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2017 DIGILAW 136 (CAL)
Trilochan Pattanayak v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal
2017-02-03
I.P.MUKERJI
body2017
JUDGMENT I.P. Mukerji, J. 1. This writ application challenges an award dated 15th March, 2011 passed by the learned Judge, Fourth Industrial Tribunal, Kolkata. The cause of grievance of the writ petitioner is that the Tribunal held that he was not a workman of M/s. Champdani Industries Limited (the company), the third respondent. The Tribunal also held that the management had rightly terminated his services. 2. Let us examine the first issue. 3. On or about 7th December, 1991 the writ petitioner worked in Wellington Jute Mill, Rishra, Hooghly as an apprentice. Mr. Majumder states that this mill was part of the establishment of the company. After having undergone this period of apprenticeship on 17th August, 1992, he was appointed as an Electrical Supervisor in the works of the company in Kaikhali Crossing at VIP Road at a salary of Rs. 800/- (basic+DA) and house rent and travelling allowance of Rs. 300/- and Rs. 200/- respectively. He was to be on probation for a period of six months. Clause 4 of the appointment letter is very important. It says, "you will remain as a full-time employee of the company" during the period of this appointment. On 29th October, 1994, by a letter the company confirmed the writ petitioner's appointment as an Electrical Supervisor with effect from 1st November, 1994 for a period of three years. I am told that this period of service was extended by the company from time to time till November, 1998. On 21st November, 1998 the writ petitioner received a letter from them that his service was terminated with effect from that afternoon. He would, however, be paid one month's salary in lieu of notice. 4.
I am told that this period of service was extended by the company from time to time till November, 1998. On 21st November, 1998 the writ petitioner received a letter from them that his service was terminated with effect from that afternoon. He would, however, be paid one month's salary in lieu of notice. 4. A "workman" is defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as follows: "2[(s) "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person- (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.]" 5. Mr. Dubey for the company submits that the employment of the petitioner was contractual. In other words, he tried to suggest that the petitioner was like an independent contractor and not a servant of the company. 6. The language of Section 2(s) suggests that to be a workman, a person should "employed" in any industry. The word employment means that the person must be in a master-servant relationship with the employer. An employer has to enter into a contract with a servant to define the terms and conditions of the service. An employer also enters into a contract with an independent contractor to obtain his service. Therefore, the key factor or test is whether there is a master-servant relationship. 7.
An employer has to enter into a contract with a servant to define the terms and conditions of the service. An employer also enters into a contract with an independent contractor to obtain his service. Therefore, the key factor or test is whether there is a master-servant relationship. 7. The relationship between an employer and an employee is partly contractual and partly statutory as explained by the Supreme Court in Uptron India Limited v. Shammi Bhan & Another reported in AIR 1998 SC 1681 . 8. The above correspondence clearly denotes that the petitioner was first employed as a probationer Electrical Supervisor of the company and thereafter made a permanent employee. However, the duration of his employment and other terms and conditions of it were regulated by contract. Since the petitioner was doing supervisory work, he fell squarely within the definition of "workman" in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 9. Learned Industrial Tribunal clearly fell into error in holding that the petitioner was not a workman. 10. Now I come to the second part. 11. When the employer terminates the service of an employee, without any fault on his part it is called retrenchment. It is defined in Section 2(oo) as follows: "2[(oo) "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include- (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or] © termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health;]" 12. Now, if an employer chooses to do away with the services of an employee, without fault he is bound to observe some conditions provided in Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. These conditions inter alia are that the workman has to be given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment.
Now, if an employer chooses to do away with the services of an employee, without fault he is bound to observe some conditions provided in Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. These conditions inter alia are that the workman has to be given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment. The workman cannot be retrenched unless the notice period has expired or he has been paid full wages in lieu of notice. Furthermore, for every completed year of continuous service or part thereof in excess of six months the workman would be paid retrenchment compensation equivalent to 15 days' average pay for such a year, 13. Mr. Majumder argues that the petitioner has been removed from service without the compensation prescribed in Section 25F. He said there was no disciplinary proceeding pending against him and none of the other grounds for not treating his termination as retrenchment existed. Mr. Majumder cited various authorities before me. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Madhya Pradesh Bank Karmchari Sangh [M.P.] v. Syndicate Bank and Another, reported in 1996 LAB I.C. 1161 held that Section 2[oo] was to be construed liberally in favour of a workman. In the facts of that case it held that the workman continued in service, as the termination notice was bad certain points of defence usually taken by the employer that the employee's contract expired etc. should not be viewed in favourable light by the Court. This view of the Madhya Pradesh High Court was endorsed by a division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Shailendra Nath Shukla and Others v. Vice-Chancellor, Allahabad University and Others; reported in 1987 LAB I.C. 1607. 14. The Supreme Court stated the following in Mohan Lal v. The Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd.; reported in AIR 1981 SC 1253 . "9. Reverting to the facts of this case, termination of service of the appellant does not fall within any of the excepted or to be precise, excluded categories. Undoubtedly therefore the termination would constitute retrenchment and by a catena of decisions it is well settled that where prerequisite for valid retrenchment as laid down in Section 25F has not been complied with, retrenchment bringing about termination of service is ab initio void.
Undoubtedly therefore the termination would constitute retrenchment and by a catena of decisions it is well settled that where prerequisite for valid retrenchment as laid down in Section 25F has not been complied with, retrenchment bringing about termination of service is ab initio void. In State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, [1960] 2 SCR 866 at p. 872: [ AIR 1960 SC 610 at p. 613] this Court held that failure to comply with the requirement of Section 25F which prescribes a condition precedent for a valid retrenchment renders the order of retrenchment invalid and inoperative. In other words, it does not bring about a cessation of service of the workman and the workman continues to be in service. This was not even seriously controverted before us." 15. Mr. Majumder is right. The termination of the service of the petitioner amounts to retrenchment without compensation. For all those reasons, this writ application succeeds. The impugned award dated 15th March, 2011 of the Industrial Tribunal is set aside. The writ petitioner be immediately reinstated in the services of the company together with benefits consequential to this order, particularly provided in paragraph 9 of Mohan Lal v. The Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd.; reported in AIR 1981 SC 1253 to be paid within three months of communication of this order. The writ petitioner is to be reinstated immediately.[ 2017 DIGILAW 136 (CAL) · digilaw.ai ]