JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. 1. Very often, when writ petitions are filed unreasonably long after the proximate cause for such action had arisen, courts are placed in a predicament either to deny relief on grounds of laches, the claims having become stale or to assess the relief sought, from the touchstone of the violations complained of and to grant relief ex aequo et bono (from equity and good conscience). 2. Recourse in such situations is usually taken by the respondents to the off quoted maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subueniunt which, as is well known, declares that law comes to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleepy. This is to mean that only persons who are watchful and careful of using his/her rights, are entitled to the benefits of law, thus disentitling a petitioner to relief when petitions are filed unusually long after the cause of action arose. 3. However, in the assessment of these issues there is need for great caution because, as is now settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in several judgments, when it comes to violations of fundamental rights, especially to life and personal liberty, delay or laches by itself would not disentitle relief to a petitioner, but with a covenant that if, on account of such delay, rights have accrued to others, such rights cannot be disturbed unless the delay is explained with reasonable and sufficient cause. 4. These appeals call upon us to consider issues of laches and delay because the writ petitions, from which they arise, have been filed more than thirteen years after the cause of action had arisen. The appellants who are respondents in the writ petitions, contend inter alia that the writ petitions be dismissed on the short ground of delay asserting that the claims of the writ petitioners have become stale. 5. These appeals are listed before us for admission and we are proceeding to finally decide these at this stage itself with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties. For ease of convenience, we will treat W.A.No.1570 of 2017 as the lead case and reference to parties and documents in this judgment as they are arranged and marked in the said appeal. 6. We have heard Sri. Vipin P. Varghese, the learned standing counsel appearing for the appellant in all the three appeals; Sri. For ease of convenience, we will treat W.A.No.1570 of 2017 as the lead case and reference to parties and documents in this judgment as they are arranged and marked in the said appeal. 6. We have heard Sri. Vipin P. Varghese, the learned standing counsel appearing for the appellant in all the three appeals; Sri. K.N. Sasidharan Nair, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 5 in W.A.No.1570 of 2017, respondents 1 and 2 in W.A.No.1784 of 2017 and the first respondent in W.A.No.1584 of 2017 and the learned Government Pleader appearing for the State of Kerala in all these cases. Although a certain Sri. A.K. Sree Kumar, proprietor of Jayasree Cashew Company, has been shown as a respondent in all these appeals, we deem it not necessary to issue notice to him because of the manner in which we intend to dispose of these appeals. 7. These appeals arise from three writ petitions which were filed by respondents 1 to 5 in W.A.No.1570 of 2017, respondents 1 and 2 in W.A.No.1784 of 2017 and the first respondent in W.A.No.1584 of 2017 (hereinafter referred to as “the writ petitioners” for convenience). The writ petitioners claim that they were regular employees of the Kerala State Cashew Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “the Corporation” for short). Their grievance is that they were unceremoniously terminated from service by the Corporation for the reason that the cashew factories in which they were then employed were, by virtue of a judgment of this court, released to the owners and, therefore, left without employment. They say that they had made certain representations before the Corporation against such termination but they concede that they had not approached this court or any other court or forum to ventilate their grievances. 8. That being so, however, certain similarly placed persons had earlier approached this court by filing eight other writ petitions, which culminated in a judgment dated 15.11.2012, a copy of which has been appended to the writ petition which jointly disposed of these writ petitions as Ext.P1, whereby this court declared that all such persons to be regularly appointed workmen in the service of the Corporation and consequently that they are eligible for compensation when they were sent out of service. The learned single Judge, after making such declaration, thereafter issued the following directions in Ext.P1 judgment: “25. The learned single Judge, after making such declaration, thereafter issued the following directions in Ext.P1 judgment: “25. In the above circumstances, it is directed that those petitioners who have reached or passed their age of superannuation shall be paid the entire back-wages, which shall be computed from the day after the last pay was paid to them, till the date of superannuation. Needless to say, that, such pay directed to be paid shall include the basic pay as also the Dearness Allowance and shall be computed with the necessary increments as specified in the scales to which the petitioners were entitled in their respective posts. Such petitioners shall also be entitled to all the retirement benefits eligible to the employees of the Corporation, including gratuity as on the date of superannuation considering them to have continued without any break in service from the date of their appointment to the date of superannuation. The petitioners, who have not attained the age of superannuation, shall, on a request being made, immediately be appointed in the vacant posts available with the Corporation with immediate effect, or again following the principle of 'last come first go'. Such petitioners who are appointed shall also be entitled to the entire back-wages as, specified above, in the case of petitioners who have superannuated. In the event of the Corporation computing the benefits as directed above within a period of three months from today and effecting payment within a period of three months thereafter, the respondent Corporation shall not be liable for any interest. However, if such payments are not made within the time stipulated, the amounts due to the petitioners shall carry interest at the rate of 12.5% per annum from the date on which it became due, till the date of realization.” 9. This judgment was taken in appeal by the Corporation before a Division Bench of this court by filing W.A.Nos.242, 262, 282, 294, 295, 296, 297 and 307 of 2013. This judgment was taken in appeal by the Corporation before a Division Bench of this court by filing W.A.Nos.242, 262, 282, 294, 295, 296, 297 and 307 of 2013. These writ appeals were disposed of through Ext.P2 judgment by the Division Bench on the basis of a compromise, the Corporation and 18 of the writ petitioners therein, who were the only surviving writ petitioners, had entered into, under which an amount of Rs.38,61,580/- was to be paid to them, representing 45% of the back wages and recording that the writ petitioners therein had agreed to accept this amount in full and final settlement of all their claims. The Division Bench in Ext.P2 also directed that this amount will be in addition to a sum of Rs.21,58,751/-, which was to be paid as gratuity, after deducting an amount of Rs.2,98,253/- which had already been paid. 10. On being aware of Exts.P1 and P2 judgments, the writ petitioners/respondents herein filed their respective writ petitions claiming that they are also similarly situated and asserting that they are also entitled to the same benefits as was offered to the workman shown in Ext.P2 judgment. A learned single Judge of this court, specifically noticing the judgments of the learned single Judge and that of the Division Bench, namely Exts.P1 and P2 referred to above, directed the Corporation to consider the representations made by the writ petitioners before it, adverting to the said judgments and further directed that if the writ petitioners are found to be similarly situated as the petitioners in Ext.P1 judgment, then all the benefits, as were given to them, should also be offered to the writ petitioners herein. 11. The Corporation has filed these appeals against the judgment of the learned single Judge on the specific submission that the writ petitioners herein are not similarly situated as the petitioners in Ext.P1 judgment and further on the legal assertion that they are not entitled to any relief since they have approached this Court more than 15 years after their termination from service, thus disentitling them to any discretionary orders from this Court. 12. From the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, we see that apart from the contentions relating to laches and delay, the issues placed for our consideration are broadly three. 12. From the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, we see that apart from the contentions relating to laches and delay, the issues placed for our consideration are broadly three. The first is that the writ petitioners are not similarly situated like the petitioners in Ext.P1 judgment delivered by the learned single Judge in O.P.No.10546 of 2002 and connected matters. The second is that even assuming that they are similarly situated, these writ petitioners cannot claim the discretionary relief from this Court since they have kept quiet without invoking any remedy for the last 15 years. Thirdly, the learned counsel says that the Corporation has no information as to whether the writ petitioners were gainfully employed after they were terminated from service in the year 2002 and that in the absence of such information being placed before them, it would not be possible for them to dispose of the representations as has been directed by the learned single Judge. 13. Sri. Sasidharan Nair, learned counsel for the writ petitioners, on the contrary, submits that it is not correct to say that the writ petitioners were silent during the period of 15 years till they filed these writ petitions. He says that some of them had earlier approached this Court and obtained a judgment, wherein directions were given to the Corporation to consider their case and give them benefits, if they were similarly situated to the writ petitioners in the earlier round of litigation. He also says that none of the writ petitioners herein had been gainfully employed until they had approached this Court or thereafter and that the alleged laches attributed against them, namely, that they had waited for over 15 years in approaching this Court was because of their abject poverty and impecuniousness into which they were pushed on account of the illegal action of the Corporation in terminating their services unceremoniously in the year 2002. 14. We have considered the dialectical contentions of the learned counsel as above in great detail. 15. There is no doubt that most of the writ petitioners have waited until the earlier round of litigation initiated by similarly placed persons had concluded through Ext.P2 judgment of the Division Bench, wherein the settlement between the Corporation and those persons were recorded. 14. We have considered the dialectical contentions of the learned counsel as above in great detail. 15. There is no doubt that most of the writ petitioners have waited until the earlier round of litigation initiated by similarly placed persons had concluded through Ext.P2 judgment of the Division Bench, wherein the settlement between the Corporation and those persons were recorded. It also appears to be true, as is contended by the Corporation, that they have not made any pleading in the writ petition that they were not gainfully working, after they were terminated from service and until they filed the writ petitions. The assertion made by the learned counsel for the writ petitioners is specific that the writ petitioners were incapacitated from approaching this Court on account of poverty and impecuniousness. We have, however, no doubt that if the writ petitioners herein are also similarly situated as the petitioners in the earlier round of litigation leading to Exts. P1 and P2 judgments, then they are justified in seeking that their representations made by them before the Corporation, be disposed of so as to enable them to obtain the benefits granted to the petitioners in the earlier round of litigation. This is because if they are denied such benefits, when similarly placed persons have been offered it, albeit under a settlement, it would certainly amount to an affront on the constitutional imperatives of equality and right to life, protected under Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. These claims of the petitioners can never be seen to be stale, since they had pressed such claims, which are based on Exts.P1 and P2 judgments, soon after the said judgments were delivered. There is also no case for the appellants that if these claims are considered, the vested rights of anyone else would be disturbed or that on account of the delay other rights in favour of third parties had been created. 16. The issues regarding laches and delay in approaching writ courts have often engaged the attention of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, especially when alleged violations of rights of the marginalised sections of society are presented. The Hon'ble Court has held in such cases that great amount of latitude and leniency be adopted by courts of equity for such causes. 16. The issues regarding laches and delay in approaching writ courts have often engaged the attention of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, especially when alleged violations of rights of the marginalised sections of society are presented. The Hon'ble Court has held in such cases that great amount of latitude and leniency be adopted by courts of equity for such causes. One can see the mind of the Hon'ble Court expressed clearly in the judgment in Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha and others v. Union of India and others [ (2015) 3 SCC 1 ], wherein Their Lordships have, in paragraphs 31 and 32 thereof, declared that the time has come to have a re-look at the doctrine of laches altogether when it comes to violations of Articles 21 and 29 of the Constitution of India. Their Lordships also went on to say that it has now been conclusively held that fundamental rights cannot be waived and given these important developments in the law, the time has come for this Court (the Hon'ble Supreme Court) to say that at least when it comes to violations of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty, delay or laches by itself would not be sufficient to shut the doors of the Court on any petitioner. 17. It is pertinent that as early as in the year 1974, in the judgment in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and others v. The State of Maharashtra and others [ (1974) 1 SCC 317 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the question of laches in a completely different perspective and held therein that barring a writ petition containing stale claims is not a Rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper discretion. Their Lordships affirmatively said that there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is a delay, the court must necessarily refuse relief. Their Lordships in paragraph 10 of the said judgment declared the law as under: xxxx It may also be noted that the principle on which the Court proceeds in refusing relief to the petitioner on ground of laches or delay is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay. Xxxx “xxx Moreover, it may be noticed that the claim for enforcement of the fundamental right of equal opportunity under Article 16 is itself a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 32 of the Constitution and this Court which has been assigned the role of a sentinel on the qui vive for protection of the fundamental rights cannot easily allow itself to be persuaded to refuse relief solely on the jejune ground of laches, delay or the like. 18. The words of Hidayatullah C.J., in Tilokchand Motichand vs. H.B. Munshi [ (1969) 1 SCC 110 ] sublimely states it all, in issues relating to laches in approaching courts, and requires attentive reading, for which we extract it as under: “11. Therefore, the question is one of discretion for this court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit. A case may be brought within the Limitation Act by reason of some article but this court need not necessarily give the total time to the litigant to move this court under Article 32. Similarly in a suitable case this court may entertain such a petition even after a lapse of time. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are when and how the delay arose.” 19. Guided by the above immutable principles postulated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we have no doubt that in exceptional cases questions of delay and laches would not be a reason to deny legitimate remedies and relief to parties, specially when what is complained of is infraction of fundamental rights or such other constitutional rights. 20. In the case at hand, it may be true that the writ petitioners had not approached this Court in the year 2002 when they were dismissed from service. Presumably, they were waiting to see the progress of the case filed by similarly placed persons, which finally led to Ext.P1 judgment of the learned single Judge and Ext.P2 judgment of the Division Bench as mentioned supra. 21. It is also pertinent that all the writ petitioners did not remain without invoking remedy for this period. In fact, two of the writ petitioners had approached this Court earlier by filing W.P.(C) No.347 of 2004, which was disposed of by this Court directing the Corporation to consider their case. 21. It is also pertinent that all the writ petitioners did not remain without invoking remedy for this period. In fact, two of the writ petitioners had approached this Court earlier by filing W.P.(C) No.347 of 2004, which was disposed of by this Court directing the Corporation to consider their case. These two are petitioners in W.P.(C) No.38606 of 2016, from which W.A.No.1784 of 2017, which we are now considering, has arisen. It, therefore, becomes obvious that the question of delay and laches cannot be a good reason for denying the writ petitioners their legitimate remedies and reliefs. 22. The only question that thus remains is whether they are similarly placed as the writ petitioners in Ext.P1 judgment of the learned single Judge referred to above. This will depend upon a factual analysis as to whether they were regular employees of the Corporation prior to the handing over of the Cashew Factories to the owners; whether they were terminated from service without reason; whether they were entitled to be retrenched as has been found in the case of the petitioners in Ext.P1 judgment by the learned single Judge and such other relevant factors which would have to be considered by the Corporation before entering into a conclusive view. 23. We notice that the learned single Judge in the judgment, impugned in these appeals, has only directed the Corporation to consider these aspects and verify whether the writ petitioners herein are similarly placed as the petitioners in the earlier round of litigation. We do not find any prejudice that would be caused to the Corporation on account of these directions issued to them. In fact, these directions have been issued for valid and equitable cause, so that the writ petitioners will obtain benefits if they are found by the Corporation to be similarly placed as the petitioners in Exts.P1 and P2 judgments. 24. The other question whether these writ petitioners were profitably or gainfully employed in other avocations before approaching this Court in these writ appeals could also be certainly a ground which the Corporation can explore while disposing of their representations in terms of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 24. The other question whether these writ petitioners were profitably or gainfully employed in other avocations before approaching this Court in these writ appeals could also be certainly a ground which the Corporation can explore while disposing of their representations in terms of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. In fact, we are of the view that every relevant aspect as would be necessary for assessing the claims of the petitioners, specially as to whether they are similarly situated as the writ petitioners in the earlier case, would be available to the Corporation while disposing of their representations and we, therefore, find no justifiable reason why the appellant Corporation should have filed these appeals. 25. In these circumstances and for the reasons above, we see no cause to allow these writ appeals or to interfere with the directions of the learned single Judge in any manner whatsoever. 26. The appellant-Corporation will be obligated by the directions of the learned single Judge and by the terms of this judgment to consider the representations of the writ petitioners in the manner as we have stipulated above and after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the writ petitioners, who will also be entitled to place before the competent Authority of the Corporation all relevant materials, including documentary evidence, to show that they are similarly placed as the petitioners in Exts.P1 and P2 judgments; that they have not been employed in any avocation or business prior to approaching this Court and that they are entitled to the same benefits specially the benefits under the settlement entered into by the Corporation with the earlier petitioners as recorded in Ext.P2 judgment. These writ petitions are thus ordered but in the peculiar facts and circumstances we have noticed above, we refrain from making any order as to costs and direct the parties to suffer their respective costs. Since these writ appeals have been filed as early as in the year 2016, we deem it appropriate that the Corporation dispose of the representations of the petitioners as directed herein, as expeditiously as possible but not later than three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.