JUDGMENT : 1. The present first appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated August 28, 2006 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No.1 Jaipur, Jaipur City (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial court’) in civil suit No.18/2006 whereby the trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance of an agreement to sell with costs. The legal representatives of the deceased sole defendant Smt. Chandan Devi in the said suit, aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, are before this court as appellants. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to in this judgment with the same status as they were before the trial court. 2. Brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that a suit for specific performance of the contract was filed by the plaintiff Shri Gyan Chand Kothari alleging that an agreement to sell in respect of a property-a residential house No.D-146, Rajendra Marg, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant Smt. Chandan Devi on 19.01.1996. The defendant agreed to sell her aforesaid property for a consideration of Rs.18 Lakh. Out of the said consideration, Rs.16 Lakh were paid by the plaintiff on the same day through a bank draft and it was agreed that the rest of the amount i.e. Rs.2 Lakh shall be paid at the time of execution and registration of the sale deed. It was further averred in the plaint that the defendant shall obtain necessary permission from the concerned departments and shall prepare the draft of the sale deed and send it to the plaintiff for approval within six months from the date of the agreement and the plaintiff shall approve the draft within a week from its receipt. Since, the defendant did not perform her part of the agreement and showed her reluctance to carry out her obligation under the agreement, the plaintiff caused a notice to be served through his counsel on 20.02.1997 calling upon her to perform her part of the contract within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice. In response to the said notice, the defendant send a reply on 23.03.1997 stating therein that her husband was out of Jaipur and therefore, she can give reply only after he returns. Thereafter, the defendant caused a reply to the said notice to be given through her advocate on 11.04.1997. In response to the said notice, the defendant send a reply on 23.03.1997 stating therein that her husband was out of Jaipur and therefore, she can give reply only after he returns. Thereafter, the defendant caused a reply to the said notice to be given through her advocate on 11.04.1997. Thereafter, the plaintiff, continuously requested the defendant and her husband for executing the sale deed. Ultimately on 15.01.1999, the defendant finally denied to execute the sale deed. It was the submission made in the plaint that since he had paid Rs.16 Lakh at the time of execution of the agreement to sell and had already been ready and willing to pay the remaining amount of Rs.2 Lakh, he was entitled to obtain a decree of specific performance against the defendant. 3. The defendant resisted the suit by filing written statement wherein it is stated that though defendant had received Rs.16 Lakh from the plaintiff, the amount was received by way of loan and not as a consideration of her property as alleged by the plaintiff. The document dated 19.01.1996 was a sham (uqekb’kh) document and defendant had never executed agreement to sell. In fact, her son Pawan Kumar needed money to settle a company dispute and he was obliged under an order of Company Law Board to pay the money by 20.01.1996. She tried to arrange the money from various quarters, but did not succeed. Ultimately, her son Pawan Kumar contacted the plaintiff, who was known to them, for a loan of Rs.16 Lakh. The plaintiff agreed to give him Rs.16 Lakh with the stipulation that he will sell the factory shed, which was to come in possession and ownership of her son under the settlement of the said company dispute, and will recover his loan from the proceeds of the sale and shall also recover a brokerage @ 3%. The plaintiff demanded from her son one stamp paper and two pie papers, signed by her. Since they were in dire need of the money and if they had been unable to arrange the money, a long drawn litigation would have been lost, therefore, she signed the above three papers and Pawan Kumar handed over the same to the plaintiff alongwith the original sale-deed of the residential house. Since they were in dire need of the money and if they had been unable to arrange the money, a long drawn litigation would have been lost, therefore, she signed the above three papers and Pawan Kumar handed over the same to the plaintiff alongwith the original sale-deed of the residential house. It is further stated in the written statement that the said amount of Rs.16 Lakh was received through a Bankers cheque No.001607 on 19.01.1996 and the same had been deposited with her bank account and thereafter an amount of Rs.15 Lakh was transferred to the account of her daughter in law-Smt. Sudha Baj (wife of Shri Pawan Kumar). Out of this amount, two TDR’S No.835911 and 835912 were got issued respectively of Rs.12 Lakh and Rs.2,09,400/- on 20.01.1996 and informed to the Company Law Board. As per the defendant, the above amount was obtained from the plaintiff to carry out her son’s obligation under the Company Law Board, which was Rs.12 Lakh as the settlement amount and about Rs.4 Lakh as cost of the proceedings. It was further stated by the defendant in the written statement that the market value of the disputed house was about Rs.70 Lakh at the time of the alleged transaction and there was no question of selling this property for merely 18 Lakh rupees. Besides this, defendant also took the plea that the property in question was acquired as joint family property and defendant was merely a Benami. It was also stated that there were manipulations and interpolations in the alleged document of agreement to sell and her signatures on the cuttings were fabricated. It was stated that the word ‘Rehan’ (mortgage) had been struck off and the condition that the stamp duty shall be payable, by the sellers had been added subsequently. 4. It was also stated that there were manipulations and interpolations in the alleged document of agreement to sell and her signatures on the cuttings were fabricated. It was stated that the word ‘Rehan’ (mortgage) had been struck off and the condition that the stamp duty shall be payable, by the sellers had been added subsequently. 4. On the basis of the pleading of the parties, the learned ‘trial court’ framed the following issues:- 1- vk;k izfrokfn;k us oknxzLr laifRr dks vius O;olk; ds fy, :i;s izkIr djus gsrq fnukad 19-01-1996 dks 18 yk[k :i;s esa oknh dks fodz; djus dk djkj fd;k vkSj oknh ds i{k esa fodz;kuqcU/k fu"ikfnr dj fn;k \ 2- vk;k izfrokfn;k us mDr laO;ogkj isVs oknh ls fnukad 19-01-96 dks 16 yk[k :i;s udn izkIr dj fy, \ 3- vk;k 'ks"k jkf'k nks yk[k :i;s oknxzLr tk;nkn dh jftLVªh djkrs oDr fn;k tkuk r; gqvk \ 4- vk;k oknh lafonk ds vius Hkkx dh ikyuk djus ds fy, lnSo rRij ,oa bPNqd jgk gS ysfdu izfrokfn;k us vius Hkkx dh ikyuk djus ls bUdkj dj fn;k gS\ 5- vk;k okn cs:u fe;kn gS \ 6- vuqrks"k \ vfrfjDr fook|d 5 ,- vk;k oknh us izfrokfnuh ls [kkyh dkxtkr ij nLr[kr djk;s Fks vkSj oknh us mDr dkxtkrksa ds eu ekfQd rjhds ls Hkj fn;k \ 5 ch- vk;k oknh ,oa izfroknh ds chp gqvk laO;ogkj vudksfUluscy gS \ 5 lh- vk;k e`rd izfrokfnuh o mlds ifjokjtuksa ds e/; fnukad 14-01-95 dks gq, ekSf[kd caVokjs ds varxZr izfrokfnuh dk oknxzLr laifRr esa dqy 1@6 fgLlk Fkk\ 5 Mh- vk;k izfrokfnuh us fnukad 30-12-95 dks mlds oknxzLr lEifRr esa 1@6 fgLls dh olh;r jtr dqekj ct iq= jktdqekj ct ds i{k esa fu"ikfnr dh A vr% jtr dqekj gh fof/kd okfjlku cuus ;ksX; gS \ 5. Both the parties adduced oral as well as documentary evidence to prove the said issues. The trial court vide impugned judgment decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant and decreed the suit of specific performance of contract in favour of the plaintiff. 6. Hence, this first appeal filed by the appellant-defendant. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 8. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellants Shri Bihari Lal Agarwal that the transaction between the parties was clearly a loan transaction. 6. Hence, this first appeal filed by the appellant-defendant. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 8. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellants Shri Bihari Lal Agarwal that the transaction between the parties was clearly a loan transaction. The son of the defendant needed Rs.16 Lakh to settle a company dispute and therefore, he approached the plaintiff who agreed to arrange the loan of Rs.16 Lakh and against the loan, two blank papers and one stamp paper were signed by the defendant, which were given to the plaintiff along with the documents of title deeds of the property. Thus, it was clear intention of the parties that to secure the loan, the document of the mortgage deed will be prepared. However, the plaintiff prepared a document of an agreement to sell which was contrary to the intention of the parties. Learned counsel for the appellant Shri Agarwal drew my attention towards interpolations, cuttings and mis-discriptions in (Ex.-1) and also the contradiction between term No.2 of (Ex.-1) and the notice dated 20.02.1997 regarding expenses of registry and submitted that this shows that term No.2 was interpolated after the said notice. It is further contended by him that on the second page of (Ex.-1) signatures of defendant are forged and all the three papers of (Ex.-1) are typed by different typewriters. It is further submitted that the report of the hand writing expert submitted on behalf of the plaintiff is cryptic and the hand writing expert Shri Anil Khutetia is an advocate and not qualified to be a signature expert. On the basis of the finding of the learned courts below that the document was written by different typewriter on papers of different colours, he argued that it shows that the document was not executed simultaneously at one stretch and could not have the effect of a valid agreement. While admitting receipt of Rs.16 Lakh, he argued that out of this amount the appellant paid Rs.14,09,400/- by way of TDR before the Company Law Board and one lakh were paid through cheque to the counsel and rest of the amount was spent in miscellaneous expenses. It shows that under dire necessity, loan was taken and defendant had never thought that a document of agreement to sell shall be forged against the loan. It shows that under dire necessity, loan was taken and defendant had never thought that a document of agreement to sell shall be forged against the loan. It is further submitted by Shri Agarwal that on 19.01.1996, the value of the property was more than Rs.70 Lakh and the agreement for vaule of Rs.18 Lakh could not have been understandable. The appellant had submitted a valuation report which clearly showed that the value of the property in the year 1996 was Rs.75 Lakh. This value was on the basis of DLC rates as proved by Sanjay Gupta (DW-5) registered valuer. The trial court has observed that value is not relevant for the purpose of the suit for specific performance but he was argued that, these circumstances clearly suggest and prove that it was merely a loan transaction and the paper were given for security of loan otherwise, there was no intention of the parties to sell the disputed house. Shri Agarwal while referring to the testimony of (PW-1) & (PW-2) contended that it is doubtful as to when and where the document was typed and why different papers were used. It is contended by him that despite the provision of section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, inadequacy of consideration is also a ground of denying a decree of specific performance. Since the property belonged to a Joint Hindu Family and defendant was merely a Benami holder and it had already been partitioned, it could not have been presumed that she would have entered into an agreement to sell regarding that property. In the facts and circumstance of the case, decree of specific performance, which is a discretionary relief should not have been passed. In support of his submission Shri Agarwal has placed reliance upon Hansraj Vs. Govind Naraian 2005 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1465, A.K. Lakshmipathy (Dead) & Ors., Vs. Raj Saheb Pannalal H. Lahoti Charitable Trust & Ors., 2009 (4) CivCC 650 , Azhar Sultana Vs. B. Rajamani & Ors., 2009 (1) CCC 324, Narendra Kumar Malik Vs. Surinder Kumar Malik, 2009 (4) CivCC 119 , P.R. Deb and Associates Vs. Sunanda Roy, (1996) 4 SCC 423 , S. Rangaraju Naidu Vs. S. Thiruvarakkarasu, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 680, V. Muthusami (Dead) Vs. Angammal and Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 316 , G. Jayashree & Ors. B. Rajamani & Ors., 2009 (1) CCC 324, Narendra Kumar Malik Vs. Surinder Kumar Malik, 2009 (4) CivCC 119 , P.R. Deb and Associates Vs. Sunanda Roy, (1996) 4 SCC 423 , S. Rangaraju Naidu Vs. S. Thiruvarakkarasu, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 680, V. Muthusami (Dead) Vs. Angammal and Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 316 , G. Jayashree & Ors. Bhagwandas S. Patel & Ors., 2009 (2) ACD 234, Mohammadia Cooperative Building Society Limited Vs. Lakshmi Srinivasa Cooperative Building Society Limited And Ors., (2008) 7 SCC 310 , K.S. Vidyanadam and Ors. Vs. Vairavan, (1997) 3 SCC 1 . 9. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the plaintiff Shri Sudhanshu Kasliwal has submitted that on the one hand, (DW-1) Chandan Devi says that the agreement to sell a sham and fabricated and her signatures were obtained on blank papers and on the other hand, she says that alteration were made in the document. In the written statement she admits receipt of notice dated 22.02.1997 and in cross-examination she denies receipt of such notice. On the one hand she deposed against the sale agreement and on the other hand she says that she does not aware as to whether Rs.16 Lakh were returned to the plaintiff or not. (DW-2) Pawan Kumar deposed that in the past also, there were loan transaction but he failed to give any instance of past transaction. (DW-2) deposed that he did not remember whether the stamp paper purchased by him or not. Thus, his evidence is very shaky. (DW-2) deposed that the loan was taken on interest @ 12% per annum but there is no such averment either in (Ex.3) or in (Ex.4) and there is no evidence that the interest has ever been paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. All in all, the contention of the learned counsel for plaintiff is that there are major contradictions in the statements of (DW-1). (DW-2) and their, evidence is not at all reliable. It is further argued by him that had it been loan transaction, the defendant would have offered back the loan amount but there is no such pleading. It is also against human conduct that one will sign on blank papers that too a person from business community. The burden was entirely on the defendant to show that the transaction was sham one. It is also against human conduct that one will sign on blank papers that too a person from business community. The burden was entirely on the defendant to show that the transaction was sham one. It is further submitted by him that the defendant had placed on record on 8.9.1999 a photo copy of the agreement to sell dated 19.1.1996, but they have failed to give any explanation regarding the agreement in photo copy. It is settled law that the document filed by a party can be looked into and the other party is entitled to take advantage of the document against the party filing it even it is not proved in evidence. The precise argument appear to the effect that even if the agreement to sell dated 19.01.1996 is taken to have not been proved, the plaintiff is entitled to take benefit of the photo copy of the agreement to sell filed by the defendant on record. He further contended that admittedly, the defendant needed money. The defendant has changed his version time and again. Coming to the issue of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to carry out his part of the contract, he contended that since the defendant has not denied the readiness and willingness in her written statement therefore, the issue has paled into insignificance. On the issue of inadequacy of consideration, he supported the reasoning of the trial court and contended that in the light of the provision of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act inadequacy of consideration is irrelevant. Referring to the contentions of the defendant that the property was not a property acquired by her but was purchased by her father in law out of joint family property and she was only benami he contended that in the light of provisions of the Benami, Transaction (Prohibition) Act 1988 she was barred to raise such a plea. Having argued so, he supported the judgment and decree of the trial court and submitted that the appeal liable to be dismissed. In support of his contentions he has placed reliance upon M/s. Rudnap Export- Import Vs. Eastern Associates Co. and others, AIR 1984 Delhi 20, Vimal Chand Ghever Chand Jain & Ors. Vs. Ramakant, Exnath Jajoo, (2009) 5 SCC 713 , Grasim Industries Limited Vs. Agarwal Steel, (2010) 1 SCC 83 , Chinthamani Ammal Vs. In support of his contentions he has placed reliance upon M/s. Rudnap Export- Import Vs. Eastern Associates Co. and others, AIR 1984 Delhi 20, Vimal Chand Ghever Chand Jain & Ors. Vs. Ramakant, Exnath Jajoo, (2009) 5 SCC 713 , Grasim Industries Limited Vs. Agarwal Steel, (2010) 1 SCC 83 , Chinthamani Ammal Vs. Nandagopal Gounder And Ors., (2007) 4 SCC 163 , Gulam Mohd. Vs. Mst. Mariyam, RLW 1984 321, Motilal Jain Vs. Ramdasi Devi (Smt.) & Ors., (2000) 6 SSC 420, Prakash Chand Vs. Narain, (2012) 5 SCC 403 , Narinderjeet Singh Vs. North Star Estate Promoters Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 712 , Silvey & Ors. Vs. Arun Varghese & Ors., (2008) 11 SCC 45 , Nand Kishore Mehra Vs. Sushila Mehra (1995) 4 SCC 572 , Kalianna Gounder Vs. Palani Gounder & Ors., (1970) 1 SCC 56 , Ram Khilona and Ors. Vs. Sardar & Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 375 , Bishwanath Prasad Singh Vs. Rajendra Prasad & Ors., (2006) 4 SCC 432, G. Mahalingappa Vs. G.M. Savitha (2005) 7 SCC 441, R. Rajgopal Reddy (dead) By LR’s Vs. Padmini Chandrasekharan (Dead) By LR’s, 1995 (2) SCC 630 , Punjab & Sind Bank Vs. C.S. Co. & Ors. (2012) 2 SCC 743 , AIR-1952 Kant-114, Lakshmamma & Ors. Vs. M. Jayaram, Canara Bank Vs. Vara Trading Co. & Ors., 2005 (4) CCC. 10. I have given utmost consideration to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties and record as well as rulings cited by them. 11. On the basis of the arguments of both the learned counsel for the parties, following questions are required to be answered for effective adjudication of the controversy involved in this appeal:- (1) Whether the document in question is an agreement to sell or a loan transaction? (2) Whether the document in question is a forged document? (3) Whether the sale consideration was inadequate and if so, its effect? 12. So far as questions No.1 & 2 are concerned, it is an admitted fact that the plaintiff paid Rs.16 Lakh to the defendant on 19.01.1996 through a Bankers Cheque and the defendant received the said amount. It is also not in dispute that this amount was deposited in defendant’s bank account and transferred to her daughter-in-law’s account on the same day and on the next day i.e. 20.01.1996. Two TDR Nos. It is also not in dispute that this amount was deposited in defendant’s bank account and transferred to her daughter-in-law’s account on the same day and on the next day i.e. 20.01.1996. Two TDR Nos. 835911 & 835912 were got issued respectively of Rs.12 Lakh and Rs.2,09,400/- and there was an order of Company Law Board dated 19.12.1995 under which such amounts were payable by the defendant’s son. The issues on which parties are at seriously at dispute is the veracity of the agreement to sell (Ex.1) dated 19.01.1996. With respect to the agreement to sell (Ex.1). The learned trial court has recorded in the judgment that evidence of both the parties with respect to (Ex.-1) is contradictory. The trial court has also observed that the document (Ex.1) has been typed on papers of different colours by different typewriters. There is no explanation on behalf of any of the parties as to how a single document came to be typed by different typewriters. It is also evident from the record that handwriting experts examined by both the parties are not in agreement on the genuineness or otherwise of the signatures on the (Ex.-1). There is a witness (DW-4) who is a deed writer and has accepted that he was asked by the plaintiff to write a document on signed blank papers, however, this witness has not been considered by trial court to be reliable on the ground that how a deed writer can identify the papers which he saw 7 years back. In such a factual scenario, the learned trial court concluded that though man can tell lies, circumstances never and if these contradictory evidences are analyses and tested on this touch stone, the evidence produced by the plaintiff appeared to be true. The learned trial court has given following reasons in support of his conclusion:- (i) If there have been made erasures and omissions in the document (Ex.1) or if the signatures of the defendant would have been forged on the document (Ex.1), the defendant would have initiated criminal proceedings against the plaintiff. (ii) The plaintiff has exercised due diligence and payment had been made by him through demand draft. (iii) It is correct that the two papers attached to the stamp paper (Ex.1) are of two different colours and they have been typed by two different typewriters. (ii) The plaintiff has exercised due diligence and payment had been made by him through demand draft. (iii) It is correct that the two papers attached to the stamp paper (Ex.1) are of two different colours and they have been typed by two different typewriters. However, it cannot be attributed to the plaintiff because if it has been the intention of the plaintiff to forge the document, he would have exercised utmost care and obtained advice of any advocate and would have used similar papers and got typed them with one typewriter and would not have made any erasures and omissions. (iv) If it had been a loan transaction, the defendant would have mentioned so in their replies (Ex.3) & (Ex.4) given in response to the notice given by the plaintiff but they have not mentioned so. (v) On the one hand, defendant completely deny the execution of (Ex.1) and on the other hand they are saying that their signatures are forged on two pages. In the written statement they call the instrument a sham and during testimony they deny the averments made in the written statement. (vi) The plaintiff has produced in the court the original sale deed of the disputed property which was handed over to the plaintiff by the defendant at the time of execution of agreement to sell whereas defendant and her son deny the fact of handing over that document. This affirms the fact of sale of the property. (vii) Though the learned advocate of the defendant while stressing the striking off the word ‘Rehan’ from (Ex.1) has tried to show that the instrument was a mortgage deed yet the over all reading of the document nowhere show that it was a mortgage deed but it clearly shows that it is an agreement to sell. (viii) Though (DW-4) Sahaza Singh Chawla has deposed that plaintiff had approached him in December 1995 and asked him to prepare an agreement to sell on a blank stamp paper and two other blank papers, however, it is unnatural to believe that a deed writer can remember the blank papers after a period of seven years. (ix) The Defendant contended that at the time of transaction, value of the property was Rs.75 Lakh and it cannot be believed that this property could have been sold only for Rs.18 Lakh. (ix) The Defendant contended that at the time of transaction, value of the property was Rs.75 Lakh and it cannot be believed that this property could have been sold only for Rs.18 Lakh. They have also examined valuer Shri Sanjay Gupta (DW-3), who has also claimed that value of the property was Rs.75 Lakh in January, 1996. However, he has not quoted prevalent DLC rates. He has also said in his cross-examination that there is no difference between the value of the free hold and lease hold property which cannot be believed as it is apparent that a vacant property would certainly fetch more value than a property occupied by the tenants. Besides, as the explanation to section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, inadequacy of consideration is irrelevant in granting the decree of specific performance. (x) Though the plaintiff has denied yet even if the facts stated by (DW-1) Chandan Devi (DW-2) Pawan Kumar, (DW-6) Prem Chand Sanghi and the facts disclosed by (Ex.A-2), (Ex.A-3) and (Ex.DW.6/1) are accepted that Pawan Kumar son of defendant Chandan Devi needed Rs.15 Lakh and he was obliged to pay this amount under the orders of the Company Law Board, it only shows that defendant were in need of money and therefore, they agreed to sell their house but only for this reason the agreement in question cannot be held to be a loan agreement. (xi) Even if for a moment, it is assumed that the defendant have sold the house below the market price, they have done so in anticipation of acquiring a factory shed built in a land of 2,000 Sq. ms. Therefore, there is no ground to doubt the agreement. (xii) Had the plaintiff given loan and had the defendant obtained the same, there was no need to make the payment through demand draft and loan could well be given by cheque. Had the amount been obtained by way of loan, it could be repaid immediately on receipt of the notice from the plaintiff. (xiii) It is the averment of the defendant that the amount was obtained by way of loan and they are continuously paying the interest. First of all it is unbelievable that someone would give loan at a rate less than the bank rates. (xiii) It is the averment of the defendant that the amount was obtained by way of loan and they are continuously paying the interest. First of all it is unbelievable that someone would give loan at a rate less than the bank rates. Besides this @ 1%, the amount of interest comes to be Rs.16,000, however, the defendant neither have produced any accounts in this regard nor have produced any receipts. (xiv) It is averred by the defendant that the property is a joint family property and it had been partitioned in January, 1995 and there has been litigation regarding the partition. The plaintiff has claimed that the proceedings were collusive. However, (Ex.-2) shows that the property is registered in the name of the defendant. Otherwise also the amount was needed for the business of defendant’s son Pawan Kumar, therefore, it may be presumed that there was a consent of the family in arranging the amount. (xv) It has been contended on behalf of the defendant that when the plaintiff has paid Rs.16 Lakh on account of the said transaction of Rs.18 Lakh, why he filed suit only before one day of the expiry of the limitation. This shows the transaction was a loan transaction. However, this is not true. It is not that the plaintiff was silent for three years without any reason. Rs.16 Lakh had gone out of his hand and he was required to pay Rs.90,000/- as court fees, in such circumstances waiting for three years was not unreasonable. On the other hand had it been a loan transaction, the defendant should have repaid the amount as and when they received notice from the plaintiff. (xvi) Though the handwriting experts examined from both the sides have given contradictory reports yet the expert’s evidence has only corroborative value and even if the opinion of both the experts is ignored, it is proved that defendant has signed the agreement to sell (Ex.1) and has also signed the erasures and omissions and her son Pawan Kumar Baj has also signed the document. 13. In my considered view, once signature of the defendant on the (Ex.1) are duly proved, the burden would shift upon the defendant to prove that it was a forged document. Admittedly, a transaction had taken place. The dispute pertains only to the nature of the transaction. 13. In my considered view, once signature of the defendant on the (Ex.1) are duly proved, the burden would shift upon the defendant to prove that it was a forged document. Admittedly, a transaction had taken place. The dispute pertains only to the nature of the transaction. There is direct evidence of plaintiff and attesting witness of the document Shri Anil Adwani (PW-2), both have proved the execution of (Ex.1) and the fact that the defendant agreed to sell her property to the plaintiff for a sale consideration of 18 Lakh, out of which, 16 Lakh were paid at the time of agreement itself. 14. Apart from it, the signatures of defendant on the stamp paper are admitted. It is a settled law that opinion of a hand writing expert under section 45 of the Evidence Act has only corroborative evidence and the court may ignore such opinions and can draw its own conclusion by comparing the admitted signature with the disputed signature. A bare perusal of the signature of defendant on the second and third paper of (Ex.1) and on the cuttings thereon shows that it is absolutely similar to the one put on the stamp paper (first paper) and there is no visible difference in these signatures. Therefore, I find no force in the contention that signatures on the cuttings and on other two papers are forged. Once, it is held that all the signatures of the defendant on the disputed document (Ex.1) are genuine, the slight differences in colour and type do not make any difference. Therefore, I find no error in the conclusion of the trial court that the document (Ex.1) has been signed by the defendant and its execution is proved. So far as the evidence of (DW-4), who is a deed writer and has stated that he was asked by the plaintiff to write a document on signed blank papers, is concerned, the trial court has rightly observed that it is beyond imagination that a person after lapse of 7 years can identify the papers. In addition to the above, it has not been clarified that how the defendant came to know that the plaintiff had approached this witness for scribing a document on blank signed papers. No evidence available on the record to the fact that either she or any family member etc. In addition to the above, it has not been clarified that how the defendant came to know that the plaintiff had approached this witness for scribing a document on blank signed papers. No evidence available on the record to the fact that either she or any family member etc. were present there and in her/their presence the plaintiff had gone there. Apart from it from the cross-examination of (DW-4), it is clear that in a number of cases he had engaged Shri Vidya Bhushan Sharma, Advocate, who was representing defendant in this case. In view of the above, it is clear that the statement of this witness is tainted and not reliable. 15. So far as this argument is concerned, that in fact, the transaction was a loan transaction and it has been wrongly made as an agreement to sell. For this purpose, learned counsel for the appellant has heavily relied on the circumstance that the defendant’s son was in dire need of money in order to carry out his obligation under the orders of the Company Law Board and he in fact, utilised the amount received from the plaintiff for that purpose. 16. I am afraid that this stand appears to be clearly an afterthought. This stand has firstly been taken in the written statement. Before that the plaintiff had served a notice upon the defendant calling upon her to execute the sale deed as per the terms of the agreement to sell on 20.02.1997. The defendant replied to the notice through her lawyer on 11.04.1997. Wherein though she raised a number of technical issues yet she did not refer to any loan transaction. Had there been any reference of a loan transaction between the parties, she would have stated so in the reply in clear terms. In fact, this stand has been taken only to avoid an obligation under a binding contract. The circumstance relied upon by the learned counsel goes to show the contrary to what he contends. In fact, the order of the Company Law Board was issued in pursuance of the settlement between the parties under which defendant’s son was to get an industrial plot measuring 2,000 Sq. The circumstance relied upon by the learned counsel goes to show the contrary to what he contends. In fact, the order of the Company Law Board was issued in pursuance of the settlement between the parties under which defendant’s son was to get an industrial plot measuring 2,000 Sq. Metres with a factory shed and it appears that defendant had agreed to sell her house, a major portion whereof was already in possession of the tenant and a litigation between the owner and the tenant was underway in a court of law, in order to obtain a larger industrial property. 17. It has been pleaded by the defendant in the written statement that no agreement to sell was executed by her and the same was a sham ¼uqekb’kh½ whereas in her testimony as (DW-1), she stated that her signatures were obtained by her son, Pawan Kumar, on blank papers. In the written statement, the defendant has pleaded that the alterations were made in the original draft. It is an admitted fact that she received a notice dated 22.02.1997 from the plaintiff, which was replied by her on 23.03.1997 and on 11.04.1997 but when she appeared as witness she denied the receipt of the notice and its reply (Ex.3) and (Ex.4). In her statement, she claimed ignorance about the execution of the document (Ex.1). She also stated that she could not say whether the sum of Rs.16 Lakh was returned to the plaintiff. Pawan Kumar (DW-2) stated that it was a loan transaction and in the past also they entered into loan transactions but he failed to give any specific instance thereof. He also stated that no document was produced by him regarding his factory and its loan transaction. Although, he stated that interest @ 12 % was payable on this loan, but there is no material available on record that any interest was ever paid on the aforesaid amount. The defence raised by the defendant is unbeliveable. If the transaction was a loan transaction, the consequence of payment of interest would naturally follow. 18. The photo copy of the disputed agreement has been produced by the defendant and it is revealed that the photo copy of the draft agreement was retained by the defendant. The production of the photo copy of the agreement by the defendant further corroborates the stand of the plaintiff. 18. The photo copy of the disputed agreement has been produced by the defendant and it is revealed that the photo copy of the draft agreement was retained by the defendant. The production of the photo copy of the agreement by the defendant further corroborates the stand of the plaintiff. The contents of the agreement to sell (Ex.1) are also self speaking. It is clearly mentioned therein that the disputed property was agreed to be sold for a sum of Rs.18 Lakh, out of which, Rs.16 Lakh were paid at that time and remaining amount was agreed to be paid at the time of registration of sale deed. The word ‘Seller’ and ‘Purchaser’ used in the agreement to sell (Ex.1) are also pertinent. The document, if read as a whole, leads to the only conclusion that it is an agreement to sell and theory of loan transaction is an afterthought defence. The stand of the plaintiff is further strengthened by the fact that the original sale deed (Ex.2) pertaining to disputed house was handed over by the defendant to the plaintiff. The defendant and her son had denied the delivery of the above document to the plaintiff and it reflects upon their conduct. Therefore, the argument is devoid of any merit and cannot be accepted. 19. Merely because, while drafting the deed, word ‘Rehan’ was written it does not get conveyed that it is a mortgage deed because the word ‘Rehan’ has been struck off and it is also initialed by the defendant. The learned trial court has referred to the various terms and conditions stipulated in the document and concluded that there is no doubt that the document is an agreement to sell and nothing else. I have also read the document and am in complete agreement with the trial court that the word ‘Rehan’ has been struck off as it would have crept erroneously in the document; otherwise the nature of the document is clearly that of an agreement to sell. 20. So far as question No.3 is concerned, as per defendant, at the time of transaction, value of the property was Rs.75 Lakh and it cannot be believed that this property could have been sold only for Rs.18 Lakh. In this regard, defendant examined Shri Sanjay Gupta (DW-3) who stated that the value of the property was Rs.75 Lakh in January, 1996. In this regard, defendant examined Shri Sanjay Gupta (DW-3) who stated that the value of the property was Rs.75 Lakh in January, 1996. It is revealed from his statement that he has not quoted prevalent DLC rates. He also stated in his cross-examination that there is no difference between free hold and lease hold property. The same cannot be believed as it is apparent that a vacant property would certainly fetch more value than a property occupied by tenants. Indisputably, there is a tenant in the disputed property. Besides, as per the explanation appended to section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, inadequacy of consideration is irrelevant in granting the decree of specific performance. The defendant, with eyes wide open, entered into the agreement to sell for an agreed consideration and thereafter it was not open for her to raise the issue of inadequate consideration. Hon’ble Apex Court in Narinderjit Singh Vs. North Star Estate Promoters Ltd. (supra) while considering Section 20 of Specific Relief Act and its earlier judgment K. Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd., 1999 (5) SCC 77 held that mere inadequacy of consideration or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant shall not constitute an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendant. Relevant para of the judgment reads as under:- “25. We are also inclined to agree with the lower appellate Court that escalation in the price of the land cannot, by itself, be a ground for denying relief of specific performance. In K. Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd. this Court interpreted Section 20 the Act and laid down the following propositions: (SCC P.91, para 29) “29 Section 20 the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. Performance of the contract involving some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee while non-performance involving no such hardship on the plaintiff, is one of the circumstances in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. The doctrine of comparative hardship has been thus statutorily recognized in India. Performance of the contract involving some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee while non-performance involving no such hardship on the plaintiff, is one of the circumstances in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. The doctrine of comparative hardship has been thus statutorily recognized in India. However, mere inadequacy of consideration or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not constitute an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendant or unforeseeable hardship on the defendant.” (emphasis supplied) 26. In the present case, the appellant had neither pleaded hardship nor produced any evidence to show that it will be inequitable to order specific performance of the agreement. Rather, the important plea taken by the appellant was that the agreement was fictitious and fabricated and his father had neither executed the same nor received the earnest money and, as mentioned above, all the Courts have found this plea to be wholly untenable.” 21. So far as rulings cited by the learned counsel for the appellants are concerned, they are not helpful for the appellants in the facts and circumstances of the case. 22. In Hansraj vs. Govind Narayan (supra) the trial court had granted decree of specific performance but Single Judge set aside the decree on the grounds that the execution of sale deed and receipt of advance amount was not proved, it was also not proved as to why a property of Rs.7 lacs was sold at a lesser price of Rs.2 lacs. There was also evidence that the purchaser was a money lender and he had played active role in settle the dues of the creditors of the seller and he was required to clear all dues by selling the suit property, however, he falsely executed a sale deed in his favour and in such circumstances granting the discretionary relief like the decree of specific performance was not found to be proper. On a special appeal, the order of the Single Judge was upheld. This judgment does not help the appellants herein for the simple reason that in the instant case the execution of agreement to sell as well as the payment and receipt of the advance amount of Rs.16 lacs has been proved. On a special appeal, the order of the Single Judge was upheld. This judgment does not help the appellants herein for the simple reason that in the instant case the execution of agreement to sell as well as the payment and receipt of the advance amount of Rs.16 lacs has been proved. Besides this, the defendants have not been able to prove that the plaintiff was a money lender and the money was advances by way of loan. 23. In A.K. Lakshmipathy vs. Rai Saheb Pannalal H. Lahoti Charitable Turst & Ors. (supra), it was held that the plaintiff must always be ready and willing to complete the terms of the agreement for sale and that he has not abandoned the contract and his intention is to keep the contract subsisting till it is executed. The defendant herein has never raised the issue of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff. To the contrary the plaintiff has always shown his readiness and willingness for performing his part of the agreement to sale by serving notice on the defendant. He has also made specific averments in his plaint that he is and has always been ready and willing to pay remaining amount of Rs.2 lacs on account of the consideration of the suit property and get the sale deed executed. Thus, this judgment rather supports the case of the plaintiff. 24. In Azhar Sultana vs. B. Rajamani (supra), it was held that continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is condition precedent for obtaining a relief of grant of specific performance of contract. It was further held that for showing continuous willingness and readiness it was not necessary that the entire consideration amount be always kept ready and the plaintiff must file proof thereof. The plaintiff in that case was found not to be entitled for the decree of specific performance because he filed suit belatedly, did not implead relevant parties and filed replication without leave of the court and thus failed to prove continuous willingness and readiness to perform his part of the contract. This case is again not helpful to the defendant. As has been mentioned earlier, there has never been the case of the defendant that the plaintiff was not willing or ready to perform his part of the contract. 25. This case is again not helpful to the defendant. As has been mentioned earlier, there has never been the case of the defendant that the plaintiff was not willing or ready to perform his part of the contract. 25. In Narinder Kumar Malik vs. Surinder Kumar Malik (supra) was also a case in which decree of specific performance was denied on the ground that the respondent had not been ready and willing throughout the relevant period to carry out the terms and conditions of the agreement. This case is also not helpful for the appellant for the reasons mentioned hereinabove. 26. In P.R. Deb and Associates vs. Sunanda Roy (Supra), the appellant, owner of an immovable property, entered into an agreement with the respondent whereunder he agreed to sell the property to the respondent for Rs.9 Lakhs. Under the terms of this agreement a sum of Rs.25,000 was to be paid at the time of execution of the agreement. A further sum of Rs.4 Lakhs was to be paid within five months from the date of the agreement and the balance amount was to be paid at the time of conclusion of the purchase, time being essence of the contract. The payment Rs.4 lakh was not by way of earnest money but was part payment of the purchase price. The purpose of this payment, as disclosed in a letter of the appellant’s solicitor, was to purchase alternative residential accommodation for herself in order to carry out her obligation under agreement of sale to deliver vacant possession of the property to the respondent. Clause 11 of the agreement provided that if ultimately the conveyance was to be executed in favour of a cooperative housing society a further agreement may be entered into between the promoter of that housing society and that the vendor shall have to give necessary consent letter to the Cooperative Society to the effect that she has agreed to sell the land and the building thereon to the Cooperative Housing Society. As the respondent failed and neglected to pay Rs.4 Lakhs, the appellant addressed to the respondent her solicitor’s letter calling upon the respondent to pay the said sum of Rs.4 lakhs within seven days failing which the appellant would be compelled to take further steps against the respondent as she may be advised. As the respondent failed and neglected to pay Rs.4 Lakhs, the appellant addressed to the respondent her solicitor’s letter calling upon the respondent to pay the said sum of Rs.4 lakhs within seven days failing which the appellant would be compelled to take further steps against the respondent as she may be advised. Despite this notice, the respondent failed and neglected to pay Rs.4 lakh and afterwards filed a suit for specific performance. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the respondent was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In appeal, however, the High Court granted the relief of specific performance. Allowing the appeal Hon’ble the Apex Court held that the plaintiff, in a suit for specific performance, must be ready and willing to carry out his part of the agreement at all material times. Since willingness and readiness of plaintiff has not been disputed before the trial court in the case at hand, this ruling does not help the appellants. 27. In S. Rangaraju Naidu vs. S. Thiruvarakkarasu (Supra), a suit filed by respondent-moneylenders for recovery of amount due from the appellant decreed. The decretal amount made up of a total sum of Rs.35,500 which after payment of Rs.20,000 remained Rs.15,500. The appellant executed a promissory note for payment of Rs.15,500 inclusive of interest @ 9% per annum. On the same day, the appellant had also executed an agreement of sale, for the discharge of the very same promissory note debt. Since the appellant had not paid the amount neither he executed sale deed, the respondent filed a suit for specific performance of the sale agreement. The suit was decreed by the trial court and the decree confirmed in first and second appeal. Allowing the appeal Hon’ble the Supreme Court held that though normally the discretion exercised by the Courts below should not have been interfered with by Supreme Court under Article 136 but considering the fact that the respondents were moneylenders with whom appellant had entered into the agreement being not in the position to pay the amount due, predominant object of the agreement was payment of dues with interest. Hence, instead of decreeing specific performance of the sale agreement, justice would be met by granting alternative relief sought in the suit viz. Hence, instead of decreeing specific performance of the sale agreement, justice would be met by granting alternative relief sought in the suit viz. Decree for refund of the money due with simple interest @ 12% p.a. It may be noted the facts of the above case were totally different from that of the instant case and therefore the ruling does not apply to the present case in anyway. 28. In V. Muthusami vs. Angammal (Supra) purchasers had bought the land more than 25 years prior to matter reaching Supreme Court and had invested a large sum of money on improvement. Having regard to the facts it was held that specific relief in favour of plaintiff would cause hardship to the purchasers whereas plaintiff could be compensated by a decree of compensation. Accordingly respondent purchasers were directed to repay the advance amount paid by the appellant with interest @ 12 % from the date of filing the suit. The facts and circumstances of the above case are different from that of the case at hand. Therefore this ruling does not help the appellants. 29. In G. Jayashree vs. Bhagwandas S. Patel (Supra) it was held that the relief of specific performance is discretionary jurisdiction of the Court and this jurisdiction has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The conduct of the plaintiff in such cases plays an important role. Non-filing of a suit of specific performance of the contract at first instance speaks volumes about his conduct. I am unable to understand how this judgment helps the defendants. In the instant case neither there is any inexplicable delay in filing suit by the plaintiff nor is any conduct on the part of the plaintiff which may disentitle him for the relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale in question. 30. In Mohammadia Cooperative Building Society ltd. vs. Lakshmi Sriniwasa Cooperative Building Society ltd. (supra) also the role of the conduct of plaintiff has been stressed and the relief of specific performance was not granted because of the dubious nature of the agreement to sale and unworthy conduct of the plaintiff. 31. In K.S. Vidyanadam vs. Vairavan (Supra) it was held that the decree of specific performance of the agreement of sale is a discretionary power and in exercise of the discretion circumstances of the case should be considered. 31. In K.S. Vidyanadam vs. Vairavan (Supra) it was held that the decree of specific performance of the agreement of sale is a discretionary power and in exercise of the discretion circumstances of the case should be considered. Even though time is not of essence of contract of sale of immovable property and suit can be filed within the period of 3 years provided under article 54 of the Limitation Act but it should be performed within a reasonable time having regard to terms of the contract prescribing a time limit and nature of the property. If property is a house located in an urban area continuing steep rise in price thereof would be a relevant factor for the court to decide whether the delay or laches on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract would disentitle him the relief of specific performance. In the case in hand though the suit for specific performance has been filed immediately before the expiry of the limitation yet the circumstances on the record show that the plaintiff has fairly tried to persuade the defendant to performs her part of the sale agreement and execute the sale deed. There has not been any pleading on behalf of the defendants that the plaintiff was unwilling or was not ready at any point of time for performing his part of the agreement. Hence, this ruling is also not helpful for the defendants. 32. As far as the issue of Benamidar is concerned, a daughterin- law does not come within the allowed categories of persons under the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and therefore, it is correct to say that the defendant is barred to raise such a plea and is to be treated as full owner of the disputed property. 33. In view of the above discussions, questions No.1 to 3 which are framed in the appeal, are decided against the appellants and I find no error of law or fact in the judgment and decree of the learned trial court. Therefore, the judgment and decree of the learned trial court are upheld and the appeal, being devoid of any merit, is dismissed with cost.