JUDGMENT : P.P. Bhatt, J. 1. The petitioner, by way of present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has prayed for issuance of appropriate writ and/or order for quashing and setting aside the impugned orders at Annexure K and M dated 14.10.2002 and 03/06.01.2003 respectively. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the petition are as under:- "The petitioner was working as a Law Officer in the Gujarat State Khadi Gramodhyog Board. The petitioner had a long service tenure of about 39 years, 7 months. The petitioner was served with a charge-sheet on 09.10.2000 alleging certain irregularities. The petitioner replied to the said allegations vide his reply dated 7.12.2000. The respondent did not accept the defence of the petitioner and continued the departmental proceedings by appointing a presenting officer as well as an inquiry officer. On completion of the inquiry, the inquiry officer submitted his report on 23.10.2001, against which the petitioner made a representation in March 2002. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority vide its order dated 14.10.2002 imposed a penalty of reduction of two increments with effect from 1.09.2001 permanently. Subsequently, by order dated 3/6.01.2003, the said order was modified, but in substance, the punishment of stoppage of two increments with future effect was inflicted upon the petitioner. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order, the present petition is filed by the petitioner." 3. The learned advocate appearing for the petitioner Mr. J.A. Adeshra vehemently submits that the inquiry proceedings as well as the final order passed by the disciplinary authority imposing penalty of stoppage of two increments with retrospective effect is in clear contravention of the principles of natural justice. It is submitted that the petitioner has been served with a charge-sheet in the year 2000 in respect of the incident occurred in the year 1990. It is submitted that the action of the respondent to initiate departmental proceedings in such a stale matter is not permissible under law. In this context, learned advocate Mr. Adeshra has referred to and relied upon the provisions of Rule 24 of Gujarat Civil Services Pension Rules, 2002, and submitted that as per sub-rule 2(b) of Rule 24, departmental proceedings shall not be instituted or initiated in respect of any event which took place more than four years before such institution or initiation. In this context, learned advocate Mr. Adeshra has referred to and relied upon the provisions of Rule 24 of Gujarat Civil Services Pension Rules, 2002, and submitted that as per sub-rule 2(b) of Rule 24, departmental proceedings shall not be instituted or initiated in respect of any event which took place more than four years before such institution or initiation. It is further submitted that the respondent Khadi Gramodhyog Board has formulated the regulations called the Gujarat Rajya Khadi Gramodhyog Board (Conditions of Service Regulations) 1973. Regulation 2 of the said regulations provides that the provisions contained in Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 shall mutatis mutandis apply to the officers and servants of Board subject to modification to the effect that reference to Government shall be considered as reference to the Board, and reference to Government Service shall be considered as reference to an officer or servant of the Board. Thus according to learned advocate for the petitioner, when the provisions contained in Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 have been adopted by the Board, the Gujarat Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2002 shall also be made applicable to an employee/officer serving under the Board. As such, there are no separate pension rules formulated or framed by the respondent Khadi Gramodhyog Board. It is submitted that in view of aforesaid rule 24, sub-rule 2(b), the action of the respondent to initiate departmental proceedings in the year 2000 in respect of stale charges of 1990 is not permissible under the rules, and therefore, on this count, the inquiry proceedings as well as the order passed by the disciplinary authority based on the findings recorded by the inquiry officer is bad in law and required to be set aside. 4. The learned advocate further submits that the disciplinary authority inflicted punishment of stoppage of two increments with future effect after having consultation with the vigilance commission, but a copy of the advice/opinion rendered by the vigilance commission was not provided to the petitioner before imposition of final penalty. It is submitted that the petitioner requested the respondent Board authorities to supply a copy of the advice/opinion given by the vigilance commission, but it was never supplied to the petitioner. It is submitted that the petitioner requested the respondent Board authorities to supply a copy of the advice/opinion given by the vigilance commission, but it was never supplied to the petitioner. It is also submitted that the petitioner has also asked for certain other relevant documents, but the respondent Board did not supply those documents which has caused prejudice to the petitioner. Learned advocate Mr. Adeshra submits that the aforesaid action regarding non-supply of copy of advice rendered by vigilance commission and non supply of relevant documents amounts to violation of principles of natural justice, and therefore, on this count alone, the impugned orders are required to be set aside. In this context, the learned advocate for the petitioner has referred to and relied upon the decision in case of A.K. Roy Choudhury vs. Union of India and Others, 1981 GLR 1153 . It is submitted that the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgment is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Learned advocate for the petitioner Mr. Adeshra further submits that the order passed by the disciplinary authority is without any authority of law as the said order was passed by the Chairman of the Khadi Board, who is not competent to pass such an order. According to Mr. Adeshra, in view of rules and regulations of Khadi Gramodhyog Board, the Board itself is the competent authority to take such decision and pass orders in respect of disciplinary matters, and therefore, the order passed by the Chairman, Khadi Board, imposing punishment upon the present petitioner is required to be set aside since it is without any authority of law. The learned advocate further submits that the impugned decision is also illegal as punishment was inflicted upon the petitioner with retrospective effect, and such order cannot be passed under law. The order of punishment passed by the Chairman of the respondent Board is contrary to the settled principle of law in this regard. While concluding his submissions, learned advocate Mr. Adeshra submits that the petitioner has rendered more than 39 years of service under the respondent Board, and during his service tenure, he has not faced any departmental inquiry, except the inquiry under challenge. While concluding his submissions, learned advocate Mr. Adeshra submits that the petitioner has rendered more than 39 years of service under the respondent Board, and during his service tenure, he has not faced any departmental inquiry, except the inquiry under challenge. It is submitted that petitioner being a Law Officer of the Board has performed his duty with utmost sincerity and devotion, and rendered legal assistance as and when required by the officers and functionaries of Board on various legal issues. It is submitted that the petitioner is now a senior citizen, aged about more than 72 years. According to learned advocate Mr. Adeshra, the disciplinary authority ought to have taken into consideration the overall service record of the petitioner before inflicting such a harsh penalty, which has far reaching consequential effects, more particularly, the petitioner is put to financially disadvantageous position as his pension was also fixed on the basis of last drawn salary and therefore, the factors, which were required to be taken into consideration before imposition of such penalty, have not been appropriately considered by the disciplinary authority, and therefore, on this count also, the orders passed by the disciplinary authority are required to be set aside as it is disproportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner. 5. The learned advocate appearing for the respondent Khadi Gramodhyog Board, Mr. Premal Joshi, assisted by Mr. N.R. Koyani submits that the order passed by the respondent Board is in accordance with law. It is submitted that the Chairman of Khadi Gramodhyog Board is authorised by the Board to take disciplinary action against the officers and staff of the Khadi Board, and therefore, the ground advanced by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the Chairman is not having any authority under law to pass such order is not a correct proposition. It is submitted that the petitioner was supplied with all relevant documents and material along with charge-sheet, and therefore, the ground agitated by the learned advocate for the petitioner regarding non-supply of requisite material is also far from truth. Learned advocate Mr. Joshi further submits that it is not mandatory for the respondent Board to supply copy of the vigilance commission's report/opinion. Learned advocate Mr. Joshi further submits that it is not mandatory for the respondent Board to supply copy of the vigilance commission's report/opinion. It is submitted that it is an internal correspondence between the Board and the vigilance commission as per the rules, under which the Board requires to take opinion of the vigilance commission before passing an order of punishment. The learned advocate Mr. Joshi further submits that the decision referred to and relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case because the factual position is different than the case cited by the learned advocate for the petitioner. It is further submitted that the ground raised by the petitioner that the inquiry was initiated in the year 2000 in respect of stale charges of 1990 cannot be accepted because the irregularity committed by the petitioner was noticed by the higher authorities, may be at a later stage, but an irregularity remains as an irregularity, and therefore, the concerned officer/employee, who is responsible for committing such irregularity is required to be held responsible after giving an opportunity of being heard in the inquiry proceedings. It is submitted that there is no delay or laches on the part of the respondent Board, and the inquiry proceedings were conducted after following the due process of law, and therefore, the order passed by the disciplinary authority, which is legal and valid, may not be interfered with at the hands of this Court. The learned advocate Mr. Joshi further submits that the disciplinary authority has taken into consideration the overall service record of the petitioner before imposing penalty of stoppage of two increments with future effect, otherwise, for the charge of causing financial loss to the respondent Board on account of inaction or negligence on the part of petitioner could have been viewed seriously and some major punishment could have been imposed on him in the instant case. The respondent Board after taking into consideration the length of service and other factors thought it fit to impose penalty which is in proportion to the charges levelled against the petitioner. It is also submitted that the inquiry officer as well as the disciplinary authority have given sufficient opportunity to the petitioner to put forth his case. The respondent Board after taking into consideration the length of service and other factors thought it fit to impose penalty which is in proportion to the charges levelled against the petitioner. It is also submitted that the inquiry officer as well as the disciplinary authority have given sufficient opportunity to the petitioner to put forth his case. The petitioner was given a fair opportunity to represent his case, and thereafter, the final decision was taken by the disciplinary authority in accordance with law. 6. Regard being had to the above submissions and looking to the facts and circumstances of the present case, it appears that petitioner was working in the Gujarat State Khadi Gramodhyog Board as a Law Officer. The petitioner served for more than 39 years under the respondent Board. On 9.10.2000, the petitioner was served with the charge-sheet regarding certain alleged irregularities. Petitioner replied on 7.12.2000 and denied the allegations made against him. Since the respondent did not accept the defence, inquiry proceedings were initiated. It appears that a demand was made by the petitioner for certain important documents such as advice/report of the vigilance commission as well as the other important documents. It reveals from the record of the case that no such opinion/report was ever supplied to the petitioner during the course of inquiry, though specifically requested and demanded by the petitioner. This Court therefore, finds substance in the arguments advanced by the learned advocate Mr. Adeshra on this point as it is supported by a decision given in case of A.K. Roy Choudhury vs. Union of India and Others, 1981 GLR 1153 . Para-5 of said decision reads as under:- "From what has been quoted above, it is clear that the comments and opinion of the Central Vigilance Commission were taken into account by the disciplinary authority. It cannot do for the department to say that as these comments and opinion and recommendations are confidential in character, they are not to be brought to the notice of the delinquent concerned. In judicial or quasi-judicial enquiries, there is nothing that can be said to be confidential. Any material that is employed against a delinquent to his prejudice has to be brought to his notice so that he may have his own say in this regard. In judicial or quasi-judicial enquiries, there is nothing that can be said to be confidential. Any material that is employed against a delinquent to his prejudice has to be brought to his notice so that he may have his own say in this regard. It is well nigh possible that the Central Vigilance Commission might have given its own reasons and expressed strong opinion against the petitioner. It is equally well nigh possible that some other record also might have been made available to the Central Vigilance Commission in the form of earlier confidential records of the employee concerned. The opinion of an august body like the Central Vigilance Commission would obviously carry great weight with the disciplinary authority in reaching a final conclusion. At any rate, the possibility of such an influence cannot be negatived." 7. Another ground advanced by the learned advocate for the petitioner is pertaining to initiation of inquiry in respect of stale charges Rule 24, sub-rule 2(b) of the GCS (Pension) Rules, 2002, provides as under :- "24. 2(b) The departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government employee was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment: (i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the Governor. (ii) shall not be in respect of any event which took place more than four years before such institution. (iii) shall be conducted by such authority and at such place as the Government may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable to the departmental proceedings in which an order of dismissal from service could be made in relation to the Government employee during his service." In the instant case departmental inquiry was initiated/instituted while the petitioner was in service. Therefore, in view of above mentioned rule, the submission advanced by the learned advocate for the petitioner can not be accepted. The other ground canvassed by the learned advocate for the petitioner Mr. Adeshra is that the orders passed by the disciplinary authority are ex-facie bad in law as they are passed without any authority of law. This contention can not be accepted as the chairman of the respondent Board is authorised to pass such order in view of averments made in Para-10 of the affidavit in reply. Adeshra is that the orders passed by the disciplinary authority are ex-facie bad in law as they are passed without any authority of law. This contention can not be accepted as the chairman of the respondent Board is authorised to pass such order in view of averments made in Para-10 of the affidavit in reply. The another contention raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner is with respect to imposition of punishment with retrospective effect, which is not permissible under law. This Court finds substance in the argument advanced by the learned advocate for the petitioner as the impugned orders clearly indicate that the orders have been made effective from 1.09.2001. Admittedly, the orders have been passed by the disciplinary authority on 3/6.01.2003 (Annexure-M) and the previous order (Annexure-K) was passed on 14.10.2002, but both the orders indicate that they are passed with retrospective effect, i.e. from 1.09.2001. Usually the effect of such order, where financial implications are involved, is required to be passed with prospective effect. Under the circumstances, the orders passed by the disciplinary authority referred here-in-above, which are having retrospective effect, are required to be modified and prospective effect is required to be given. 9. The last ground projected by the learned advocate Mr. Adeshra is with regard to quantum of punishment, as according to him, the punishment inflicted by the disciplinary authority is disproportionate to the charges proved against the petitioner. The petitioner has served for a period of more than 39 years under the respondent Board, and since 1986, he was serving as a law officer. During the long service tenure, the petitioner has not faced any other departmental inquiry. The disciplinary authority ought to have taken into consideration all these factors before imposition of punishment, which has far reaching financial consequences on the petitioner as well as his family. Stoppage of two increments with future effect will have adverse effect on the pension because pension is fixed on the basis of the salary last drawn by an officer. On account of stoppage of two increments with future effect, there will be adverse effect on the quantum of salary, and accordingly the retiral benefits will be affected adversely. Stoppage of two increments with future effect will have adverse effect on the pension because pension is fixed on the basis of the salary last drawn by an officer. On account of stoppage of two increments with future effect, there will be adverse effect on the quantum of salary, and accordingly the retiral benefits will be affected adversely. There is nothing on the record to show that the disciplinary authority, before imposition of such penalty, has taken into consideration the factors discussed hereinabove, therefore, the orders passed by the disciplinary authority are required to be set aside on this count also. The matter, therefore, can be remitted to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration and for imposition of lesser punishment, but considering the fact that the petitioner has retired long back, and now has attained the age of more than 70 years, this Court is of the view that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be just and proper to maintain a penalty of stoppage of one increment for a period of one year without future effect so that it does not have much adverse effect on the petitioner's retiral benefits. 10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the petition is partly allowed. The orders passed by the disciplinary authority at Annexure-K and M dated 14.10.2002 and 3/6.03.2003 are hereby modified to the effect that punishment of stoppage of one increment for a period of one year shall be maintained, but without future effect. In other words, there shall be no future effect of stoppage of one increment. The respondent authority shall take immediate steps for refixation of pay and pension of the petitioner and shall pay arrears of pension and gratuity accordingly to the petitioner. The said exercise shall be completed within one month from the date of receipt of the order. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Petition Partly Allowed.