JUDGMENT : Dinesh Mehta, J. The petitioner has knocked at the door of this Court, invoking its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, being aggrieved by the action of the respondent-Bank, in not considering him for promotion for a period of four years, on account of a penalty inflicted upon him vide order dated 12th September 2012. 2. The facts, necessitating the petitioner to file present writ petition, are that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Clerk-cum-Cashier in the erstwhile Jaipur Thar Gramin Bank, which came to be merged with Marudhar Gramin Bank in the year 2012 and subsequent thereto, with effect from 25th February 2013, the said Marudhar Gramin Bank also came to be amalgamated with Rajasthan Marudhar Gramin Bank, the respondent No.1 herein. 3. While the petitioner was working on the post of Office Assistant at Chandsama Branch, a disciplinary inquiry was initiated against him under Jaipur Thar Gramin Bank (Officers & Employees) Service Regulations 2010 {herein after 'the Service Regulations of 2010'}, which culminated into a penalty order dated 12.09.2012, vide which a penalty of reduction of pay was imposed as under:- "Reduction of basic pay of Shri Rajesh Harsh by four stages in his present time-scale of pay, with cumulative effect, from the date of this order i.e. present pay Rs. 20,900/- is reduced to Rs. 17,200/-. However, he will earn his future increments falling due on anniversary date" 4. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner did not prefer any appeal etc, assailing aforesaid penalty order dated 12.09.2012, till the filing of the present writ petition. 5. In exercise of powers conferred by Sections 17 and 29 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976, the Central Government promulgated Regional Rural Banks (Appointment and Promotion of Officers and Employees) Rules, 2010 {herein after 'the Rules of 2010'}, which came to be published in the Official Gazette on 13th July 2010. These Rules have been made applicable to all Regional Rural Banks, including the respondent-Bank. 6. Rule 6 of the Rules of 2010 provides for two modes of appointment; by way of direct recruitment and promotion. These Rules have been made applicable to all Regional Rural Banks, including the respondent-Bank. 6. Rule 6 of the Rules of 2010 provides for two modes of appointment; by way of direct recruitment and promotion. As per the Rules of 2010, post of Officer Scale-I is designated as Group 'A' post and is required to be filled up 50% by way of direct recruitment and 50% by way of promotion, from amongst candidates holding the posts of Office Assistant (Multipurpose) in the Bank, in substantive capacity, having 10 years' service experience. The Rules further provide that 50% posts of promotional quota shall be filled by two methods viz. 50% by Normal Channel i.e. on the basis of seniority-cum-merit and 50% by Fast Track channel, on the basis of merit-cum-seniority. 7. Thus, according to Rule 6 of the Rules of 2010, the post of Officer Junior Management (Scale-I) is also required to be filled by two modes viz. (a) normal channel, and (b) fast track. The process of promotion has been provided in Clause (iii) of Part-I of Group-A of the Third Schedule, according to which for the purpose of promotion, a candidate is required to clear a written test. 8. It is the case of the petitioner, that when petitioner's credentials were not summoned, he made a representation dated 06.12.2014 to the respondent-Bank, with a request to restore his Basic Pay in terms of Regulation 39(2)(b)(iv) of the Regulations of 2010 and to put up his case for promotion, before the Departmental Promotion Committee. 9. The petitioner was, however, informed that his case can not be placed before the Departmental Promotion Committee, prior to expiry of four years from the date of passing of the punishment order, in the wake of circular dated 02.01.2015, commonly known as Debarment Policy. It may be noted that said policy stipulates that in case of imposition of penalty of withholding increments, a candidate would become eligible for promotion, only after expiry of the period of penalty. It would be apt to reproduce relevant clause (8) of a the Debarment Policy or Circular dated 02.01.2015: "8. In case, where the disciplinary proceedings end with imposition of a penalty of 'withholding of promotion for specified period' or 'withholding of increments' or 'reduction to a lower stage in the time scale', the concerned officer/employee will become eligible for promotion only after expiry of the penalty." 10. In case, where the disciplinary proceedings end with imposition of a penalty of 'withholding of promotion for specified period' or 'withholding of increments' or 'reduction to a lower stage in the time scale', the concerned officer/employee will become eligible for promotion only after expiry of the penalty." 10. The petitioner has stated that the Respondent Bank, published a Circular No.150/14-15 dated 28.01.2015, wherein as a part of a stipulation regarding non-consideration of candidature for promotion, punishment period had been highlighted in the form of Note No.1, reproduced as under: uksV& ifji= la[;k dkfeZd@133@14&15 fnuakd 02-01-2015 ds vuqlkj fMckjesaV ikWfylh ds vuqlkj tks vf/kdkjh@deZpkjh n.M+ vof/k esa gksaxs mUgsa inksUufr ds ik= ugha ekuk tk;sxkA 11. The respondent-Bank decided to fill up the post by way of promotion and in this process, the Office Order dated 28.01.2015 was issued and vacancies for each post, with a list of eligible candidates for different posts were notified. Petitioner's name has been shown at Serial No.52, whereas the vacant posts of Office Assistant shown were also, 52. 12. A written examination was conducted by the Respondent-Bank on 09th February 2015, in which the petitioner did appear and his name was mentioned in the list of candidates declared qualified, to be called for interview. However, his name was scored out of the list, apparently on account of clause (8) of the Debarment Policy or the Circular dated 02.01.2015 and he was not considered for promotion. 13. Being aware of such decision, the petitioner made a representation on 14th March 2015, only to be informed that he would not be called for interview, as inhibited vide Clause (8) of the Policy circular of the Bank. 14. Being aggrieved with such action of the Respondent-Bank, the petitioner has preferred present writ petition with the following prayer: "(a) By an appropriate writ, order or direction, in the nature thereof, the arbitrary and illegal action of the respondent Bank, for not permitting him to appear in the interview to participate the promotion process for the post of Officer Junior Management (Scale-I), against Bank circular dated 28.01.2015 (Annexure-6), may kindly be declared illegal and unsustainable in the eye of law and the petitioner may kindly be declared entitled to participate the promotion and to be considered for promotion, if he qualifies the promotion process in terms of the Regional Rural Banks (Appointment of Officers and Employees) Service Rules 2010. (b) By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the impugned Bank circular dated 02.01.2015 and the department policy framed by the Bank, whereby debarring promotion to employees on the ground of penalty imposed in the past, may kindly be declared illegal and contrary to the Rules of 2010, framed by the Govt. of India and accordingly the same may kindly be struck down, being ultra-vires the constitution of India. (c) By an appropriate writ, order or direction, in the nature thereof, the impugned order dated 13.09.2012 (Annexure-1), passed by the respondent Bank, and the impugned penalty imposed, may kindly be declared illegal so far it is inconsistent the Jaipur Thar Gramin Bank (Officers & Employees) Service Regulation 2010 and accordingly respondent Bank may kindly be directed to consider the case of petitioner for promotion to the post of Officer Scale-I, against DPC being held vide Bank circular dated 28.01.2015." 15. No sooner did the counsel for the petitioner Mr. S.P. Sharma commenced his arguments than, Mr. Jagdish Vyas, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank raised preliminary objections as follows: (1) The writ petition is not competent, on account of misjoinder of cause of actions, inasmuch as the petitioner has challenged the propriety and legality of the Debarment Policy of 2015 while also laying challenge to the punishment order dated 12.09.2012. (2) The writ petition qua laying challenge to the punishment order dated 12.09.2012 is not maintainable, in the wake of availability of remedy of appeal, provided under Regulation 49 of the Service Regulations 2010. (3) The challenge to the punishment order dated 12.09.2012 suffers from delay and laches, particularly when limitation for filing appeal etc has expired much prior to the filing of the present writ petition. (4) The penalty order had been passed on 12.09.2012. Thereafter, the exercise for promotion was conducted in the years 2012 and 2013, and petitioner's candidature for promotion was not considered, yet the petitioner has chosen to file writ petition only in the year 2015 without raising any voice on earlier occasion. In other words, as per the Respondents, the petitioner has acquiesced or waived his right to challenge his non-consideration for promotion as a result of the punishment order. 16. After hearing preliminary objections raised by Mr. In other words, as per the Respondents, the petitioner has acquiesced or waived his right to challenge his non-consideration for promotion as a result of the punishment order. 16. After hearing preliminary objections raised by Mr. Jagdish Vyas, this Court was prima facie of the view that petitioner's challenge to the penalty order dated 12.09.2012 suffers from delay and laches on one hand and cannot be examined in wake of the availability of efficacious alternative remedy on the other. Faced with such a situation, Mr. S.P. Sharma dropped his prayer regarding challenge to the legality and propriety of the order dated 12.09.2012 (sic 13.09.2012); encapsulated in Clause (c), however, reserving his right to challenge the same, separately by way of appeal or other proceedings. 17. In view of abandonment of prayer clause (c) by the petitioner, Mr. Jagdish Vyas fairly conceded that the other preliminary objections may not have much bearing, as the same are, in one way or the other revolve around the challenge to the punishment order dated 12.09.2012. 18. Arguing the case on merits, Mr. S.P. Sharma invited attention of this Court towards the phraseology used in the penalty order, to contend that though petitioner's Basic Pay has been reduced by four stages with cumulative effect, from the date of the order, as the Disciplinary Authority had observed that petitioner would earn his future increments falling due on anniversary date; yet the punishment period or the rigour period cannot be treated as four years, inasmuch as the petitioner has been held entitled to increments immediately on the next anniversary date. In other words, his argument was that although by way of the penalty order, petitioner's Pay has been stepped down by four stages, but, the effect thereof is arrested on the date of the penalty order itself, as he has been held entitled to receive the annual increments in regular course. 19. Inviting attention of this Court towards Service Regulations 2010, more particularly clause 39 thereof, he contended that as provided in sub-clause (iv) of Clause (b) of Regulation 39(2), a maximum penalty for a period of two years can be imposed and as such, the impugned penalty order, which provides for reduction of salary by four stages, is thus excessive and without jurisdiction. He maintained that despite relinquishment of the challenge to the penalty order dated 12.09.2012 being void. He maintained that despite relinquishment of the challenge to the penalty order dated 12.09.2012 being void. With these assertions, e argued that the rigour period should be confined for a period of two years. 20. Mr. Sharma then argued that, without prejudice to the petitioner's other contentions, the Debarment Policy dated 02.01.2015, more particularly clause (8) thereof, itself is illegal and without jurisdiction, besides being violative of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 20 (2) of the Constitution of India. 21. His last argument was that as per criteria for promotion, given under the Rules of 2010 there is no stipulation regarding denial of promotion to a candidate, if he has been penalized in any way and hence, the respondent Bank can not deprive the petitioner from promotion. Developing his argument, he urged that in a given case while considering the merit of a candidate, the Departmental Promotion Committee may take into account the penalty imposed upon the candidate, but the respondent Bank itself can not deny petitioner's right to be considered by the committee. He thus submitted that it was required of the respondent Bank to place petitioner's case for consideration before the Departmental Promotion Committee held on 28.01.2015. 22. Attacking the Debarment Policy, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as per Section 29 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976, power to make Rules vests with the Central Government, which in consultation with the National Bank and Sponsor Banks, by notification in Official Gazette, can frame Rules in relation to the mode and manner in which officers and other employees of the Regional Rural Banks are to be appointed. He invited attention of this Court towards Sections 29 and 30 of the Act of 1976, to contend that as per Section 29(2)(b)(a), it is only the Central Government, which has the power to frame Rules, even in relation to promotion; which should be treated to be a part of the broader term "appointed," as used in Section 29(2)(b)(a) of the Act. He added that the power to frame Regulation has been conferred upon the Board of Directors of the Regional Rural Bank, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Act; which Regulations too, require previous sanction of the Central Government and consequential publication in the Official Gazette. 23. Inviting attention towards such statutory provisions, Mr. He added that the power to frame Regulation has been conferred upon the Board of Directors of the Regional Rural Bank, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Act; which Regulations too, require previous sanction of the Central Government and consequential publication in the Official Gazette. 23. Inviting attention towards such statutory provisions, Mr. S.P. Sharma contended that the Central Government has framed Regulations of 2010, published on 26th September 2010 and the Service Rules 2010, which though extensively deal with appointment, promotion, penalties etc., but contain no stipulation regarding forbidding promotion to an employee, who has suffered some punishment, including the punishment of stoppage of Annual Grade Increments with cumulative effect. As such, the respondent Bank, by way of the impugned Circular or Debarment Policy can not put an embargo, denying promotion to a candidate, in the wake of currency of the punishment imposed. 24. Mr. Sharma further contended that the policy circular dated 02.01.2015, particularly clause (8) thereof has an effect of giving double punishment to an employee for the same breach or fault and hence, the same is violative of Article 20 of the Constitution of India, besides being violative of Article 14. Adverting to the facts of the present case, he submitted that by way of punishment order dated 12.09.2012, the petitioner had been punished, by way of reduction of his pay by four stages on one hand and on the other, by reason of the debarment policy, his promotion has been withheld for four years from 12.09.2012. Counsel for the petitioner thus brought to fire the predicament of the petitioner, who has been punished twice, for the same offence. In light of this fact situation, he contended that clause (8) of the offending Circular dated 02.01.2015, suffers from the vice of double jeopardy and thus, liable to be quashed and set aside. 25. Mr. Sharma, in support of his arguments, relied upon a judgment of Supreme Court, rendered in the case of Sarva UP Gramin Bank & others v. Manoj Kumar Chak reported in AIR 2013 SC 2473 and contended that in light of the aforesaid judgment, the Circular dated 01.01.2015 or the department policy besides being de hors the powers of the respondent-Bank, is arbitrary and violative of Constitutional rights of the petitioner and thus liable to be struck down. 26. Mr. 26. Mr. Jagdish Vyas, learned counsel for the respondent Bank, defending the case, submitted that in view of clause (8) of the Debarment Policy, duly adopted by the respondent Bank, petitioner can not be considered for promotion during the rigour period of four years. Learned counsel for the Respondent Bank contended that as the petitioner has been visited with penalty of reduction of pay by four stages, the petitioner will come to his pay of 2012, only after completion of four years and till such time he can not be considered for promotion. In support of his contention, Mr. Vyas cited judgment reported in AIR 1991 SC 2010 (Union of India etc v. K.V. Jankiraman etc), para 8 thereof in particular, to contend that the respondents are justified in not considering petitioner's case for rigour period of four years. 27. Coming to the argument of double jeopardy, Mr. Vyas contended that the petitioner has not been subjected to double jeopardy, inasmuch as he has been punished with only one penalty i.e. reduction of pay by four stages and the deferment or postponement of his promotion for four years, is only natural consequence. According to him such deferal, by itself, can not be treated to be another punishment. 28. Inviting attention of this Court towards eligibility clause contained in Clause B(ii) of Part-A, Group A of Recruitment & Promotion, attached with the Rules of 2010, he contended that the petitioner can seek promotion, either in Normal channel or in Fast Track channel. However, the petitioner has appeared in written examination only in the year 2015, whereas he could have appeared in the written examination for seeking promotion in Fast Track Channel earlier also. With these contentions, Mr. Vyas tried to impress upon the Court that the petitioner has acquiesced and thus cannot challenge the denial of promotion, having accepted it for more than 4 years. 29. Mr. Vyas tried to distinguish the judgment relied on by Mr. S.P. Sharma by submitting that the Circulars under consideration before Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Sarva UP Gramin Bank (supra) were entirely different, whereas the Circular in the present case is in conformity with the power available with the Bank and the Bank is well within its rights to frame its own policy to ensure proper and smooth administration in the Bank. He pointed out that there was a complete debarment for 5 years, in all cases of penalty in the case before the Supreme Court, whereas by way of the Circular under consideration, the respondent Bank has confined the debarment based on nature of the punishment and it may vary in different cases. To support the Circular in question, he submitted that if such impediment is not provided, the employee who has been punished for indiscipline or misconduct, would nevertheless enjoy the benefits of promotion; which promotion would be detrimental to the interests of the Bank and would demoralise the other meritorious incumbents. 30. Distinguishing the above referred case, Mr. Jagdish Vyas also pointed out that the issue of rigour period was not involved in the matter before the Supreme Court and as such, the judgment cited by Mr. Sharma is distinguishable. He also relied on judgment of Supreme Court reported in (2011) 7 SCC 397 (Union of India v. Arulmozhi Iniarasu) and further contended that the petitioner has acquiesced inasmuch as during the currency of punishment order, the petitioner was not considered for promotion in the years 2012 and 2013, which action of the Bank, has not been challenged by the petitioner and as such, the petitioner can not be permitted to lay challenge to his present non-consideration, having accepted the action of the Bank in the years 2012 and 2013. 31. Addressing the Court in rejoinder, Mr. S.P. Sharma submitted that the petitioner was not having sufficient seniority to fall in the zone of consideration. He came in the consideration zone only in the year 2015, when 53 posts were notified, while he was at Serial No.52 of the seniority list. In view of these facts, learned counsel urged that the cause of action to assail the action of the Bank accrued to the petitioner, only in the year 2015 and prior thereto the petitioner was not at all concerned much less aggrieved. In view of these submissions, he said that the petitioner can not be non-suited on the ground of delay and laches, much less acquiescence. 32. I have heard rival counsel and perused relevant record. 33. First of all it would be apt to deal with the argument of Mr. In view of these submissions, he said that the petitioner can not be non-suited on the ground of delay and laches, much less acquiescence. 32. I have heard rival counsel and perused relevant record. 33. First of all it would be apt to deal with the argument of Mr. Vyas that the petitioner can not maintain the present writ petition as he has acquiesced, suffers it to observe that period to 2015, the petitioner was very low in seniority and he has shown his concern and raised grievance when 52 posts were notified and he was at serial No. 52 in the seniority list. In considered opinion of this Court, petitioner cannot be held guilty of delay or acquiescence, as prior to 2015, he has no cause of concern, what to say about cause of action. As such the petition filed by the petitioner cannot be thrown for this reason. 34. Dealing with the first argument of Mr. S.P. Sharma in relation to the penalty order dated 12.9.2012 and the phraseology used therein, to the effect that firstly there can be no rigour period and even if it is held that the prescription of rigour period is valid, then also the same cannot exceed beyond the upper cap of two years; it is to be noticed that the penalty order provided deduction from basic pay by four stages, in present time scale of pay, with cumulative effect, with a further qualification "however he will earn his future increments falling due on anniversary date", such stipulation attached with the penalty inflicted by the Disciplinary authority, cannot be understood to mean that the period of punishment would stand eclipsed, merely because from the next year itself, the petitioner had earned his future increment. It may be true that immediately from the year following the imposition of penalty, the petitioner has been held entitled to the increment, but it has taken him four years to reach to the level of original salary, which he was getting at the time of imposition of the penalty. 35. As such, the argument that the period of punishment or the rigour period had eclipsed on expiry of one year, as petitioner has been held entitled to the increment from the next financial can not be countenanced. 36. 35. As such, the argument that the period of punishment or the rigour period had eclipsed on expiry of one year, as petitioner has been held entitled to the increment from the next financial can not be countenanced. 36. In considered opinion of this court, the rigour period eclipsed only after expiry of four years, when the petitioner's salary reached to the level, which he was getting on the date of imposition of penalty. The petitioner has been visited with penalty of reduction of pay by four stages in the year 2012, thus he has reached the previous level only after completion of four years in the year 2016. As such, if the debarment policy were to apply, the petitioner would be ineligible for being considered for promotion for a period of four years, from the date of the order of punishment. 37. Despite having dropped the challenge to the penalty order dated 12.9.2012 , Mr. Sharma argued that since the penalty of reduction of salary, by four stages is fundamentally void, the same is liable to be ignored, to the extent it traverse beyond the period of two years. 38. This argument, if tested on the touchstone of it is necessary to go through the provisions of Regulations, particularly Regulation No. 39 of the Service Regulations, 2010, this Court finds that major penalty has been provided in sub clause IV of Clause (b) of the Regulation 39 (2), prescribing a maximum penalty for a period of two years. Although the penalty order dated 12.9.2012 is apparently beyond the authority, but since the petitioner has abandoned his challenge to the penalty order, it is not permissible for the the petitioner to contend that the penalty order beyond a period of two years is non-est and liable to be given a go by. The challenge to an order cannot be bifurcated in two parts, as attempted by Mr. Sharma and hence this argument of the petitioner, though convincing, merits rejection, in wake of the waiver of prayer clause (C). 39. The challenge to an order cannot be bifurcated in two parts, as attempted by Mr. Sharma and hence this argument of the petitioner, though convincing, merits rejection, in wake of the waiver of prayer clause (C). 39. Adverting to the arguments of the petitioner that the debarment policy or the Circular dated 02.1.2015 is arbitrary and unconstitutional, this Court finds that the Debarment policy, particularly clause 8 thereof act as a stumbling block, in the way of an employee, seeking promotion, if he has been visited with a penalty of withholding of increments or reduction to a lower stage in time scale. 40. The fountain head or repository of power to frame rules is Section 29 of the Act of 1976, which postulates that power to make Rules vests in the Central Government, which Government, in consultation with the National Bank and Sponsor Bank, can frame rules by way of publication of a notification in the Official Gazette, in relation to the manner, in which, officers and other employees of the Rural bank are to be appointed. This provision of course does not convey the power to frame rules in the matter of promotion etc; but a close and conjoint reading of Section 29 and 30 of the Act of 1976, particularly Section 29(2)(b)(a) of the Act goes a long way to show that it is the Central Government alone, which has the power to frame Rules, even in relation to promotion, which according to this Court, is an integral part of the broader term "Appointment" as given under Section 29(L)(b)(a) of the Act of 1976. As promotion also like appointment, is a substantive right of the employees and the provision in relation thereto can be inserted or tinkered with by the executive orders or by the Act or by the rules provided by Central Government, but in no case by the subordinate legislation such as Regulation 5 much less by the executive orders or circulars. 41. By way of the debarment policy, the Bank has laid down disqualification or ineligibility for promotion, which touches upon the substantive rights of an employee. Such power, in opinion of this Court can not be exercised by the respondent Bank, in the form of the policy circular, which has neither any statutory force nor a legal sanction behind it. 41. By way of the debarment policy, the Bank has laid down disqualification or ineligibility for promotion, which touches upon the substantive rights of an employee. Such power, in opinion of this Court can not be exercised by the respondent Bank, in the form of the policy circular, which has neither any statutory force nor a legal sanction behind it. It is noteworthy that though the power to frame regulations has been conferred upon the Board of Directors of the Regional Rural Banks in relation to all the matters, which are deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Act of 1976, but even such regulations require sanction of the Central Government and publication in the Official Gazette. 42. It is not in dispute that in exercise of the statutory provisions, the Central Government has already framed regulations of 2010 duly published in the official gazette on 29.9.2010. Similarly the service Rules of 2010, which extensively provide for appointment, promotion and penalty etc. have been promulgated by following the due process. 43. Neither these Rules of 2010, nor the Regulation of 2010 create any sort of embargo for an employee suffering some punishment or penalty, including stoppage of annual grade increments with cumulative effect. As such, the Respondent Bank by way of the impugned circular or debarment policy, cannot implant a disqualification, denying promotion to a candidate during the currency of a punishment of stoppage of increment or continuing of rigour period. The impugned debarment policy dated 02.1.2015 having no statutory force or sanction behind it, thus is clearly illegal and without authority of law. 44. The judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Manoj Kumar Chak reported in AIR 2013 SC 2473 , applies with full force in the present factual and legal matrix. It would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant part of the said judgment :- 38. The reliance placed by Mr. Dhruv Mehta on the judgment of this court in the case of ram Ashish Dixit (supra) is also misconceived. In the aforesaid case, the officer had been considered for promotion during the pendency of the departmental proceedings to Middle Management Grade-II. However, the result was kept in a sealed cover. After finalization of the proceedings, the appellants requested the authority to open the sealed cover. In the aforesaid case, the officer had been considered for promotion during the pendency of the departmental proceedings to Middle Management Grade-II. However, the result was kept in a sealed cover. After finalization of the proceedings, the appellants requested the authority to open the sealed cover. He was, however, informed that he cannot be promoted in view of the bank Circular dated 28th March, 1998 as he had been punished. Subsequently, again his case was to be considered for promotion September, 1999. However, he was denied consideration for promotion in view of the conditions contained in Circular dated 28th March, 1998. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that the punishment imposed upon the staff of the Bank can not be treated to be an ineligibility for promoting since the eligibility for promotion is prescribed under the RRB Rules, 1998. It was submitted on behalf of the bank (respondent therein) that since stoppage of increment for 3 years is a punishment imposed upon the appellants, during the period, he would be undergoing punishment, he could not have been considered to be eligible for promotion. Therefore, according to the bank, respondent had been rightly held to be ineligible under Circular dated 28th March, 1998. It was also claimed by the bank that the Circular is supplementary in nature and cannot be said to be in any manner inconsistent and ultra vires or the rules. In answering the rival submissions, this Court held as under:- "The criteria for promotion from Junior Manager Grade-I to Middle Management Grade-II is on the basis of the Seniority-cum-merit. Clearly therefore, the fact that the appellant has been punished for a misconduct, the same would form a part of his record of service which would be taken into consideration while adjudging his suitability on the criteria of seniority-cum-merit. In on such assessment of his record of service the appellant is not promoted, it cannot be said to be by way of punishment. It is a non-promotion on account of the appellant not reaching a suitable standard to be promoted on the basis of the criteria." 39. We also do not find any merit in the submission of Mr. In on such assessment of his record of service the appellant is not promoted, it cannot be said to be by way of punishment. It is a non-promotion on account of the appellant not reaching a suitable standard to be promoted on the basis of the criteria." 39. We also do not find any merit in the submission of Mr. Dhruv Mehta that the Circular No. 17 of 2009 dated 30th November, 2009 and Circular dated 12th July, 2010 are to ensure that the individual members of the DPC do not recommend for promotion an individual officer despite having been punished in the preceding 5 years. Such curtailment of the power of the DPC would have to be located in the statutory service rules. The 1998 Rules do not contain any such provision. The submission needs merely to be stated, to be rejected. We also do not find any merit in the submission of Mr. Mehta that without the aforesaid guidelines, an officer, even though, he has been punished for gross misconduct would have to be permitted to be promoted as no minimum marks are prescribed for interview or performance appraisal. In our opinion, it is fallacious to presume that under the 1998 Rules, once an officer gets the minimum marks in the written examination, he would be entitled to be promoted on the basis of seniority alone. There is no warrant for such a presumption. The misconduct committed by eligible employee/officer would be a matter for DPC to take into consideration at the time of performance appraisal. The past conduct of an employee can always be taken into consideration in adjudging the suitability of the officer for performing the duties of the higher post. 40. There is another very good reason for not accepting the submissions made by Mr. Dhruv Mehta. Different rules/regulations of the banks provide specific punishments such as "withholding of promotion, reduction in rank, lowering in ranks/pay scales". However, there is another range of penalty such as censure, reprimand, withholding of increments etc. which are also prescribed under various staff regulations. To debar such an employee form being considered for promotion would tantamount to also inflicting on such employee, the punishment of withholding of promotion. In such circumstances, a punishment of censure/reprimand would, in fact, read as censure/reprimand +5 years debarment from promotion. which are also prescribed under various staff regulations. To debar such an employee form being considered for promotion would tantamount to also inflicting on such employee, the punishment of withholding of promotion. In such circumstances, a punishment of censure/reprimand would, in fact, read as censure/reprimand +5 years debarment from promotion. Thus the circulars issued by the bank debarring such employees from being considered would be clearly contrary to the statutory rules. The circulars clearly do not fall within the ratio in Sant Ram's case (Supra). 41. In our opinion, the observations made by this Court in the case of Ram Ashish Dixit (Supra) are a complete answer to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Dhruv Mehta,. Therefore the High Court, in our opinion, has rightly quashed the aforesaid two Circulars and directed that the respondent be considered for promotion in accordance with the applicable rules. 42. We, therefore, find no merit in the civil appeals filed by the appellant-bank, and are accordingly dismissed. No costs. 45. Besides this, clause 8 of the impugned debarment policy has an effect of giving double punishment to an employee. A simple reading of the offending clause shows that it puts a barrier in the path of the employee seeking promotion, who has been punished by an order of withholding of increment or reduction in the pay scale. By virtue of the subject provisions of the policy, such employee can not be considered for promotion, till the period of punishment is over. Resultantly, the contentious clause has an effect of punishing an employee twice, for a single offence or breach as has happened in the present case. The petitioner on one hand, has been visited with a penalty of stoppage of four grade increments, vide order dated 12.9.2012, and on the other has a necessary corollary of such stoppage of increment, per force, Clause 8 of the debarment policy, has been denied promotions for a period of four years. As an offshoot of the debarment policy, the petitioner has been punished twice for the same breach or allegation. 46. A recent decision of this Court dated 12.8.2016 above reported in 2016 (4) RLW 3331 (Raj.) Laxmi Beniwal v. State of Rajasthan fortifies the view aforesaid. It will not be out of place to reproduce relevant para 2,10, & 12 of the said judgment for taking appropriate guidance:- "2. 46. A recent decision of this Court dated 12.8.2016 above reported in 2016 (4) RLW 3331 (Raj.) Laxmi Beniwal v. State of Rajasthan fortifies the view aforesaid. It will not be out of place to reproduce relevant para 2,10, & 12 of the said judgment for taking appropriate guidance:- "2. The petitioner Smt. Laxmi Beniwal was inflicted two penalties of Censure by orders dated 01.12.1997 and 30.4.2001 respectively and under the effect thereof, the first selection grade was sanctioned to her with deferment of two years form 20.2.2004 to 20.2.2006. When the petitioner Laxmi Devi had completed 18 years of service, she claimed the benefit of second selection grade upon which she was communicated an order dated 8.8.2013 intimating that owing to two punishments of Censure, she would be entitled to second A.C.P. (selection scale) w.e.f. 20.2.2015. 10. The undisputed factual scenario in cases of both the petitioners is that the respondents deferred the grant of second/third selection grade otherwise admissible to them on account of penalty orders which were inflicted at the time when respective petitioner was considered for grant of first selection grade. It is admitted that under the effect of penalties imposed on the respective petitioners, consequential deferment in the first selection grade was effected. Thus, the question which falls for the Court's consideration as to whether the orders imposing penalty, can be given a cascading/recurring effect while considering the grant of subsequent selection grade/A.C. Ps. To the petitioners. The memorandums dated 19.8.2009 and 21.8.2009 issued from the office of Director General of Police clearly provide that while assessing the entitlement for selection grades/ACP regarding the employee, the service record for the previous seven years shall be taken into account. Selection grade of A.C.P. Scheme as the case may be was introduced by the State Government to stop stagnation amongst the employees who did not have any avenue of promotion in the cadre or are working no isolated posts. Financial up gradation is virtually an alternate to identical. The DPC Rules and notification issued thereunder governing the promotion exercise of State Govt. employees provide that while considering the entitlement of an employee to be promoted, the previous seven years service record shall be seen. Any adverse factor in the service record which is beyond 7 years cannot be used to the detriment of the employee concerned. The DPC Rules and notification issued thereunder governing the promotion exercise of State Govt. employees provide that while considering the entitlement of an employee to be promoted, the previous seven years service record shall be seen. Any adverse factor in the service record which is beyond 7 years cannot be used to the detriment of the employee concerned. The circular/memorandum dated 31.12.2009 issued by the Finance Department, Government of Rajasthan particularly Clause 11 thereof which provides that the penalty imposed earlier shall be given effect to while considering the grant of selection grades in the subsequent periods as well clearly runs contrary to the guarantee against double jeopardy enshrined under the Constitution of India. No person can be penalized twice for the same violation. Repeated use of an order of punishment against an employee definitely amounts to violation of the above fundamental right against double jeopardy. Thus, I am of the firm opinion that Clause No. 11 of the memorandum issued by the Finance Department which provides that a departmental punishment would have a recurring effect on the subsequent ACPs admissible to the employee concerned is clearly repugnant to the statutory rules and also runs contrary to the fundamental right against the double jeopardy guaranteed by the Constitution of India. 12. Thus, the said condition of the Finance Department notification Annexure P-6 dated 31.12.2009 is clearly illegal and arbitrary and also runs contrary to ratio of the above Division Bench judgment and is hereby struck down. As a consequence of the above discussion, the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of second/third selection grade as the case may be by ignoring the order/s of penalty imposed upon them earlier and the effect whereof has already been applied while granting the earlier selection grade to them. The petitioners shall be granted benefit of subsequent selection grades in light of the above directions ignoring the effect of penalties imposed upon them in the earlier period . 47. The debarment policy of 2015 or the circular dated 02.01.2015 therefore clearly impeaches Article 20(2) of the Constitution, which mandates that no person shall be punished more than once for the same office. 48. As an upshot of the above discussion, the writ petition filed by the petitioner succeeds. The denial of promotion to the petitioner vide Annexure 7 is quashed and set aside. 48. As an upshot of the above discussion, the writ petition filed by the petitioner succeeds. The denial of promotion to the petitioner vide Annexure 7 is quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to consider petitioner's case for promotion from the date when persons immediately junior to him have been promoted.