JUDGMENT By the Court.—By means of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has prayed for issuance of writ of certiorari quashing the impugned censure entry as communicated to the petitioner vide letter of the Registrar (Confidential) dated 2.9.2009 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition). 2. The petitioner was selected and appointed as Civil Judge (Junior Division) in the U.P. Provincial Civil Services (Judicial) in 1990. Later on, he was promoted as Civil Judge (Senior Division) in October, 2000 and thereafter he was promoted and posted as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court on 6.6.2006. At the relevant time in the year 2008, he was posted as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Barabanki and decided the Sessions Trial No. 612 of 2008 (Union of India v. Mohd. Ansar and others) under Section 8, 21(b) read with Section 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (here-in-after referred to as “the NDPS Act”). The facts relating to the said Sessions Trial are that the sub-Inspector of Police on 8.4.2008, made recovery of two packets from the accused, Mohd. Ansar containing 1280 grams of Heroin, for which the said accused could not show any authorised or valid licence. At the same time, two other accused namely, Shahjade and Guddu were also arrested. Mohd. Ansar was charged under Section 8/21 of the NDPS Act whereas co-accused Shahjade and Guddu were charged under Section 8/22 read with Section 29 of the NDPS Act. Charge-sheet was submitted and trial commenced. The petitioner on 30.1.2009 framed the charge as above and all the three accused, confessed their guilt and were also convicted on the same day. Thereafter, they were heard on the point of sentence. 3. The accused, Mohd. Ansar was in jail for more than 09 months, had no criminal antecedents, and was aged about 35 years. The percentage of recovered Heroine was found to be 7.5%, the quantity was more than small quantity but less than commercial quantity as defined under the NDPS Act. Based upon the aforesaid facts and reasons he was awarded 10 months’ imprisonment and fine of Rs. 15,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo additional sentence of 03 months. 4. Co-accused, Shahjade from whom no recovery was made, was awarded sentence of 02 months 07 days imprisonment with fine of Rs. Based upon the aforesaid facts and reasons he was awarded 10 months’ imprisonment and fine of Rs. 15,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo additional sentence of 03 months. 4. Co-accused, Shahjade from whom no recovery was made, was awarded sentence of 02 months 07 days imprisonment with fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo additional sentence of 03 months. 5. Co-accused, Guddu who was already in jail, was sentenced to the period already undergone which was more than 4 months and awarded Rs. 10,000/- as fine and in default of payment of fine to undergo further sentence of 3 months. 6. The Union of India preferred an appeal registered as Criminal Appeal No. 799 of 2009 before the Lucknow Bench of this Court (Union of India v. Mohd. Ansar and two others) under Section 377(2) Cr.P.C. against the quantum of sentence awarded to the 3 accused. The Division Bench at the time of considering admission of the appeal, passed an order dated 2.4.2009 and commented upon the part of sentencing in the judgment dated 30.1.2009 passed by the petitioner. It was of the view that the judgment on the face of it seems to be per se illegal and speaks volume and accordingly referred the matter to Hon’ble The Chief Justice for appropriate orders. The relevant portion of the order dated 2.4.2009 is reproduced below: “The judgment on the face of it seems to be per se illegal and speaks volume. However, we are not indulging furthermore in view of the fact that we propose to refer the matter to Hon’ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders. Let the matter be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice within a week for appropriate orders/inquiry, as may be deemed just and proper in the facts of the case.” 7. Based on the observations made in order dated 2.4.2009, the matter was referred to the Committee dealing with such matters. The Committee by its report dated 27.4.2009 was of the view that different sentence for the same offence to the co-accused cannot be left at the whims of the Judicial Officer and further recorded that no such reasons were given for awarding ridiculous and different sentence to the 3 accused. The Committee by its report dated 27.4.2009 was of the view that different sentence for the same offence to the co-accused cannot be left at the whims of the Judicial Officer and further recorded that no such reasons were given for awarding ridiculous and different sentence to the 3 accused. The view of the Committee as contained in its report dated 27.4.2009 is reproduced below: “The object of the amendment of Section 21 of the NDPS Act was to provide for lesser sentence for less serious offence, but not ridiculously small sentence and that too varying upon period undergone for a period of nine months, four months and two months respectively for the same offence. The sentencing is an important part of administration of criminal justice. It cannot be left at the whim of the judicial officer. The judicial officer in the anxiety to dispose of the case after recording confessions, has given no special reasons except the fact that the convicts are poor persons and have responsibility of their family in awarding ridiculously low and different sentences to the accused.” 8. Based on the report of the Committee, a show-cause notice dated 30.5.2009 was given to the petitioner by the Registrar (Confidential), to show-cause as to why he be not punished in the matter with minor punishment. 9. The petitioner submitted his reply dated 29.6.2009 to the show-cause notice. The petitioner gave reasons regarding award of different sentences to 3 accused which were mentioned in the sentencing order itself. He further stated that the decision was taken in bona fide manner and was based upon law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of E. Michel Raj v. Intelligene Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, 2008 (2) EFR 227. He further stated that the order was passed by him to the best of his knowledge, ability and integrity. He further submitted that he has always maintained high standard of judicial propriety and impeccable integrity throughout his judicial career and prayed for exoneration in the matter. He also submitted that he may have erred in exercise of judicial discretion, but it could not be said to be lacking in integrity or such judicial aberration which may amount to misconduct in any way. 10. He also submitted that he may have erred in exercise of judicial discretion, but it could not be said to be lacking in integrity or such judicial aberration which may amount to misconduct in any way. 10. The reply of the petitioner did not find favour with the Court and he was awarded the censure entry by the Court on 30.5.2009, which was communicated by the Registrar (Confidential) vide letter dated 2.9.2009. The entry to be recorded in the character role is reproduced below: “He is inflicted with the punishment of censure for abusing his discretion against the statute, decided cases and of the settled principles of sentencing in trial of three accused together on their confession but awarding different sentences to them, releasing them on the sentences undergone by them with different amounts of fine in Sessions Trial No. 612 of 2008, Union of India v. Mohd. Ansar and two others under Sections 8/21/29/NDPS Act while posted as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Barabanki.” 11. Thereafter, the petitioner made a further representation/appeal dated 3.10.2009 (Annexure 6 to the writ petition) against the said entry indicated by the Registrar (Confidential) vide letter dated 2.9.2009. The representation/appeal dated 3.10.2009 of the petitioner was rejected, and was communicated by the Registrar (Confidential) vide letter dated 30.11.2009. Aggrieved by the aforesaid censure entry, the present petition has been filed. 12. We have heard Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Tarun Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ashish Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent-High Court. Counter-affidavit and rejoinder-affidavit have been exchanged. We have perused the pleadings and the material placed on record. 13. Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior counsel submitted that the Committee only on the basis of sentencing awarded by the petitioner to 3 accused has recorded that the sentencing is an important part of administration of criminal justice and it cannot be left at the whim of the judicial officers and in the present case, the sentence awarded by the petitioner was ridiculously low and different sentences were awarded to the 3 accused. No other finding on the integrity or any other extra judicial consideration was recorded by the Committee in its report. No other finding on the integrity or any other extra judicial consideration was recorded by the Committee in its report. He also submitted that there was no complaint made against the petitioner for any extra judicial consideration or any other vested interest in passing the order awarding different sentences to the 3 accused. It was only on the basis of the order passed in Criminal Appeal on 2.4.2009 that the proceedings were taken. 14. Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior counsel further submitted that once the accused confessed their guilt, the Trial Court had rightly proceeded to record the conviction on the same day and heard them on sentence and awarded the sentence on the same day. He also submitted that the pressure on Judicial Officers for disposal of cases, cannot be ignored and if the petitioner proceeded to finally decide the matter with all clear, clean and bona fide intention on the same day, there was nothing wrong or illegal. This is a normal practice adopted and followed by all Judicial Officers in such small confessional matters. There was no procedural fault on the part of the petitioner in disposing of the case in the given circumstances. 15. He has next submitted that the sentence provided under the NDPS Act for this offence are given in Section 21 of the NDPS Act. The quantity recovered from Mohd. Ansar being greater than small quantity but less than commercial quantity, the sentence could be awarded with imprisonment for the period which may extend to ten years and with fine which may extend to Rs. 01 lakh. The span of sentence prescribed in sub-clause (b) of Section 21 provides the discretion to the Court to award any sentence within the span provided. He further submitted that it is true that the sentencing has to be done according to the settled principles but if the sentence awarded is supported by reasons it cannot be said that the sentencing was not done in accordance to law. He has referred to the judgment in the Sessions Trial dated 30.1.2009 which has been filed alongwith the counter-affidavit as Annexure CA2 and has referred to the reasons given with regard to each of 3 accused for awarding the sentence and the reasons so given cannot be said to be either absurd or completely unrelated to the facts of the case. It has been submitted that any judicial discretion exercised by the Judicial Officer in passing any order cannot straightway amount to misconduct, even if Higher Court or Superior Court does not agree with the same. The Higher Court or Superior Court can always set aside the part of the order which is found to be incorrect but merely on this reason, it cannot be said that the Judicial Officer has committed any misconduct resulting into enquiry and consequential punishment. 16. In support of the submissions of Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others v. K.K. Dhawan, AIR 1993 SC 1478 , in which the Supreme Court relying upon the ratio laid down in Govinda Menon v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1274 , observed in paragraph 19 of the report as follows : “19. The above case, therefore, is an authority for the proposition that disciplinary proceedings could be initiated against the Government servant even with regard to exercise of quasi-judicial powers provided: (i) The act or omission is such as to reflect on the reputation of the Government servant for his integrity or good faith or devotion to duty, or (ii) there is prima facie material manifesting recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of the official duty, or (iii) the officer had failed to act honestly or in good faith or had omitted to observe the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of statutory power.” 17. Reading of the above ratio indicates the circumstances under which disciplinary proceedings could be initiated against the Government servant even with regard to exercise of quasi-judicial powers provided that firstly, the act or omission is such as to reflect on the reputation of the Government servant for his integrity or good faith or devotion to duty; secondly, where there is prima facie material manifesting recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of the official duty; lastly, the officer had failed to act honestly or in good faith or had omitted to observe the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of statutory power. He has submitted that none of above conditions existed which could have invited the disciplinary action against the petitioner. He has submitted that none of above conditions existed which could have invited the disciplinary action against the petitioner. The Committee in its report dated 27.4.2009 did not record any such finding nor made any such observation which could have called upon initiation of disciplinary proceeding. 18. Further in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra) the Supreme Court has held that disciplinary action can be taken against the Officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers, acting negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a Judge. The relevant paragraph No. 28 of the report is reproduced below: “28. Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a Judge. Accordingly, the contention of the respondent has to be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the decision of the respondent but the conduct of the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer. The legality of the orders with reference to the nine assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that the Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. Thus, we conclude that the disciplinary action can be taken in the following cases : (i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty; (ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty; (iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Government servant; (iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers; (v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party; (vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive however, small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago “though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great.” 19. Further, Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. and others, 2001 (6) SCC 491 and referred in particular to paragraph 7 thereof which again reiterated the view taken in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra). Paragraph 7 of the aforesaid case is reproduced below: “7. In the present case, though elaborate enquiry has been conducted by the enquiry officer, there is hardly any material worth the name forthcoming except to scrutinize each one of the orders made by the appellant on the judicial side to arrive at a different conclusion. That there was possibility on a given set of facts to arrive at a different conclusion is no ground to indict a judicial officer for taking one view and that too for alleged misconduct for that reason alone. The enquiry officer has not found any other material, which would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or devotion to duty or that he has been actuated by any corrupt motive. At best, he may say that the view taken by the appellant is not proper or correct and not attribute any motive to him which is for extraneous consideration that he had acted in that manner. If in every case where an order of a subordinate Court is found to be faulty a disciplinary action were to be initiated, the confidence of the subordinate judiciary will be shaken and the officers will be in constant fear of writing a judgment so as not to face a disciplinary enquiry and thus judicial officers cannot act independently or fearlessly. Indeed the words of caution are given in K.K. Dhawan case and A.N. Saxena case that merely because the order is wrong or the action taken could have been different does not warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the judicial officer. In spite of such caution, it is unfortunate that the High Court has chosen to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant in this case.” 20. He further placed reliance upon another judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad and another, 2007 (4) SCC 247 and in particular referred to paragraph Nos. He further placed reliance upon another judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad and another, 2007 (4) SCC 247 and in particular referred to paragraph Nos. 11 and 12 thereof wherein again the Supreme Court reiterated the earlier view taken in the cases of K.K. Dhawan (supra) and P.C. Joshi (supra). Paragraph Nos. 11 and 12 of the aforesaid case is reproduced below: “11. .... If the High Court were to initiate disciplinary proceedings based on a judicial order, there should have been strong grounds to suspect officer’s bona fides and the order itself should have been actuated by malice, bias or illegality. The appellant officer was well within his right to grant bail to the accused in discharge of his judicial functions. Unlike provisions for granting bail in the TADA Act or the NDPS Act, there was no statutory bar in granting bail to the accused in this case. A Sessions Judge was competent to grant bail and if any disciplinary proceedings are initiated against the officer for passing such an order, it would adversely affect the morale of subordinate judiciary and no officer would be able to exercise this power freely and independently. 12. This Court on several occasions has disapproved the practice of initiation of disciplinary proceedings against officers of the subordinate judiciary merely because the judgments/orders passed by them are wrong. The appellate and revisional Courts have been established and given powers to set aside such orders. The higher Courts after hearing the appeal may modify or set aside erroneous judgments of the lower Courts. While taking disciplinary action based on judicial orders, the High Court must take extra care and caution.” 21. On such submissions, Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior counsel submitted that the entire proceedings initiated against the petitioner and the award of the censure entry is unwarranted. 22. Sri Ashish Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the Court after considering the reply of the petitioner to the show-cause notice has awarded the punishment. He further submitted that different sentences awarded to different accused for the same offence cannot be said to be reasonable or justified or proper exercise of discretion. The petitioner failed to give any reasonable explanation as to why the different sentences were awarded to the 3 accused. He further submitted that different sentences awarded to different accused for the same offence cannot be said to be reasonable or justified or proper exercise of discretion. The petitioner failed to give any reasonable explanation as to why the different sentences were awarded to the 3 accused. He further submitted that the sentence awarded was extremely on the liberal side and was not adequate considering the gravity of offence of the accused who were dealing with Heroin and Morphine which are prohibited substances. He submitted that the petition is liable to be dismissed. 23. Having considered the submissions, we are of the view that until and unless there is any element of mala fide or lack of integrity or good faith or devotion to duty or honesty, there is no justification for initiating disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. The power of sentence exercised by the petitioner was within the framework of the statute which is not less than the law laid down in the statute. Reasons have been recorded by the petitioner for awarding different sentences to different accused. Recovery has been made only from Mohd. Ansar and not from the other co-accused Shahjade and Guddu. All three of them suffered incarceration of more than the minimum period prescribed under law. There was no criminal antecedent of any of the accused. Role of the accused, their age, poor economic condition and their family responsibility are the relevant factors to be considered in awarding the sentence. The petitioner had exercised the discretion vested in him under law for awarding the sentence giving tenable and sound reasons. In view of the settled law as discussed above, we do not find any justification for awarding punishment to the petitioner. 24. For all the reasons recorded above the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned censure entry as communicated to the petitioner vide letter of the Registrar (Confidential) dated 2.9.2009 is set aside and the subsequent letter/communication dated 30.11.2009 relating to rejection of representation of the petitioner is hereby quashed. There shall be no order as to costs.