ORDER : The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 12.05.2004 passed by the learned Sub-Judge-I, Dhanbad in Title Suit No. 306 of 2001, whereby the application of the petitioner dated 06.02.2004 filed for recall of the order dated 19.02.2003 debarring the petitioner from filing the written statement has been rejected. 2. The factual matrix of the case is that a suit for declaration of permanent injunction being Title Suit No. 306 of 2001 was filed by the plaintiff/respondent no. 2. Notices upon the defendants were issued on 16.01.2002. Pursuant to the notice, defendant no. 3/petitioner appeared in the suit proceeding on 04.02.2002, however, no written statement was filed. The plaintiff/respondent no. 2 and the defendant no. 3/petitioner filed a compromise petition on 18.01.2003. Subsequently, the plaintiff/respondent no. 2 pressed injunction petition which was dismissed vide order dated 02.08.2003. In the meantime, the petitioner was debarred from filing written statement on 19.02.2003. Thereafter, the case was fixed for order on compromise petition on several dates. On 29.08.2003, the respondent no. 2 prayed for debarring the petitioner from filing the written statement, however, no order was passed by the learned court below as the petitioner was already debarred from filing written statement vide order dated 19.02.2003. When the defendant came to know the said fact, he filed written statement on 13.11.2003 and also filed an application to recall the earlier order dated 19.02.2003 by which the petitioner was debarred from filing the written statement. However, the said application for recalling the order dated 19.02.2003 was dismissed by the learned Sub-Judge-I, Dhanbad vide order dated 12.05.2004 on the ground that the statutory period for filing the written statement has already lapsed. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the parties had earlier intended to compromise the matter, the petitioner did not choose to file the written statement. When the compromise did not materialise between the petitioner and the respondent no. 2, he filed the written statement on 13.11.2003 and also filed an application to recall the earlier order dated 19.02.2003 by which he was debarred from filing the written statement. However, the learned court below rejected the petitioner's application to recall the order dated 19.02.2003 vide impugned order dated 12.05.2004. 2, he filed the written statement on 13.11.2003 and also filed an application to recall the earlier order dated 19.02.2003 by which he was debarred from filing the written statement. However, the learned court below rejected the petitioner's application to recall the order dated 19.02.2003 vide impugned order dated 12.05.2004. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned court below committed an error in not considering the fact that earlier the petitioner and the respondent no. 2 were taking steps for entering into a compromise and a compromise petition was also filed for the same. In view of the said fact, the impugned order dated 12.05.2004 passed by the learned Sub-Judge-I, Dhanbad may be set aside. 4. No one appears on behalf of respondent no. 2. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and going through the relevant documents placed on record, it appears that the suit was filed on 21.12.2001 by the respondent no. 2 in which notice was issued to the petitioner on 16.01.2002. Though, it is not clear as to on which date the notice was served upon the petitioner, yet it is apparent from the record that the petitioner appeared in the suit proceeding on 04.02.2002. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner filed the written statement on 13.11.2003 i.e., after more than one year and nine months from the date he appeared in the suit proceeding. Order VIII Rule 1 C.P.C. (prior to Act 4 of 2016 Amendment) reads as under: “1. Written statement.– the defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence: Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the written statement on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons.” 6. The issue regarding period of limitation provided under Order VIII Rule 1 C.P.C. is no more resintegra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd.” reported in (2015) 16 SCC 20 [: 2016 JLJR (SC) 113], has held as under: “13. The issue regarding period of limitation provided under Order VIII Rule 1 C.P.C. is no more resintegra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd.” reported in (2015) 16 SCC 20 [: 2016 JLJR (SC) 113], has held as under: “13. The question arose in J.J. Merchant whether the Forum can grant time beyond 45 days to the opposite party for filing its version. After considering the aforestated section in the light of the object with which the Act has been enacted, a three-Judge Bench of this Court came to the conclusion that in no case period beyond 45 days can be granted to the opposite party for filing its version of the case.” 14. Without discussing the aforestated three-Judge Bench judgment in detail, we now turn to another judgment which has been referred to by the referring Bench. The other judgment which has been referred to is Kailash, which pertains to Election law. The issue involved in the said case was whether time-limit of 90 days, as prescribed by the proviso to Rule 1 of Order 8 of the Civil Procedure Code, is mandatory or directory in nature. The said issue had arisen in an election matter where the written statement was not filed by the candidate concerned within the period prescribed under the relevant Election law and the issue was whether in the election trial, delay caused in filing the written statement could have been condoned. After considering the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and several other judgments pertaining to grant of time or additional time for filing written statement or reply, in the interest of justice, this Court came to the conclusion that the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 CPC are not mandatory but directory in nature and therefore, in the interest of justice, further time for filing reply can be granted, if the circumstances are such that require grant of further time for filing the reply.” 23. Upon hearing the counsel concerned and upon perusal of both the judgments referred to hereinabove, which pertain to extension of time for the purpose of filing written statement, we are of the opinion that the view expressed by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in J.J. Merchant should prevail.” 25. Upon hearing the counsel concerned and upon perusal of both the judgments referred to hereinabove, which pertain to extension of time for the purpose of filing written statement, we are of the opinion that the view expressed by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in J.J. Merchant should prevail.” 25. We are, therefore, of the view that the judgment delivered in J.J. Merchant holds the field and therefore, we reiterate the view that the District Forum can grant a further period of 15 days to the opposite party for filing his version or reply and not beyond that.” 26. There is one more reason to follow the law laid down in J.J. Merchant. J.J. Merchant was decided in 2002, whereas Kailash was decided in 2005. As per law laid down by this Court, while deciding Kailash, this Court ought to have respected the view expressed in J.J. Merchant as the judgment delivered in J.J. Merchant was earlier in point of time. The aforestated legal position cannot be ignored by us and therefore, we are of the opinion that the view expressed in J.J. Merchant should be followed.” 28. In view of the aforestated clear legal position depicted by a five-Judge Bench, the subject is no more res integra. Not only this three-Judge Bench, but even a Bench of coordinate strength of this Court, which had decided the case of Kailash, was bound by the view taken by a three-Judge Bench in J.J. Merchant.” 7. It is apparent from the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “New India Assurance Co. Ltd.” (supra) that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of “Dr. J.J. Merchant & Ors. Vs. Shrinath Chaturvedi”, reported in (2002) 6 SCC 635 [: 2002 (3) JLJR (SC) 100] has been held to be a correct law so far as the period of limitation for filing written statement by the defendant is concerned. The relevant part of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “Dr. J.J. Merchant” is quoted as under: “14. For this purpose, even Parliament has amended Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads thus: “1. The relevant part of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “Dr. J.J. Merchant” is quoted as under: “14. For this purpose, even Parliament has amended Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads thus: “1. Written statement.—The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence: Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be specified by the court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons.” (emphasis supplied) 15. Upon hearing the concerned counsel and upon perusal of both the judgments referred to hereinabove, which pertain to extension of time for the purpose of filing written statement, we are of the opinion that the view expressed by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) should prevail. 17. In view of the aforesaid provisions, the Commission can certainly refer to Order 7 Rule 14 which provides that where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon a document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such document in a list, and shall produce it in the court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof to be filed with the plaint. It appears that this mandatory requirement is not followed and thereafter, there is complaint of delay in disposal. Similarly, in case of written statement under Order 8 Rule 1-A, the defendant is required to produce the documents relied upon by him when written submission is presented. The Commission can always insist on production of all documents relied upon by the parties along with the complaint and the defence version.” 8. Coming back to the facts of the present case, it is an admitted fact that the petitioner put his appearance in the suit proceeding on 04.02.2002, however, the written statement has been filed by him only on 13.11.2003 i.e., after more than one year and nine months from the date he appeared in the suit proceeding. Coming back to the facts of the present case, it is an admitted fact that the petitioner put his appearance in the suit proceeding on 04.02.2002, however, the written statement has been filed by him only on 13.11.2003 i.e., after more than one year and nine months from the date he appeared in the suit proceeding. The maximum period of filing of written statement by the defendant provided under Order VIII Rule 1 C.P.C. is 90 days from the date of service of summons on him. Even if the provision of Section 148 C.P.C. is taken into consideration, the outer limit within which the written statement by a defendant is to be filed is 120 days. However, the petitioner sought to file the written statement in the present suit proceeding after more than one year and nine months he put appearance in the said suit. 9. Considering the said fact, I find no infirmity in the impugned order dated 12.05.2004 passed by the learned Sub-Judge-I, Dhanbad in Title Suit No. 306 of 2001. 10. The present writ petition being devoid of merit is accordingly dismissed.