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2017 DIGILAW 1393 (KER)

Annamma Sunny v. Vasanthakumari Amma

2017-11-09

ALEXANDER THOMAS

body2017
JUDGMENT : 1. These two Revision Petitions arise out of conviction and sentence imposed in the two complaints in C.C.Nos.422/2007 and 423/2007 on the file of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences), Ernakulam, which were jointly tried. 2. In Crl.R.P.No.1655/2010, the petitioner is the accused for the offence punishable under Sec.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in C.C.No.422/2007 on the file of the above Magistrate Court, instituted on the basis of a complaint filed by R-1 herein. The dishonoured cheque involved in C.C.No.422/2007 is Ext.P-6 dated 28.2.2004 for Rs.2,15,000/- whereas the dishonoured cheque involved in C.C.No.423/2007 is Ext.P-5 dated 31.1.2004 for Rs.3 lakhs. Thus altogether the total amount involved in both the cheques comes to Rs.5,15,000/-. 3. In Crl.R.P.No.1660/2010, the petitioner is the accused for the same offence in C.C.No.423/2007 on the file of the same Magistrate Court, instituted on the basis of a complaint preferred by the very same respondent-complainant. The complaints were jointly tried. The trial court as per the impugned common judgment rendered on 30.5.2009 had convicted the petitioner for the above said offence in both the complaints and had given a joint substantive sentence of simple imprisonment for a period of one month and to pay total fine amount of Rs.6 lakhs and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 3 months and the fine amount so realised was directed to be paid to the complainant as compensation under Sec.357(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. Aggrieved by the verdict of the trial court the petitioner has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 399/2009 to challenge the conviction and sentence in C.C.No.422/2007 and also filed Criminal Appeal No. 398/2009 to challenge the conviction and sentence in C.C.No.423/2007. The appellate Sessions Court concerned (Court of Additional Sessions Judge-IV, Ernakulam), as per the common judgment dated 22.12.2009 had dismissed the appeal and thereby confirmed the conviction and sentence imposed on the petitioner. It is challenging the concurrent verdicts of both the courts below, that the petitioner has filed these two Criminal Revision Petitions by taking recourse to the remedy available under Sec.397 r/w Sec.401 of the Cr.P.C, 1973. 4. Heard Sri.S.Rajeev, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner, Sri.Bepin Vijayan, learned counsel appearing for R-1 complainant and Sri.Jestin Mathew, learned Prosecutor appearing for R-2 State. 5. 4. Heard Sri.S.Rajeev, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner, Sri.Bepin Vijayan, learned counsel appearing for R-1 complainant and Sri.Jestin Mathew, learned Prosecutor appearing for R-2 State. 5. The brief facts leading to the complaint are to the effect that the complainant had entered into Ext.P-1 agreement dated 24.5.2003 with the accused, who offered to sell her house bearing building Nos.37/1339 and 1340 situated at Elamkulam Village, Ernakulam, for a total consideration of Rs.25 lakhs and that, in furtherance of the said agreement for sale, the complainant had given a token advance of Rs.10,000/- and further amount of Rs.5 lakhs to the accused thus totalling to Rs.5,10,000/-. That the accused was unable to execute and register the sale deed as she was not able to free the property from encumbrances with the bank. Therefore, initially the date of execution of sale was extended from time to time by making endorsement in the agreement and finally the complainant had given an ultimate date as 28.4.2004 for execution and registration of the sale deed after complying with necessary formalities and after freeing the property from encumbrance, etc. Since the accused was convinced that she will not be able to free the property from encumbrances and execute the sale deed, she had executed Ext.P-5 cheque dated 31.1.2004 for Rs.3 lakhs and Ext.P-6 cheque dated 28.2.2004 for Rs.2.15 lakhs, thus totalling to Rs.5.15 lakhs and that on receipt of the cheques by the complainant, the agreement for sale was cancelled. The complainant, thereafter presented Exts.P-5 & P-6 cheques for collection before her bank, which led to dishonour as per Exts.P-7 & P-8 bank memos dated 27.3.2007 on two grounds, namely, (1) “exceeds arrangement” and (2) “joint signature of both the account holders are necessary”. It appears that the dishonoured cheques were issued from a joint account of the accused and her husband and instructions given by them to the bank were to the effect that cheques could be passed only if it bear the signatures of both the account holders. It appears that the dishonoured cheques were issued from a joint account of the accused and her husband and instructions given by them to the bank were to the effect that cheques could be passed only if it bear the signatures of both the account holders. Thereupon, the complainant caused to send Exts.P-8 and P-9 statutory demand notices under Sec.138 proviso (b) of the N.I. Act calling upon the accused to pay the amount covered by Exts.P-5 and P-6 cheques within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice and that the said notice sent by registered post was duly served on the accused as per Exts.P-11 and P- 12 postal acknowledgement cards and that the accused had not responded by sending any reply and since there was no reply from the accused and the amount was not paid, the complainant, after adhering to the procedural formalities had instituted the instant complaints, which resulted in the conduct of the trial. During trial, the complainant examined as PW-1 and PW-2 (Bank Manager) and has marked Exts.P-1 to P-12 documents. The defence has marked Exts.D-1 to D-3 documents through PW-1. But the defence has not adduced any oral evidence. PW-1 has broadly deposed in tune with the complaint as stated hereinabove. It has also been brought out in evidence that the property in question, which was the subject matter of the sale agreement, was mortgaged with the Banaras State Bank, Ernakulam Branch, which was subsequently merged with the Bank of Baroda. That the accused has initially assured the complainant that she will clear off all encumbrances on the property within the prescribed time and execute the sale deed, but due to some reason or another, the encumbrances on the property could not be cleared by the accused and hence she could not proceed with the execution and registration of the sale deed. Ext.P-2 letter dated 15.9.2003 sent by the accused to the complainant reveals that encumbrance was not cleared by that time and accused is taking steps with her bank, Banaras State Bank Ltd., which was then facing amalgamation with the Bank of Baroda, to clear the encumbrances, etc. Ext.P-2 letter dated 15.9.2003 sent by the accused to the complainant reveals that encumbrance was not cleared by that time and accused is taking steps with her bank, Banaras State Bank Ltd., which was then facing amalgamation with the Bank of Baroda, to clear the encumbrances, etc. In Ext.P-3 letter dated 25.9.2003, sent by the accused to the complainant, the accused had acknowledged the receipt of the advance amount of Rs.5 lakhs and it is stated that she is taking steps to settle the due amounts with the Bank of Baroda and that she regrets the inconvenience caused in the delay and it is expected that the sale deed could be executed at the earliest, etc. In Ext.P-4 letter dated 26.12.2003, the accused has taken the stand that she has already obtained clearance from the bank which expires on 31.10.2003 and that the original date of the said agreement of sale had expired and the complainant had received the two cheques, etc. According to the complainant, she had given ultimatum on 28.2.2004 to execute the sale deed. Since it did not fructify, she had presented the cheques for collection, which resulted in dishonour as stated hereinabove. The main defence set up by the accused was to the effect that Exts.P-6 & P-7 cheques were obtained by the complainant under threat and coercion and that the accused was prepared to abide her obligations for effectuating the sale, etc. Ext.D-3 is the certified copy of the FIR dated 9.2.2004 said to have been registered by the Kochi Central Police Station, wherein the accused herein has been accused therein on the basis of a complaint lodged by the complainant herein. It also appears that during the pendency of the sale agreement, possession of the upper stairs of the building portion was given to the complainant and she apprehended that her peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said property will be obstructed by the accused herein and therefore she filed Ext.D-1 civil suit injuncting the accused herein from the peaceful enjoyment and possession of the said property by the complainant. Ext.D-2 is the copy of the injunction order dated 23.1.2004. Ext.D-2 is the copy of the injunction order dated 23.1.2004. On the basis of Exts.D-1 to D-3 it has been argued by the accused that these proceedings, both civil and criminal, against the accused herein, were prior to the issuance of Exts.P-5 & P-6 cheque dated 31.1.2004 & 28.2.2004 respectively and that therefore, it is highly unlikely and improper that the accused would have voluntarily executed and issued the cheques, etc. Ext.D-1 plaint in the suit is dated 21.1.2004 and the injunction order is dated 23.1.2004. The courts below have found that except raising a defence suggestion, no convincing or clinching circumstance could be let in by the accused to establish the veracity of the basic case set up by the accused that she had issued the cheques under threat and coercion. That apart, the courts below have noted that in Ext.P-4, the accused herself has admitted about the handing over of the above said two cheques in question. The explanation of the complainant was to the effect that she was staying alone in the upstairs of the building for which she was given possession and as she apprehended peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said property, she was constrained to initiate the suit, etc. It has also come out in evidence that the accused had never executed and registered the sale deed in favour of the complainant. The courts below have found that the evidence tendered by PW-1 is broadly credible and believable. Whereas the basic defence suggestion advanced by the accused has not been probabilised in a credible manner before the courts below. 6. It is contended by Sri. S. Rajeev, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner (accused) that it is clear from Exts.P-7 & P-8 dishonour memos issued by the bank that the cheques are dishonoured not only on the ground of insufficiency of funds but also on the specific ground that signatures of both the account holders were required. It is further argued that, PW-2, Bank Manager, has deposed that the bank account from which the dishonoured cheques were issued is from the joint account maintained by the accused and by her husband and specific instruction of those account holders was that any cheque should be passed by the bank only if the cheque contained the signatures of both the joint account holders. Therefore, it is contended by the accused that the offence under Sec.138 of the N.I. Act is not attracted in this case. It is beyond dispute that the cheques have been dishonoured on the ground “exceeds arrangement” which is part of the genus of the dishonour of the cheques as held in a catena of rulings. The Bombay High Court in the judgment in Vinod Tanna v. Zaheer Siddiqui, reported in 2001 CRI. L.J 2297, has held that, in a case where the cheque is dishonoured and returned unpaid with the advice of the bank “account operation jointly, other Director signature required”, still it would attract the offence under Sec.138 of the N.I. Act. It will be profitable to refer to paras 8 & 9 of the above said judgment of the Bombay High Court which read as follows: '8. On reference to paras 17 and 18 of the judgment, it can be seen that observations in paras 5 and 6 of the judgment in K.K. Sidharthan's case [ (1996) 6 SCC 369 ] were disapproved with following words : "The aforesaid propositions in both these reported judgments, in our considered view, with great respect, are contrary to the spirit and object of Sections 138 and 139 of the Act. If we are to accept this proposition, it will make section 138 a dead letter, for, by giving instruct ions to the bank to stop payment immediately after issuing a cheque against a debt or liability, the drawer can easily get rid of the penal Consequences notwithstanding the fact that a deemed offence was committed." The observations in para 6 of Electronics Trade case [1996 Cri. LJ 1692], as follows, were also, held to be not laying down the law correctly. "Section 138 intended to prevent dishonesty on the part of the drawer of negotiable instrument, to draw a cheque without sufficient funds in his account maintained by him in a bank and induce the payee or holder in due course to act upon it. Section 138 draws presumption that one commits the offence if he issues the cheque dishonestly." Lastly in para 20 of Electronics Trade case [1996 Cri. Section 138 draws presumption that one commits the offence if he issues the cheque dishonestly." Lastly in para 20 of Electronics Trade case [1996 Cri. LJ 1692], Hon'ble Apex Court observed : "On a careful reading of Section 138 of the Act, we are unable to subscribe to the view that Section 138 of the Act draws presumption of dishonesty against drawer of the cheque if he, without sufficient funds to his credit in his bank account to honour the cheque, issues the same and, therefore, this amounts to an offence under Section 138 of the Act." Thus, it is evident that Larger Bench of the Apex Court adopted the view that "stop payment" instruction, if causes dishonour of the cheque, the same attracts Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, even if such an instruction to bank was with an intimation to drawee and before presentation of cheque for encashment. And this is so without reference to balance in the account whether sufficient to honour the cheque or not. This is also irrespective of amount of cheque being less on more than the amount arranged to be paid from the account by an agreement with the bank. Larger Bench in Modi case [1998 Cri LJ 1397] also disapproves the proposition "Section 138 draws presumption that one commits offence if he issues the cheque dishonestly" as laid down in para 6 of the judgment in Electronics Trade case. In Modi's matter, Hon'ble Supreme Court held the cheque dishonoured with bank advice "payment stopped by the drawer" as the situation attracting Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. 9. Considering the observations of Hon'ble Apex Court and especially those referred in para 8 above, it is difficult to accept the proposition of Advocate Shri Pradhan that applicability of Section 138 is interpreted as restricting only to two eventualities referred within the text or that the judgment approved its expansion to a limited extent to cover the cases of dishonour due to "stop payment" instruction. It is pertinent to not that in spite of reproducing para 5 of the judgment in Electronics Trade case, which also held the endorsement "refer to drawer" amounts to dishonour of the cheque. Larger Bench in Modi Cements Ltd. v. Kuchil Kumar,' did not record disagreement with the same. It is pertinent to not that in spite of reproducing para 5 of the judgment in Electronics Trade case, which also held the endorsement "refer to drawer" amounts to dishonour of the cheque. Larger Bench in Modi Cements Ltd. v. Kuchil Kumar,' did not record disagreement with the same. Observations of a Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Rakesh Nemkumar v. Narayan Dhondu [1993 Cri.LJ 680], on this aspect may usefully be referred. "A clear reading of section 138 leaves no doubt that the circumstances under which such dishonour takes place are required to be totally ignored. In this case, the law only takes a note of the fact that the payment has not been forthcoming and it matters little that any of the manifold reasons may have caused that situation. If for instance, the closure of an account or the stoppage of payment of any other of the common place reasons for dishonour were to be justifiable, then, the Legislature would have set these out in the section as exceptions not constituting an offence. No such intention can be read into Section 138, as none exists." Thus, contention of learned counsel Shri Pradhan for petitioner that return of the cheque unpaid with the advice "account operation jointly, other director signature required" is not dishonour of the cheque, is not sustainable and will have to be rejected.' This Court is in full concurrence with the above said considered view rendered by the Bombay High Court in Vinod Tanna v. Zaheer Siddiqui, reported in 2001 CRI. L.J 2297. 7. The Apex Court in para 16 of the judgment in Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2012) 13 SCC 375 = 2013 (1) KLT 167 SC, has held as follows: '16. The above line of decisions leaves no room for holding that the two contingencies envisaged under S.138 of the Act must be interpreted strictly or literally. We find ourselves in respectful agreement with the decision in NEPC Micon Ltd. (supra) that the expression “amount of money …………. is insufficient” appearing in S.138 of the Act is a genus and dishonour for reasons such “as account closed”, “payment stopped”, “referred to the drawer” are only species of that genus. We find ourselves in respectful agreement with the decision in NEPC Micon Ltd. (supra) that the expression “amount of money …………. is insufficient” appearing in S.138 of the Act is a genus and dishonour for reasons such “as account closed”, “payment stopped”, “referred to the drawer” are only species of that genus. Just as dishonour of a cheque on the ground that the account has been closed is a dishonour falling in the first contingency referred to in S.138, so also dishonour on the ground that the “signatures do not match” or that the “image is not found”, which too implies that the specimen signatures do not match the signatures on the cheque would constitute a dishonour within the meaning of S.138 of the Act. This Court has in the decisions referred to above taken note of situations and contingencies arising out of deliberate acts of omission or commission on the part of the drawers of the cheques which would inevitably result in the dishonour of the cheque issued by them. For instance this Court has held that if after issue of the cheque the drawer closes the account it must be presumed that the amount in the account was nil hence insufficient to meet the demand of the cheque. A similar result can be brought about by the drawer changing his specimen signature given to the bank or in the case of a company by the company changing the mandate of those authorised to sign the cheques on its behalf. Such changes or alteration in the mandate may be dishonest or fraudulent and that would inevitably result in dishonour of all cheques signed by the previously authorised signatories. There is in our view no qualitative difference between a situation where the dishonour takes place on account of the substitution by a new set of authorised signatories resulting in the dishonour of the cheques already issued and another situation in which the drawer of the cheque changes his own signatures or closes the account or issues instructions to the bank not to make the payment. So long as the change is brought about with a view to preventing the cheque being honoured the dishonour would become an offence under S.138 subject to other conditions prescribed being satisfied. So long as the change is brought about with a view to preventing the cheque being honoured the dishonour would become an offence under S.138 subject to other conditions prescribed being satisfied. There may indeed be situations where a mismatch between the signatories on the cheque drawn by the drawer and the specimen available with the bank may result in dishonour of the cheque even when the drawer never intended to invite such a dishonour. We are also conscious of the fact that an authorised signatory may in the ordinary course of business be replaced by a new signatory ending the earlier mandate to the bank. Dishonour on account of such changes that may occur in the course of ordinary business of a company, partnership or an individual may not constitute an offence by itself because such a dishonour in order to qualify for prosecution under S.138 shall have to be preceded by a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon and has the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque. It is only when the drawer despite receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount that the dishonour would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. Even in such cases, the question whether or not there was a lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued would be a matter that the trial Court will examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it and keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration.' In the light of the legal principles enunciated by the Apex Court in decisions as in Laxmi Dyechem's case (supra), this Court has no hesitation to hold that, so long as the cheque is dishonoured on the ground of insufficiency of funds even if there is another ground of dishonour that the cheques do not contain the requisite signature of the other joint account holder, etc., still it will attract an offence under Sec.138 of the N.I. Act, in so far as the cheque has been issued from the account of the accused and the necessary conditions for the prosecution of the offence are made out. It is also made clear the issue as to whether Sec.138 offence is made out in a case where the dishonour is solely on the ground of absence of signature of one of the joint account holders, despite sufficient account balance, etc. does not arise in the facts of this case and such an issue is left open to be decided in an appropriate case. 8. It is in the light of these aspects that the courts below have found that the accused is liable to be convicted for the offence punishable under Sec.138 of the N.I. Act. These findings of facts cannot be said to be vitiated by gross perversity or illegality. Therefore, this Court will not be justified to interfere in a matter like this by taking recourse to the revisional powers conferred on this Court. Sri. S. Rajeev, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner-accused, would submit that in case this Court is so inclined to affirm the conviction, then the impugned substantive sentence of simple imprisonment for one month may be set aside or reduce it to imprisonment till the rising of the court, etc. As regards the sentence, it is seen that in the two complaints, which are jointly tried, the trial court has imposed a joint sentence on the accused in respect of both the complaints. This appears to be patently illegal and ultra vires. 9. Sri. S. Rajeev, learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that interference with the joint sentence will prejudice the accused, especially in the enhancement of compensation and as the separate default sentences, if attracted, will have to be suffered consecutively. Though this argument of the accused is attractive at first blush, the same is unsound. The accused herself demands that the joint substantive sentence of one month simple imprisonment is to be altered in her favour by reducing it to imprisonment till the rising of the court. This plea can be considered only subject to rendering of justice to the complainant, by enhancement of the compensation amount, taking into consideration the long lapse of time, after the dishonour of the cheques. Moreover, as the joint sentence is in two complaints, even though it is jointly tried, is per se illegal and ultra vires. This Court, in revision, can easily remit the matter to the trial court, for imposing proper sentence. Moreover, as the joint sentence is in two complaints, even though it is jointly tried, is per se illegal and ultra vires. This Court, in revision, can easily remit the matter to the trial court, for imposing proper sentence. This will result in unnecessary delays, with scope for further challenge, which will certainly cause injustice to the complainant. Instead of such remit, this Court, in revision, is certainly empowered to correct such illegality and if there is any, technical objection in so doing in the accused's revision, certainly the suo motu revisional powers can be appropriately invoked for rectifying such illegality. Moreover, the joint default sentence clause in this case is 3 months' simple imprisonment and as the balance amount payable is only Rs.1 lakh in one case and Rs.2 lakhs in the other case, this Court is inclined to limit the separate default sentences as one month in the former case and 2 months in the latter case, thus totalling to only 3 months, which is the same as in the impugned joint default sentence. So, there is no question of any prejudice in the facts of this case. Even if the separate default sentences are higher than the impugned one, this Court, in revision, is perfectly competent to do so in a case like this, especially when the accused is demanding to alter the joint substantive sentence by reducing the same. So, the petitioner cannot approbate and reprobate in the same breath and the above argument of the accused is overruled. In order to resolve the impasse created by such hyper technical objections, this Court can easily decide not to interfere with the joint sentence, in which case the petitioner will have to suffer the substantive sentence of one month. But this Court should render justice to both the adversarial parties. Faced with this situation, Sri. S. Rajeev, learned counsel for the accused, submitted that this Court may pass appropriate orders in the interest of justice. 10. True, that the criminal courts are empowered to try complaints jointly in appropriate cases. Where the private complaints are jointly tried, which result in conviction, then the criminal courts after rendering findings of convictions in the complaints concerned, should consider the issue of imposition of separate sentences on the accused in each of those complaints. 10. True, that the criminal courts are empowered to try complaints jointly in appropriate cases. Where the private complaints are jointly tried, which result in conviction, then the criminal courts after rendering findings of convictions in the complaints concerned, should consider the issue of imposition of separate sentences on the accused in each of those complaints. Therefore, the joint sentence imposed by the trial court is a patent illegality which requires interdiction at the hands of this Court. True, that the complainant has not filed any revision to challenge the legality of such a joint sentence or for enhancement of fine/compensation amount, etc. This Court is also empowered to resort to suo motu revisional powers in terms of Sec.399 r/w Sec.401 of Cr.P.C. The matter has been pending before this Court for more than 7 long years. There is no necessity to separately register any suo motu proceedings in the facts of this case and necessary orders in exercise of suo motu revisional powers conferred on this Court, which could be exercised by this Court in these proceedings itself, so as to rectify the said patent illegality. 11. Going by the legal principles laid down by the Apex Court in Kaushalya Devi v. Roopkishore , reported in AIR 2011 SC 2566 , it was held that the offence of dishonour of cheques under Sec.138 of the N.I. Act is essentially a civil wrong which has been given criminal overtones and the gravity of such a complaint cannot be equated with an offence under IPC and instead of jail sentence, imposition of fine payable as compensation was found sufficient to meet the ends of justice. The Apex Court in the case Damodar S.Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal, reported in AIR 2010 SC 1907 held that in case of dishonour of cheques, it is the compensatory aspect of the remedy which should be given priority over the punitive aspect. In the light of the legal principles enunciated by the Apex Court, this Court is inclined to accept the plea made by the counsel for the accused for reducing the simple imprisonment for one month to imprisonment till the rising of the court. It should be borne in mind that any such reduction should be made in such a manner so that due justice is rendered to the complainant. It should be borne in mind that any such reduction should be made in such a manner so that due justice is rendered to the complainant. The cheques were executed, dishonoured and dishonour memos were issued in the year January/February, 2004 and more than 13 long years have elapsed after the dishonour and execution of the cheques. Therefore, any such reduction of substantive sentence based on the plea made by the accused should be made in such a manner so as to suitably enhance the compensation amount payable to the complainant, as otherwise serious prejudice would be caused to the complainant. In such a situation, judicial obligation is cast on the court to ensure that justice is not done not only to the accused but also to the complainant. 12. The total compensation/fine amount imposed by the courts below is Rs.6 lakhs as against total cheque amount of Rs.5.15 lakhs. It is now reported by the trial court before the Registry of this Court that in compliance with this Court's interim order dated 28.5.2010 passed in these two revision petitions, the accused had deposited Rs.2 lakhs each in respect of these two complaints, thus totalling to Rs.4 lakhs. Having regard to the long pendency of the matter, this Court was inclined to grant compensation in these two cases for a total amount of Rs.10 lakhs, which is about twice the cheque amount in question. However, Sri. S. Rajeev, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would submit on the basis of instructions that the petitioner is suffering from cancer and is undergoing treatment and she has placed reliance on Anx.A-I medical certificate dated 1.10.2015 issued by a private hospital. Counsel for the complainant would submit that this Court may order that the compensation payable should be twice the cheque amount or that the cheque amount should carry interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of cheque upto the date of actual payment, in the light of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in R.Vijayan v. Baby & anr., reported in (2012) 1 SCC 260 . Having regard to the above said pleas, this Court is inclined to order that the total compensation payable in these two cases be fixed as Rs.7 lakhs and the said amount should be apportioned between these two cases separately. Having regard to the above said pleas, this Court is inclined to order that the total compensation payable in these two cases be fixed as Rs.7 lakhs and the said amount should be apportioned between these two cases separately. Of course, the amount of Rs.4 lakhs already deposited by the petitioner could be deducted for such amounts. 13. Accordingly, the following orders and directions are passed in C.C.No.422/2007 (which led to Crl.R.P.No.1655/2010) for which the cheque amount is Rs.2.15 lakhs: (i) The impugned conviction imposed on the petitioner for the offence under Sec.138 of the N.I. Act will stand confirmed. (ii) In super-session of the orders passed by the courts below, it is ordered that the petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay total compensation amount of Rs.3 lakhs to the complainant under Sec.357(3) of the Cr.P.C in relation to this complaint. (iii) The amount of Rs.2 lakhs already deposited by the petitioner in this complaint before the trial court could be deducted from the total compensation of Rs.3 lakhs payable in this case and the petitioner will have to pay the balance amount of Rs.1 lakh. The amount of Rs.2 lakhs already deposited by the petitioner shall be forthwith released to the complainant on a request in that regard made by that party. (iv) The petitioner is given 5 months' time to remit the balance compensation amount of Rs.1 lakh before the trial court. (v) The petitioner shall personally appear before the trial court at 11: a.m. on 21.4.2018 to receive the sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the court and to remit the balance compensation amount payable in this case. On default on the part of the petitioner to pay the said amount, she will have to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of one month. (vi) Until 21.4.2018, all further coercive proceedings taken against the petitioner in execution of the impugned sentence will stand deferred. (vii) On default of the petitioner either to appear before the court below on 21.4.2018 or to make payment as above said, the trial court will be at liberty to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law. 14. (vi) Until 21.4.2018, all further coercive proceedings taken against the petitioner in execution of the impugned sentence will stand deferred. (vii) On default of the petitioner either to appear before the court below on 21.4.2018 or to make payment as above said, the trial court will be at liberty to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law. 14. Accordingly, the following orders and directions are passed in C.C.No.423/2007 (which led to Crl.R.P.No.1660/2010) for which the cheque amount is Rs.3 lakhs: (i) The impugned conviction imposed on the petitioner for the offence under Sec.138 of the N.I. Act will stand confirmed. (ii) In super-session of the orders passed by the courts below, it is ordered that the petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay total compensation amount of Rs.4 lakhs to the complainant under Sec.357(3) of the Cr.P.C in relation to this complaint. (iii) The amount of Rs.2 lakhs already deposited by the petitioner in this complaint before the trial court could be deducted from the total compensation of Rs.4 lakhs payable in this case and the petitioner will have to pay the balance amount of Rs.2 lakhs. The amount of Rs.2 lakhs already deposited by the petitioner shall be forthwith released to the complainant on a request in that regard made by that party. (iv) The petitioner is given 5 months' time to remit the balance compensation amount of Rs.2 lakhs before the trial court. (v) The petitioner shall personally appear before the trial court at 11: a.m. on 21.4.2018 to receive the sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the court and to remit the balance compensation amount payable in this case. On default on the part of the petitioner to pay the said amount, she will have to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of two months. (vi) Until 21.4.2018, all further coercive proceedings taken against the petitioner in execution of the impugned sentence will stand deferred. (vii) On default of the petitioner either to appear before the court below on 21.4.2018 or to make payment as above said, the trial court will be at liberty to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law. (vi) Until 21.4.2018, all further coercive proceedings taken against the petitioner in execution of the impugned sentence will stand deferred. (vii) On default of the petitioner either to appear before the court below on 21.4.2018 or to make payment as above said, the trial court will be at liberty to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law. It is further ordered in the interest of justice in exercise of Sec.427(1) of the Cr.P.C that in case the petitioner pays the balance amount in both these two cases within the above said time limit as mentioned hereinabove, then the substantive sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the court imposed on the petitioner in these two cases will run concurrently. Otherwise, the same will run separately. Registry will forward a copy of this order to the trial court for information and necessary action. With these observations and directions, both the Crl.R.Ps stand finally disposed of.