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2017 DIGILAW 1385 (KER)

Union of India v. Anandan

2017-11-07

P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON, SHIRCY V.

body2017
JUDGMENT : 1. Whether the termination of service of a Railway employee, effected prior to the commencement of the Constitution of India, could be interdicted by the Tribunal in an Original Application filed decades after arising the cause of action, that too in a matter where there is no challenge against the termination of service, but for seeking to grant pension by the Railways ?-is the point for consideration. 2. Heard Mr. C.S. Dias, learned Standing Counsel for the Railways and Mr. M.P. Krishnan Nair, who entered appearance on behalf of the additional respondents impleaded pursuant to the order dated 02.11.2017 in I.A. No. 15289/2012 by virtue of the demise of the original applicant/respondent. The O.A. was filed with the following prayers: “i. Declare that the applicant is entitled to get pensionary benefits and direct the respondents dispose of his Annexure A1 representation within a time frame; and ii. Pass such other appropriate order or orders or direction as this Hon'ble Tribunal deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. 3. The claim was contested seriously by the Railways both by raising the plea of limitation and also pointing out that the termination of service was pursuant to the terms as contained in the service agreement; adding that the Pension Scheme was brought into existence only much later with effect from 16.11.1957 and hence that the claim for Pension is not sustainable. Reliance was also sought to be placed on the verdict passed by the Supreme Court in C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining ((2008) 2 SCC L&S 961). After hearing, the Tribunal passed Ext.P8 order, holding that the question of limitation was not applicable to the case in hand; in turn directing the respondents/Railways to work out the benefits towards the arrears of pension for the period mentioned therein and to disburse the same with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 26.2.2006 till date of payment and continue to effect the payment of pension. This made the Railways to challenge it by way of the present Original Petition. 4. During the pendency of the proceedings before this Court, the applicant in the O.A. took his last breath, pursuant to which steps were taken by the petitioners/Railways to implead the legal heirs in the party array. This made the Railways to challenge it by way of the present Original Petition. 4. During the pendency of the proceedings before this Court, the applicant in the O.A. took his last breath, pursuant to which steps were taken by the petitioners/Railways to implead the legal heirs in the party array. On filing I.A. No.15289/2012, notice was ordered therein and despite completion of service of notice, the additional respondents sought to be impleaded did not choose to enter appearance. The matter was adjourned on different occasions and today, when the case was taken up for consideration, the learned counsel who was appearing on behalf of the respondents made a submission with reference to a ‘g mail’ communication (dated 6.11.2017) issued to him by one of the legal representatives, requesting to address the Court on his behalf. We found it appropriate to hear the learned counsel and the merit was considered accordingly. 5. The sequence of events described in the Original Petition shows that the applicant in the O.A. was initially appointed as an 'Office Boy' in the Railways Workshop on 10.4.1945 and was later elevated to the status as a 'Labourer' in 1948. As per the relevant Norms/Rules of engagement, he was to attain the age of retirement on 30.4.1987. While so, there was an illegal strike, as put forth by the applicant, on 7th/8th of March 1949. The Railways contended that the applicant and another employee had placed some iron pieces in the 'lathe machine' with intend to cause damage to the same, in connection with the strike. This led to a criminal case registered against the applicant and he was arrested on 4.4.1949, in respect of the offence u/S.101 of the Railways Act and S.287 of the Indian Penal Code. Even prior to the apprehension of the accused/applicant, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him and he was placed under suspension on 8.3.1949. The applicant was subsequently terminated from the service on 28.3.1949. 6. About two decades after the termination of service, a representation was submitted by the applicant on 11.8.1970, which was rejected by the Railways as per Annexure A5 dated 30.11.1970. The case projected by the applicant appears to be that the applicant was virtually acquitted by the criminal court as per Annexure A7 judgment dated 3.5.1949 and hence, he was to be reinstated in service. The case projected by the applicant appears to be that the applicant was virtually acquitted by the criminal court as per Annexure A7 judgment dated 3.5.1949 and hence, he was to be reinstated in service. The version of the Railways was that the termination of service on 28.3.1949 was in terms of the service agreement executed before the Constitution of India came into operation and that the applicant was not entitled to have any relief as sought for. Even after rejection of the said representation in the year 1970, the petitioner did not move the Departmental Authorities or the appropriate Court and only after about 16 years', did he file another representation through a Member of Parliament. After verifying the course and proceedings and after getting opinion from the counsel representing the Railways, the matter was examined and the prayer in the representation was rejected as per Annexure A-8 order dated 19.3.1987. It took another 20 years' for the applicant to submit Annexure A1 representation dated 28.1.2008 projecting some grievance in this regard. The applicant filed the O.A. only in the year 2009, i.e. virtually after 60 years of the termination from the service. The reliefs sought for, to grant pensionary benefits and to dispose of Annexure A1 representation within a time frame were opposed by the Railways by filing detailed reply statement, also producing copies of the relevant proceedings. It was also specifically contended that the O.A. was hopelessly barred by limitation and further that, it was not liable to be entertained on merits as well. Relevant verdicts passed by the Apex Court were also adverted to, in support of the contentions. It was without any regard to the pleadings and the law laid down by the Supreme Court, that the Tribunal passed Ext.P8 verdict, which has extended only misplaced sympathy and hence the challenge, submits the learned Standing Counsel for the Railways. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the legal representative of the deceased applicant submits that the case was the result of a fraud nurtured by the Railways. The applicant was acquitted u/S.258(1) of Cr.P.C. as evident from Annexure A7. This being the position, there was a duty upon the Railways to have him reinstated immediately. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the legal representative of the deceased applicant submits that the case was the result of a fraud nurtured by the Railways. The applicant was acquitted u/S.258(1) of Cr.P.C. as evident from Annexure A7. This being the position, there was a duty upon the Railways to have him reinstated immediately. It is also added that the benefit of reinstatement and pensionary benefits have already been extended by the Railways to the other similarly situated person who was arrested in connection with the said crime. This has not been extended to the applicant, which is stated as nothing but arbitrary and illegal in all respects. This being the position, the verdict passed by the Tribunal, granting the relief as per Ext.P8, is within the four walls of law and is not assailable under any circumstance, submits the learned counsel. 8. There is no much dispute with regard to the sequence of events, especially with regard to the date of commencement of service, the date of attaining the age of superannuation, the date of suspension in connection with the arrest and detention and also as to the date of termination of service. In Annexure A5 representation itself, the applicant has pointed out about the termination of service-as per the order dated 28.3.1949. Despite the admitted factum of termination of service, no challenge is raised anywhere in the Original Application to set aside the order of termination or even to declare that the termination was bad in any manner or else to consider the applicant as having deemed to be continued in service, till the normal date of retirement. The only reliance placed, to claim the benefit of pension, is on the judgment passed by the criminal court ordering acquittal u/S.258 (1) Cr.P.C. The said order clearly says that the prosecution had failed to establish the case against the accused, thus leading to acquittal. The misconduct, if any, committed by the applicant, which in fact, has given rise to the registration of the criminal case, followed by arrest and detention, however could have been pursued by the Department, had it been brought to the notice of the Department at the relevant time. The rigour of rule regarding evidence in a criminal case is different from the position in the case of disciplinary proceedings. The rigour of rule regarding evidence in a criminal case is different from the position in the case of disciplinary proceedings. In the case of former, it has to be proved 'beyond reasonable doubt', whereas in the case of latter, even 'preponderance of probability' is sufficient. The issue can be approached in different angle as well. No challenge was raised by the applicant against the termination of service, even after the acquittal from the criminal case as per Annexure A7, for a period of 20 years. The first representation itself was preferred on 11.8.1970 (as referred to in Annexure A5), which came to be rejected as per Annexure A5. Still, the same was never sought to be challenged. The petitioner was sleeping over the issue for another 16 years and woke up much later, submitting another representation in 1986, which came to be rejected in 1987. Still, there was total silence and there was no challenge. On a fine morning, after about 21 years, the petitioner preferred yet another representation dated 28.2.2008 and it was thereafter, that he approached the Tribunal by filing the O.A. with the sole prayer to declare that the applicant was entitled to get pensionary benefits and to direct disposal of Annexure A1 representation. As pointed out already, the order of termination or the rejection of the representation at different points of time was never subjected to challenge; nor is there any such challenge even in the Original Application filed in the year 2008. Unless the order of termination was set aside, no relief could have been extended with regard to the claim for pensionary benefits. The matter is liable to be decided against the applicant in this regard. 9. The Tribunal has dealt with the issue while passing Ext.P8 order holding that 'limitation' has no role to play in the instant case. The operative portion of the said order as contained in paragraph.7 reads as follows: “Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the question of limitation has no role to play as the onus is on the Railways to reinstate him firstly on the basis of judgment of the Magistrate Court and secondly, along with 22 others and thirdly, should have offered him solace by virtue of the decision taken in 1972 and 1974. Having failed in all these, respondents now cannot be heard to claim that plea of the applicant would be hit by limitation. If such defences are to be accepted, it will be tantamount to adding insult to injury.” The relief granted by the Tribunal, as flowing from Ext.P8, is in the following terms: “8. The applicant has prayed for pensionary benefits and for disposal of Annexure A-1 representation within a time frame. As the applicant is already ged 82 and we are in agreement with the Hon'ble High Court of Madras that there is no need for any direction to dispose of Annexure A-1 representation. In view of the fact that the applicant ought to have reinstated earlier and even in spite of representations and other cases in which the whole situation is known only to the Railway authorities, they have taken a negative stand and had not informed the applicant of the correct situation, we hold that the applicant is entitled to pensionary benefits from a period which would date back 3 years prior to the filing of the O.A. i.e. from 26.2.2006 onwards. In harmony with the judgment of the High Court of Madras, we direct the respondents to compute and calculate the pension which would have been notionally available to the applicant had he been taken back in service on the next date of judgment of the Hon'ble Magistrate Court, Trichy and to pay him arrears of pension within eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order and also sanction future pension within such period. The arrears should be computed as arising from and be paid with simple interest @ 6% per annum from 26.2.2006 till the date of payment. Further pension shall also be paid.” 10. In the above context, the law declared by the Supreme Court in Ramesh Chand Sharma v. Udham Singh Kamal and Others ( (1999) 8 SCC 304 ) is sought to be relied on by the petitioners/Railways; particularly, paragraph 7, which is reproduced below: “7. On a perusal of the materials on record and after hearing counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the explanation sought to be given before us cannot be entertained as no foundation thereof was laid before the Tribunal. On a perusal of the materials on record and after hearing counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the explanation sought to be given before us cannot be entertained as no foundation thereof was laid before the Tribunal. It was open to the first respondent to make proper application u/S.21(3) of the Act for condonation of delay and having not done so, he cannot be permitted to take up such contention at this late stage. In our opinion, the OA filed before the Tribunal after the expiry of three years could not have been admitted and disposed of on merits in view of the statutory provision contained in S.21(1)) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The law in this behalf is now settled (see Secy. to Govt. of India v. Shivram Mahadu Gaikwad)”. 11. It will be worthwhile to go through the verdict passed by the Supreme Court in ((2008) 2 SCC (L & S) 961) (supra) as well; paragraphs 8 and 9 of which are extracted below: “8. Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the termination. But nearly two decades later, say in the year 2000, he decides to challenge the termination. He is aware that any such challenge would be rejected at the threshold on the ground of delay (if the application is made before tribunal) or on the ground of delay and laches (if a writ petition is filed before a High Court). Therefore, instead of challenging the termination, he gives a representation requesting that he may be taken back to service. Normally, there will be considerable delay in replying to such representations relating to old matters. Taking advantage of this position, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition before the tribunal/High court seeking a direction to the employer to consider and dispose of his representation. The tribunals/High courts routinely allow or dispose of such applications/petitions (many a time even without notice to the other side), without examining the matter on merits, with a direction to consider and dispose of the representation. 9. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly, they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any “decision” on rights and obligations of parties. 9. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly, they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any “decision” on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realise the consequences of such a direction to “consider”. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to “consider”. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored. 12. The Apex Court observed in paragraph 10, that every representation to the Government for relief may not be replied on merits and that representation relating to matters, which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone. The reply to such representation cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim, according to the Apex Court. It was accordingly held that, sufficient care and caution have to be taken by Courts/Tribunals and that misplaced sympathy in such matters will encourage indiscipline, leading to unjust enrichment of the employee. The observation as contained in paragraph 13 will be relevant in this context, which is reproduced below: “13. Where an employee un authorisedly absents himself and suddenly appears after 20 years and demands that he should be taken back and approaches the court, the department naturally will not or may not have any record relating to the employee at that distance of time. In such cases, when the employer fails to produce the records of the enquiry and the order of dismissal/removal, court cannot draw an adverse inference against the employer for not producing records, nor direct reinstatement with back wages for 20 years, ignoring the cessation of service or the lucrative alternative employment of the employee. In such cases, when the employer fails to produce the records of the enquiry and the order of dismissal/removal, court cannot draw an adverse inference against the employer for not producing records, nor direct reinstatement with back wages for 20 years, ignoring the cessation of service or the lucrative alternative employment of the employee. Misplaced sympathy in such matters will encourage indiscipline, lead to unjust enrichment of the employee at fault and result in drain of public exchequer. Many a time there is also no application of mind as to the extent of financial burden, as a result of a routine order for back wages.” 13. It is seen that the petitioners/Railways have specifically adverted to the ruling rendered by the Supreme Court in ((2008) 2 SCC 961 (L&S)) (supra) in paragraph 4(2) of Ext.P2 Reply Statement and some other decisions are referred to in paragraph 6 of Ext.P4 Reply Statement filed by the respondents in the O.A. Unfortunately, there is no discussion or even reference to these decisions, which was stated as projected before the Tribunal in the course of arguments, to have them appreciated by the Tribunal. The learned Standing Counsel for the Railways asserts that not even a petition was filed by the applicant to condone the inordinate delay of 60' (sixty) years in filing the O.A. before the Tribunal. In the above circumstances, we are of the view that Ext.P8 verdict passed by the Tribunal in favour of the applicant has resulted in misplaced sympathy, which has to be interdicted. We do so. Ext.P8 stands set aside. The Original Petition is allowed. As a natural consequence, the O.A. filed by the Original Applicant stands dismissed.