ORDER : We have heard the learned counsels of the parties. 2. The respondent-Swami Munisha Nand (now substituted) the writ petitioner before the High Court of Uttaranchal, Nainital (now Uttarakhand) was challenging the orders passed by the District Magistrate and the Commissioner, Garhwal Division cancelling three leases of land granted to the respondent - writ petitioner for residential purpose. The cancellation as evident from the orders of the aforesaid two authorities proceeded on a two-fold basis. Firstly, that the Parganadhikari (hereinafter referred to as "S.D.M.") who granted the lease was not authorized to do so; and secondly that the respondent - lessee (writ petitioner) had violated the terms of the lease inasmuch as he had constructed a cowshed and bathing ghats on the lands allotted for residential purposes. 3. The High Court invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel overturned the verdicts of the aforesaid two authorities leading to the institution of the present appeal before this Court by the State. 4. Insofar as the second ground of cancellation i.e. violation of the purpose for which the lease was granted is concerned, the matter need not engage the attention of the Court in any great detail. This is because it has been clearly averred by the respondent in the pleadings before the High Court as well as this Court that the land had been utilized to construct bathing ghats which facility is used by pilgrims who visit the Ashrams run by the respondents. The aforesaid position has also been accepted by the State in its counter affidavit filed before the High Court wherein a statement has been made in paragraph 11 thereof to the effect that the respondents is, indeed, utilizing the land for religious purposes. 5. Viewed in the aforesaid context, though the land is for residential purpose and what has been constructed there are bathing ghats to be used by the pilgrims visiting the Ashrams, we will not hold the same against the respondents and will not construe the said departure in the user of the land to be so significant as to call for the extreme penalty of cancellation/forfeiture of the leases. 6. The second point raised having been answered in the above manner, we will now turn to the core of the issue, namely, the jurisdiction of the S.D.M. to make the allotment. 6. The second point raised having been answered in the above manner, we will now turn to the core of the issue, namely, the jurisdiction of the S.D.M. to make the allotment. It appears from the Government Order dated 9th October, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as "G.O. of 1987") that the S.D.M. was the authority competent to sign the lease deed and it is the District Magistrate who was authorized to make the allotment in cases where the value of the land did not exceed Rs.25,000/-. There is a subsequent Government Order/Office Memorandum dated 7th July, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as "G.O. of 1992") which seems to indicate that due to certain misuse of the aforesaid power, the concerned G.O. of 1992 was issued specifically mentioning the requirement of prior sanction/permission of the District Magistrate to make an allotment of the land. There is also a reference in the aforesaid G.O. of 1992 to another Government Order No.2077/11-4(89-90) dated 5th May, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as "G.O. of 1990") which indicates that the S.D.M. may not altogether be an intruder or authority unknown to the process of the grant of lease. 7. The question with regard to jurisdiction of the S.D.M. to grant leases of the kind involved in the present proceedings came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Raj Kumar Soni and another v. State of U.P. and another, (2007) 10 SCC 635 . Though in the aforesaid case the original lessee had transferred the land to a third person, this Court while considering the validity of the transfer had occasion to deal with the legality of the initial grant also made by the S.D.M./S.D.O. In paragraph 10 of the aforesaid decision, this Court specifically held that no provision of law has been laid before it to enable it to come to the conclusion that S.D.O. could have allotted the land to the original allottee. The position in the present case is no different. Though a reference has been made to the G.O. of 1990 by the learned counsel for the respondents, the same has not been brought on record to enable the Court to take any other view which may even remotely be inconsistent with what has been held in paragraph 10 of the decision of this Court in Raj Kumar Soni (supra), as noticed above. 8. 8. An argument has been advanced by Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents to contend that the G.O. of 1987 and the G.O. of 1992 and the requirements imposed thereunder lay down principles of internal working and a citizen who is the beneficiary of an allotment cannot be made to suffer merely because there has been some infraction of the requirements spelt out by the aforesaid two Government Orders. Reliance has been placed by Shri Mehta on a decision of this Court in the case of Sunil Pannalal Banthia and others v. City & Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. And another, (2007) 10 SCC 674 , particularly paragraph 12 thereof, to contend that the concept of "indoor management" would come to the aid of the respondents whose rights cannot be defeated by an infraction of principles governing such "indoor management". 9. Having read and considered the decision of this Court in U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd. v. Indure Pvt. Ltd. and others, (1996) 2 SCC 667 referred to in Sunil Pannalal Banthia (supra) we are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with what has been contended by Shri Mehta inasmuch as the principles of "indoor management" evolved in U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd. (supra) were altogether in a different context and not in the context of the exercise of the State power. To hold that a citizen would be entitled to the benefits under a Government Order passed contrary to the principles governing the exercise of such power or an order passed without jurisdiction or authority, in our considered view, would be laying down a wholly unacceptable principle of law. 10. Shri Mehta has also sought to contend that the allotment made by the S.D.M. was not without jurisdiction and was merely an irregular exercise of power. This is because, under the G.O. of 1987 and G.O. of 1992, the S.D.M. is not unknown to the process of allotment of lease. Having considered the matter we are unable, once again, to agree with Shri Mehta. Consideration of the aforesaid two G.Os. Of 1987 and 1992 would clearly indicate that the competent authority to grant an allotment is the District Magistrate and the S.D.M. could not have signed the lease deed/agreement without getting necessary approval of the District Magistrate. Having considered the matter we are unable, once again, to agree with Shri Mehta. Consideration of the aforesaid two G.Os. Of 1987 and 1992 would clearly indicate that the competent authority to grant an allotment is the District Magistrate and the S.D.M. could not have signed the lease deed/agreement without getting necessary approval of the District Magistrate. The present, therefore, would be a case of lack/absence of power and not one of mere irregular exercise of power. 11. Having held as above the conclusion is inevitable. The order of the High Court is legally fragile and, therefore, cannot be sustained. We accordingly interfere with the said order and allow this appeal. 12. Before parting, we would like to put on record that the respondent (original writ petitioner) or the substituted legal heirs, as may be, appear to be a charitable religious body running several Ashrams and have by this time utilized the land for building/constructing bathing ghats for pilgrims who visit the Ashrams. This has been virtually accepted by the State Government in its counter affidavit before the High Court, details of which have been mentioned above. Regardless of the context in which the statement in the counter affidavit had been made, the acceptance of the position i.e. that the lessee had utilized the land for religious purposes is clear. The period of the leases i.e. 30 years is also coming to an end. Having regard to the use of the land and the long period of possession by the respondents as well as the fact that the period of lease is coming to an end we are of the view that the State Government should seriously consider allowing the respondents to complete the remaining part of the lease once a representation to the said effect is made by the respondents before the competent authority of the State Government. 13. Consequently and in the light of the above, we allow this appeal by setting aside the order of the High Court subject to what has been observed hereinabove. We also make it clear that all amounts due to the State by the respondents on account of lease rent, etc. shall be forthwith paid and unless payment of amounts due is tendered the question of consideration of continuance of the respondent in terms of the lease deed will not arise.