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2017 DIGILAW 1380 (RAJ)

Ramlal Sahai v. State of Rajasthan Thro' P. P.

2017-05-30

MANOJ KUMAR GARG, MOHAMMAD RAFIQ

body2017
JUDGMENT : Manoj Kumar Garg, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 22.7.2011 passed by Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No. 1, Jaipur in Sessions Case No. 98/2010 by which the Judge convicted the present appellant for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default of payment, further two months rigorous imprisonment. 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 23.6.2010 complainant Mukesh Kumar (PW-7) lodged a written report at Police Station Bassi, District Jaipur alleging therein that on 14.6.2010 his brother Dinesh Kumar came to his in-laws village Gadoli from Sawaimadhopur along with his wife and children at around 12-1 PM and after leaving his children and wife Parvati Devi went along with Dr. Gajanand at around 6 PM from village Gadoli and reached at Gothda Bus Stand at Choudhary Dhaba for taking food where they consumed liquor and also took the food. A barber was also along with them who later on left their company and Dr. Gajanand and his brother Dinesh slept at Dhaba. In the morning, a person was found lying unconscious behind the bus stand of Gothda who was taken to Bassi Hospital in an ambulance from where he was referred to SMS Hospital, Jaipur and admitted in Polytroma ward. On 17.6.2010 his uncle Rajendra informed him on telephone that Dinesh was beaten up by someone else who is admitted in SMS Hospital, Jaipur in serious condition. On receiving the information, his brother Santosh along with his relative Jagdish reached there and saw the grievous injuries on the knee of left leg and head of his brother. He came in his senses only for 20 minutes and on asking about the injuries, it was disclosed by his brother that the driver and the Dhaba owner beated him and no accident had taken place and thereafter his brother Dinesh again got unconscious. 3. It is stated that the complainant made efforts to save Dinesh but he could not survive and ultimately expired on 17.6.2010 at 6:10 PM. His brother Dinesh was beaten up by Dhaba owner and the driver along with their associates and caused severe injuries as a result of which he died. 3. It is stated that the complainant made efforts to save Dinesh but he could not survive and ultimately expired on 17.6.2010 at 6:10 PM. His brother Dinesh was beaten up by Dhaba owner and the driver along with their associates and caused severe injuries as a result of which he died. On this report, Police registered a case for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. and recorded the statements of various witnesses and after conclusion of the investigation submitted a challan against the present appellant as well as two more co-accused namely; Hanuman and Suresh before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Bassi, District Jaipur. 4. Then the case was committed to the Court of learned District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur. The learned District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur transferred this case for trial to the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No. 1, Jaipur District Jaipur where the charges of the case were framed against all the three accused person for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 302/34 I.P.C. Thereafter the prosecution examined as many as twenty witnesses in all. Then statements of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded, they denied their involvement in the case. Thereafter, on defence side, statement of DW-1 to DW-5 were recorded before the Trial Court. 5. After conclusion of the trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No. 1, Jaipur by his impugned judgment dated 22.7.2011 acquitted the co-accused namely; Hanuman and Suresh for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 302/34 I.P.C. but the present appellant was convicted for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. and passed a sentence as mentioned earlier. 6. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant as well as learned Counsel for the State. 7. The learned Counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that this case is of circumstantial evidence and a chain of circumstance does not connect the present appellant with the crime. He further argued that in this case there was no motive. In circumstantial evidence cases the motive plays a big role, without which, it cannot be said that only the appellant committed the murder and not any other person. 8. The learned Counsel for the appellant further urged that the occurrence took place on 14.6.2010 and a written report was filed by the complainant on 23.6.2010. In circumstantial evidence cases the motive plays a big role, without which, it cannot be said that only the appellant committed the murder and not any other person. 8. The learned Counsel for the appellant further urged that the occurrence took place on 14.6.2010 and a written report was filed by the complainant on 23.6.2010. This delay has not at all been explained by the complainant. He argued that previously on 18.6.2010 the inquest report was prepared in which the complainant Mukesh clearly mentioned that this is the case of accident and he had not implicated any of the accused. The prosecution recorded oral statements of dying declaration which does not connect the appellant with this case because after receiving this severe injuries, there was no occasion that the deceased got any consciousness and he could not speak anything. The dying declaration, which was relied by the prosecution, does not prove anything against the accused appellant, who has been absolutely falsely implicated in this case. Lastly, the learned Counsel for the appellant argued that on the same set of evidence the co-accused namely; Hanuman and Suresh have been acquitted by the Trial Court. Conviction against the present appellant therefore deserves to be set aside. 9. Per contra, learned Counsel for the State argued that this is the case of a circumstantial evidence and the witnesses of the last seen coupled with the oral dying declaration of the deceased and the recovery fully proves the charge against the accused. These three circumstances implicate the present appellant. So appeal filed by the accused deserves to be dismissed. 10. We have scanned, scrutinized and evaluated the prosecution evidence exhaustively and considered the rival contentions. 11. This is not in dispute that this was a case of circumstantial evidence and the prosecution relied upon the statement of last seen witnesses. They were Gajanand (PW-2), Babu Lal (PW-4) and Subhash (PW-9). Statement of Gajanand (PW-2) clearly stated that on the day of incident, deceased Dinesh was present. Ramlal gave fist blows on his cheek and after that deceased Dinesh went away and they all had slept. In the next morning, they came to know that Dinesh had died. Dinesh received injuries. He never knew what happened to Dinesh that night. In cross-examination also, this witness mentioned that in the night deceased Dinesh went away from Dhaba. At that time deceased Dinesh was in drunk conditions. In the next morning, they came to know that Dinesh had died. Dinesh received injuries. He never knew what happened to Dinesh that night. In cross-examination also, this witness mentioned that in the night deceased Dinesh went away from Dhaba. At that time deceased Dinesh was in drunk conditions. So this shows that this witness had not seen the occurrence and he only mentioned that deceased in drunken condition went away from the Dhaba. The other two last seen witnesses have been examined namely; Babu Lal (PW-4) and Subhash Chand (PW-9), both these witnesses were declared hostile and they had not supported the story of the prosecution. So the last seen witnesses whatever stated above, do not connect against the present appellant at all. 12. That occurrence has taken place on 14.6.2010 and deceased died on 17.6.2010. Up to that time, complainant Mukesh and the other witnesses had not lodged any type of the report with the Police. After the death of the deceased Dinesh, the inquest report was submitted by Het Ram (PW-13) Constable on 18.6.2010 in which they called deceased's brother Mukesh. The complainant Mukesh had stated that his brother died due to an accident. Even in Roznamcha also this entry Ex.D-6 was mentioned by Mukesh. He clearly stated that his brother had received several injuries on account of the said accident, so his brother expired. This shows the conduct of the complainant Mukesh and all of a sudden complainant Mukesh Kumar (PW-7) filed a written report on 23.6.2010 at the concerned Police Station Bassi, District Jaipur mentioning that the deceased informed him that driver and Dhaba owner both beated his brother so his brother expired. This theory was built up on 23.6.2010. Previously, no such type of report was lodged by the complainant Mukesh Kumar. Conduct of Mukesh Kumar shows that he has falsely implicated the accused person in this case. 13. About the recovery of 'Sabbal' (Iron Rod), which was recovered from the possession of the present appellant, the information related to 'sabbal' was given to the Police on 25.6.2010. On perusal of the discovery statement, it is revealed that it amounts to confession made by the accused appellant before the Police Officer, therefore, the same is hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. So this recovery made in pursuance of such statement, is not admissible in evidence in the eye of law. On perusal of the discovery statement, it is revealed that it amounts to confession made by the accused appellant before the Police Officer, therefore, the same is hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. So this recovery made in pursuance of such statement, is not admissible in evidence in the eye of law. Besides, as per the recovery memo of 'Sabbal' Ex.P-9 dated 26.6.2010, there was no blood stains found. The recovered article was not sent to the FSL for determination of blood group. As per the site plan Ex.P-6, it was an open field belonging to one Surajmal which was not in exclusive possession of the accused appellant. Therefore, it cannot be believed that the recovered article was in exclusive possession or knowledge of the accused appellant. Thus, the recovery cannot connect the present appellant with the crime. 14. Now we will examine the oral dying declaration. About this, the prosecution relied upon the statements of three witnesses namely; Jagdish (PW-3), Santosh (PW-5) and Mukesh Kumar (PW-7). Jagdish (PW-3) has not supported to the prosecution story and thus has been declared hostile. Therefore, the deceased Dinesh died and his brother Mukesh reached after the death of Dinesh. Another witness Santosh (PW-5) has also not supported the prosecution story and thus he has been declared hostile. The witness Mukesh (PW-7) alleged the written report which was lodged after nine days of the alleged incident and firstly, he gave his version in inquest report that his brother died due to the accident, more so, he reached to the hospital after the death of the deceased as per the statement of Jagdish (PW-3). 15. It is very much doubtful that the deceased, who became unconscious all of a sudden, could inform Mukesh about the names of assailants. As per the testimony of Dr. N.L. Disania (PW-15), there was a fracture in the neck and dislocation in the neck of the deceased. Therefore, in such a condition, he could not speak and the death must have occurred spontaneously. As per the Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence, the injuries to the cervical spine involving the spinal cord may prove rapidly fatal or may paralyse the victim. There is no evidence adduced by the prosecution that the deceased was conscious. Statement of Dr. N.L. Disania (PW-15) clearly reveals he did not examine the deceased first. As per the Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence, the injuries to the cervical spine involving the spinal cord may prove rapidly fatal or may paralyse the victim. There is no evidence adduced by the prosecution that the deceased was conscious. Statement of Dr. N.L. Disania (PW-15) clearly reveals he did not examine the deceased first. However, no other Doctor is examined and treating Doctor was not at all examined by the prosecution to corroborate this oral dying declaration story. The theory of oral dying declaration is highly doubtful and no reliance can be placed in this regard. 16. The deceased had died after receiving several injuries on his body. Het Ram (PW-13) in his statement has stated that he prepared the inquest report and deceased was taken by Ranjit Constable but Ranjit Constable was not at all examined by the prosecution. He further mentioned in his investigation that he found that no occurrence had taken place and complainant Mukesh, who is brother of the deceased also corroborate that his brother received several injuries due to the said accident and Dr. N.L. Diosania (PW-15) has submitted that the injuries on the deceased may come due to the accident. As per the statement of Rajesh Kumar Bairwa (DW-3) male nurse, who had taken the deceased in unconscious condition in the ambulance also admitted that it was a case of an accident therefore, it appears that the deceased, who was in drunken condition, left Dhaba and got sudden injuries. As there was no motive in this case, this is a case of circumstantial evidence where there is no complete chain of circumstances, to connect the accused appellant with the crime. On the same set of evidence, other co-accused namely Hanuman and Suresh were acquitted by the Trial Court. 17. In Munish Mubar v. State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 912 in Criminal Appeal No. 294 of 2010, decided on 4.10.2012 Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under : "Undoubtedly, in a case of circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances must be fully established and all the facts so established, must be consistent with the hypothesis regarding the guilt of the accused. The circumstances so established, should exclude every other possible hypothesis except the one sought to be proved. The circumstances must be conclusive in nature. The circumstances so established, should exclude every other possible hypothesis except the one sought to be proved. The circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Circumstantial evidence is a close companion of factual matrix, creating a fine network through which there can be no escape for the accused, primarily because the said facts, when taken as a whole, do not permit us to arrive at any other inference but one, indicating the guilt of the accused. In a case of circumstantial evidence, motive assumes great significance and importance, for the reason that the absence of motive would put the Court on its guard and cause it to scrutinize each piece of evidence very closely in order to ensure that suspicion, emotion or conjecture do not take the place of proof. However, the evidence regarding existence of motive which operates in the mind of an assassin is very often, not within the reach of others. The said motive, may not even be known to the victim of the crime. The motive may be known to the assassin and no one else may know what gave birth to such evil thought, in the mind of the assassin. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the evidence indicating the guilt of the accused becomes untrustworthy and unreliable, because most often it is only the perpetrator of the crime alone, who has knowledge of the circumstances that prompted him to adopt a certain course of action, leading to the commission of the crime. Therefore, if the evidence on record suggest sufficient/ necessary motive to commit a crime, it may be conceived that the accused has committed the same. [See : Subedar Tewari v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1989 SC 733 ; Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2420 ; and Dr. Sunil Clifford Daniel v. State of Punjab, JT 2012 (8) SC 639]." Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of Assam, AIR 2013 SC 2422 , Criminal Appeal No. 737 of 2006, decided on 24.5.2013 Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under : "It is seemly to state here that the whole case of the prosecution rests on the circumstantial evidence. The learned trial Judge as well as the High Court has referred to certain circumstances. The learned trial Judge as well as the High Court has referred to certain circumstances. When a case is totally hinges on the circumstantial evidence, it is the duty of the Court to see that the circumstances which lead towards the guilt of the accused have been fully established and they must lead to a singular conclusion that the accused is guilty of the offence and rule out the probabilities which are likely to allow the presumption of innocence of the accused." Majendran Langeswaran v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr., AIR 2013 SC 2790 in Criminal Appeal No. 1300 of 2009, decided on 1.7.2013 has held as under : "As discussed herein above, there is no dispute with regard to the legal proposition that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested on the touchstone of law relating to circumstantial evidence as laid down by this Court. In such a case, all circumstances must lead to the conclusion that the accused is the only one who has committed the crime and none else." Raj Kumar Singh @ Raju @ Batya v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2013 SC 3150 , in Criminal Appeal Nos. 931-932 of 2009, decided on 6.5.2013 has held as under : "Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof, and there is a large difference between something that 'may be' proved and 'will be proved'. In a criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot and must not be permitted to take place of proof. This is for the reason, that the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is quite large and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal case, the Court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The large distance between 'may be' true and 'must be' true, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution, before an accused is condemned as a convict, and the-basic and golden rule must be applied. The large distance between 'may be' true and 'must be' true, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution, before an accused is condemned as a convict, and the-basic and golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind the distance between 'may be' true and 'must be' true, the Court must maintain the vital distance between conjectures and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of dispassionate judicial scrutiny based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case, as well as the quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record. The Court must ensure, that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if the facts and circumstances of a case so demand, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, keeping in mind that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely probable doubt, but a fair doubt that is based upon reason and common sense. [Vide : Hanumant Govind Nargundkar & Anr. v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343 ; Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Mahrashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622 ; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 ; Subhash Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 1 SCC 702 ; Ashish Batham v. State of M.P., AIR 2002 SC 3206 ; Narendra Singh & Anr. v. State of M.P., AIR 2004 SC 3249 ; State through CBI v. Mahender Singh Dahiya, AIR 2011 SC 1017 ; and Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P., AIR 2012 SC 1979 ]." Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1988 SC 1705 in Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 1988 decided on 27.7.1988 has held as under : "Then we are left with the recovery of the dead bodies. Investigating Officer S.I. Puran Singh (PW-8) admitted in cross examination that after recording the statement of Amrik Singh he could not know the correct place where the bodies and other articles were kept buried and concealed. This clearly indicates that he could get some information from the statement of Amrik Singh. Investigating Officer S.I. Puran Singh (PW-8) admitted in cross examination that after recording the statement of Amrik Singh he could not know the correct place where the bodies and other articles were kept buried and concealed. This clearly indicates that he could get some information from the statement of Amrik Singh. As seen earlier, the field is an open place surrounded by other fields and according to Nihal Singh the adjacent field is his own as he had taken it on lease and therefore it cannot be said that any one else could not have known about the bodies being buried in the field. The Investigating officer himself admitted that after recording the statement of Amrik Singh he knew that the bodies were buried in the field but he felt that information was not sufficient. It cannot therefore, be said that the place from where the bodies were recovered was such a place about which knowledge could only be attributed to the appellant and none else. Since the exclusive knowledge to the appellant cannot be attributed, the evidence under Section 27 also cannot be said to be a circumstances against the appellant." Babboo alias Kalyandas & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 1042 in Criminal Appeal No. 2284 of 1969 decided on 3.11.1978 has held as under : "The learned Additional Sessions Judge has also referred to the recovery of Katarnas on the information given by accused Nos. 1, 3 and 5. These recoveries hardly have any probative value in the facts and circumstances of this case. If there is no substantive evidence worth the name the recovery of Katarnas would hardly advance the prosecution case against the accused. Katarnas appear to have been stained with human blood. However, it is revealing to refer to the recovery memos. Katarna is recovered from accused No. 1 under seizure memorandum Ex.P-8 in which it is recited that accused No. 1 made the statement that he would show the Katarna with which he assaulted Diwan Singh on 31.9.1973 at night. The first part in the seizure memo would be inadmissible because the fact that accused No.1 assaulted Diwan Singh is not (discovered in pursuance of the information given by accused No. 1). The first part in the seizure memo would be inadmissible because the fact that accused No.1 assaulted Diwan Singh is not (discovered in pursuance of the information given by accused No. 1). It would be a confessional statement to Police Officer hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act, same infirmities were to be found in regard to the recovery memos in respect of accused Nos. 3 and 5. In this background we are not disposed to attach any importance to the recovery of blood-stained Katarnas on the information given by accused Nos. 1, 3 and 5." Kake Singh alias Surendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1981 (Supp.) SCC 25, in Criminal Appeal No. 79 of 1976, decided on 2.4.1981 has held as under : "The solitary evidence against the appellant consists of the dying declaration alleged to have been made, by the deceased Tulsi Baba before Head Constable D.N. Verma (PW-8). We have gone through the dying declaration and we find that the dying declaration presents suspicious features. In the first place, Tulsi Baba had himself lodged a complaint before the police against the accused that there was some dispute about the house which Kake wanted Tulsi Baba to vacate and had given threats that he would, come to serious harm if he does not vacate the house. Despite this threat, according to the dying declaration, the deceased readily agreed to take a round in the jeep along with Kake and two others. Indeed, in view of the enmity it is hard to believe that the deceased would trust the accused and go with him at a late part of the night and invite trouble for himself. Another important circumstance that throws doubt on the dying declaration is that Tulsi Baba was alleged to have been missing from 30.1.1975, as would appear from the report made before the police station by PW-3. The doctor who held the autopsy of the deceased in his statement has not categorically stated that at the time when the deceased was burnt he was conscious or could give any coherent statement. The deceased was burnt and a good part of the brain was also burnt and therefore the possibility is that he must have become unconscious. This is intrinsically supported by another important factor. The deceased was burnt and a good part of the brain was also burnt and therefore the possibility is that he must have become unconscious. This is intrinsically supported by another important factor. The doctor found not only burns on the body of the deceased but also other injuries which could have been inflicted on him by lat his which had caused lacerations and haematoma. In his statement the deceased makes no mention at all of any such injuries although one of the injuries caused to him resulted in fracture of sternum. There is no reference at all to the manner in which the deceased could have got the fracture of the sternum. The cumulative effect of these circumstances therefore leads to the irresistible conclusion that the deceased was unconscious and never made any such statement. Once the dying declaration is disbelieved, then there remains no legal evidence on the basis of which the appellant could be convicted." In K. Ramachandra Reddy & Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 618 , Civil Appeal No. 143 of 1975, decided on 5.5.1976 has held as under : "The accused pleaded innocence and averred that they had been falsely implicated due to enmity. Thus it would appear that the conviction of the accused depends entirely on the reliability of the dying declaration Ext. P-2. The dying declaration is undoubtedly admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act and not being a statement on oath so that its truth could be tested by cross-examination, the Courts have to apply the strictest scrutiny and the closest circumspection to the statement before acting upon it. While great solemnity and sanctity is attached to the words of a dying man because a person on the verge of death is not likely to tell lies or to concoct a case so as to implicate an innocent person yet the Court has to be on guard against the statement of the deceased being a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of has imagination. The Court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit slate of mind to make the statement after the deceased had a clear opportunity to observe and identify his assailants and that he was making the statement without any influence or rancour. The Court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit slate of mind to make the statement after the deceased had a clear opportunity to observe and identify his assailants and that he was making the statement without any influence or rancour. Once the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can be sufficient to found the conviction even without any further corroboration. Once the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can be sufficient to found the conviction even without any further corroboration. The law on the subject has been clearly and explicitly enunciated by this Court in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, 1958 Cri.L.J. 106 where the Court observed as follows : "On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in India and in this Court, we have come to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the Full Bench of the Madras IB High Court, aforesaid, (1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated, (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping 1 in view tile circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence, (S) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by Q competent Magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night, whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control, that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties. Hence, in order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-examination." It is true that a dying declaration is not a deposition in Court and it is neither made on oath nor in the presence of the accused. It is, therefore, not tested by cross-examination on behalf of the accused. But a dying declaration is admitted in evidence by way of an exception to the general rule against the admissibility of hearsay evidence, on the principle of necessity. The weak points of a dying declaration just mentioned merely serve to put the Court on its guard while testing its reliability, by imposing on it an obligation to closely scrutinise all the relevant attendant circumstances. In Lallubhai Devchand Shah and others v. State of Gujarat, 1972 Cri.L.J. 828, this Court laid special stress on the fact that one of the important tests of the reliability of a dying declaration is that the person who recorded it must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and observed as follows : "The Court, therefore, blamed Dr. Pant for not questioning Trilok Singh with a view to test whether Trilok Singh was in a "fit state of mind" to make the statement. The "fit state of mind" referred to is in relation to the statement that the dying man was making. In other words, what the case suggests is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the dying man was making a conscious and voluntary statement with normal understanding." 18. Clearly, charges against the accused are sought to be proved by circumstantial evidence. Chain of circumstance in the present case has several missing links and does not rule out every single hypothesis which may be compatible with his innocence. This makes the accused appellant entitled to benefit of doubt. 19. In the result, the criminal appeal is allowed. Clearly, charges against the accused are sought to be proved by circumstantial evidence. Chain of circumstance in the present case has several missing links and does not rule out every single hypothesis which may be compatible with his innocence. This makes the accused appellant entitled to benefit of doubt. 19. In the result, the criminal appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 22.7.2011 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No. 1, Jaipur District, Jaipur in Sessions Case No. 98/2010 is set aside, and consequently the conviction and sentence of accused-appellant Ramlal S/o Shri Kalyan Sahai for offence under Section 302 of the I.P.C. is also set aside. He is acquitted of the charge for offence under Section 302 I.P.C. He is in the Central Jail, Jaipur. He be set at liberty forthwith if not required to be detained in any other case. Keeping, however, in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, accused-appellant Ramlal S/o Shri Kalyan Sahai is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 20,000/- each, and a surety bond in the like amount, before the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court, which shall be effective for a period of six months, undertaking that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of leave, the appellants aforesaid, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Supreme Court.