JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. 1. Instant Regular Second Appeal filed under Section 100 CPC is directed against judgment and decree dated 27.12.2007 passed by the learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh in Civil Appeal No. 159-G/XIII of 2005, affirming judgment and decree dated 26.10.2005 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dehra, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, in Civil Suit No. 264/1999, whereby suit for perpetual prohibitory injunction and for possession having been filed by the respondents-plaintiffs (hereinafter, ‘plaintiffs’) came to be decreed. 2. Briefly stated facts as emerge from the record are that the plaintiffs filed a suit for perpetual prohibitory, mandatory injunction and also for possession of land comprised in Khata No. 42 Khatauni No. 80, Khasra No. 1036, measuring 62-65 square metre (hereinafter, ‘suit land’) situate in Mohal Jawalamukhi, Tehsil Dehra, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, averring therein that the suit land is owned and possessed by him and the land of the defendants comprised in Khasra No. 1023 is adjoining to the land of the suit land. Plaintiffs further averred in the plaint that he is having his house on suit land and also on the land comprising of Khasra No. 1017. Some portion of the suit land was vacant, which was adjoining to the defendant’s land in Khasra No. 1023. As per plaintiff, in the second week of October, 1999, defendant without getting the map sanctioned from local authority, threatened to raise construction on the suit land as shown in the site plan by letters ‘ABCD’. An application was moved by the plaintiff before the Nagar Panchayat, Jawalamukhi on 11.10.1999 intimating therein factum with regard to threats extended by the defendant to encroach the suit land. Plaintiff had also applied for the demarcation of his land before Revenue Officer and accordingly, suit land was demarcated by Tehsildar on 15.10.1999 in the presence of the defendant and her father. During demarcation it was found by the Kanungo that there was vacant land in the suit land and Pakka points were fixed, however, defendant objected to the demarcation. The report was accepted by Tehsildar Dehra on 26.10.1999. After demarcation on 16.10.1999, the defendant forcibly raised septic tank on the portion ‘ADCF’ shown in the site plan and also kept one outlet for over flow from the septic tank in the vacant land of the plaintiff. The report was accepted by Tehsildar Dehra on 26.10.1999. After demarcation on 16.10.1999, the defendant forcibly raised septic tank on the portion ‘ADCF’ shown in the site plan and also kept one outlet for over flow from the septic tank in the vacant land of the plaintiff. Since defendant failed to stop the construction over the suit land despite plaintiff’s requests, he was compelled to file the instant suit, praying therein for a decree of perpetual prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from raising any construction over the land as reflected by letters, ‘ABCD’ in the site plan. Plaintiff also sought a decree for mandatory injunction for demolition and removal of the structure in the form of septic tank and foundation dug by the defendant during the pendency of the trial. Apart from above, plaintiff also prayed for a decree for possession of encroached portion of suit land, comprising of Khasra No. 1036, by way of demolition of structure. 3. Defendant by way of written statement refuted the aforesaid claim put forth by the plaintiff. Defendant denied that there is any vacant land of plaintiff adjoining to her land. She also denied the allegations of threats, if any, extended by her in October, 1999. Defendant also denied the allegations of encroachment made by her on any portion of suit land, while raising construction of septic tank and foundation. Defendant, while denying allegations of raising construction after demarcation report dated 16.10.1999, specifically averred that she took demarcation on 3.7.1999 of her land in Khasra Nos. 1023 and 1022, in the presence of plaintiff’s son namely Jitender Pal, which was accepted by Tehsildar on 15.7.1999. As per defendant, lintel of septic tank was laid on 20.7.1999 and construction was completed in September, 1999. Defendant also denied that during the pendency of the suit and despite visit of local commissioner and stay order, construction was raised by her over the suit land. Defendant, while refuting contention of the plaintiff that no permission was sought from the authorities concerned before raising construction, submitted that map of the construction in question was submitted by her before Nagar Panchayat, Jawalamukhi, much prior to present suit and charges for sanctioning map were also deposited. 4. Plaintiff by way of replication, reasserted and reaffirmed his claim and denied all the allegations and averments made by the defendant in the written statement. 5. 4. Plaintiff by way of replication, reasserted and reaffirmed his claim and denied all the allegations and averments made by the defendant in the written statement. 5. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, following issues came to be framed by the learned trial Court, on 8.8.2001: “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of mandatory injunction as prayed for? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the possession of the suit land? OPP 4. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act, conduct and acquiescence from filing the suit? OPD 5. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 6. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not properly valued for the purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction? OPD. 7. Relief.” 6. Subsequently, learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 26.10.2005, on the basis of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, decreed the suit of the plaintiff for mandatory injunction and possession, whereas, prayer for permanent injunction was declined. Learned trial Court held the plaintiff entitled for possession of the suit land as shown in demarcation report Ext. CW-1/A, Mussabi Ext. CW-1/B and Field Book, Ext. CW-1/C. Learned trial Court, further directed for demolition of the structure raised by the defendant over Khasra No. 1036/1 on her cost and risks. 7. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court, appellant-defendant (hereinafter, ‘defendant’) filed appeal under Section 96 CPC in the Court of learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala. However, the fact remains that the same was dismissed, as a consequence of which, judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court came to be upheld. In the aforesaid background, defendant has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, seeking therein dismissal of suit having been filed by the plaintiff after setting aside judgments and decrees passed both the learned Courts below. 8. The present Regular Second Appeal came to be admitted by this Court on 29.6.2009, on the following substantial question of law: “Whether the findings of the Court below are a result of complete misreading, misinterpretation of the evidence and material on record and against the settled position of law?” 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record carefully. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record carefully. 10. During the proceedings of the case, this court had an occasion to peruse the pleadings and evidence adduced on record before the learned Courts below, perusal whereof certainly does not compel this Court to agree with the contentions of Mr. V.S. Rathore, learned counsel representing the defendant that there is misreading, mis-appreciation and misinterpretation of the pleadings and evidence adduced on record by the respective parties before the learned Courts below, while passing judgments and decrees by the learned Courts below, rather this Court, after having carefully examined the material available on record has no hesitation to conclude that both the learned Courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously and there is no scope of interference, especially in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In the case at hand, plaintiff, while claiming decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from raising construction over the suit land and also decree for possession by way of demolition of the structure raised on the portion of the suit land has categorically claimed that suit land is adjoining to the land bearing Khasra No. 1023 owned and possessed by the defendant. Aforesaid factum has not been denied at all by the defendant rather, in her written statement, she has claimed that neither she intends to raise any construction over the land nor she has raised construction over any portion of suit land. It is also not in dispute, as clearly emerges from the record that during the pendency of the suit, Tehsildar, Dehra, came to be appointed as a local commissioner, who was specifically examined as CW-1. Shri V.S. Rathore, learned counsel representing the defendant, while referring to the judgment passed by first appellate Court strenuously argued that that it has failed to appreciate the evidence available on record in its right perspective, as a consequence of which erroneous findings have come on record to the detriment of the defendant. While inviting attention of this Court to the statement of PW-4, Jitender Pal i.e. Power of Attorney of plaintiff, Mr. While inviting attention of this Court to the statement of PW-4, Jitender Pal i.e. Power of Attorney of plaintiff, Mr. Rathore, forcibly contended that not much reliance could be placed upon the version put forth by this witness, especially when plaintiff himself has not chosen to appear and examine himself as a witness in support of his claim. Aforesaid argument having been made by Mr. Rathore, learned counsel representing the defendant does not appear to be based upon material available on record, because it stands duly proved on record that the plaintiff is an old and paralytic person and he is confined to bed and his mental faculties are not functioning well. It has also come on record that the plaintiff is being looked after and maintained by PW-4 Jitender Paul. It has also come in evidence that property owned and possessed by the plaintiff is also maintained by PW-4, as such, he was competent to depose in place of the original owner, who was unable to appear before the Court being paralytic. There is no material placed on record by the defendant, from where it can be inferred that Power of Attorney, if any, executed in favour of PW-4 Jitender Paul, is/was procured by coercion or fraud, rather, it has come in the statement of defendant herself that PW-4 Jitender Paul, being son of the plaintiff used to maintain the property including suit property of the plaintiff. 11. In Smt. Jagtamba & Ors vrs. Smt. Kanta Devi, Latest HLJ 2005(HP) 1291, which has been taken note by the first appellate Court, this Court, has categorically held that Power of Attorney can act on behalf of principal and his testimony should only confine to the acts done by the Power of Attorney holder in exercise of powers granted by the instrument. In the aforesaid judgment, it has been categorically held that Power of Attorney can not depose in respect of the matter in which the principal may have exclusive knowledge and in respect of which the principal is liable to be cross-examined. In the aforesaid judgment, it has been categorically held that Power of Attorney can not depose in respect of the matter in which the principal may have exclusive knowledge and in respect of which the principal is liable to be cross-examined. But, in the case at hand, suit has been filed by the plaintiff against defendant with the specific allegation that defendant despite there being demarcation report submitted by Tehsildar Dehra on 26.10.1999 forcibly constructed septic tank over part of suit land, meaning thereby unauthorized construction, if any, was raised by the defendant during the illness of original plaintiff, who was admittedly being taken care of and maintained by PW-4 Jitender Paul, being his son. It has specifically come in the statement of defendant that she also got suit land demarcated through revenue authorities in the presence of PW-4 Jitender Paul, as such, aforesaid plea having been raised by Mr. Rathore, learned counsel representing the defendant is not tenable, as such, same is rejected accordingly. 12. PW-1 Des Raj, who was Secretary of Nagar Panchayat, Jawalamukhi at the relevant point of time, proved certain documents, which are Ext. P3, Map Ext. P6, Notice Ex. P8 and resolution Ext. P7. Perusal of aforesaid documents clearly suggests that application dated 12.10.1999 Ext. P3 was moved by plaintiff to the Secretary, Nagar Panchayat, complaining therein that defendant had started raising construction of building in land comprised in Khasra Nos. 1022 and 1023 and also laid foundation in the land bearing Khasra No. 1038 un-authorisedly. It has also come in the evidence of aforesaid witness that on the basis of aforesaid allegation, Secretary, Nagar Panchayat directed Junior Engineer to inspect the spot and submit his report. 13. PW-3 Pratap Singh, Nambardar also stated that on 15.10.1999, Field Kanungo demarcated the suit land, wherein digging of foundation on the portion of suit land, owned and possessed by plaintiff was reported. This witness also stated that at the time of demarcation, no septic tank was constructed. 14. PW-2 V.P. Singh, Advocate, in his evidence also stated that he was appointed as a local commissioner by the Court and on the direction of the Court, he inspected the spot on 17.12.1999 and submitted his report dated 17.12.1999 (Ext. P9). As per report, Ext. 14. PW-2 V.P. Singh, Advocate, in his evidence also stated that he was appointed as a local commissioner by the Court and on the direction of the Court, he inspected the spot on 17.12.1999 and submitted his report dated 17.12.1999 (Ext. P9). As per report, Ext. P9, defendant encroached over some portion of suit land but this witness in his cross-examination, admitted that when he visited the spot along with Patwari, Patwari was not in possession of copy of Mussabi, but despite that land was demarcated. Aforesaid demarcation carried out by PW-2, V.P. Singh, was not taken into consideration by the court below, since it was not carried out in accordance with law. Otherwise, it has come in the statement of PW-2 that when he visited the spot in connection with demarcation of land, he found that construction was being carried out on the spot and as per his report, encroachment was made by defendant over the suit land. 15. It is also not in dispute that Court appointed Tehsildar Dehra as a local commissioner, who in his statement recorded before the court below stated that as per direction issued by the court on 27.10.1999, he visited the spot and submitted report, Ext. CW-1/A. It has also come in his statement that defendant encroached upon the suit land as reflected by him on Mussabi, Ext. CW-1/D. He categorically stated that before and after carrying out demarcation, he recorded statements of the parties regarding three Pakka points fixed by him before carrying out demarcation, Ext. CW-1/D. Careful perusal of the cross-examination conducted on this witness nowhere suggests that defendant was able to extract anything contrary to what was stated in examination-in-chief. 16. PW-4 Jitender Paul deposed that his father is a heart patient and had been medically advised to take rest. He also stated that he is looking after property of his father for the last twenty years and is acquainted with the facts of the case. It has come in his statement that suit land is adjoining to Khasra No. 1022, whereupon defendant started raising construction and encroached upon the suit land. Even cross-examination conducted on this witness, nowhere suggests that defendant was able to extract anything contrary to what was stated by this witness in examination-in-chief. 17. It has come in his statement that suit land is adjoining to Khasra No. 1022, whereupon defendant started raising construction and encroached upon the suit land. Even cross-examination conducted on this witness, nowhere suggests that defendant was able to extract anything contrary to what was stated by this witness in examination-in-chief. 17. Even, defendant, as has been observed above, has categorically stated before the learned Court below that demarcation of land comprised in Khasra Nos. 1022 and 1023 was obtained by her in the presence of Jitender Paul, which corroborates version put forth by PW-4 that he in the absence of his father, maintained property owned and possessed by him. 18. DW-1 Sushila Devi and DW-2 Des Raj, by way of affidavits deposed that during demarcation, no encroachment was found on the land of the plaintiff. DW-2 feigned ignorance about demarcation being carried out by Field Kanungo or local commission appointed by the Court. 19. Careful perusal of evidence, be it ocular or documentary, adduced on record clearly suggests that plaintiff successfully proved on record that defendant encroached upon the suit land and thereafter raised construction over the same, during the pendency of the trial. Demarcation report submitted by local commissioner appointed by the Court below Ext. CW-1/A clearly proves on record encroachment made by defendant because there is nothing on record suggestive of the fact that aforesaid report was ever disputed by the defendant. If statement of Tehsildar Dehra, M.S. Thakur, is read in its entirety, there is no force in the argument of Mr. Rathore, learned counsel representing the defendant that demarcation was not carried out in accordance with law, rather, careful perusal of demarcation report, Ext. CW-1/A clearly suggests that local commission before carrying out demarcation on the spot, associated both the parties and recorded their statements. He has categorically stated that suit land of defendant was demarcated in the presence of both the parties and encroached portion as shown in Mussabi Ext. CW-1/B was found during demarcation. He further stated that Field Book, Ext. CW-1/C was prepared and statements of parties with regard to Pakka points were recorded. It has also come on record that statements of parties after demarcation, Ext. CW-1/E and Ext. CW-1/F were also recorded, perusal whereof nowhere suggests that objection, if any, was ever raised by the defendant with regard to correctness of demarcation carried out by the aforesaid local commissioner. It has also come on record that statements of parties after demarcation, Ext. CW-1/E and Ext. CW-1/F were also recorded, perusal whereof nowhere suggests that objection, if any, was ever raised by the defendant with regard to correctness of demarcation carried out by the aforesaid local commissioner. Cross-examination conducted on this witness, nowhere suggests that defendant was able to extract anything contrary to what was stated by this witness in examination-in-chief, rather, this witness in his cross-examination reiterated that on three sides of suit land and land of defendant, there is a constructed area but some portion is vacant. It has also come on record that pursuant to aforesaid demarcation given by Tehsildar Dehra, objections were invited from both the parties and defendant filed objection. Court below afforded opportunity to defendant (DW-1) to substantiate her objection and accordingly, Tehsildar Dehra, was summoned to appear as a witness in the Court. As has been taken note above, defendant was not able to extract from CW2 anything contrary to what he stated in his examination-in-chief. 20. From the statement of PW-1 Des Raj, it clearly stands proved on record that no prior permission was obtained by defendant from Nagar Panchayat before carrying out construction activity on the suit land, hence, this Court, after having carefully perused the evidence adduced on record, by respective parties, especially plaintiff, sees no reason to differ with the findings returned by the both the learned Courts below that defendant has encroached upon the suit land and thereafter, raised construction un-authorisedly. 21. Hence, there is no force in the arguments of Mr. Rathore, learned counsel representing the defendant that there is misreading, mis-appreciation and misinterpretation of evidence by the learned Courts below, while decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. Substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 22. Now, it would be appropriate to deal with the specific objection raised by the learned counsel representing the respondents with regard to maintainability and jurisdiction of this Court, while examining the concurrent findings returned by both the Courts below. Mr. Vijay Verma, invited the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma and Others vs. Ranganath and Others, (2015)4 SCC 264 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held: “16. Mr. Vijay Verma, invited the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma and Others vs. Ranganath and Others, (2015)4 SCC 264 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held: “16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for re-appreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the A schedule property for road and that she could not have full-fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to the plaintiffs’ right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.” (p.269) 23. Perusal of the judgment, referred hereinabove, suggests that in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. There can be no quarrel (dispute) with regard to aforesaid observation made by the Court and true it is that in normal circumstances High Courts, while exercising powers under Section 100 CPC, are restrained from re-appreciating the evidence available on record, but as emerges from the case referred above, there is no complete bar for this Court to upset the concurrent findings of the Courts below, if the same appears to be perverse. 24. In this regard reliance is placed upon judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (Dead) through LRs and Others vs. K.V.P. Shastri (Dead) through LRs and Others, (2013)15 SCC 161 wherein the Court held: “35. The learned counsel for the defendants relied on the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006)5 SCC 545 , wherein the principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC were summarized in para 24, which is extracted below : (SCC pp.555-56) “24. The learned counsel for the defendants relied on the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006)5 SCC 545 , wherein the principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC were summarized in para 24, which is extracted below : (SCC pp.555-56) “24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” We have to place reliance on the afore-mentioned case to hold that the High Court has framed substantial questions of law as per Section 100 of the CPC, and there is no error in the judgment of the High Court in this regard and therefore, there is no need for this Court to interfere with the same.” (pp.174-175) 25. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Parminder Singh versus Gurpreet Singh, Civil Appeal No. 3612 of 2009, decided on 25.7.2017, has held as under: “(14) In our considered opinion, the findings recorded by the three courts on facts, which are based on appreciation of evidence undertaken by the three Courts, are essentially in the nature of concurrent findings of fact and, therefore, such findings are binding on this Court. Indeed, such findings were equally binding on the High Court while hearing the second appeal. (15) It is more so when these findings were neither found to be perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever record such findings nor these findings were found to be against the evidence, nor against the pleadings and lastly, nor against any provision of law.” 26. It is quite apparent from aforesaid exposition of law that concurrent findings of facts and law recorded by both the learned Courts below can not be interfered with unless same are found to be perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever record such findings. In the case at hand, as has been discussed in detail, there is no perversity as such in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below, rather same are based upon correct appreciation of evidence as such, same deserve to be upheld. 27. In the case at hand, as has been discussed in detail, there is no perversity as such in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below, rather same are based upon correct appreciation of evidence as such, same deserve to be upheld. 27. This court after having carefully gone through the evidence available on record, has no hesitation to conclude that both the learned Courts below have appreciated the evidence in its right perspective and there is no mis-appreciation of the evidence. 28. Consequently, in view of discussion above, there is no merit in the appeal and same is dismissed. Judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below are upheld. Pending applications are disposed of. Interim directions, if any, are vacated.