JUDGMENT : Shabihul Hasnain, J. This criminal appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 16.11.1981 passed by 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge, Faizabad in Sessions Trial No. 30 of 1981 convicting appellant No.1 to 7 under section 147 I.P.C. to one year, under section 302 I.P.C. read with section 149 I.P.C. to life imprisonment and under section 324 read with section 149 I.P.C. to two years R.I. and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- each in default of payment of fine to six months R.I. and convicted appellant No.8 under section 148 I.P.C. to two years R.I., under section 302 I.P.C. to life imprisonment and under section 324 I.P.C. to two years R.I. and a fine of Rs. 500/- in default of payment of fine to six months R.I. 2. During pendency of this appeal, appellant no. 1 Ram Achal, appellant No.5 Barsati, appellant No.6 Achhe Lal and appellant No.7 Chhotey Lal died, therefore, their appeal stood abated vide order of this Court dated 19.7.2016. 3. The prosecution story as has been unfolded by the F.I.R. lodged by the complainant P.W. 1 is that there was a litigation of agricultural land between the complainant and accused persons, in which the complainant had succeeded from Consolidation Court, for the reason thereof, the accused persons bore grudge against the complainant. On 25.6.1980 at about 9.00 a.m. Consolidation Lekhpal Shiv Bahadur Lal and Kanungo had gone to the complainant's village for making measurement of the aforesaid agricultural field. The complainant and his brother Shanker, Lekhpal Shiv Bahadur Lal and Kanungo were sitting at the door of Bans Raj Yadava in the aforesaid village of the complainant. There existed a mango grove near the house of Bans Raj Yadava. The complainant and his brother were keeping watch over the aforesaid mango grove. When the accused persons and others learnt that Lekhpal and Kanungo had come to make measurement of the said field, then the accused persons got greatly angry and accused persons namely Ram Achal, Shri Pad, Budh Ram, Tulsi, Barsati, Chotelal, Achhelal armed with Lathis in their hands and the accused Hari Ram armed with spear turned up and started assaulting the complainant with lathis and brother Shanker Lal with the spear. 4. 4. It has been specifically stated in the F.I.R. that accused Hari Ram assaulted Shanker with spear, who fell down and after his falling down all the accused men assaulted him with their respective weapons held by them and thus killed Shanker. 5. On hearing alarm raised by the complainant, the Lekhpal and Kanungo, witnesses Rajit Ram, Paras, Ram Naresh, Bans Raj of the village and others, reached at the place of occurrence and saw the incident. The accused persons having assaulted the complainant and killing his brother Shanker, fled away. 6. On completion of proper investigation, the charge sheet was submitted against all the accused. Charges were framed against accused Ram Achal, Tulsi, Budh Ram, Sri Pal, Barsati, Chhotelal and Achhelal for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 302/324 read with section 149 of the I.P.C. Accused Hari Ram, who was having spear in his hand, was charged u/s 302/324 I.P.C. 7. In support of its case, the prosecution has examined Khunkhun, the complainant as P.W. 1, Ram Naresh P.W. 2, Rajit Ram P.W. 3 as eye witnesses of the incident. Dr. L.K. Agnihotgri as P.W. 4 and S.I. B.D. Singh, I.O., P.W. 5 as formal witnesses. 8. The trial Court, after going through the ocular account furnished by the prosecution witnesses, coupled with the circumstances and facts of the case, found that the prosecution has been able to prove guilt of the accused persons beyond any doubt. Therefore, the learned sessions judge passed the order convicting and sentencing them as stated above. Hence this appeal. 9. We have Sri Mohd. Abid Ali, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Umesh Verma, learned A.G.A. for the State, considered their rival submissions. 10. Firstly we may now advert to the evidence of P.W. 1 Khunkhun, who is alleged to have lodged the F.I.R. He narrated the prosecution version as set up in the F.I.R. He stated that accused Ram Achal, Budh Ram, Tulsi, Sri Pal, Achchey Lal, Chhotey Lal and Barsati armed with Lathi and accused Hari Ram with Bhala came while he along with his brother Shanker were sitting and watching mango grove and hurled lathi on his back side. Then Hari Ram assaulted him with Bhala on which he sat down. After which, the accused persons beaten deceased-Shanker with their lathis and Bhala. Thereafter, they fled away towards West. He got himself medically examined the same day. Then Hari Ram assaulted him with Bhala on which he sat down. After which, the accused persons beaten deceased-Shanker with their lathis and Bhala. Thereafter, they fled away towards West. He got himself medically examined the same day. He raised alarm which attracted Rajit Ram, Paras and other turned up. The deceased-Shanker died as a result of injuries caused by means of respective weapons held by the accused men at the spot. In his cross-examination on the query put by the defence, he stated that he does not know that son of accused Sri Pal died in the morning at 6-7 on the date of accused. The house of accused Sri Pal is at the distance of six lattha. He also does not hear the sound of hue and cry from the house of Sri Pal. Since the time, the accused quarreled about my field and filed Consolidation case, the accused persons at one hand and between me there has been enmity. In his cross-examination he has fully supported the prosecution story. He has asserted that he had seen Hari Ram assaulting Shanker by means of spear and accused Budh Ram assaulting Shanker by means of Lathi. 11. P.W. 2 Ram Naresh also fully supported the testimony of P.W. 1. He has stated that accused Tulsi and Sri Pal had assaulted Khunkhun with lathi and accused Hari Ram assaulted Khunkhun by spear as a result of which Khunkhun, the complainant sat down, thereafter, accused Ram Achal, Barsati, Achchelal and Chhotelal assaulted Shanker by means of lathi and accused Hari Ram assaulted Shanker with spear, on which Shanker fell down being injured and died. 12. The statement of P.W. 3 Rajit Ram also corroborated the prosecution version as has been adduced by P.W. 1 and 2. He asserted that accused Sri Pal asnd Tulsi had assaulted Khunkhun by lathi for 2 to 3 times and accused Hari Ram who was armed with spear, assaulted Khunkhun, then accused Ram Achal, Budh Ram, Chhotelal, Achchelal had assaulted Shanker by means of lathi and when Hari Ram gave spear blow to Khunkhun then he sat down, then accused Hari Ram leaving khunkhun, assaulted Shanker by means of speard and accused Ram Achal, Budh Ram, Tulsi, Shri Pal, Chhotelal, Achchedlal and Barsati put an end to the life of Shanker. 13. 13. We have gone through the ocular account furnished by the three eye witnesses and found that nothing has come in their statements, which may discredit their testimony. All the three eye witnesses have given consistent version about hurling of lathis on the person of injured witness Khunkhun, P.W.1, who is the complainant in this case as well as inflicting injuries on the person of deceased Shanker. They have categorically supported the prosecution story regarding incident having taken place. We find that there is no reason whatsoever not to accept their evidence. 14. Sri Abid Ali, learned counsel for the appellant has laid much stress on the fact that Lekhpal and Kanoongo, who are said to be present at the place of occurrence have not been produced as witness by the prosecution. These two witnesses could have been independent witnesses of fact but their non-production as witnesses for the prosecution, gives rise to the presumption against the story of the prosecution. If they would have been produced, the truth had come. The appellants have referred to Section 111 (g) of Indian Evidence Act. For convenience Section 111-G is quoted herein below:- "111. Proof of good faith in transactions where one party is in relation of active confidence. - Where there is a question as to the good faith of a transaction between parties, one of whom stands to the other in a position of active confidence, the burden of proving the good faith of the transaction is on the party who is in a position of active confidence." 15. Sri Abid Ali has relied upon para-20 of the case of Ramesh and others v. The State, reported in 2004 CRI. L.J, 1877, which reads as under:- "Before we proceed to the operative part of the judgment we would also like to give three other reasons as to why we are not inclined to accept the prosecution case. Firstly, we have seen that right from the F.I.R. the prosecution case is that co-villagers Kallu and Bhelu saw the incident. It is pertinent to mention that neither of them were examined by the prosecution and the reasons furnished by it for their non-examination which is contained in the examination in which of Idris (PW-2), that on account of fear they and Abid were not prepared to depose against the appellants is untenable because Abid was examined by it as PW 10. In this connection, we would like to advert to the decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1971 SC 1586 : 1971 Crl. L.J. 1173 (State of U.P. v. Jaggo alias Jagdish) wherein in paragraph 16 the Supreme Court has laid down that a mere averment by the prosecution in the form of an application that a witness has been won over is not sufficient and the said witness should be examined in Court. In our view, the failure of the prosecution to examine Kallu and Bhelu is another nail in the coffin of the prosecution. In this connection we would also like to advert to the provisions contained in Section 114 (g) of the Indian Evidence Act, which are to the effect that if evidence which could have been produced is not produced, the presumption would be that it would have gone against the party which withholds it. In our view, it would be reasonable to draw the said inference in this case." 16. Sri Abid Ali has also stressed that the prosecution has not produced any order, on which the basis of which it can be ascertained that Kanoongo and Lekhpal had come to the village for demarcation of field. Such an order has to be passed on behalf of District Magistrate of concerning District. Further no judgment of the Joint Director, Consolidation as alleged by P.W.1, was produced by prosecution during the trial. 17. On the basis of this argument Sri Abid Ali has tried to emphasize that the story of prosecution was baseless. No incident had taken place at 9.00 a.m as stated by P.W.1 and other witnesses. Further non-production of the Lekhpal and Kanoongo will raise a presumption against the prosecution story. 18. Learned A.G.A. Sri Umesh Kumar Verma has replied to the argument of Sri Mohd. Abid Ali comprehensively. He has argued that the argument with regard to applicability of Section 111-G is absolutely misconceived. He has argued that non-producing of likely eye witness will not mean that other eye witnesses' account has to be disbelieved. Moreover, it was open to the defence to have resorted to Section 311 of Cr.P.C. they could have moved an application for summoning the Lekhpal and the Kanoongo before the court to testify in the matter. 19. He has argued that non-producing of likely eye witness will not mean that other eye witnesses' account has to be disbelieved. Moreover, it was open to the defence to have resorted to Section 311 of Cr.P.C. they could have moved an application for summoning the Lekhpal and the Kanoongo before the court to testify in the matter. 19. Learned A.G.A. has relied upon the case law of State of M.P. v. Dharkole alias Govind Singh and others, reported in 2005 Supreme Court Cases (Crl.) 225. In paragraph 14 of this judgment Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- "14. It is not necessary for prosecution to examine somebody as a witness even though the witness was not likely to support the prosecution version. Non-examination of some persons per se does not corrode vitality of prosecution version, particularly when the witnesses examined have withstood incisive cross-examination and pointed to the respondents as the perpetrators of the crime." 20. In another case law cited by learned A.G.A. in the case of Hukum Singh and others v. State of Rajasthan, 2000 Supreme Court Cases (Cri.) 1416, in which in paras 9, 10, 12 and 14 following has been held:- "10. Shri Uday Umesh Lalit, learned counsel for the appellants made a criticism against the Public Prosecutor for not examining those two witnesses, as they were the only independent witnesses. Learned counsel contended that the Public Prosecutor can not withhold the evidence of such independent witnesses in a case of this nature as the remaining witnesses were the close relatives of the deceased person. The discretion of the Public Prosecutor in choosing the witnesses for examination cannot include the freedom to keep away such independent witnesses from being examined, argued the counsel. ..... 12. In trials before a Court of Sessions the prosecution shall be conduced by a Public Prosecutor. Section 226 of the Code enjoins on him to open up his case by describing the charge brought against the accused. He has to state what evidence he proposes to adduce for proving the guilt of the accused. If he knew at that stage itself that certain persons cited by the investigating agency as witnesses might not support the prosecution case he is at liberty to state before the court that fact. Alternatively, he can wait further and obtain direct information about the version which any particular witness might speak in court. If he knew at that stage itself that certain persons cited by the investigating agency as witnesses might not support the prosecution case he is at liberty to state before the court that fact. Alternatively, he can wait further and obtain direct information about the version which any particular witness might speak in court. If that version is not in support of the prosecution case it would be unreasonable to insist on the Public Prosecutor to examine those persons as witnesses for prosecution. 13. When the case reaches the stage envisaged in Section 231 of the Code the Sessions Judge is obliged to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution. It is clear from the said Section that the Public Prosecutor is expected to produce evidence in support of the prosecution and not in derogation of the prosecution case. At the said stage the Public Prosecutor would be in a position to take a decision as to which among the persons cited are to be examined. If there are too many witnesses on the same point the Public Prosecutor is at liberty to choose two or some among them alone so that the time of the court can be saved from repetitious depositions on the same factual aspects. That principle applies when there are too many witnesses cited if they all had sustained injuries at the occurrence. The Public Prosecutor in such cases is not obliged to examine all the injured witnesses. If he is satisfied by examining any two or three of them, it is open to him to inform the court that he does not propose to examine the remaining persons in that category. This will help not only the prosecution for relieving itself of the strain of adducing repetitive evidence on the same point but also helps the court considerably in lessening the workload. Time has come to make every effort possible to lessen the workload, particularly those courts crammed with cases, but without impairing the cause of justice. 14. This will help not only the prosecution for relieving itself of the strain of adducing repetitive evidence on the same point but also helps the court considerably in lessening the workload. Time has come to make every effort possible to lessen the workload, particularly those courts crammed with cases, but without impairing the cause of justice. 14. The situation in a case where the prosecution cited two categories of witnesses to the occurrence, one consisting of persons closely related to the victim and the other consisting of witnesses who have no such relation, the Public Prosecutors duty to the court may require him to produce witnesses from the latter category also subject to his discretion to limit to one or two among them. But if the Public Prosecutor got reliable information that any one among that category would not support the prosecution version he is free to state in court about that fact and skip that witness being examined as a prosecution witness. It is open to the defence to cite him and examine him as defence witness. The decision in this regard has to be taken by the Public Prosecutor in a fair manner. He can interview the witness before hand to enable him to know well in advance the stand which that particular person would be adopting when examined as a witness in court." 21. In the case of Vijendra Singh v. State of U.P. and Mahendra Singh v. State of U.P. reported in 2017 (1) JIC 328 (SC) their Lordships in para 30 of the case have observed as under:- "30. The next plank of argument of Mr. Giri is that since Nepal Singh who had been stated to have accompanied PW-2 and PW-3 has not been examined and similarly, Ram Kala and Bansa who had been stated to have arrived at the tube-well as per the testimony of PW-2, have not been examined, the prosecution's version has to be discarded, for it has deliberately not cited the independent material witnesses. It is noticeable from the decision of the trial court and the High Court, reliance has been placed on the testimony of PWs 1 to 3 and their version has been accepted. They have treated PW-2 and PW-3 as natural witnesses who have testified that the accused persons were leaving the place after commission of the offence and they had seen them quite closely. They have treated PW-2 and PW-3 as natural witnesses who have testified that the accused persons were leaving the place after commission of the offence and they had seen them quite closely. The contention that they were interested witnesses and their implication is due to inimical disposition towards accused persons has not been accepted and we have concurred with the said finding. It has come out in evidence that witnesses and the accused persons belong to the same village. The submission of Mr. Giri is that non-examination Nepal Singh, Ramlal and Kalsa is quite critical for the case of the prosecution and as put forth by him, their non-examination crucially affects the prosecution version and creates a sense of doubt. According to Mr. Giri, Nepal Singh is a material witness. In this regard we may refer to the authority in State of H.P. v. Gian Chand wherein it has been held that non-examination of a material witness is again not a mathematical formula for discarding the weight of the testimony available on record howsoever natural, trustworthy and convincing it may be. The charge of withholding a material witness from the court levelled against the prosecution should be examined in the background of the facts and circumstances of each case so as to find whether the witnesses are available for being examined in the court and were yet withheld by the prosecution. The Court after so holding further ruled that it is the duty of the court to first assess the trustworthiness of the evidence available on record and if the court finds the evidence adduced worthy of being relied on and deserves acceptance, then non-examination of any other witnesses available who could also have been examined but were not examined, does not affect the case of the prosecution." 22. The arguments of the learned A.G.A. carries weigh because non examination of Lekhpal and Kanungo, would not affect the case of the prosecution. We find that the prosecution evidence adduced in this case is trustworthy and reliance can very well be placed upon the testimony of the eye witnesses produced by the prosecution. Mere facts that some of the witnesses have not been examined is of no consequence when credible evidence and unshaken testimony of injured witness, the complainant are available on record. 23. Mere facts that some of the witnesses have not been examined is of no consequence when credible evidence and unshaken testimony of injured witness, the complainant are available on record. 23. Sri Abid Ali has submitted that there was no immediate provocation/motive with the appellants to have caused assault and hence the story of the prosecution cannot be believed. We are of the firm opinion that in the light of direct evidence adduced by the prosecution, this argument of the appellants would be of no consequence and fails. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh and others reported in 2017 Crl.L.J. 291, observed as under :- "..................It is a settled legal proposition that even if the absence of motive, as alleged, is accepted that is of no consequence and pales into insignificance when direct evidence establishes the crime. Therefore, in case there is direct trustworthy evidence of witnesses as to commission of an offence, motive loses its significance. Therefore, if the genesis of the motive of the occurrence is not proved, the ocular testimony of the witnesses as to the occurrence could not be discarded only on the ground of absence of motive, if otherwise the evidence is worthy of reliance." 24. Much stress has been laid by him about death of Sri Pal son of Manorath Pal-appellant No.4. Sri Abid Ali has submitted that the prosecution witnesses have denied any knowledge about the death of son of Sri Pal although they were living on the main road. He has argued that the appellants had gone for the burial of the son of Sri Pal at the time of incident. The death certificate issued by competent authority has not been denied by prosecution. 25. So far the case about death of Sri Pal's son is concerned, Sri Umesh Verma, learned A.G.A. has argued that in case defence wanted to take the plea of alibi that they have gone for burial of the child at the time of the incident it was their duty to have brought any witness of the village who had attended the burial/funeral. In Indian social structure many people accompany a dead body along with family members. No witness has been brought forward from the defence site to prove that the accused had actually gone for burial at the time of incident. In Indian social structure many people accompany a dead body along with family members. No witness has been brought forward from the defence site to prove that the accused had actually gone for burial at the time of incident. Learned A.G.A. has referred to Section 101 of the Evidence Act, which is quoted herein below:- "101. Burden of proof. - Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person." 26. Learned A.G.A. has also referred to the case of Vijay Pal v. State (GNCT) of Delhi, reported in 2015 CRI. L.J. 2041. He has referred to paragraphs 23 and 25 of the said judgment, which will be interesting to be quoted here for usefulness of this case:- "23. The Latin word alibi means "elsewhere" and that word is used for convenience when an accused takes recourse to a defence line that when the occurrence took place he was so far away from the place of occurrence that it is extremely improbable that he would have participated in the crime. It is a basic law that in a criminal case, in which the accused is alleged to have inflicted physical injury to another person, the burden is on the prosecution to prove that the accused was present at the scene and has participated in the crime. The burden would not be lessened by the mere fact that the accused has adopted the defence of alibi. The plea of the accused in such cases need be considered only when the burden has been discharged by the prosecution satisfactorily. But once the prosecution succeeds in discharging the burden it is incumbent on the accused, who adopts the plea of alibi, to prove it with absolute certainty so as to exclude the possibility of his presence at the place of occurrence. When the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence has been established satisfactorily by the prosecution through reliable evidence, normally the court would be slow to believe any counter-evidence to the effect that he was elsewhere when the occurrence happened. When the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence has been established satisfactorily by the prosecution through reliable evidence, normally the court would be slow to believe any counter-evidence to the effect that he was elsewhere when the occurrence happened. But if the evidence adduced by the accused is of such a quality and of such a standard that the court may entertain some reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the scene when the occurrence took place, the accused would, no doubt, be entitled to the benefit of that reasonable doubt. For that purpose, it would be a sound proposition to be laid down that, in such circumstances, the burden on the accused is rather heavy. It follows, therefore, that strict proof is required for establishing the plea of alibi. [Emphasis supplied] The said principle has been reiterated in Gurpreet Singh v. State of Haryana, S.K. Sattar v. State of Maharashtra and Jitender Kumar v. State of Haryana. 25. In our considered opinion, when the trial court as well as the High Court have disbelieved the plea of alibi which is a concurrent finding of fact, there is no warrant to dislodge the same. The evidence that has been adduced by the accused to prove the plea of alibi is sketchy and in fact does not stand to reason. It is not a case where the accused has proven with absolute certainty so as to exclude the possibility of his presence at the place of occurrence. The evidence adduced by the accused is not of such a quality that the Court would entertain a reasonable doubt. The burden on the accused is rather heavy and he is required to establish the plea of alibi with certitude. In the instant case, nothing has been brought on record that it was a physical impossibility of the presence of the accused to be at the scene of the offence by reason of his presence at another place. The plea can succeed only if it is shown that the accused was so far away at the relevant time that he could not be present at the place where the crime was committed. [See Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P.. The evidence of the sister, DW-1, does not inspire any confidence. The plea can succeed only if it is shown that the accused was so far away at the relevant time that he could not be present at the place where the crime was committed. [See Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P.. The evidence of the sister, DW-1, does not inspire any confidence. The cumulative effect of the evidence as regards the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence cannot be disbelieved on the basis of bald utterance of the sister which is not only sketchy but also defies reason. Hence, we are obliged to concur with the findings recorded on this score by the learned trial Judge that has been given the stamp of approval by the High Court." 27. Learned A.G.A. has also submitted that in the cross examination of P.W.-1 the death certificate was not shown to him and he did not question about the authenticity of death certificate. Similar question was asked as to whether he knew nothing about the death of the child which was replied in the negative by the prosecution witness No.1. This fact finds mention on page 24 of the paper book. Similarly, no document was shown to P.W.3 and no question was put to P.W.2 about the death. 28. This plea of the appellant is not fortified by any documentary or oral evidence available on record. The appellants has not been able to prove it with absolute certainty so as to exclude the possibility of his presence at the place of occurrence. When the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence has been established satisfactorily by the prosecution through reliable evidence, their testimony cannot be discarded on mere placing un-established facts. 29. Lastly, Sri Abid Ali has submitted that the testimony of Ram Naresh-P.W.2 cannot be relied upon as he is an interested witness and the testimony of Rajit Ram appears to be improbable. Rajit Ram in his testimony has submitted that he had gone to see his field at around 6-7 a.m. and after remaining there for around half an hour he was returning to his house when he saw the incident. He has argued that calculation of time does not reach to 9.00 a.m. hence the testimony of Rajit Ram is not reliable. 30. He has argued that calculation of time does not reach to 9.00 a.m. hence the testimony of Rajit Ram is not reliable. 30. Learned counsel for the prosecution Sri Umesh Verma has argued that spontaneity in this case is very important feature to be noted. We find that the incident took place at 9.00 a.m. F.I.R. was lodged promptly at 10.15 a.m. the distance to the police station is said to be four kilometers. The F.I.R. was lodged by the injured witness. P.W.-1 Khunkhun. The Inspector is reported to have taken the statement of P.W.1 under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Simultaneously, he has reached the spot of occurrence around 11.00 a.m. Inquest took place between 11.30 to 12.30. Postmortem was held at 4.15 and the injured witness was medically examined at 3.45 by the Doctors. It is also to be noted that it was Sunday and initially no Doctor was available at P.H.C., hence the time taken in the medical treatment of P.W.1 is understandable. We find substance in stand taken by the A.G.A. that this spontaneity and chain of events is also worth of consideration. It effectively refutes the charges of Sri Mohd. Abid Ali that any story could have been concocted for false implication or cooked up a nonexistent factual story. 31. The postmortem report has not been challenged by the defence. The cross examination of Dr. at page 27 corroborates the findings of the postmortem report. According to Khunkhun P.W.1 the deceased had taken breakfast at around 7.00 a.m. Undigested food were found on in his body in the postmortem report. Time of death has been fixed around 9.00 O' clock, hence the prosecution story corroborates with the medical evidence. A person whose brother has been murdered at 9.00 a.m. lodges the F.I.R. promptly at 10.15 a.m. traveling by bicycle driven by someone else clearly shows that he was injured and could not have driven the bicycle himself. There is no delay, no concoction could be presumed. Moreover, the Inspector after lodging the F.I.R. as well as taking statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. has also referred him for medical examination which further corroborates the story of prosecution given in the F.I.R. coupled with the statement of Khunkhun P.W.1, the injured witness during trial. 32. There is no delay, no concoction could be presumed. Moreover, the Inspector after lodging the F.I.R. as well as taking statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. has also referred him for medical examination which further corroborates the story of prosecution given in the F.I.R. coupled with the statement of Khunkhun P.W.1, the injured witness during trial. 32. We are in absolute agreement with the findings arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge and in view of the above discussion, we do not find anything wrong with the conviction and sentence recorded against the appellants. 33. Therefore, the appeal being bereft of substance, is hereby dismissed. The appellants be taken into custody to serve the sentence passed against them.