applicable to the facts of this case. Arrests: 6.10. However, assuming that Section 45 would apply, whether the accused persons are entitled to bail is a matter to be considered, as it is contended by the learned Special Public Prosecutor that Section 45 of the PMLA would be applicable to the facts of this case. Arrests: 6.10. Under Section 19 of PMLA, the appropriate authority under the Act has the power to arrest any person provided that such authority on the basis of the material in his possession has reason to believe that such person has been guilty of any offence punishable under PMLA. After the arrest, the person arrested has to be informed about the grounds for his arrest. It is also required that the person so arrested shall, within 24 hours, be produced before the Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, having jurisdiction. 6.11. Relying upon this provision, the learned senior counsel appearing for the accused contended that there were no material in possession, which would give an indication that the accused could have been guilty of the offence of money laundering. 6.12. It is specifically contended that the power to arrest does not imply that there is a necessity to arrest. When the accused persons have cooperated during interrogation and enquiry, there is no necessity to arrest. 6.13. The material in possession includes material in possession available to consider the case of both sides. No material in possession furnished on behalf of the accused has been considered by the Court below. Presumption: 7. The learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent would contend that in view of the availability of presumption available in favour of the prosecution, the accused persons are not entitled to bail. 7.1. At this juncture, it is necessary to consider the presumption available in favour of the prosecution and the opportunity for the accused to rebut the presumption. Presumptions and Burden of Proof Under PMLA: 7.2. Where Money-Laundering involves two or more inter-connected transactions and one or more such transactions is or are proved to be connected with Money- Laundering, then for the purposes of Adjudication or Confiscation, under Section 8 or for the trial of the Money- Laundering offence, it shall unless otherwise proved, be presumed that the remaining transactions form part of such inter-connected transactions associated with Money-Laundering. 7.3. 7.3. Under Section 24 of PMLA, in any proceeding relating to the proceeds of crime a presumption is raised by the authority or court against any person charged with the offence of Money-Laundering, unless the contrary is proved by the accused, that such proceeds of crime are involved in money-laundering; and in the case of any third person, such authority or court may also presume that such proceeds of crime are involved in Money-Laundering. 7.4. Essentially, under PMLA, the burden of proof lies on the person who claims that the proceeds of crime alleged to be involved in Money-Laundering, are not involved in Money-Laundering. The presumption against the accused or any 3rd party is good enough to discharge the onus of the authorities under PMLA. 7.5. A person accused of an offence under Section 3 of PMLA, whose property is attached and proceeded against for Confiscation, shall discharge the onus of proof (Section 24) vested in him by disclosing the sources of his Income, Earnings or Assets, out of which or means by which he has acquired the property attached, to discharge the burden that the property does not constitute proceeds of crime. Presumption under Section 23 of PMLA: 7.6. The scope of presumption available under Section 23 of the PMLA has been explained, in the case of B. Rama Raju, S/o B. Ramalinga Raju v. Union of India (UOI), (2012)1 MLJ 419 , wherein, it was held that: "115. The presumption enjoined by Section 23 is clearly a rebuttable presumption i.e., presumptio pro tantum. 116. In Izhar Ahmad v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1052 , Gajendragadkar, J (as his Lordship then was) observed (in the majority opinion of the Constitution Bench) that: The term "Presumption" in its largest and most comprehensive signification, may be defined to be an inference, affirmative or disaffirmative of the truth of false-hood of a doubtful fact or proposition drawn by a process of probable reasoning from something proved or taken for granted. Quoting with approval the statement of principle set out in the Principles of the Law of Evidence by Best, his Lordship observed that when the rules of evidence provide for the raising of a rebuttable or irrebuttable presumption, they are merely attempting to assist the judicial mind in the matter of weighing the probative or persuasive force of certain facts proved in relation to other facts presumed or inferred." 7.7. To invoke the presumption under Section 23 of the PMLA, at least one of the transactions has to be proved to the "proceeds of crime" transaction. 7.8. So far as the cases on hand are concerned, there are no materials proving that one of the transactions which has to be proved was out of proceeds of crime. Thus, it is a case where the grant of bail has to be considered. 8. The learned senior counsel appearing for the accused relied upon the following decisions, which would be in support of the accused, justifying the accused seeking grant of bail. 8.1. Contending that the accused must be given an opportunity to rebut the presumption under the PMLA and that is possible only during trial and that as the Punishment begins after conviction, bail shall not be refused at this stage, the decision reported in Ajay Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement (CRM-M-30826 of 2016) dated 07.10.2016 is relied upon. The observation made while granting anticipatory bail, reads thus:- "(6) Regarding the specific allegations of his having purchased Pseudo ephedrine worth Rs.68 lacs in 2012, and of having sold it subsequently to one Suresh Kumar alias Mehnga Ram for Rs.70 lacs, first of all, there is no document to support the allegations of such transactions, and. more importantly, there is no explanation or indication by the complainant/respondent whatsoever to show as to in what manner, the petitioner had been engaged in projecting or claiming the aforesaid 'Proceeds of Crimes' as 'untainted property', which is an essential ingredient to constitute the offence of Money Laundering as denned u/s. 3 of the PML Act." 8.2. Punishment begins after conviction; the object of bail is neither punitive nor preventive: "(ii) (2012) 1 SCC 40 (Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation) :- "21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventive. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, 'necessity' is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances." 8.3. Pointing out that even the trial under the predicate offence has not commenced and when the High Court has admitted the quash petition, there is bound to be delay in the trial and hence, bail should be granted, the decision reported in the case of Dipak Shubashchandra Mehta v. C.B.I. And another (Criminal Appeal No. 348 of 2012) is relied upon:- "... only Pradip Shubhashchandra Mehta (A- 3) was arrested. Remand was not granted by the Special CBI Court at Ahmedabad and bail was granted within a span of one day. The appellant herein was not arrested in this case and formal bail was granted to him on filing charge sheet..... (17) This Court has taken the view that when there is a delay in the trial, bail should be granted to the accused. Vide Babba v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 11 SCC 569 , Vivek Kumar v. State of U.P., (2000) 9 SCC 443 . But the same should not be applied to all cases mechanically. (18) The Court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Vide Babba v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 11 SCC 569 , Vivek Kumar v. State of U.P., (2000) 9 SCC 443 . But the same should not be applied to all cases mechanically. (18) The Court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the stage of granting bail, a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted, particularly, where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. The Court granting bail has to consider, among other circumstances, the factors such as : (a) the nature of accusation and severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence; (b) reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant and; (c) prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. In addition to the same, the Court while considering a petition for grant of bail in a non-bailable offence apart from the seriousness of the offence, likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and tampering with the prosecution witnesses, have to be noted. Considering the present scenario and there is no possibility of commencement of trial in the near future and also of the fact that the appellant is in custody from 31.03.2010, except the period of interim bail, i.e. from 15.09.2011 to 30.11.2011, we hold that it is not a fit case to fix any outer limit taking note of the materials collected by the prosecution. This Court has repeatedly held that when the under trial prisoners are detained in jail custody to an indefinite period, Article 21 of the Constitution is violated. As posed in the Sanjay Chandra's case (supra) we are also asking the same question i.e. whether the speedy trial is possible in the present case for the reasons mentioned above...." 8.3.1. In the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2012) 1 SCC 40 (referred to supra), which is applicable to the facts of this case, whether bail should be granted is the issue to be decided. 8.4. In the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2012) 1 SCC 40 (referred to supra), which is applicable to the facts of this case, whether bail should be granted is the issue to be decided. 8.4. Pointing out that there is no allegation by the respondent that the petitioners were non-cooperative or they deliberately did not divulge the information, the learned senior counsel for the accused persons seeks bail for the accused, reinforcing the dictum laid down in the following case:- "(iv) Harmesh Kumar Gaba v. Assistant Director, Directorate (CRM No. M-42455 of 2016), dated 28.02.2017):- "The investigation in the instant complaint is over and whenever the petitioner was summoned, he appeared before the E.D. It is not alleged by E.D. that the petitioner was non-cooperative or he deliberately did not divulge the information. Be that as it may, if the petitioner has shown any reluctance in divulging the information in a subsequent matter under investigation, that will constitute an independent offence within the meaning of PMLA, 2002 for which the E.D. shall be at liberty to proceed against him in accordance with law." 8.5. Having regard to the maximum sentence being prescribed is only seven years, it is pleaded that the accused are entitled to bail and the following decision is relied upon: "(v) (Hinish Ramchandani and others v. The State of U.P. and Ors.):- "From the above affidavit, it is apparent that taking advantage of the procedure, applicant was able to withdraw the money to the tune of Rs. 44 crore approximately. Fact remains that even under Sections 420 & 120-B IPC, maximum sentence prescribed is seven years and in the said offence, applicant has been granted bail. Entire property is already lying attached. As such, it cannot be said that crime proceed is being enjoyed by applicant." 8.6. Punishing a person, applying the law, retrospectively, is against the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence and against the constitution itself and relying upon the following decision, bail is sought for: (vi) W.P. No. 17525 of 2014 (Tech Mahindra Limited and another v. Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement and three others):- "65. In the instant case, there is no dispute of the fact that the alleged illegalities were committed prior to 2009 and precisely from 2001 to 2008. In the instant case, there is no dispute of the fact that the alleged illegalities were committed prior to 2009 and precisely from 2001 to 2008. In the instant case, when the alleged incident occurred, the provision that was in the statute book was Section 467 IPC only insofar as the petitioner case is concerned. In terms thereof, it thus means that to attract Section 3 only allegation that can be levelled was forgery of valuable securities/will/authority to receive any money by the SCSL..... ............. 67. In Varinder Singh v. State of Punjab and another, almost identical issue has come up for consideration before the Supreme Court. The appellant was visited to the Central Jail, Ferozepur on 17.09.2009. On such a mobile phone and charger were recovered from him, crime was registered on 24.09.2009 under Section 42 and 45 (12) of the Prisons Act, 1894. He was charged on 01.05.2010 under the above provisions. He challenged the same by way of petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before the High Court praying to quash the FIR. The High Court dismissed the said petition. High Court applied provision in Section 42 to hold against the appellant. High Court held that provision of Section 42 and 45 (12) are not attracted. Section 52-A was introduced by way of Prisons (Punjab Amendment) Bill 2011. As per this provision, supplying mobile phone or any other instruments by any person is made an offence. Notification of the above provision was issued by the Punjab Government on 8.3.2011. Supreme Court held that notification does not apply to the case on hand as alleged offence was committed in 2009 and retrospective effect will not apply in the case of criminal laws (para 10). Supreme Court further considered the scope of High Court to quash FIR under Section 482 Cr.P.C., by relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal. Supreme Court further considered the scope of High Court to quash FIR under Section 482 Cr.P.C., by relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal. Supreme Court held that High Court erred in not exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., It further held that principle-1 in Bajan Lal case is attracted since on the date of offence the mobile phone was not listed as one of the prohibited articles under the Punjab Prison Manual and therefore, no offence was made out under Section 42 of the Act, as appellant was not a prisoner and the prison offence as defined under Section 45 of the Act was not attracted." 8.7. There can be no retrospective application of criminal liability, the decision reported in Crl. M.C. No. 5508/2014 : (Arun Kumar Mishra v. Directorate of Enforcement) by the High Court of Delhi is relied upon:- "17..................... "3. Offence of money-laundering. -Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected [proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming] it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money- laundering" 18. The term 'proceeds of crime' has been defined in Section 2(u) of PMLA, which reads as under: - "2. Definitions. - (1).. XXX XXX XXX (u) "proceeds of crime" means any property derived or obtained directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property;" 19. At the outset it may be mentioned that the ECIR discloses the commission of the alleged offences during the period from November, 2005 to December, 2006. Section 3 of the PMLA specifically mandates that the act of money laundering should be intentional, therefore, it has to be traced to the point of time when the actual transaction took place. The offence punishable under Section 120B IPC and Section 13 of the PC Act were inserted in the schedule of PMLA w.e.f. 01.06.2009 i.e. after the period in which the alleged offences have been committed. 20. In 'Tech Mahindra's case' (supra) it was observed as under:- "70. The offence punishable under Section 120B IPC and Section 13 of the PC Act were inserted in the schedule of PMLA w.e.f. 01.06.2009 i.e. after the period in which the alleged offences have been committed. 20. In 'Tech Mahindra's case' (supra) it was observed as under:- "70. It is settled principle of law that no person can be prosecuted on the allegation which occurred earlier by applying the provision of law which has come into force after the alleged incident. In other words, there can be no retrospective application of criminal liability for the incident occurred prior to introduction of such liability in the statute book. 71. Admittedly, prior to Amendment Act, 2009, none of the provisions which are now invoked by the Enforcement Directorate were on the statute book except Section 467 IPC. Thus, the petitioner cannot be prosecuted by invoking those provisions." 21. It is settled principle of law that the provisions of law cannot be retrospectively applied, as Article 20(1) of the Constitution bars the ex-post facto penal laws and no person can be prosecuted for an alleged offence which occurred earlier, by applying the provisions of law which have come into force after the alleged offence." 8.8. The fervent contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the accused persons is that the prosecution itself is not maintainable, in the absence of material showing whether there was proceeds and whether those proceeds were proceeds of crime, the prosecution itself is not maintainable: "(viii) (Maha Nivesh Oils and Foods Pvt. Ltd., v. Directorate Enforcement) dated 25.01.2016:- "29. The Act is a penal statute and, therefore, can have no retrospective or retroactive operation. Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India expressly forbids that no person can be convicted of any offence except for the violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence. Further, no person can be inflicted a penalty greater than what could have been inflicted under the law at the time when the offence was committed. Clearly, no proceedings under the Act can be initiated or sustained in respect of an offence, which has been committed prior to the Act coming into force. However, the subject matter of the Act is not a scheduled offence but the offence of money-laundering. Clearly, no proceedings under the Act can be initiated or sustained in respect of an offence, which has been committed prior to the Act coming into force. However, the subject matter of the Act is not a scheduled offence but the offence of money-laundering. Strictly speaking, it cannot be contended that the Act has a retrospective operation because it now enacts that laundering of proceeds of crime committed earlier as an offence. In The Queen v. The Inhabitants of St. Mary, Whitechapel (1848) 12 QB 120, the Court pointed out that "The Statute which in its direct operation of prospective cannot be properly be called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for that action is drawn from the time antecedent to its passing". Thus, with effect from 1st June, 2009 laundering proceeds of crime under Section 420 of the IPC is enacted as an offence of money-laundering punishable under Section 4 of the Act. It is important to note that the punishment under Section 4 of the Act is not for commission of a scheduled offence but for laundering proceeds of a scheduled crime. The fact that the scheduled crime may have been committed prior to the Act coming into force would not render the Act a retrospective statute as only the offence of money-laundering committed after the enforcement of the Act can be proceeded against under the Act." 8.9. Contending that there is no necessity to arrest the accused, hence, arrest is illegal, it is argued that bail cannot be refused: (ix) 1994 AIR 1775, 1994 SCR (1) 445 (Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan):- "46. The word 'arrest' is derived from the French word 'Arreter' meaning "to stop or stay" and signifies a restraint of the person. Lexicologically, the meaning of the word 'arrest' is given in various dictionaries depending upon the circumstances in which the said expression is used. One of us, (S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. as he then was being the Judge of the High Court of Madras) in Roshan Beevi v. Joint Secretary, Government of T.N. had an occasion to go into the gamut of the meaning of the word 'arrest' with reference to various textbooks and dictionaries, the New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Halsbury's Laws of England, A Dictionary of Law by L.B. Curzon, Black's Law Dictionary and Words and Phrases. On the basis of the meaning given in those text book sand lexicons, it has been held that: "The word 'arrest' when used in its ordinary and natural sense, means the apprehension or restraint or the deprivation of one's personal liberty. The question whether the person is under arrest or not, depends not on the legality of the arrest, but on whether he has been deprived of his personal liberty to go where he pleases. When used in the legal sense in the procedure connected with criminal offences, an arrest consists in the taking into custody of another person under authority empowered by law, for the purpose of holding or detaining him to answer a criminal charge or of preventing the commission of a criminal offence. The essential elements to constitute an arrest in the above sense are that there must be an intent to arrest under the authority, accompanied by a seizure or detention of the person in the manner known to law, which is so understood by the person arrested." 48. Thus the Code gives power of arrest not only to a police officer and a Magistrate but also under certain circumstances or given situations to private persons. Further, when an accused person appears before a Magistrate or surrenders voluntarily, the Magistrate is empowered to take that accused person into custody and deal with him according to law. Needless to emphasize that the arrest of a person is a condition precedent for taking him into judicial custody thereof. To put it differently, the taking of the person into judicial custody is followed after the arrest of the person concerned by the Magistrate on appearance or surrender. It will be appropriate, at this stage, to note that in every arrest, there is custody but not vice versa and that both the words 'custody' and 'arrest' are not synonymous terms. Though custody' may amount to an arrest in certain circumstances but not under all circumstances. If these two terms are interpreted as synonymous, it is nothing but an ultra legalist interpretation which if under all circumstances accepted and adopted, would lead to a startling anomaly resulting in serious consequences, vide Roshan Beevi..." 8.10. Scope of Section 45 of the Act - the court must be satisfied that the accused is not guilty of such offence, and that he is not likely to commit any offence, while on bail. 8.10.1. Scope of Section 45 of the Act - the court must be satisfied that the accused is not guilty of such offence, and that he is not likely to commit any offence, while on bail. 8.10.1. The provisions curtailing the discretion of the Court in the matter of grant of bail found in section 45 of the PMLA are not attracted in the present case, as section 420 of the IPC did not fall in Part A of the Schedule at the time when it was allegedly committed, bail is sought for :- "(x) Sayed Mohammed Masood v. Nilkanth Shelke :- "14. The question that arises is whether the provisions of section 45 of the PMLA Act which restrict the powers of the Court in the matter of grant of bail to a person accused of an offence punishable under the PMLA Act, are attracted in this case. Section 45, inter alia, provides that 'no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of more than three years under Part A of the schedule shall be released on bail unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and unless (where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application) the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that such person is not guilty of such offence, and that he is likely to commit any offence while on bail'. Thus, the powers of the Court in the matter of grant of bail are indeed restricted in case of the accusation being of an offence listed in Part A of the schedule. 15. The contention advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant is that the scheduled offence/s in this case are of cheating and that the offence of cheating did not find a place in Part A of the Schedule at the material time. It is submitted that the offence of cheating was brought in Part A only after the complaint had been filed. According to him, therefore, in the present case, the bar provided under section 45 of the PMLA Act is not attracted. 16. It is not in dispute that the complaint has been filed on 11 February 2013. It is submitted that the offence of cheating was brought in Part A only after the complaint had been filed. According to him, therefore, in the present case, the bar provided under section 45 of the PMLA Act is not attracted. 16. It is not in dispute that the complaint has been filed on 11 February 2013. It is also not in dispute that the scheduled offences which, allegedly, generated the 'proceeds of crime' in this case are said to be offences punishable under section 420 of the IPC. It is also not in dispute that at the point of time when the alleged offences were committed, and also at the point of time when the complaint was filed, the offence punishable under section 420 of the IPC was mentioned in Part B of the schedule. It is by the Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act 2012 (Act 2 of 2013) that the schedule was amended, and the offence punishable under section 420 of the IPC was brought in Part A of the Schedule. It is not in dispute that this change was brought into force with effect from 15th February 2013. 17. The learned Public Prosecutor however, contended that since the offence punishable under section 420 of the IPC now finds a place in Part A of the schedule, the restrictions contained in section 45 would come in play. According to him, the offence of money laundering being a continuing offence, the applicant cannot benefit by the fact that at the material time, the offence punishable under section 420 of the IPC did not fall in Part A of the schedule. In support of this proposition, the learned Public Prosecutor has placed reliance on a decision given by a learned Single Judge of this Court in ABA No. 823 of 2012 decided on 1st April 2014. 18. Indeed, in that case, the learned Judge observed that the offence punishable under the Money Laundering Act is a continuing offence, but the proposition as spelt out by the learned Public Prosecutor, cannot be seen to have been laid down in the said decision. Moreover, in that case, the applicant before this Court had approached this Court for Anticipatory Bail, and investigation into the matter was yet to be carried out. 19. Moreover, in that case, the applicant before this Court had approached this Court for Anticipatory Bail, and investigation into the matter was yet to be carried out. 19. The question as to whether a person who is alleged to have committed the offence of money laundering in respect of proceeds of crime generated by committing a scheduled offence mentioned in Part B of the Schedule, would, by the subsequent amendment of the Schedule, be treated as a person who has generated the proceeds of crime by committing a scheduled offence falling in Part A of the schedule, would be a rather complex question, needing thorough discussion in the context of the constitutional provisions, and the settled principles of interpretation of penal statutes. Penal statutes which create offences, or which have the effect of increasing penalties for existing offences will only be prospective - not only by reason of the restriction imposed by Article 20 of the Constitution - but even otherwise, on the principle of fairness and justice. In fact, it is the principle that it would be shocking to one's sense of justice that an act legal at the time of doing it, should be made unlawful by some subsequent enactment, that has been recognized in the said constitutional provision. In this case, the change brought about by amending the schedule cannot be said to be merely procedural, as it would affect the rights of a person to be released on bail substantially and drastically. Anyway, an elaborate discussion on this, is not necessary in the present case, as in this case, the complaint, after investigation had already been filed, before the offence punishable under section 420 of the IPC was included in Part A of the Schedule. In fact, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the applicant, the complaint itself proceeds on the basis that the offences allegedly committed by the applicant, were covered under Part B of the Schedule (para 8). As such, it cannot be said that the provisions curtailing the discretion of the Court in the matter of grant of bail found in section 45 of the PMLA Act are attracted in the present case. As such, it cannot be said that the provisions curtailing the discretion of the Court in the matter of grant of bail found in section 45 of the PMLA Act are attracted in the present case. In my opinion, since the offence punishable under section 420 of the IPC did not fall in Part A of the Schedule at the time when it was allegedly committed; and also at the time when the investigation into offences punishable under the PMLA Act commenced; and even at the time when the complaint case came to be filed against the applicant, the provisions curtailing the discretion of the Court in the matter of grant of bail, as found in section 45 of the PMLA Act are not applicable in the instant case. There is, therefore, no bar to release the applicant on bail, even on the basis that there exists a prima facie case against him.... 24. The anxiety on the part of the investors can very well be understood, but in the circumstances, the remedy is not to keep the applicant under detention for an indefinite period. In the case of Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, 2012-1 -L. W. (Crl.)46 : AIR 2012 S.C. 830 , the Supreme Court of India reiterated the principles regarding grant of bail after having taken a review of various decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in bail matters, including that in Babu Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1978-1-L.W. (Crl.) 85 : (1978) 1 SCC 579 , Moti Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1978) 4 SCC 47 and Siddharam Satligappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 L.W.(Crl) 1385 : (2011) 1 SCC 694 . The observations made by Their Lordships leave no manner of doubt that there has been no change in the legal principles or legal position with respect to the grant of bail. There is no change in the basic principle that power to refuse bail is not to be exercised as and by way of inflicting punishment. The following observations made by Their Lordships in the aforesaid judgment are worth quoting. "................... There is no change in the basic principle that power to refuse bail is not to be exercised as and by way of inflicting punishment. The following observations made by Their Lordships in the aforesaid judgment are worth quoting. "................... one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any Court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson", (paragraph 14 of the judgment) In the same paragraph, Their Lordships have expressed that 'the Courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty'. 25. In this case, not only that the applicant is in custody for a period more than 3 years, but there is absolutely no possibility of the trial of this case commencing within a reasonable time. This is not disputed by the learned Public Prosecutor who submitted that steps for bringing the cases in respect of the scheduled offences allegedly committed by the applicant are before the Special Court under the PMLA Act, are being taken. As aforesaid, the properties belonging to the applicant and his Companies have already been attached, and the process of attachment is still being undertaken. Considering the volume of evidence that would be required to be adduced before the Special Court, it can be easily said that the trial would take several years for getting completed, after it commences; and presently even the commencement thereof is nowhere in sight. The applicant would be required to give sureties/securities not only in the present case if released on bail, but also in all the other cases of scheduled offences, though they would form a part of the present case only. As such, it would not be easy for him to abscond. In any case, appropriate conditions can be imposed upon the applicant to ensure that he would not abscond. Detaining the applicant further in custody without granting bail, in the circumstances, would be unfair, unreasonable and would violate the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 26. As such, it would not be easy for him to abscond. In any case, appropriate conditions can be imposed upon the applicant to ensure that he would not abscond. Detaining the applicant further in custody without granting bail, in the circumstances, would be unfair, unreasonable and would violate the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 26. Considering all the relevant aspects of the matter, I am inclined to release the applicant on bail, subject to certain conditions. 27. Application is allowed." 9. From the facts alleged, this Court has to find out whether the materials point out the guilt of the accused/non-guilt of the accused and the possible non-involvement of the accused after the release of bail and whether it is a fit case for grant of bail. 10. This Court is of the view that there cannot be any retrospective application of penal law and at the time when the alleged predicate offence are said to have been committed, those predicate offences were not included in Part A of the schedule. Therefore, the restrictions under Section 45 of the PMLA would not apply to the facts of the cases on hand. Even assuming that the money laundering is a continuing offence and therefore, the presumption would operate, even then the accused persons are entitled to bail because of the following reasonings. 11. So far as the grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence is concerned, this court wish to point out that: (a) the Bank before granting loan has inbuilt safeguards and checks and measures to find out the credit worthiness of the company and only thereafter, it could have sanctioned the loan; (b) the transaction ranges over a period of time; (c) the materials relied upon by the accused have not been placed before this Court and the conclusion arrived at based upon the statement of the accused by the prosecution has not been pointed out by the prosecution; and (d) as the transaction ranges over a period of time, perhaps the Company Court would be in a position to find out whether there had been exaggeration of financial position or the misstatement was on account of deliberate mismanagement or there was misappropriation or diversion of funds on account of cheating. 12. 12. The remaining reasons for grant of bail would be portrayed with reference to the arguments canvassed by the learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent. 13. The learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent would submit that the Bail Applications filed by the petitioner/A-1, A-3 and A-4 have already been dismissed by this Court and District Court, respectively, and therefore, they are not entitled to ask for bail at this stage. 13.1. This contention requires scrutiny of grounds of dismissal of the earlier Applications and requires consideration as to whether there is change in circumstances, so as to enable the accused to ask for bail. Dismissal of earlier bail application on 02.08.2016: 13.2. This Court, by relying upon two orders passed in Crl.O.P. Nos. 24586 of 2016 and Crl.O.P. No. 19185 of 2015, has dismissed the bail application, by the order dated 02.08.2016, in Crl.O.P. No. 13636 of 2016. 13.3. It is observed that search has been conducted under Section 17 of the PMLA, 2002 r/w Section 3 of the PML Rules, 2005, in the presence of the accused, Farouk Irani, and main incriminating documents have been seized under the Seizure Memo, dated 09.06.2016. 13.4. Reliance has been placed upon the order passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, dismissing the bail application on 24.07.2016, on the ground that, if the accused is released on bail, he will hamper the investigation. 13.5. This is the general ground on which the earlier bail application has been dismissed. The evidence in this case is based upon the documentary evidence, which has been already seized by the respondent. 13.6. The nature of proof depends more on documents than on oral evidence. Therefore, it may not be fair to dismiss the bail application on the ground that the accused will hamper the prosecution, especially when major part of the investigation is over. 13.7. In paragraph 18 of the earlier order, it has been mentioned that investigation is over and statements have been recorded. Interrogation: 13.8. Therefore, it may not be fair to dismiss the bail application on the ground that the accused will hamper the prosecution, especially when major part of the investigation is over. 13.7. In paragraph 18 of the earlier order, it has been mentioned that investigation is over and statements have been recorded. Interrogation: 13.8. The observations made by this Court, on an earlier occasion, that custodial interrogation may be necessary is countered by the learned senior counsel appearing for the accused stating that on an earlier occasion on two days, the petitioner had been taken to custodial interrogation and that even assuming that further custodial interrogation is necessary right from the date of earlier order dated 02.08.2016, till date, the respondent did not seek for custodial interrogation and therefore, the court can very well conclude that the respondent is not interested in taking custodial interrogation or that custodial interrogation has become unimportant or irrelevant, so far as the respondent is concerned. 13.9. Relying upon Section 24 of the Act, it is contended that the burden of proof is on the petitioner/accused to show that the proceeds of crime are untainted property and that burden has not been discharged and therefore, the bail application is liable to be dismissed. 13.10. Despite the statutory presumptions being against the accused, still, the initial burden is only upon the prosecution regarding the availability of proceeds of crime and this Court wish to point out that the following decision: - "In State v. Haremza, 213 Kan. 201 (Kan. 1973), the court observed that "Statutory presumptions are ordinarily rebuttable. A rebuttable statutory presumption governs only the burden of going forward with the evidence and, even when it operates against the defendant, it does not alter the ultimate burden of proof resting upon the prosecution, nor deprive the defendant of the benefit of the presumption of innocence." 14. The learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gautam Kundu v. Enforcement Directorate reported in Criminal Appeal No. 1706 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6701 of 2015. That was a case where the accused flouted as many as 27 companies to allure the investors to invest in their different companies on a promise of high returns and funds were collected from the public at large and it was not repaid. 14.1. That was a case where the accused flouted as many as 27 companies to allure the investors to invest in their different companies on a promise of high returns and funds were collected from the public at large and it was not repaid. 14.1. Here is a case where it is not the innocent public who are involved but an equally omnipotent Bank who has the facility, capacity and ability to verify the financial position of the company, before granting loan. It is not known whether the Bank failed in their duty before granting loan or whether the company gave a floated figure with respect to the financial position in order to get more loan. Moreover, it is stated that the petition to wind up the company is pending. The Court dealing with Company Case would be in a position to find out whether the winding up was a necessity on account of the commercial expediency or it is out of mismanagement on account of want of capacity or it is a deliberate mismanagement calculated to derive benefit. 14.2. The predicate offence is yet to be decided. Whether the accused persons are guilty of predicate offence or not itself is yet to be decided. Many of the predicate offences, except Section 467 were not included in the schedule to the PMLA at the time when the Money Laundering is stated to have taken place. Whether there was income on account of proceeds of crime and whether those proceeds of crime were involved in the purchase of property and whether the accused persons projected that the income involved in the purchase of the property were untainted money are all subject matter of presumptions, which have to be rebutted. 15. The learned Special PP appearing for the respondent also relied upon the decision reported in the case of Shamsuddin v. Enforcement Directorate, W.P.(C) No. 15378 of 2016, dated 19.07.2016. 15.1. It is a case where the predicate offence has been proved and thereafter only proceedings under the Money Laundering has been initiated. 16. The learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent also relied upon the decision reported in the case of The Joint Director, Enforcement Directorate v. Tech Mahindra Limited, in W.A.M.P. No. 768 of 2015, dated 01.04.2015. 16.1. It is a case where Writ Appeal has been filed challenging the quashing of proceedings as against the first writ petitioner. 16. The learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent also relied upon the decision reported in the case of The Joint Director, Enforcement Directorate v. Tech Mahindra Limited, in W.A.M.P. No. 768 of 2015, dated 01.04.2015. 16.1. It is a case where Writ Appeal has been filed challenging the quashing of proceedings as against the first writ petitioner. Direction was issued to frame charges as against the first writ petitioner also, on the ground that correctness and truthfulness cannot be decided as it is a demurrer action. 16.2. This decision is not helpful for the decision of the Bail Application. "Questions:- Whether commission of scheduled offence is a fundamental precondition for initiating prosecution under the Money Laundering Act? In other words, laundering of money acquired by committing a scheduled offence, i.e., dealing with the proceeds of the crime is essential to maintain the prosecution under Money Laundering Act. In order to decide the maintainability of the prosecution, is it a time of commission of scheduled offence or is it the time of commission of the act of money laundering, which is crucial in determining the prosecution under the Money Laundering Act? and When the scheduled offence was not included in the schedule to Money Laundering Act at the relevant point of time, whether the prosecution would be hit by Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India?" 17. These are all rather complex questions needing thorough arguments in the context of the constitutional provisions/interpretation of penal statutes. Thus, having regard to the complexities of issues raised and pending determination of the same, bail cannot be refused. 18. The well being, liberty and security of the individual are the cornerstone of democracy. "Law is a human institution created by human agents to serve human ends." - "Rule of law must run close to the rule of life." - said Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, (Perspectives in Criminology, Law and Social Change, (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1980), p.67) and therefore, the accused persons cannot be put behind the bars as a measure of punishment even before trial. Therefore, even though there are presumptions available in favour of prosecution, the prosecution is expected to place materials to the extent of invoking the presumptions and even in case of availability of presumptions, the accused is entitled to rebut the presumptions, it is appropriate to grant bail to the accused persons. 18.1. Therefore, even though there are presumptions available in favour of prosecution, the prosecution is expected to place materials to the extent of invoking the presumptions and even in case of availability of presumptions, the accused is entitled to rebut the presumptions, it is appropriate to grant bail to the accused persons. 18.1. So far as this case is concerned, the presumption is a rebuttable presumption. The accused will have the liberty of showing that the property is an untainted property only during trial. This Court has entertained the applications to quash the proceedings and has also granted an order of stay. Therefore, trial is not likely to commence in near future. 18.2. Even though the offence is serious in nature, there is no severity in the punishment. As the investigation is over, there is no likelihood of tampering with witnesses. 18.3. Already the accused persons have given an undertaking that they will not flee from India, without the prior permission either this Court/the Special Court and that they will not tamper with the prosecution witnesses. 19. For the reasons afore-stated, the Bail Applications are allowed, subject to the following conditions:- "(i) the petitioners, along with two sureties for each of them, shall furnish the bail bonds to the satisfaction of the Special Court, each for a sum of Rs. 50,000/-; (ii) the petitioners shall not leave the country without prior permission of the Special Court or this Court; (iii) the petitioners shall appear before the Special Court as and when summoned; (iv) the petitioners are ordered to be released on bail, subject to the attachment/seizure of his immovable properties already effected by the Enforcement Directorate. Today, after pronouncement of the order, a request was made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, expressing difficulties in producing the sureties before the learned Sessions Judge, Chennai, who sits only on specified dates and expressed a request for production of sureties before the learned VIII Special Judge for CBI Cases, Chennai." The said request is accepted and it is ordered accordingly.