JUDGMENT : Biswanath Rath, J. The writ petition involves challenge to the order of the opposite party-company vide Annexure-4 therein intimating the petitioner that she was to attain the age of superannuation on 31.12.2003 and as a consequence, she was to retire/superannuate from service w.e.f. afternoon of 31.12.2003. 2. Short background involved in the case is that the petitioner being an employee under the Superintendent of Mines/Manager, Ballarpur Colliery, which was under the western coalfield limited, in the year 1979 the petitioner was transferred from Ballarpur Colliery to Central Hospital, Ib Valley area, Mahanadi Coalfield Ltd. on bifurcation of the said Western Coalfield Ltd, where she continued till the order at Annexure-4 was given effect to. It is averred that while the petitioner was continuing as such, she was served with the copy of order of superannuation on her attaining the age of sixty years as on 30.12.2003. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that on a query being made with regard to the actual date of birth of the petitioner by the Deputy Chief Personnel Manager, Ib Vally area to the Superintendent, Mines/Manager, Ballarpur Colliery, the said letter was responded by the Superintendent, Mines/Manager, Ballarpur Colliery with intimation that the Form ‘B’ Register maintained by the establishment, discloses the date of birth of the petitioner as 15.5.1953. 3. Filing the copies of the correspondences referred to hereinabove and copy of the Form ‘B’ Register indicating the details of the petitioner at Sl.139 vide Annexure-3, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that for availability of the particular date of birth in the Form ‘B’ Register being a statutory Register, there was no scope for the establishment to interfere with the date of birth of the petitioner and Sri Mishra, the learned counsel for the petitioner therefore, claimed, prepone-ment of the superannuation date of the petitioner is not justified and thus, remain contrary to law. Learned counsel for the petitioner further taking this Court to the counter response as well as the verity of documents available in the brief submitted that the plea taken in the counter affidavit and the documents appended thereto are all created by the establishment only to defeat the case of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner further taking this Court to the counter response as well as the verity of documents available in the brief submitted that the plea taken in the counter affidavit and the documents appended thereto are all created by the establishment only to defeat the case of the petitioner. Documents referred to in the counter having no statutory support, learned counsel for the petitioner thus contended that the documents relied on by the establishment have no legal sanctity and thus, requested this Court to interfere with the matter, thereby set aside the order vide Annexuer-4 and permit the petitioner to continue in service till actually attending the age of superannuation. 4. Sri Sahoo, learned counsel for the opposite party no.4-establishment while opposing the allegations made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, referring to the documents under Annexure-3 submitted that the documents vide Annexure-3 nowhere discloses the date of birth of the petitioner as 15.5.1953. Referring to the document vide Annexure-2 learned counsel for the opposite party no.4 submitted that for availability of no clear picture in Form ‘B’ Register, the response of the previous employer indicating the date of birth of the petitioner as 15.5.1953 was of no help. Further, referring to the response of the opposite party no.4 in the counter, learned counsel for the opposite party no.4 further submitted that the documents available with the Mahanadi Coal Field Ltd. and several documents available at Annexure-A/4 give a clear indication with regard to clear recording of the age of the petitioner as on 1.1.1975 to be 31 years. The documents are official documents and each of the documents also bears the signature of the petitioner further with thumb impression of the petitioner on some documents. Taking this Court to each such documents, Sri Sahoo, learned counsel for the opposite party no.4 submitted that for no clear picture available in the Form ‘B’ Register indicating the date of birth of the petitioner, the company was constrained to take the date of birth of the petitioner from the other documents, which were prepared on the information supplied by the petitioner herself and even though these documents are prepared long back, but has never been challenged by the petitioner at any point of time. 5. 5. For the information available in the materials indicated hereinabove and taking support of a case in the case of Burn Standard Co.Ltd. and others v. Dinabandhu Majumdar and another as reported in AIR 1995 Supreme Court 1499 learned counsel for the opposite party no.4 contended that for the claim of the petitioner being involving a disputed question of facts, no writ petition is maintainable and the only way of ascertainment of this facts is by way of raising an Industrial Dispute. It is under the circumstance, Sri Sahoo, learned counsel for the opposite party no.4 requested this Court for dismissing the writ petition. 6. Considering the rival contentions of the parties, this Court has no doubt that the petitioner is relying on two documents in proof of her date of birth, whereas the opposite party-company also relies on several documents being maintained by the company itself and prepared on the source of information furnished by the petitioner herself. Reading of the document vide Annexure-3 and examining the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court has no hesitation to hold the numerical appearing in proof of date of birth of the petitioner as against Sl.no.139, the indication therein nowhere establishes the date of birth as 15.5.1953 rather the numbers therein indicates 15-52-53. It is for this reasons, a serious doubt is raised regarding acceptance of the information provided by the previous employer of the petitioner. It is on the other hand, looking to the series of documents filed by the opposite party-company this Court finds, there has been repeated indication of the age of the petitioner being mentioned therein as 31 years as on 1.1.1975. Since some of the documents bears the signature of the petitioner, this Court finds, there remains no doubt as to the actual date of birth of the petitioner. Since some of the documents bears the signature of the petitioner, this Court finds, there remains no doubt as to the actual date of birth of the petitioner. But however, for no clear mentioning of the date of birth in the purported Form ‘B’ Register copy of which available at Annexure-3 and it is on the other hand, for clear recording of the age of the petitioner in the official records that too upon the source of information provided by the petitioner, even some documents bearing the signature of the petitioner herself and further, for no challenge to such entry in the Official records for more than three decades, this Court finds, the claim of the petitioner at this stage involves disputed question of facts and for which, the reliefs claimed by the petitioner cannot be adjudicated upon in absence of evidence and proof of actual date of birth of the petitioner. Coming to consider the decision in the case of Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and others v. Dinabandhu Majumdar and another as reported in AIR 1995 Supreme Court 1499 this Court finds, the Hon’ble Apex Court has the clear view in such citation observing that a High Court cannot exercise a discretionary extraordinary jurisdiction vested with it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. For the observations made hereinabove, this Court while declining to interfere with the impugned action of the opposite party-company vide Annexure-4 involving the writ petition, keeps it open for the petitioner to take up the issue by way of an appropriate application with proper authority. For the petitioner’s serving beyond the period of superannuation by virtue of an interim direction of this Court involving this writ petition, there shall be no recovery of the payments made to the petitioner by virtue of such continuation. 8. The writ petition stands dismissed for being not maintainable in the present circumstance, but however, with the observations made hereinabove. No cost.