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2017 DIGILAW 135 (CAL)

Dhirendra Nath Mondal v. State of West Bengal

2017-02-03

TAPASH MOOKHERJEE

body2017
JUDGMENT : Tapash Mookherjee, J. 1. The present Revisional Application under Section 401 read with Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, Cr.P.C.) is directed against the judgment and order of acquittal passed on 16th January, 2009 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court Barasat North 24 Parganas in Sessions Trial No. 6(3) 1996 (Sessions Case No. 14 (12) 1994). 2. The facts leading to the initiation of the aforesaid case may be summarised as follows:- 3. Late Krishna Mondal daughter of Dhirendranath Mondal of village Tyangra Colony, under P.S. Bongram, was married to one Subhas Bishwas on 16th January, 1992 according to Hindu Rites and Customs and after marriage Krishna went to her matrimonial home at village Naldugari, under P.S. Bagdah District North 24 Parganas. Krishna's father gifted several valuable articles including gold ornaments in the marriage. But within a very short period after marriage Krishna's husband as well as other members of her matrimonial home started expressing their dissatisfaction in respect of the quality and inadequacy of the articles gifted in their marriage and they started physical and mental torture upon Krishna in different ways. Krishna was not given sufficient food in her matrimonial home and she was not permitted to visit her parental home and they also raised a demand for payment of an amount of 27,000.00 (rupees twenty seven thousand only) in cash, to buy a land and they also asked Krishna to handover all her gold ornaments. Krishna refused to accede to such unfair claims of her matrimonial home and hence torture upon her continued in her matrimonial home. Krishna's father asked for intervention of the persons who had negotiated the marriage but of no result and at some point of time Krishna's father-in-law assured her father of good behaviour towards her in her matrimonial home. But her father-in-law did not care to keep his promise. Krishna's father asked for intervention of the persons who had negotiated the marriage but of no result and at some point of time Krishna's father-in-law assured her father of good behaviour towards her in her matrimonial home. But her father-in-law did not care to keep his promise. In the same year, on the day of Kalipuja, i.e., on 25.10.1992, Krishna was supposed to visit her parental home with her Husband but as they did not come on that day, Krishna's mother herself went to the matrimonial house of Krishna and after reaching there she came to know that her daughter took poison in the morning of that very day and was removed to local P.H.C. Krishna's parents thereafter rushed to the local P.H.C. at 4 p.m. where they were informed that their daughter was dead. Hence, Krishna's father Dhirendra Nath Mondal submitted a written complaint at Bagda P.S. and narrated therein all the aforesaid facts on the basis of which Bagda P.S. case No. 137, dated 27.10.1992 was started under Section 498A/306 of Indian Penal Code against Krishna's Husband and other family members of her matrimonial home and after completion of investigation charge-sheet under Section 498 A/306 of the Indian Penal Code was submitted in the case. Thereafter the case was committed to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, North 24 Parganas from where the case was transferred to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court at Barasat for trial. 4. Considering the materials collected during investigation charges under Section 498A, 306, 304B I.P.C. were framed against all the accused persons in the case. The accused persons denied the charges and pleaded their innocence. 5. Prosecution examined as many as 28 witnesses and proved some documents also to prove their charges against the accused persons. Defence tendered no evidence. 6. Considering the evidence produced by the prosecution the Trial Court found all the accused persons not guilty of the charges and accordingly acquitted all the accused persons under Section 235(1) Cr.P.C. Being aggrieved by such decision and order of acquittal, the defacto complainant in the case filed the present Revisional Application praying for setting aside of the judgment and order of the Trial Court. 7. Opposite parties No. 2 to 5 are the accused persons in the case and they have contested the Revisional case. 7. Opposite parties No. 2 to 5 are the accused persons in the case and they have contested the Revisional case. However, O.P. No. 1, i.e., the State of West Bengal has assailed the judgment and decisions of the Trial Court. 8. This is a revision against an order of acquittal. Unlike an appeal, the scope of interference with the order of an acquittal is restricted in a revision. According to Mr. Sengupta, learned Advocate appearing for the Opposite Party Numbers 2 to 5, has argued that in a revision against an order of acquittal filed by a Private Party the Court cannot reappreciate the evidence on record in its own way and as such there is hardly any scope to scrutinize critically the evidence on record by a Revisional Court in case of an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. He has also cited a decision in his support on the point, reported in (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1449 (K. Ramchandran versus Mn. Rajan and Another). But nowhere in the aforesaid decision it has been stated that in no case, the Revisional Court while considering the legality of an order of acquittal, can look deep in to the evidence produced by the parties. Moreover, in para 40 of the decision, Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down a guideline where the High Court's interference with the finding of an acquittal in a revision is justified in law. 9. In a recent decision reported in (2014) 1 SCC 87 , (Ganesh versus Sharanappa & Anr.). The Hon'ble Apex Court has explained that the High Court in a revision, can set aside an order of acquittal at the instance of a Private Party where it is found that the decision of the Trial Court is based on misreading of evidence, non-consideration of material evidence on record or perverse appreciation of evidence. 10. Let the present case be considered in the light of the aforesaid principles of the Hon'ble Apex Court. 11. The Trial Court at page numbers 17 to 20 in its judgment has recorded the following grounds for acquittal of the accused persons in the case. 12. Firstly, that due to gross difference in the financial condition of the two families the victim was mentally depressed which led her to commit suicide. 11. The Trial Court at page numbers 17 to 20 in its judgment has recorded the following grounds for acquittal of the accused persons in the case. 12. Firstly, that due to gross difference in the financial condition of the two families the victim was mentally depressed which led her to commit suicide. Secondly, that the F.I.R. was prepared under the undue influence of a close relation of the victim who was a Police Officer and as such the explanation for delay behind the F.I.R. is not satisfactorily explained. Thirdly, the contradictory medical opinion in respect of the cause of the death of the victim. Fourthly, the live-link between the alleged torture and the suicide of the victim is missing and the allegation of torture is not proved at all. Fifthly, good relationship between the victim and her Husband and other members of her matrimonial home. 13. Learned Advocate, Mr. Purkayastha appearing for the Petitioner (defacto complainant) has argued that all the reasonings recorded by the Trial Court for the acquittal of the accused persons are perverse and against the evidence on record as well. He has further argued that the main witnesses, i.e., P.W.-1, P.W.-2, P.W.-3 and P.W.-4 have all proved the allegation of physical as well mental torture upon the victim in her matrimonial home to realise their illegal demands for money and materials from the victim's family and their evidence should not be thrown away just because they are the close relations of the victim, especially when their evidence find supports from the testimonies of some neutral witnesses including the person who was the 'match-maker' in the marriage. It was his further contention that there is no real contradiction between the medical opinions on the point of cause of death and the injuries found in the dead body of the victim themselves prove that the victim had been physically tortured immediately before her suicide. Mr. Purkayastha has further submitted that the presumption under Section 113 B of the evidence Act is applicable in the present case. Mr. Purkayastha has cited the following decisions, (I) 2004 SCC (Cri) 2009, (Ram Briksh Singh and Others versus Ambika Yadav And Another), (II) 2005 SCC (Cri) 511, (Kamesh Panjiyar verses State of Bihar) & (III) 2004 SCC (Cri) 699 (Reema Aggarwal versus Anupam and Others.) 14. Learned Advocate, Mr. Mr. Purkayastha has cited the following decisions, (I) 2004 SCC (Cri) 2009, (Ram Briksh Singh and Others versus Ambika Yadav And Another), (II) 2005 SCC (Cri) 511, (Kamesh Panjiyar verses State of Bihar) & (III) 2004 SCC (Cri) 699 (Reema Aggarwal versus Anupam and Others.) 14. Learned Advocate, Mr. Keshri appearing for the State/Opposite Party has further added that the span of matrimonial life of the victim is for nine months only during which the victim has been continuously tortured in her matrimonial home by the Respondent Numbers 2 to 5 and as such there is a strong link between such torture and the suicide of the victim. Mr. Keshri also cited the following decisions (I) AIR 1962 (SC) 1788 , (K. Chinnaswamy Reddy versus State of A.P. and another), (II) AIR 2015 (SCW) 3089, III and 2015 Cri.L.J. 576 (State Rep. By Inspector of Police, T.N. versus Manikandan and Ors.) 15. Learned Advocate, Mr. Sengupta appearing for the Opposite Party Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 (accused persons in the case) has submitted his oral argument as well as a written note in the case. He has submitted, inter alia, that the victim hails from a rich family and her husband being an Army Personnel was living separately at a distant places, due to which the victim could not adjust herself in her matrimonial home where she had to face poverties and all kinds of discomforts. Mr. Sengupta has further argued that the relationship between the victim and the members of her matrimonial home was always good as found from the evidence on record and there was no proof of torture upon the victim. It is also his contention that the medical evidence on the point of cause of death of the victim is contradictory and no question on the medical evidence having been put to the Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 during their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. they have been deprived of the opportunity for giving the explanation before the Court. Mr. Sengupta has obviously supported all the findings and decisions of the Trial Court. Mr. Sengupta has also cited the following decisions to support his contentions. (I) 1997 SCC (Cri) 759, (Sham Lal versus State of Haryana) (II) (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1449 K. Ramachandran versus V.N. Rajan and Another) (III) (1987) 4 SCC 116, (Sharad Birdhichand Sarda versus State of Maharashtra). 16. Mr. Sengupta has also cited the following decisions to support his contentions. (I) 1997 SCC (Cri) 759, (Sham Lal versus State of Haryana) (II) (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1449 K. Ramachandran versus V.N. Rajan and Another) (III) (1987) 4 SCC 116, (Sharad Birdhichand Sarda versus State of Maharashtra). 16. Admittedly the victim Krishna and the Petitioner/accused Subhas were married on 16.01.1992 and Krishna died on 26.10.1992, i.e., within about nine months from the date of marriage. 17. Dr. Sebak Kumar Pal (P.W. 25) performed P.M. Examination over the dead body of the deceased. He noticed some injuries in the dead body and on the basis of such injuries he opined that the death was caused due to head injury. However, his opinion recorded in the P.M. report was a tentative opinion and he reserved his final opinion till the availability of the chemical examination report of the viscera. Subsequently Dr. Jitendra Nath Pal, Assistant Chemical Examiner in State Forensic Science Laboratory examined the viscera and on his examination he found poison in the viscera of the deceased and on the basis of such reports Apurba Nandi, Professor and Head of the Upgraded Department of Forensic and State Medicine, Medical College, Calcutta submitted a report (Exhibit 11 collectively) on requisition by the Investigating Agency. In his report he opined that the death of the deceased was due to poisoning of 'endrine' which cannot be ordinarily administered on a person without his or her knowledge and as such the death was ante-mortem and suicidal in nature. He further opined in his report that the injuries found in the body of the deceased and recorded by the Autopsy Surgeon might not be sufficient to cause the death of the deceased. It should be mentioned that it was the Prosecution case also that the deceased committed suicide. It should be noted in this context that in the judgment the Trial Court has recorded a remark that the Autopsy Surgeon was 'managed'. The reason for such remark recorded in the judgment is not understandable at all. Needless to mention that passing such a comment against a responsible public officer without any strong justification is uncalled for. Be that as it may, there cannot be any doubt on the fact that the deceased committed suicide and as such her death was 'unnatural'. 18. The reason for such remark recorded in the judgment is not understandable at all. Needless to mention that passing such a comment against a responsible public officer without any strong justification is uncalled for. Be that as it may, there cannot be any doubt on the fact that the deceased committed suicide and as such her death was 'unnatural'. 18. The defence tried to make out a case that because of difference in financial status between the Parental family and her maternal home, the deceased was mentally depressed, especially when she was compelled to reside in her maternal home while her Husband was posted at a distant place like Rajasthan and for such reason the deceased committed suicide. The Trial Court accepted the theory and it was one of the main reasons for recording an order of acquittal by the Trial Court. 19. It is true that deceased's parental house is a 'pucca' structure while the house of the Petitioner's matrimonial home is a tile roofed house with split-bamboo walls and mud floors. Be that as it may, the deceased's father was an employee of Coal India and there was nothing on record to suggest that he was a very rich person. The deceased's Husband was also a Defence Personnel and all the male members of his family were self-dependent as stated by P.W.-1. So, it cannot be said that the matrimonial home of the deceased was very poor. In fact, there is no gross and remarkable difference between the two families in respect of the financial condition. That apart, the marriage was a negotiated marriage and during negotiation the deceased's family members visited the house of the Opposite Party Nos. 2 to 5 and nothing was suppressed. So, prior to her marriage the deceased had the full knowledge where he was going to be married. In the circumstances, the deceased had no reason to be mentally depressed for the financial condition of her matrimonial home. 20. From the evidence on record it is found that the Husband of the deceased made all arrangements to take the deceased with him in his place of posting. The deceased's Husband was present in his home on the date of suicide of the deceased. The fact being so, the deceased had no reason to be impatient as held by the Trial Court. The deceased's Husband was present in his home on the date of suicide of the deceased. The fact being so, the deceased had no reason to be impatient as held by the Trial Court. So, the decision of the Trial Court on such a vital point is devoid of any logic or common sense. 21. The deceased committed suicide at 9.00 a.m. on 26.10.1992 and her parental home came to know the fact at 4.00 p.m. on that day and the F.I.R. was submitted on 27.10.1992 at about 1.05 p.m. The mother of the deceased during her cross-examination admitted that before submission of the F.I.R. they waited for her brother to come, who was a Police Officer. According to the Defence, the delay is intentional and the F.I.R. has been prepared alleging false allegations against the Respondent Numbers 2 to 5 at the illegal advice of the deceased's maternal uncle and the investigation was also influenced by him. The view of the Trial Court on the point is also the same. 22. Whenever any mishap like the suicide of a daughter, within a short period after marriage takes place in a family then it is very natural for the members of that family to take advice regarding the steps to be taken, from any near and close one having some knowledge and experience in the matter. So, the parental family of the deceased committed no wrong by waiting for some time for the arrival of the deceased's maternal uncle who was a Police Officer. For such reason alone, the genuineness of the facts alleged in the F.I.R. should not be questioned into. So, the decision of the Trial Court on the point is also wrong in all respects. 23. Charges were framed against the Respondent Numbers 2 to 5 under Section 498A, 306, 304B, I.P.C. In such cases the most crucial point is whether the victim was ever tortured physically or mentally for realisation of any dowry or any other illegal demands. In the Present case, Prosecution examined several witnesses on the point. Elaborate arguments were also advanced on the point by the learned Advocates on both sides. In the Present case, Prosecution examined several witnesses on the point. Elaborate arguments were also advanced on the point by the learned Advocates on both sides. But it is very unfortunate to note that the Trial Court instead of discussion or finding on the point, straight-forward tried to find a live-link between the alleged torture and the death of the victim, as required to prove a charge under Section 304B, I.P.C. The approach is definitely wrong in law. 24. Now, let the evidence on record on the point of alleged torture upon the deceased be looked into. 25. Dhirendra Nath Mondal (P.W.-1) is the father of the deceased and he has submitted the F.I.R. in the case. He stated in his evidence that although there was no demand for dowry from the members of matrimonial family of his daughter during the negotiation of marriage, but still he gifted many valuable articles in the marriage. But after marriage his son-in-law as well as other members of his son-in-law's family started teasing his daughter regarding the quality of those gifted articles. He further stated that his son-in-law also started demanding an amount of Rs. 27,000.00 (rupees twenty-seven only) in cash, for the purpose of purchase of a piece of land and as his daughter did not agree to such proposal, the family members of his daughter's matrimonial home started torture on her daughter. He further stated that he came to know about all such tortures from his daughter herself. He further stated that he asked for the intervention of the father of his son-in-law in the matter who assured him to take care in the matter, but of no result, P.W.-1 further stated that his daughter was not given adequate food in her matrimonial home. 26. The facts stated by P.W.-1 during his evidence are almost the same in substance to what has been stated by him in his F.I.R. (Exhibit-1). He was examined by I.O. (P.W.-26) during investigation and the I.O. stated that P.W.-1 had not stated before him many of the facts in the F.I.R. However, F.I.R. is the first version of P.W.-1 and hence it is more important than his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. So, such omission is not of much importance. However, he stated before the I.O. also that the members of his daughter's matrimonial home were demanding money. 27. However, he stated before the I.O. also that the members of his daughter's matrimonial home were demanding money. 27. Smt. Suhasini Mondal (P.W.-2) is the mother of the deceased. She also stated that although there was no demand of dowry during the negotiation of marriage except the demand of Rs. 4,000.00 (rupees four thousand only) to meet the expenses of 'Boubhat'. But still they had gifted some articles in the marriage of their daughter. She stated further that within seven days after the marriage her son-in-law as well as the members of her son-in-law's family expressed their dissatisfaction regarding the quality of the articles gifted by them and her son-in-law and others started demanding articles like Television, Almirah etc. and her daughter reported all those facts to her. She further added that in the month of June the elder brother of her Husband died and in the 'Sardh' ceremony, her son-in-law and his father demanded Rs. 27,000.00 (rupees twenty-seven only) for the purpose of purchasing a piece of land and as her daughter raised protest, her son-in-law assaulted her daughter in her house and in their presence and thereafter tortures upon her daughter continued and her daughter was denied adequate food also. No serious contradiction is found between her evidence during examination-in-chief and in cross-examination. 28. Bipul Mondal (P.W.-3) was a cousin brother of the deceased and he also stated that sometimes after the marriage the Husband of the deceased and other members of her matrimonial home started demanding articles like Almirah, Fridge, Television etc. He also stated that the Husband as well as other members of the matrimonial home of the deceased demanded a sum of Rs. 27,000.00 (rupees twenty-seven only) for purchasing a land and as the deceased raised protest she was tortured physically. 29. Rama Mondal (P.W.-4) is the younger sister of the deceased. She stated that she heard from her sister that her sister was being tortured by the Husband and other inmates of the matrimonial home of her sister. She further added that she came to know from her sister that those persons were also demanding a sum of Rs. 27,000.00 (rupees twenty-seven only) to purchase a piece of land and when her sister refused to place the proposal before their father her sister was tortured. She further added that she came to know from her sister that those persons were also demanding a sum of Rs. 27,000.00 (rupees twenty-seven only) to purchase a piece of land and when her sister refused to place the proposal before their father her sister was tortured. She further added that in the month of June during 'Sardh' Ceremony of the elder brother of their father, the demand for the cash was again raised and on the issue her sister was assaulted in their house in her presence. So, her evidence supports the evidence of her parents and cousin brother mentioned above. 30. P.W.-1 stated that he reported all the incident of tortures upon his daughter to one Suresh Podder and Jagabandhu Biswas who were the negotiator in the marriage. The said Jagabandhu Biswas was examined as P.W.-14. He is also a relative of the matrimonial home of the deceased. He stated that during the visit of the deceased in her parental home he heard from the deceased that her Husband and other inmates of her matrimonial home were torturing her to realise their demand for money and over the issue, a dispute cropped up between the two families and thereafter the deceased committed suicide. He may be a neighbour of the deceased's family but at the same time he is a relation of the deceased's matrimonial home also. So, his evidence is definitely very important in the case. 31. Kalipada Mondal (P.W.-12) and Prafulla Kumar Biswas (P.W.-13) are also the neighbours of P.W.-1. P.W. 12 was present during the negotiation of marriage and he attended the 'Ashirbad' Ceremony also as claimed by him. Both the of them stated that the deceased was tortured in her matrimonial home for cash and valuable articles. However, they had not stated those facts before the I.O. as stated by the I.O. 32. Narendra Nath Biswas (P.W.-21) is also a neighbour of P.W.-1. He stated that whenever the deceased used to visit her parental home she used to complain before them that she was being tortured in her matrimonial home to satisfy their demand for money from her parental home. No contradiction or inconsistency is there in his evidence. So, he is also an important witness for the Prosecution. 33. He stated that whenever the deceased used to visit her parental home she used to complain before them that she was being tortured in her matrimonial home to satisfy their demand for money from her parental home. No contradiction or inconsistency is there in his evidence. So, he is also an important witness for the Prosecution. 33. There is a controversy on the point whether at the time of the marriage of the deceased there was any electricity in her matrimonial home. In the circumstances the demand for Refrigerator and Television might be questionable. But there is a compact and consistent evidence on the point of the demand of cash by the deceased's Husband and others for the purchase of a piece of land by them and the failure to satisfy such demand resulting in continuous torture upon the deceased. In this context, it should be mentioned that P.W.-1, P.W.-2 and P.W.-3, in one voice stated that the deceased was assaulted in their house and in their presence in connection with the said demand of cash. The evidence of P.W.-1 and his family members is corroborated to many extant by the neutral witnesses also, i.e., P.W.-14 and P.W.-21. More ever, P.W.-1 and his family members are the best persons to testify on the point. 34. So, there is sufficient evidence on record to show that the deceased was assaulted and tortured in different ways during her short stay in her matrimonial home by her husband and other close relations of her Husband for the fulfilment of their illegal demand. But surprisingly, the Trial Court, in its judgment, is quite silent on the point and the Trial Court without any view on the point, tried to search out a link between the torture and the suicide of the deceased as needed to establish a charge under Section 304B, I.P.C. It is worth mentioning here that the deceased committed suicide within a few months after her marriage and during those few months she was subjected to assault and tortures for the failure of her parental home to satisfy the demand of a sum of Rs. 27,000.00 (rupees twenty seven only) in cash of the deceased's matrimonial family for the purpose of purchase of a piece of land by them. 27,000.00 (rupees twenty seven only) in cash of the deceased's matrimonial family for the purpose of purchase of a piece of land by them. The Trial Court in its judgment has taken a view that there is no strait-jacket formula to decide what constitutes 'soon before death' and that it varies from case to case. In the present case the deceased's death is unnatural and it has been proved that within a few months of stay of the deceased in her matrimonial home she was tortured for illegal demand which may be termed as 'dowry' in connection with the marriage. 35. So, a live-link is proved between such torture and the suicide of the deceased. Needless to mention that a married woman is not supposed to commit suicide within a few months after marriage unless compelled by extreme circumstance to do so. The theory of mental depression as the cause of suicide of the deceased as accepted by the Trial Court is devoid of any logic or common sense as held earlier. So, the facts being so, the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act is available to the Prosecution in the case. 36. The Autopsy Surgeon found some injuries on the right leg, the scalp, the brain, and spinal cord of the deceased. Both Mr. Purkayastha and Keshri have argued that in absence of any explanation on the part of the Defence as to how the injuries were caused, it stands proved that the deceased was physically tortured immediately before her suicide. In reply, Mr. Sengupta has argued that from the evidence of P.W.-9, P.W.-11 and P.W.-22 it is found that on the way to Hospital there was a collision between the auto rickshaw in which the deceased was being taken and a rickshaw van coming from the opposite direction. So, the injuries in the body of the deceased were due to the impact of such collision. He has further submitted that since the fact of such collision were not explained to any of the O.P. Nos. 2 to 5 during their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. they had no scope to explain them and during hearing of the argument Mr. Sengupta repeated the fact as the explanation of the Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 on the point, in view of the decision reported in 2015 Cri.L.J. 576, (Nar Singh-State of Haryana) referred by Mr. Keshri. 37. 2 to 5 during their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. they had no scope to explain them and during hearing of the argument Mr. Sengupta repeated the fact as the explanation of the Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 on the point, in view of the decision reported in 2015 Cri.L.J. 576, (Nar Singh-State of Haryana) referred by Mr. Keshri. 37. Medical opinion is necessary to decide whether the collision mentioned by P.W.-9, P.W.-11, P.W.-22 might have caused the injuries in body of the deceased. But neither the Prosecution nor the Defence put any question on the point to the Autopsy Surgeon for clarification. So, in absence of any expert's view in the matter, it is very difficult for the Court to come to any definite finding in the matter. Be that as it may, since the live-link between the suicide of the deceased and the torture on her is otherwise proved as held above, this point should not be focused too much. 38. So, form the foregoing findings it is clear that the Trial Court has totally misread the evidence on record ignoring some vital evidence relevant in the case. The entire approach of the Trial Court is wrong in law hence I am compelled to take the view that the findings and decisions of the Trial Court on vital points in the case are perverse resulting in miscarriage of justice. So, there is scope for this Revisional Court to interfere with the judgment of the Trial Court. 39. According to the provision in Section 401(3) Cr.P.C. in a Revisional case against an order of acquittal the finding of acquittal, cannot be converted into one of conviction. So, the question comes what should be the course to be followed in the case. Both Mr. Purkayastha and Mr. Keshri have submitted that the case should be remanded back to the Trial Court for retrial. Mr. Purkayastha has cited a decision on the point reported in 2004 SCC (CRI) 2009, (Ram Briksh Singh and Others versus Ambika Jadab and Another). 40. The incident happened on 26.10.1992 and the case was initiated on 27.10.1992. The judgment was delivered by the Trial Court on 16th January, 2009. So, twenty-four years have already passed away after the institution of the case during which, the Respondent Nos. 2 to 5, in particular, have suffered from tremendous mental pain and agony. 40. The incident happened on 26.10.1992 and the case was initiated on 27.10.1992. The judgment was delivered by the Trial Court on 16th January, 2009. So, twenty-four years have already passed away after the institution of the case during which, the Respondent Nos. 2 to 5, in particular, have suffered from tremendous mental pain and agony. Whatever may be the causes for such delay or whoever may be responsible for it, the fact remains that 24 years have already passed away since the initiation of the case. So, it would not be justified now to order for retrial, in my considered view even though the offences are very serious in nature. So, no option is left now but to dismiss the Revision. Accordingly the Revisional Application is dismissed on contest without any order as to costs. 41. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the learned Counsels for the parties upon compliance of all formalities.