JUDGMENT : Abdullah Gulamahmed Uraizee, J. 1. This appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("the Code" for short) is directed against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 30.12.2006 passed by learned Additional Senior Civil Judge and learned Judicial Magistrate (First Class), Kachchh at Bhuj in Criminal Case No. 338 of 1999 whereby and where-under the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 are acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 7(2)(ix)(k) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1958 (sic 1954) ("PEA Act" for short) and Rule 32(c) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 ("PFAR" for short). The prosecution case against the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 original accused persons is that on 5-3-1998 at 16 hours, the appellant visited the shop of respondent No. 1 who is dealing in Balaji wafers Chevda (Balaji) on confectionery groundnut on wholesale basis. The appellant, who is the Food Inspector, purchased three sealed polythene bags each containing 10 packets Chevda (Balaji) weighing 100 grams, they were sent for analysis. The report dated 4-4-1998 of the Public Analyst revealed that the sample of Chevda (Balaji) was misbranded under Section 2(ix)(k) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1958. The appellant, therefore, filed a complaint in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Kachchh at Bhuj for the offence punishable under Section 2(ix)(k) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Rule 32(c) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. The complaint was registered as Criminal Case No. 338 of 1999. The learned Judicial Magistrate (First Class) Bhuj by the impugned judgment and order of acquittal acquitted the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 original accused persons of the charges levelled against them essentially on the ground that the consent given by the appropriate authority for prosecution suffers from non application of mind, as it is alleged that the complaint on the pocket name of the manufacturer of the food article was not printed while the report of the analyst says that the address of the manufacturer is not mentioned to opine that the sample was misbranded. 2. The appellant being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal has preferred the present appeal. 3. I have heard Mr. Nalin Thakkar, learned advocate for the appellant, Mr. D.K. Modi, learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 and Ms. 2. The appellant being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal has preferred the present appeal. 3. I have heard Mr. Nalin Thakkar, learned advocate for the appellant, Mr. D.K. Modi, learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 and Ms. Hansa Punani, learned APP for the respondent No. 6 State. 4. Mr. Thakkar, learned advocate for the appellant vehemently submits that the learned trial Magistrate has committed an error in acquitting the accused persons on the ground that there is a variation in the allegation made in the complaint and the report of the Public Analyst as regards the name and address of the manufacturer. It is his submission that the address includes the name, and therefore, the learned trial Judge ought not to have acquitted the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 on this ground. He further submits that sanctioning authority had given consent to file complaint after perusing relevant papers as is apparent from one Exhibit-104, therefore, the learned trial Judge ought not to have acquitted the accused persons on the ground that the consent suffers from non-application of mind. He, therefore, urges that the appeal may be allowed, and the accused persons may be convicted appropriately. 5. Mr. Modi, learned advocate for the accused persons has supported the impugned order relied upon unreported decision of this Court dated 18-9-2000 in Criminal Revision Application No. 110 of 1994. He submits that it cannot be said that appropriate authority has given the consent after due application of mind. He, therefore, urges that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal does not warrant any interference in this appeal. 6. Ms. Punani, learned APP submits that appropriate order may be passed on perusal of the record. 7. The scope of acquittal appeal under Section 378 (1)(3) of the Code is limited. The Supreme Court in the case of Sadhu Saran Sing v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2016) 4 SCC 357 : ( AIR 2016 SC 1160 , para 18), have explained the scope of acquittal appeal in paragraph No. 20 as under: "20. Generally, an appeal against acquittal has always been altogether on a different pedestal from that of an appeal against conviction. Generally, an appeal against acquittal has always been altogether on a different pedestal from that of an appeal against conviction. In an appeal against acquittal where the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced, the appellate Court would interfere with the order of acquittal only when there is perversity of fact and law. However, we believe that the paramount consideration of the Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. This Court, while enunciating the principles with regard to the scope of powers of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal in Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : ( AIR 1998 SC 2107 ) has held: 7. The principles with regard to the scope of the powers of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal, are well settled. The powers of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal are no less than in an appeal against conviction. But where on the basis of evidence on record two views are reasonably possible the appellate Court cannot substitute its view in the place of that of the trial Court. It is only when the approach of the trial Court in acquitting an accused is found to be clearly erroneous in its consideration of evidence on record and in deducing conclusions therefrom that the appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal. 8. The perusal of record, particularly, the complaint and the report of Public Analyst Exhibit-104, it is manifestly evident that in the complaint it is stated that the pockets of the samples did not bear the name of the manufacturer whereas Exhibit-4 Public Analyst reports states that the label does not bear the address of manufacturer or packers. The learned trial Judge, therefore, by assigning elaborate reasons in the impugned judgment has recorded a finding that the consent given by the appropriate authority for prosecution suffers from non-application of mind. The learned trial Judge, therefore, by assigning elaborate reasons in the impugned judgment has recorded a finding that the consent given by the appropriate authority for prosecution suffers from non-application of mind. The reasons recorded by the learned trial Judge, in my opinion, cannot be said to be perverse or illegal when this discrepancy is manifest and clearly demonstrates the non-application of mind on the part of the appropriate authority while according consent to file prosecution against the respondents. 9. This Court in a decision rendered on 18-9-2000 in Criminal Revision Application No. 110 of 1994 in the case of Shankarlal Mangilal Jain v. State of Gujarat, has observed as under regarding application or non application of mind on the part of the consenting authority: "The consent as recorded does not evidence active application of mind. Though no reasons are required to be recorded while granting consent under section 20 of the Act, the prosecution is duty bound to satisfy the court that the consent had been given after perusal of all the relevant papers and after proper application of mind. Such application of mind can either be manifest in the consent granted or can be proved by oral evidence. In the present case, the Food Inspector has deposed that he had drafted the complaint and had submitted all the papers to the competent authority. The consenting authority had perused all the papers and recorded the consent as aforesaid. I am afraid, this is not sufficient to satisfy the court as regards the proper application of mind. The Food Inspector has not disclosed which were the papers which were placed before the consenting authority, nor the competent authority had been examined by the prosecution. Hence, in my view, the prosecution has failed to prove that the consenting authority had granted consent under section 20 (1) of the Act after scrutinizing all the relevant papers and after proper application of mind." 10. In the case on hand, apart from the manifest discrepancy as regards the name and address of the manufacturer in the complaint on one hand, and the report of the Public Analyst on the other, it is not emerging either from the complaint or the oral evidence of the appellant as to what papers were placed before the consenting authority for his perusal to record satisfaction after applying mind whether to give consent for launching prosecution against the respondents. The application of mind on the part of the consenting authority has to be active and not mechanical. For active application of mind, it has to be demonstrated before the Court the specific papers having bearing on the active application of mind were placed before the consenting authority. Merely, stating that the relevant papers were placed before the authority would not meet the parameters required for recording a conclusion that the consenting authority had given consent after active application of mind. The moment prosecuting agency by the cogent evidence indicates that the nature of papers which were placed before the appropriate authority for according consent, then in that case, it would not be necessary for the appropriate authority to state that the nature of documents considered while giving consent for prosecution. 11. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the consenting authority had given consent for prosecution after due active application of mind as result the mandatory provisions of Section 20 which is mandatory in nature as has been held by catena of decisions is violated. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal, therefore, does not warrant interference in this appeal. 12. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Record and proceedings is ordered to be remitted back to the Tribunal forthwith.