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2017 DIGILAW 138 (GAU)

Sweety Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Arun Gogoi

2017-01-31

KALYAN RAI SURANA

body2017
JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. I. Chowdhury, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. P.C. Dey, learned counsel for the sole respondent. 2. By filing this application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged the impugned order dated 09.12.2015 passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 3, Guwahati in Misc.(J) Case No. 65/2014, arising in connection with T.S. No. 223/2012. 3. In order to appreciate the issues involved in this revision, it is necessary to state a summary of the case of the parties before the learned trial court:- a. The petitioner No. 1 herein is the plaintiff in T.S. No. 223/2012. Sri Maneswar Sargiari (Boro) was the arrayed as the defendant No. 1 in the said suit, who is not a party in this revision. Smt. Sunita Devi Jalan and Smt. Prachir Jalan were arrayed as Proforma defendants No. 2 and 3 in the suit, but they are not the parties in this revision. Later in point of time, the sole respondent herein was impleaded in the suit as defendant No.2. b. The suit was for declaration, recovery of possession and permanent injunction. c. In the plaint, it was projected that the plaintiff had purchased four plots of land, described in Schedules- A, B, C and D of the plaint and it was alleged that in the year 2004, the said Arun Gogoi had kept the defendant No. 1 as a watchman in respect of the suit land described in Schedule-B, by constructing a house, where the defendant No. 1 was residing with his family. d. It was further projected that in respect of the land described in Schedule B of the present plaint, the said Sri Arun Gogoi had filed a suit against the present Proforma defendants in the present suit, which was registered as T.S. No. 260/2007. The said suit was made over to the court of learned Civil Judge No. 3, Guwahati for trial. It has been stated in the plaint that the suit was withdrawn by the said Sri Arun Gogoi on amicable settlement by order dated 17.12.2011. But after the suit was withdrawn, the defendant No. 1 was asked by the said Sri Arun Gogoi to look after the suit property described in Schedule A, B, C and D of the plaint in the present suit. But after the suit was withdrawn, the defendant No. 1 was asked by the said Sri Arun Gogoi to look after the suit property described in Schedule A, B, C and D of the plaint in the present suit. The defendant No. 1 by submitting his written statement contested the said suit. Be it stated that at the time of filing the suit, the said Arun Gogoi, who is the sole respondent herein was not a party in the suit when it was initially filed and he was subsequently impleaded as defendant no.2. e. Along with the said suit, a separate application for injunction was filed by the respondent No.1 herein, which was registered as Misc. (J) Case No. 239/2012. The learned Civil Judge No. 3, Guwahati by order dated 19.10.2012 passed in the said Misc. (J) Case No. 239/2012, granted ad interim order of injunction, restraining the Opp. Party from alienating the suit land as shown in Schedule-A to D land or to change the nature and feature of the suit land by way of construction till the disposal of T.S. No. 223/12. The relevant and operative part of the said order is as follows:- “From the documents available, I am of the considered opinion that as the plaintiff has been able to demonstrate better title and OP has not claimed any title for himself, the balance of convenience lies in favour of the petitioner. I found in the submission of the petitioner side that on the strength of possession, if the OP transferred the land by way of sale, gift or mortgage, the petitioner shall suffer irreparable loss and injury. During hearing ld. Advocate of the OP has admitted that they have no claim of possession except over the B schedule land of the plaint. Considering all above, I am of the opinion that the suit properties need to be protected during trial of main suit. As such, it is a fit case for grant of temporary injunction by restraining the OP from alienating the suit land as shown in Schedule A to D land or to change the nature and feature of the suit land by way of construction till disposal of T.S. 223/2012. As such, it is a fit case for grant of temporary injunction by restraining the OP from alienating the suit land as shown in Schedule A to D land or to change the nature and feature of the suit land by way of construction till disposal of T.S. 223/2012. OP/defendant is hereby restrained from alienating the suit land as shown in schedule A to D land or to change the nature and feature of the suit land by way of any type of construction till disposal of TS 223/2012. This Misc. Case is disposed on contest accordingly.” f. The defendant No. 1 by filing an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC prayed for ad interim injunction restraining the Opp. Party/plaintiff, their men and agent from doing earth filling in the schedule properties and for temporary injunction restraining the Opp. Party from making any construction over the schedule properties. The said application was registered as Misc. (J) Case No. 283/2012. The plaintiff contested the said Misc.(J) Case No. 65/2013 by filing written objection. The learned Civil Judge No.3, Guwahati, by an order dated 30.04.2015, disposed of the said application by holding that the same has become infructuous. g. During the pendency of the said suit, Sri Arun Gogoi, who is arrayed as the sole respondent herein, had filed Petition No. 1211/2013 on 14.03.2013 under the provisions of Order I Rule 10(2) CPC for impleading him as defendant No. 2 in the suit. By order dated 30.05.2013 he was allowed to be impleaded as defendant No. 2 in the suit and the then Proforma defendant No. 2 and 3 were renamed as Proforma defendants No. 3 and 4 respectively. h. It is recorded in the said order dated 30.05.2013 that the defendant No. 1 had filed Petition No. 2616/2013, alleging that the plaintiff had violated the injunction order dated 19.10.2012 passed in Misc. (J) Case No. 239/2012. The following prayers were made therein:- “In the premises aforesaid, it is prayed before your Honour to admit this petition and direct the plaintiff not to disturb the peaceful possession of the defendant No. 1 till the disposal of the instant suit for the ends of justice.” i. The plaintiff contested the said application, numbered as Petition No. 2616/2013 by filing their written objection. j. Thereafter, the newly impleaded defendant No. 2 filed an application under Order 39 rule 2A read with Section 61 CPC, alleging violation of the ad-interim order of injunction dated 19.10.2012. The said application was received by the court as Petition No. 3372/2013 dated 05.07.2013 and it was registered as Misc. (J) Case No. 65/2013. The petitioner No. 2 in this revision, namely, Sri Kaushik Kalita was impleaded as the sole Opp. Party in the said case. k. The plaintiff, in the meanwhile, had filed Petition No. 5448/2013 under the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1(3) read with Section 151 CPC to allow the plaintiff Company to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh one. The said prayer made vie petition No. 5748/2013 was rejected, by order dated 25.04.2014 passed in T.S. No. 223/2012. Further, by the same order, the herein before referred Petition No. 2616/2013 was also disposed of as being infructuous. The suit was thereafter, posted for framing of additional issues. 4. During the pendency of the said Misc. (J) Case No. 65/2013, the petitioner herein filed an application under Section 151 CPC for dismissing Misc. (J) Case No. 65/2013 on the plea of maintainability. The said petition was numbered as Petition No. 1538/2015 dated 01.04.2015. The learned Civil Judge No. 3, Guwahati passed in Misc. (J) Case No. 65/2014, rejecting the prayer made in Petition No. 1583/2015, which is the order impugned in the present revision. It would be relevant to quote the entire order for the sake of clarity and for better appreciation of the issue involved in the present revision:- “Both the sides are represented. The case is fixed today for orders on petition No. 1538/2015. The petition was filed by the opposite party/plaintiff under section 151 of the CPC for dismissing the instant Misc. (J) Case on the plea of maintainability. The opposite party/plaintiff has challenged the maintainability of this Misc. (J) Case basically on the following two grounds: (1) The injunction order dated 19.10.2012 was passed against the defendant No. 1 and not against the opposite party/plaintiff. The only intention of the learned Court while passing the injunction order was to protect the rights of opposite party/plaintiff. The learned court has not protected the possession of the defendant No. 1 over the suit land as the learned court has not passed any status quo order. The only intention of the learned Court while passing the injunction order was to protect the rights of opposite party/plaintiff. The learned court has not protected the possession of the defendant No. 1 over the suit land as the learned court has not passed any status quo order. (2) The injunction order dated 19.10.2012 was passed only to restrain the defendant No. 1 from alienating the suit land from changing the nature and feature of the suit land. When the injunction order was passed, the petitioners/defendant No. 2 was not at all a party to the suit, and, as such, the petitioner/defendant No. 2 does not have any locus standi to file the instant miscellaneous petition. Considered the respective submissions of both the sides. Gone through the materials on record. It appears from the injunction order dated 19.10.2012 passed in Misc. (J) Case No. 239/2012, that the plaintiff has sought a temporary injunction restraining the defendant No. 1 and his men and agents from cultivating the suit land and also from alienating any part of the suit land by way of gifts, mortgage, sale etc. It was alleged by the plaintiff that the defendant No. 1 who was merely a watchman kept by Arun Gogoi on the suit land had started ploughing the entire land and also threatened the plaintiff in the event of asking him to vacate the suit land. The then predecessor of mine was of the opinion that the suit properties need to be protected during trial of the main suit. As such, vide the injunction order dated 19.10.2012, the defendant No. 1 was restrained from alienating the suit land or to change the nature and feature of the suit land by way of any type of construction till disposal of the title suit. What it, therefore, appears from the said injunction order is that the intention of the court in passing the said injunction order was not merely to restrain the defendant No. 1 , but to protect the suit land till the disposal of the title suit. The very words “the suit properties need to be protected during trial of the main suit” clearly go to show that the intention of the Court in passing the said injunction order was to protect the suit properties till the disposal of the suit. The very words “the suit properties need to be protected during trial of the main suit” clearly go to show that the intention of the Court in passing the said injunction order was to protect the suit properties till the disposal of the suit. In the premises, I am not at all satisfied with the contention of the opposite party/plaintiff that the only intention of the learned Court while passing the injunction order was to restrain the defendant no. 1 (not the plaintiff) and thereby protect the rights of opposite party/plaintiff that the learned court by passing the said injunction order has not protected the possession of the defendant No. 1 over the suit land. As I have already observed, the intention of the learned court in passing the injunction order was to protect the suit properties till the disposal of the suit, and, therefore, it was incumbent upon both the parties to the suit not to do anything contrary to the said intention of the learned court. In the premises, the first ground of non-maintainability taken by the opposite party/plaintiff is not tenable. Coming to the second ground taken by the opposite party/plaintiff in the instant petition, all I would like to say is that the defendant No. 1 was none but the watchman kept by Arun Gogoi (defendant No.2) on the suit land and this fact is well admitted by the opposite party/plaintiff. Being the master/owner of the defendant No. 1, the defendant No. 2 very much had the locus standi to file the instant miscellaneous application even though the latter was not a party to the suit when the injunction order was passed. Therefore, the said ground taken by the opposite party/plaintiff is also not tenable. Learned advocate for the opposite party/plaintiff has relied on a reported decision, Food Corporation of India Vs. Sukh Deo Prasad, (2009) 5 SCC 665 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe as follows:- “The power exercised by a court under order 39, Rule 2A of the Code is punitive in nature, akin to the power to punish for civil contempt under the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. Sukh Deo Prasad, (2009) 5 SCC 665 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe as follows:- “The power exercised by a court under order 39, Rule 2A of the Code is punitive in nature, akin to the power to punish for civil contempt under the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. The person who complains of disobedience or breach has to clearly make out beyond any doubt that there was an injunction or order directing the person against whom the application is made, to do or desist from doing some specific thing or act and that there was disobedience or breach of such orders. While considering an application under order 39 Rule 2A, the court cannot construe the order in regard to which is not mentioned in the ‘order’, on surmises, suspicions and inferences. The power under Rule 2A should be exercised with great caution and responsibility. It is shocking that the trial court had entertained an application under Order 39 Rule 2A from a person who was not entitled to file the application, has accepted an interpretation of the order which does not flow from the order, and has created an liability where none existed, resulting in attachments of the assets of FCI to an extent of more than Rs. 1.12 crores. The order dated 15.12.2004 cannot be supported or sustained under any circumstances.” Coming to the case at hand, as I have already observed hereinbefore, the intention of the learned Court in passing the injunction order was protection of the suit properties till the disposal of the title suit. This observation of mine is not based on surmises, suspicions or inferences. The said intention is very much reflected and is apparent in the said order. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the above decision, so cited, is hardly of any assistance to the opposite party/plaintiff in the case at hand. In the result, petition No. 1538/2015 stands rejected. Fixed 28.01.2016 for cross-examination of PWs.” 5. It is further projected that by order dated 09.12.2015, passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 3, Guwahati, T.S. No. 223/2012 was dismissed for non filing of evidence. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent/ defendant No.2, by referring to the order of injunction dated 19.10.2012, passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 3, Guwahati in Misc. It is further projected that by order dated 09.12.2015, passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 3, Guwahati, T.S. No. 223/2012 was dismissed for non filing of evidence. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent/ defendant No.2, by referring to the order of injunction dated 19.10.2012, passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 3, Guwahati in Misc. (J) Case No. 239/2012, submits that in the opinion of the learned trial court, the suit property was required to be protected during trial of the main suit and that based on such opinion formed, the learned trial court had passed an order of ad interim injunction by restraining the defendant No. 1 in the suit from alienating the suit land showing Schedule A to D of the plaint or to change the nature and feature of the suit land by way of construction till disposal of T.S. No. 223/2012. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners herein also submits that notwithstanding the impleadment of the defendant No. 2 in the suit by order dated 30.05.2013, in no manner the said order can be read to be an order restraining or prohibiting the petitioner No. 2 in any manner whatsoever. He further projects that on a bare perusal of the cause title of Misc. (J) Case No. 65/2014, it would be apparent that even the petitioner No. 1 herein, who was previously the sole plaintiff in the suit was not arrayed as a party. It is submitted that as the order of ad-interim injunction was not passed in the application filed by the respondent herein, he had no locus standi to maintain an application under Or.XXXIX Rule 2A CPC. It is submitted that unless there is a specific injunction prohibiting or restraining the plaintiff and/or the petitioner No.2 herein to do or to refrain from doing any particular act, no case of violation is made out and therefore, the present application is nothing but an abuse of the process of court and moreover, the defendant No.2 had no locus standi to file and/or to maintain the said application, for which, the Trial Court was not powerless to stop such abuse of the process of court by invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC. 8. Mr. 8. Mr. P.C. Dey, learned counsel for the defendant No.2/respondent specifically submits that although the plaintiff was aware that the defendant No. 2/respondent was the actual owner of the suit land described in Schedule B of the plaint, yet committed the initial mischief by filing present suit only against the defendant No.1, knowing that the defendant No.2 was the owner of the Schedule-B land and that the defendant No.1 was the caretaker/watchman of the said land and, as such, the plaintiff company, which was being represented by the petitioner No.2 herein have not come before the court with clean hands. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent also submits that on the perusal of the order of injunction dated 19.10.2012, it is clearly evident that intention of the court was to protect the suit properties during the trial of the suit and therefore, notwithstanding that only the then defendant No. 1 was restrained from alienating the suit land, the said order is required to be read as an order restraining all the parties to the suit to protect the suit properties described in the plaint. He submits that it is not the wording of the order, but the intention of the court in passing the order, which is required to be considered by this court. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent further argues that the petitioner herein, after dispossessing the sole respondent from the suit land described in Schedule B, wanted to withdraw the suit by filing an application under Order 23 Rule 1(3) and when the learned Trial Court rejected the said petition, the petitioner No. 1 choose the path of getting the suit dismissed for non-prosecution. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed by order dated 09.12.2015. 11. It is submitted that notwithstanding the dismissal of the suit, as the violation petition i.e. Misc. (J) Case No. 65/2013 was instituted prior to the dismissal of the suit, the same is maintainable as a stand-alone and independent proceeding, without being concerned with the outcome of the suit. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed by order dated 09.12.2015. 11. It is submitted that notwithstanding the dismissal of the suit, as the violation petition i.e. Misc. (J) Case No. 65/2013 was instituted prior to the dismissal of the suit, the same is maintainable as a stand-alone and independent proceeding, without being concerned with the outcome of the suit. It is argued that in the application filed by the defendant No.2/ respondent under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC, it was projected that in the last week of May, 2013, the petitioner No. 2 herein along with one Bhagya Kalita, his father, forcibly entered into the house premises and snatched the electric wire from the house and disconnected the electric supply and thereafter, on 28.05.2013 the father of petitioner No. 2 and his men had put-up a tin fencing surrounding the suit land and thus, illegally evicted the defendant No. 1 from the suit land. 12. Many other ancillary submissions have been made by the learned counsel for both the sides by referring to the materials available in the revision application, which is of about 245 pages. Therefore, other materials, which are not deemed necessary for the purpose of deciding the present revision, are not referred herein, for the sake of brevity. 13. On the basis of the arguments presented by the learned counsels for both the sides, the following points for determination are formulated in the present revision- a. Whether the learned court below had failed to exercise of jurisdiction vested in it or it had acted in exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity? b. Whether the provisions of Section 151 CPC can be invoked for the purpose of rejection of Misc. (J) Case No. 65/2014 at the belated stage when the said case at this stage of cross-examination of PWs? 14. Both the said points of determination are taken up for decision together. 15. Before venturing to delve on both the said points of determination, it would be relevant to understand the scope of Rule 2A of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As per the understanding of this Court, such a proceeding is a serious matter. Under the said provision, the civil court is empowered to take over the liberty of an individual and order the detention of the person who had violated the order, in civil prison. As per the understanding of this Court, such a proceeding is a serious matter. Under the said provision, the civil court is empowered to take over the liberty of an individual and order the detention of the person who had violated the order, in civil prison. This power is penal in nature and, as such, the burden is heavily on the person who alleges disobedience to prove the ingredients of the offence beyond all reasonable doubts. Therefore, it implies that an order under Rule 2A of Order 39 cannot be passed on suspicion or as a matter of course. There should be a clear proof that order to be obeyed was clear and unambiguous and, that with full knowledge of the content or the order, it was disobeyed. Under the aforesaid background, this Court has examined the order dated 19.10.2012, passed by the learned Civil Judge No.3, Guwahati, in Misc. (J) Case No. 239/2012. 16. It may be mentioned that the petitioner No. 2 before this court was not a party in the suit in his individual capacity, although he was representing the plaintiff Company as a Director. Therefore, whatever order was passed by in the suit instituted by the plaintiff under the signature of the Director, the said Director is deemed to have the knowledge of the orders passed in his/ her case. 17. This Court finds that language of the order dated 19.10.2012 leaves nothing to imagination as to its contents and meaning. The said order can only be construed to be an order restraining the defendant No.1 from alienating the suit land described in Schedule-A to D of the plaint and not to change the nature and feature of the suit land by way of construction till the disposal of the suit. The said order is not capable of carrying a meaning that the plaintiff was directed from maintaining status-quo in respect of the suit land. In the present injunction violation case, the alleged violation, as complained of, was that the Petitioner No.2 herein had dispossessed the defendant No.2 from the Schedule-B land. 18. Therefore, this Court is unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent, which was to the effect that instead of going by the language used by the court the intention of the court while passing the order was a relevant factor. 18. Therefore, this Court is unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent, which was to the effect that instead of going by the language used by the court the intention of the court while passing the order was a relevant factor. In the opinion of this Court, the order passed by court of law must be read in accordance with the plain language used in it and that recourse for external aid cannot be imported to give another meaning to the plain words used by the court in the judgment. 19. At the time when the order of injunction dated 19.10.2012 was passed, the defendant No.2/respondent herein was not a party in the proceedings of TS No. 223/12 and/or Misc. (J) Case No. 239/2012. He was subsequently impleaded as Defendant No.2 by order dated 30.05.2013. Therefore, under the provisions of Order I Rule 10(5) CPC, the proceedings as against the defendant No.2 is deemed to have begun on and from 30.05.2015, i.e. the date when on his own volition, he was so impleaded as defendant No.2 in the suit, for which there was no requirement for the learned trial court to issue summons upon him. Thus, this court is of the opinion that as the defendant no.2 became impleaded in the suit from 30.05.2013, he cannot be said to be a party in the said suit and/or Misc. (J) Case No. 239/2012 as on 19.10.2012. As such, by no stretch of imagination, this court is inclined to accept that the order of injunction was in favour of the defendant No.2. This court is not persuaded to accept that the defendant No.2 was a “person aggrieved”, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the said order dated 19.10.2012 was willfully violated and/or disobeyed by the petitioner No.2 herein. The impugned order is, therefore, not found sustainable. 20. There is no mention that the intention of the court while passing the same was to protect the suit land from the Plaintiff No.1. Therefore, this court is also not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the said order must be read to interpret it is an order passed with an intention to protect the suit land from the plaintiff. Therefore, this court is also not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the said order must be read to interpret it is an order passed with an intention to protect the suit land from the plaintiff. In the opinion of this court, as the defendant No.2 has taken the plea that the petitioner No.2 herein had violated and/or disobeyed the order dated 19.10.2012 passed by the learned court below, it would be for him to demonstrate whether that order, which is said to have been disobeyed, was clear and unambiguous and that the petitioner No.2 herein was not under any misconception or misapprehension about its scope. In the light of the pleadings on record in this case, this court is not persuaded to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the order dated 19.10.2012 had cast a duty upon the petitioner no.2 herein to do any particular act or to forbear from doing certain act. Hence, in the absence of any such material particulars, this court does not find that the order of injunction dated 19.10.2012 was operative against the said petitioner no.2. Therefore, having held that the said order of injunction was not operative against the petitioner no.2 herein, the natural corollary would be to hold there cannot be any consequences for breach of and/or deliberate or willful disobedience and/or violation of the said order dated 19.10.2012 by him. The impugned order is, therefore, not found sustainable. 21. Thus, the two points of determination is answered as above, in favour of the petitioners herein and against the respondent herein. 22. This leads to yet another question, which is whether the civil courts have power under section 151 CPC to reject an application filed by the respondent herein under the provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC? 23. The quest for an answer to the said question, this court has considered the following cases:- a. In the case of Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. V. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corpn., reported in (2009) 8 SCC 646 , it has been stated that “Section 151 CPC does not confer any extraordinary power on this Court. It saves the inherent jurisdiction of all the civil courts i.e. from the trial judge to the Supreme Court. It saves the inherent jurisdiction of all the civil courts i.e. from the trial judge to the Supreme Court. Thus, where a matter has expressly been provided for in the body of the CPC, ordinarily inherent power shall not be resorted to.” (para132). b. In the case of Rajnibai V. Kamla Devi, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 225 , it has been stated that “… Even otherwise also, it is settled law that under section 151 CPC, the court has got inherent power to protect the rights of the parties pending the suit.” (para 4). c. In the case of K.K. Velusamy V. N. Palanisamy, reported in (2011) 11 SCC 275 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India by citing various decisions on scope of section 151 CPC has summarized as below:- “(a) Section 151 is not is not a substantive provision which creates or confers any power or jurisdiction on courts. It merely recognises the discretionary power inherent in any court as a necessary corollary for rendering justice in accordance with law, to do what is “right” and undo what is “wrong”, that is, to do things necessary to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its process. (b) As the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, Section 151 recognises and confirms that if the Code does not expressly or impliedly cover any particular procedural aspect, the inherent power can be used to deal with such situation or aspect, if ends of justice warrant it. The breadth of such power is coextensive with the need to exercise such power on the facts and circumstances. (c) As court has no power to do that which is prohibited by law or by the Code, by purported exercise of its inherent powers. If the Code contains provision dealing with a particular topic or aspect, and such provisions either expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the power of the court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to that matter, the inherent power cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code or in a manner inconsistent with such provisions. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code, where the remedy or procedure is provided in the Code. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code, where the remedy or procedure is provided in the Code. (d) The inherent powers of the court being complementary to the powers specifically conferred, a court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the mater is not covered by any specific provision in the Code and the exercise of those powers would not in any way be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or be against the intention of the legislature. (e) While exercising the inherent power, the court will be doubly cautious, as there is no legislative guidance to deal with the procedural situation and the exercise of power depends on the discretion and wisdom of the court, and in the facts and circumstances of the case The absence of an express provision in the Code and the recognition and saving of the inherent power of a court, should not however be treated as a carte blanche to grant any relief. (f) The power under Section 151 will have to be used with circumspection and care, only where it is absolutely necessary, when there is no provision in the Code to governing the matter, when the bona fides of the applicant cannot be doubted, when such exercise is to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court.” (para 12). 24. Therefore, the ratio falling out from the above quoted citations, as understood by this court, is that when there is a specific provisions for anything expressly and elsewhere provided in the Code, the inherent power is not to be readily exercised and if situation warrants exercise of such powers, the same should be done with circumspection. The powers appear to be empowering in nature to enable the court to do to prevent injustice, to meet the ends of justice, to prevent abuse of the process of court. Coming to the present case in hand, there are specific provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure to reject and/or dismiss any petition. The powers appear to be empowering in nature to enable the court to do to prevent injustice, to meet the ends of justice, to prevent abuse of the process of court. Coming to the present case in hand, there are specific provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure to reject and/or dismiss any petition. Hence, in the light of directions contained in the above quoted excerpts from the herein before referred judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this court is of the opinion that the civil court is not required to invoke its inherent power under section 151 of the Code to dismiss Misc. (J) Case No. 65/2013 (arising out of TS No. 223/12). It would be open for the petitioners to apply before the court under the applicable provisions of law, as they may be so advised, for availing their remedy available to them under the law and if such an application is filed, the present application made under section 151 CPC i.e. Misc. (J) Case No. 65/2012 shall not stand as a bar for the learned trial court to decide the same in accordance with law. 25. For the reasons as stated above, this court is not inclined to set aside and/or quash/ dismiss the proceedings of Misc. (J) Case No. 223/12, which is the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 26. However, as this court has given its opinion on the issues set out for determination, the impugned order dated 09.12.2015 passed by the learned Civil Judge No.3, Kamrup (M), Guwahati, stands modified to the extent as indicated above. 27. This revision stands partially allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.