JUDGMENT : Bela M. Trivedi, J. All these Civil Applications have been filed by the applicants-appellants seeking condonation of delay of 2844 days occurred in filing the First Appeals seeking enhancement in the compensation awarded by the Additional District Judge and Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court-II, Mahesana (hereinafter referred to as 'the Reference Court') in the common award passed in Land Acquisition Reference Nos. 4655 of 2003 and others. 2. The lands of the present applicants along with others came to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act') for the purpose of constructing canal under Sardar Sarovar Narmada Yojna situated at Village Nanikadi, Taluka Kadi, District Mahesana as per the declaration under Sec. 4(1) of the said Act published on 29-2-1996 in the Government Gazette and the subsequent notification under Sec. 6 of the said Act published on 27-9-1996 in the Government Gazette. The common awards dated 6-1-1999 and 13-7-1998 came to be passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer in L.A.Q. Nos. 23 and 19 of 1994 respectively under Sec. 11 of the said Act. It appears that thereafter being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the said amount of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, the claimants including the present applicants/appellants approached the Collector for making Reference to the Reference Court under Sec. 18 of the said Act, and accordingly, the References were made to the Reference Court, which were registered as Land Acquisition Reference Case Nos. 4655 to 4684 of 2003. 3. The Reference Court vide the common award dated 18-3-2009 partly allowed the said References directing the opponents to pay additional compensation to the claimants @ Rs. 36-20 ps. per sq.mtr. on the amount of compensation already awarded by the said Land Acquisition Officer, along with the interest and solatium. Being aggrieved by the said award, some of the claimants had preferred the First Appeals being Nos. 1500 to 1504 of 2011. The said Appeals came to be allowed by the Division Bench of this Court vide the order dated 6-8-2015, whereby the Division Bench granted additional compensation of Rs. 11-80 ps. per sq.mtr. The present applicants thereafter filed the present First Appeals in March, 2017 seeking enhancement in the compensation awarded by the Reference Court in the common award dated 18-3-2009. The said Appeals came to be allowed by the Division Bench of this Court vide the order dated 6-8-2015, whereby the Division Bench granted additional compensation of Rs. 11-80 ps. per sq.mtr. The present applicants thereafter filed the present First Appeals in March, 2017 seeking enhancement in the compensation awarded by the Reference Court in the common award dated 18-3-2009. There being delay of about 2844 days in filing the First Appeals, the present Civil Applications have been filed seeking condonation of delay. 4. The learned Advocate Mr. Vibhuti Nanavati for the applicants pressing into service the contents of the applications submitted that the applicants were unaware about the process of filing the First Appeals as they could not contact their Advocate after passing of the award by the Reference Court. According to him, the applicants having incurred debts, were not in a position to pay the Court-fee or professional fee for filing the Appeal. He further submitted that the applicants came to know in the year 2016 about the enhancement of the compensation awarded by the High Court in First Appeals filed by the other four claimants, and therefore, they obtained the copy of judgment passed by the High Court, and thereafter, approached the concerned Advocate for filing the First Appeals. Placing heavy reliance on the various decisions of Supreme Court, more particularly in the case of Dhiraj Singh (Dead) Through Legal Representatives v. State of Haryana, reported in 2014 (14) SCC 127 , and in the case of Imrat Lal v. Land Acquisition Collector, reported in 2014 (14) SCC 133 , Mr. Nanavati submitted that the applicants are not very literate persons and are coming from the middle class of the society. He therefore urged that the Court should take pragmatic approach and not pedantic approach for condonation of delay, more particularly when the other claimants similarly situated had got their claims enhanced by filing First Appeals in the High Court. He has relied upon the decision of Division Bench of this Court rendered in the case of Thakor Dhulaji Jenaji v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, dated 21-2-2017 rendered in Civil Application No. 2958 of 2017 and allied matters, to submit that in the said case, the Division Bench had condoned the delay of 1216 days in filing the First Appeals. 5. However, the learned A.G.P. Mr. 5. However, the learned A.G.P. Mr. Patel for the respondents submitted that the present applicants-appellants had waited for filing the present appeals till the outcome of the First Appeals filed by the other four claimants, which cannot be said to be sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Mr. Patel has relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Brijesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, reported in 2014 (11) SCC 351 , and other judgments to submit that in the similar cases, the Supreme Court had refused to condone the delay. 6. It cannot be gainsaid that the law with regard to the condonation of delay is quite well-settled, and is being reiterated time and again by the Supreme Court. In similar cases as the present ones, the Supreme Court while upholding the decision of High Court in not condoning the delay, in the case of Brijesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2014 (11) SCC 351 , had observed as under :- "6. The issues of limitation, delay and laches as well as condonation of such delay are being examined and explained every day by the Courts. The law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim "Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium" (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation), Rules of Limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 7. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, AIR 1941 PC 6 , relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures, 1932 wherein it has been said that : "A law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on applicable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by law." 8. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, 1997 (7) SCC 556 , the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held as under : "6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds." xxx xxx xxx xxx 11. It is also a well-settled principle of law that if some person has taken a relief approaching the Court just or immediately after the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take benefit thereof approaching the Court at a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the behest of some diligent person. 12. In State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya, 1996 (6) SCC 267 , this Court rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches on the ground that he filed the petition just after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. The Court observed that such a plea is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring delay and laches." 7. The Supreme Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, reported in 2013 (12) SCC 649 , while considering the similar issue of condonation of delay, laid down various principles, the relevant thereof are reproduced as under :- "xxx xxx xxx 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free-play xxx xxx xxx 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the Courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-bye in the name of liberal approach. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the Courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-bye in the name of liberal approach. xxx xxx xxx 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious mater, and hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters." 8. It is also pertinent to note that every good cause may not be sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court while explaining as to what is "sufficient cause", in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in 2013 (14) SCC 81 , has held as under:- "9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose." 9. At this juncture, it is required to be noted that in the case of Dhiraj Singh (Dead) Through Legal Representatives v. State of Haryana, 2014 (14) SCC 127 , relied upon by Mr. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose." 9. At this juncture, it is required to be noted that in the case of Dhiraj Singh (Dead) Through Legal Representatives v. State of Haryana, 2014 (14) SCC 127 , relied upon by Mr. Nanavati, the Supreme Court had condoned a long delay by holding as under :- "16. The principles regarding condonation of delay particularly in land acquisition matters, have been enunciated in Collector (LA) v. Katiji, 1987 (2) SCC 107 , wherein it is stated in Para 3 as under : "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of the matters on 'merits'. The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that : (1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. (4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respect not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 17. The aforesaid judgment was followed by this Court in D.D.A. v. Bhola Nath Sharma, 2011 (2) SCC 54 , which was also a matter concerning land acquisition." 10. In the light of the aforesaid position of law, if facts and circumstances of the present case are considered, it appears that the applicants have tried to explain the gross delay of 2844 days by stating in their applications that they were not aware about the procedure to be followed for filing the First Appeals against the award passed by the Reference Court, and that they had no sufficient funds to pay the Court-fees or professional fees for filing the First Appeals. In the opinion of the Court, the said explanation is self-contradictory. If they were not aware about the procedure of filing of First Appeal, the question as to how much Court-fees and professional fees they were required to pay, would not arise. It is only when they know the procedure they would try to ascertain about the quantum of Court-fees and professional fees. As transpiring from the record, the applicants had already engaged the lawyer in the Reference Cases before the Court below. It is, therefore, not believable that the gross delay occurred because of the ignorance of the procedure or of the law for filing the appeals. 11. Further, even as per their own case, they came to know about the enhancement in compensation granted by the High Court in the appeals filed by other four claimants in October, 2016, and thereafter, they inquired about the matter and then filed the First Appeals. The Supreme Court in the case of Brijesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2014 (11) SCC 351 , has categorically held that if some person has taken a relief by approaching the Court just or immediately after the cause of action had arisen, the other persons cannot take benefit thereof approaching the Court at a belated stage. The Supreme Court in the case of Brijesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2014 (11) SCC 351 , has categorically held that if some person has taken a relief by approaching the Court just or immediately after the cause of action had arisen, the other persons cannot take benefit thereof approaching the Court at a belated stage. They cannot be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the behest of some diligent person. It is true that the law of limitation sometimes may operate harshly, but when the law provides for the limitation, it has to be applied uniformly and the Court cannot condone the same on equitable grounds. There can also not be any disagreement to the proposition that the doctrine that 'Every day's delay must be explained' should be applied in a rational and pragmatic manner, and not in a pedantic manner, however, at the sometime, inaction or negligence or lack of bona fides on the part of the applicants, would also be very relevant factors, to be considered for ascertaining as to whether there was any sufficient cause existing which prevented the applicants from approaching the Court within the prescribed time-limit. 12. In the instant case, the applicants having failed to make out any sufficient cause, the Court is not inclined to condone the delay. Waiting for the outcome of the First Appeals preferred by the other claimants could not be said to be sufficient cause for condonation of gross delay of 2844 days. 13. In that view of the matter, all the Civil Applications are dismissed. Rule is discharged in all the applications. As a result thereof, all the First Appeals (Stamp Number) also stand dismissed. Appeals dismissed.