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2017 DIGILAW 1425 (GAU)

Nabiruddin Ahmed v. Central Bank of India

2017-11-10

SUMAN SHYAM

body2017
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. N.J. Khataniar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. N.C. Das, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. A. Das, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. In this writ petition, a challenge has been made to the orders dated 29.3.2007 issued by the Zonal Manager, Central Bank of India, Guwahati, imposing major penalty of compulsory retirement upon the petitioner as well as the consequential orders passed thereunder, including the order dated 7.6.2008 forfeiting the gratuity amount of Rs. 3,50,000 payable to the petitioner and the order dated 30.7.2008 issued by the authorities forfeiting the bank's contribution amounting to Rs. 1,77,000 towards Provident Fund (PF) account of the petitioner. 3. The brief factual matrix of this case, as projected through the pleadings, may be noticed as hereunder: (a) The writ petitioner had initially joined the respondent No. 1 bank in the year 1971 as a Clerk and thereafter, he was promoted to the higher posts from time-to-time. During the year 1995 to 1998 the petitioner was posted as the Branch Manager of Thana Chariali Branch at Dibrugarh when as many as 7 (seven) fake accounts were opened by some imposters with the criminal intent of en-cashing the refund orders of ITC Classic Finance Ltd. under the Home Saving Scheme (HSS). Having detected the fraud, the petitioner had lodged an FIR with the Dibrugarh Police Station on 27.6.1997, based on which, Dibrugarh P.S. case No. 369/1997 was registered under section 468/420, IPC. (b) On 23.3.1999, an Office Memorandum bearing No. RO.UPAS.PRS: DAD:98-99:415 was issued to the petitioner by the Regional Manager, Central Bank of India (‘CBI’) calling upon him to furnish explanation as to how such fake accounts, impersonating the actual beneficiaries, could have been opened in his branch while the petitioner was the Branch Manager. (c) On 26.5.1999, the petitioner had submitted a reply explaining his position, thereby clarifying that he had not given any false introduction in any of these cases. Thereafter, on 21.4.1999, the Regional Manager of the Bank, i.e., the respondent No. 4 had issued another memorandum to the petitioner, inter alia, alleging that by abusing his official position, the petitioner had sanctioned a DOD limit of Rs. 15 lakhs to M/s. Imsong Suppliers and that he had enhanced the Cash Credit Limit of M/s. Hill Timber Mart from Rs. 4 lakhs to Rs. 15 lakhs to M/s. Imsong Suppliers and that he had enhanced the Cash Credit Limit of M/s. Hill Timber Mart from Rs. 4 lakhs to Rs. 6.20 lakhs on 3.11.1998, merely to cover up the overdue position of the account since there was an outstanding balance of Rs. 5,56,863 in the account as on 31.10.1998. (d) In the memorandum dated 21.4.1999, it had further been alleged that the petitioner had allowed excess/ad hoc drawals in case of “Nectec Computers” beyond his delegated lending powers and that while functioning as Branch Manager, Thana Chariali Branch, the petitioner had allowed excess drawals on several occasions to a party, viz., M/s. Flavour & Liquor without having any power to do so. (e) Responding to the OM dated 21.4.1999, the petitioner submitted his written reply denying the allegations levelled therein. However, despite the reply submitted by the petitioner, another memorandum dated 23.10.2000, containing similar allegations, was issued to the petitioner which was also replied by him on 30.11.2000 denying the allegations. (f) Not being satisfied with the aforesaid replies submitted by the petitioner, a memorandum of charges dated 13.9.2001 was issued to him containing as many as 9 charges in contemplation of departmental proceeding to be drawn against the petitioner. On receipt of the charge memo dated 13.9.2001, the petitioner submitted his written statement on 17.10.2001 denying all the charges. (g) Since there has been considerable delay in issuing the charge memo reckoned from the date of receipt of the replies filed by the petitioner, he had earlier approached this court by filing WP(C) No. 1869/2002, inter alia, challenging the legality and validity of the disciplinary proceeding on the ground that as per clause 3.2 of the Circular dated 5.7.1995 issued by the General Manager (PRS) it was incumbent upon the bank to inform the delinquent within a period of 30 days as to whether the reply submitted by him was satisfactory or not, failing which, it would be construed that the reply sent by the officer had been treated as satisfactory. (h) By the judgment and order dated 27.5.2004 passed in WP(C) No. 1869/2002, the learned Single Judge had allowed the writ petition filed by the present petitioner, thereby setting aside the disciplinary proceeding as well as the charge memo dated 13.9.2001. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 27.5.2004, the respondent-bank had preferred Writ Appeal No. 322/2004 before this court. (h) By the judgment and order dated 27.5.2004 passed in WP(C) No. 1869/2002, the learned Single Judge had allowed the writ petition filed by the present petitioner, thereby setting aside the disciplinary proceeding as well as the charge memo dated 13.9.2001. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 27.5.2004, the respondent-bank had preferred Writ Appeal No. 322/2004 before this court. By the judgment and order dated 28.8.2006, the Division Bench had allowed the writ appeal by permitting the respondents to proceed with the disciplinary enquiry. Accordingly, an Enquiry Officer was appointed who had eventually submitted his report dated 17.11.2006 holding that all the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved. (i) On 19.12.2006, the petitioner had made written submission against the findings recorded in the enquiry report. However, the Disciplinary Authority had accepted the findings in the enquiry report and accordingly, issued the impugned order dated 29.3.2007 imposing the major penalty of compulsory retirement from service and reduction of one increment of pay for a period of one year without cumulative effect and reduction to the lower time scale in the time scale of pay for a period of 2 years. (j) Aggrieved by the order of penalty dated 29.3.2007, the petitioner had preferred a statutory appeal before the Appellate Authority which was also dismissed by the order dated 12.5.2008. (k) On 7.6.2008, the respondent No. 4 had issued a letter informing him that the gratuity amount of Rs. 3,50,000 payable to the petitioner had been forfeited by the bank and appropriated towards the loss caused to the bank due to acts of misconduct on the part of the petitioner. Thereafter, on 30.7.2008, another letter was issued to the petitioner by the Assistant Regional Manager of the bank intimating him that a part of the Provident Fund (PF) contribution amounting to Rs. 1,77,000 payable to the petitioner, has been forfeited and appropriated by the bank due to the loss caused on account of misconduct committed by him. Hence, this writ petition. 4. Referring to regulation 10A of the Central Bank of India Officer, Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (‘Regulations of 1976’) Mr. Choudhury submits that the respondent-authorities were duty bound to furnish copies of the documents relied upon along with the list of witnesses on behalf of the bank to the writ petitioner so as to enable him to effectively defend his case. Choudhury submits that the respondent-authorities were duty bound to furnish copies of the documents relied upon along with the list of witnesses on behalf of the bank to the writ petitioner so as to enable him to effectively defend his case. However, in the present case, although as many as 43 documents were relied upon by the bank, copy of not a single document was supplied to the petitioner. As such, submits Mr. Choudhury, this is a clear case where the inquiry proceeding was conducted in violation of regulation 10A as well as the principles of natural justice, thereby causing serious prejudice to the rights and interest of the petitioner. In the above context, Mr. Choudhury further submits that besides the above mentioned violations, the two witnesses examined by the bank were also not competent to exhibit any of those 43 documents since those were authored By different persons. Notwithstanding the same, all the charges have been held to be proved merely on the basis of documents introduced by the bank, copies whereof were never supplied to the petitioner. 5. Launching a fierce attack on the procedure followed by the Bank authorities leading to furnishing of the enquiry report dated 10.11.2006 holding the petitioner guilty of all the charges, the learned senior counsel submits that charge No. A(1) was held to be proved solely on the basis of the documents MEX-10 which is a communication issued by the incharge of the Dibrugarh P.S. stating that the FSL report was positive but the aforesaid report was neither exhibited nor was the concerned Police Official, who had allegedly issued the document MEX-10, examined as an witness. That apart, submits Mr. Choudhury, the second FSL report dated 24.12.2003, which was in favour of the petitioner leading to the submission of final report dated 25.11.2008 by the Police in Dibrugarh P.S. Case, was deliberately not considered by the Enquiry Officer only because the said document would have falsified the very basis of charge No. A(1). 6. Referring to the findings in respect of the remaining charges, Mr. Choudhury submits that none of those charges, taken on their face value, would constitute a misconduct under the Regulation of 1976. 6. Referring to the findings in respect of the remaining charges, Mr. Choudhury submits that none of those charges, taken on their face value, would constitute a misconduct under the Regulation of 1976. The learned senior counsel submits that a bare reading of the enquiry report dated 17.11.2006 would go to show that there was no evidence to establish any of the charges brought against the petitioner but notwithstanding the same, the Enquiry Officer had erroneously held that all the charges had been proved and the said report had also been illegally accepted by the disciplinary authority by ignoring the version put forth by the writ petitioner. Mr. Choudhury submits that the present is a case of no evidence and, therefore, the order of penalty issued on the basis of such an erroneous enquiry report was unsustainable in the eye of law. 7. Mr. Choudhury further submits that although as many as 3 persons including the writ petitioner here-in were named as suspect in this case, no prosecution or departmental proceeding had been initiated against the other 2 persons for reasons not disclosed by the authorities. He submits that in the present case, there were other officials specifically entrusted with the duty of running the HSS Department and the petitioner was merely the Branch Manager having supervisory power in the matter. As such, submits Mr. Choudhury, in the absence of any proceeding against the Officer in-charge of the department, no allegation of misconduct on Charge Nos. A(1) and (2) can be sustained against the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In any event, submits the learned senior counsel, mere error of judgment or mistake committed in discharge of official duty would not constitute misconduct in the eye of law. 8. Mr. Choudhury has also strenuously assailed the orders dated 7.6.2008 and 30.7.2008 forfeiting the petitioner's gratuity and the bank's PF contribution contending that the Service Rules do not permit such an action and, hence, the aforementioned decision of the bank is not only wholly without jurisdiction but the same is also in violation of the constitutional rights guaranteed to the petitioner under Part III of the Constitution of India. In support of his aforesaid arguments, Mr. Choudhury has relied upon the following decisions of the Supreme Court. I. M. Raghavelu v. Govt, of A.P., (1997) 10 SCC 779 . II. In support of his aforesaid arguments, Mr. Choudhury has relied upon the following decisions of the Supreme Court. I. M. Raghavelu v. Govt, of A.P., (1997) 10 SCC 779 . II. D.D. Chaudhari v. H.I. Kalyani, (1997) 10 SCC 393 . III. G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 . IV. S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1274 . V. F.R. Jesuratnam v. Union of India, 1990 Supp SCC 640. 9. Mr. N.C. Das, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, has forcefully argued that the bank had noticed several instances of irregularities committed by the writ petitioner as a result of which, he was asked to explain his position by providing him sufficient opportunities. Since the replies submitted by the petitioner were found to be unsatisfactory, the authorities had issued the Memorandum of Charge and initiated departmental proceeding against him. Mr. Das submits that materials on record would establish that the departmental proceeding had been conducted in a fair and transparent manner, by giving all reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to safeguard his interest, and the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are also based on materials brought on record. As such, submits Mr. Das, there is no scope for this court to interfere with the order of penalty. 10. Mr. Das further submits that the FIR dated 27.6.1997 was lodged by the petitioner only to cover up his own guilt, when it had become apparent that his misdeeds would come to light sooner or later. Under the circumstances, submits Mr. Das, the present is a fit case where this court would dismiss the writ petition with cost. To buttress the said arguments, Mr. Das has relied upon the following decision of the Apex Court: I. Om Prakash Mann v. Director of Education (Basic), (2006) 7 SCC 558 . II. Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC, Etawah v. Hotilal, (2003) 3 SCC 605 . III. Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank v. PC. Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364 . IV. Bank of India v. T. Jogram, AIR 2007 SC 2793 . V. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 . 11. 1 have bestowed my anxious consideration on the rival submissions advanced at the bar and have also meticulously examined the materials brought on record. 12. Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364 . IV. Bank of India v. T. Jogram, AIR 2007 SC 2793 . V. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 . 11. 1 have bestowed my anxious consideration on the rival submissions advanced at the bar and have also meticulously examined the materials brought on record. 12. The petitioner has challenged the impugned orders primarily on 3 grounds, viz., (1) that the disciplinary proceeding has been conducted in violation of the procedural safeguards provided under regulation 10A of the Regulation of 1976, (2) that it is a case of no evidence, and (3) that the penalty imposed upon the petitioner, more particularly, the forfeiture of the gratuity amount is in violation of the Rules as well as his fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution of India. In view of the judgment and order dated 28.8.2006 passed by the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 322/2004, the question of validity of the departmental proceeding on the touch stone of clause 3.2 of the Bank's Circular dated 5.7.1995 need not detain this court. 13. As noted above, it is the specific plea taken in the writ petition that the Enquiry Officer had relied upon as many as 43 documents introduced by the bank in support of its case but copies of those documents were not furnished to the petitioner nor was the list of witnesses furnished to him. 14. It is not in dispute that the disciplinary proceeding was conducted as per the provisions of the Regulation of 1976. Regulation 3 lays down the conduct that an official of the bank would be required to maintain. A plain reading of rule 3 suggests that failure to adhere to the conduct mentioned therein would constitute misconduct under the Regulation of 1976. The ‘general’ conduct as described in regulation 3 of the Regulation of 1976 is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference: “3. General. - (1) Every officer/employee shall, at all times take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interests of the bank and discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. (2) Every officer/employee shall maintain good conduct and discipline and show courtesy and attention to all persons in all transactions and negotiations. (2) Every officer/employee shall maintain good conduct and discipline and show courtesy and attention to all persons in all transactions and negotiations. (3) No officer/employee shall, in the performance of his official duties or in the exercise of powers conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except when he is acting under the direction of his official superior. (4) Every officer/employee shall take all possible steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to duty of all persons for the time being under his control and authority.” 15. Regulation 4 of the Regulation of 1976 prescribes the penalties that can be imposed on an Officer, employee of the bank for acts of misconduct or for any other act of efficiency reasons. 16. Regulation 10A deals with the requirement of furnishing list of documents and witnesses which is quoted herein below for ready reference: “10A. The inquiring authority shall, where the officer/employee does not admit all or any of the articles of charge, furnish to such officer/employee a list of documents by which and a list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be proved.” 17. A plain reading of the aforesaid regulations leaves no manner of doubt that the delinquent official would be entitled to the list of documents and witnesses by whom the charges are sought to be proved. But from a close scrutiny of the materials available on record I find that at no point of time had the petitioner made any request before the Enquiry Officer to furnish him with the copies of the documents or the list of witnesses. There is also nothing on record to indicate that the petitioner had ever complained before the authorities on the ground of non-furnishing the list of documents and witnesses. There is also no material on record to indicate that the petitioner had objected to the introduction of those documents as inadmissible in law. 18. Materials available on record goes to show that the petitioner had submitted a detailed written brief of argument before the Enquiry Officer on 24.9.2002 but there is not even a whisper in the said brief also that he had ever requested for the copies of the documents or list of witnesses. 18. Materials available on record goes to show that the petitioner had submitted a detailed written brief of argument before the Enquiry Officer on 24.9.2002 but there is not even a whisper in the said brief also that he had ever requested for the copies of the documents or list of witnesses. Not only that, on 19.12.2006 the petitioner had submitted a written representation before the Disciplinary Authority against the Enquiry Report dated 17.11.2006 which runs into 33 pages and also has a reference to the “list of enclosures and reference” wherein reference has been made to as many as 50 official documents and correspondences in support of his contentions. In the said representation also, there is no complaint made by him on the ground of violation of regulation 10A. The petitioner had never alleged that his defence has, in any manner, been disabled due to violation of the procedural safeguards under regulation 10A. On the contrary, the basic thrust of the petitioner's submission was that he had been victimized by the bank only to deny him promotion. There are also no particulars furnished in the writ petition to show any prejudice having been caused to the petitioner on such count. 19. In the case of State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 , a question arose as to whether non-furnishing of copies of statements of witnesses and documents in violation of rule 68(iii) of the Service Rules would vitiate the enquiry proceedings. That was a case where the copies of the statement of witnesses which were required to be furnished to the delinquent official at least three days before the commencement of examination of witnesses as per rule 68(iii) was not given to him as per the mandate of the Rules. After considering several decisions of the Privy Council as well as the Apex Court covering the topic, the Supreme Court had held that the principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formula nor can these principles be put in a straitjacket. It has been observed that procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. Violation of every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. It has been observed that procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. Violation of every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. In that case, the Supreme Court had further observed that except for cases falling under “no notice”, “no opportunity”, and “no hearing” categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. 20. Similar view has been expressed by the hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Mann (supra) wherein it has been held that in order to sustain a complaint of violation of principles of natural justice, one must establish that he has been prejudiced by non-observance of such principles. 21. Law has been firmly settled by a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court on this issue and I do not deem it necessary to burden this judgment by referring to all those decisions. It would be sufficient to note herein that in order to succeed in a plea of violation of procedural safeguards or principles of natural justice, the delinquent must succeed in showing prejudice. The matter would, however, be entirely different if it turns out to be a case of “no notice”, “no opportunity”, and “no hearing” category since in these cases, violation of such procedural safe guards would go into the root of the matter having a vitiating effect on the inquiry proceeding itself and, therefore, the test of prejudice shall not be applicable. 22. Regulation 10A intends to provide procedural safeguard to the interest of the delinquent while conducting the enquiry proceeding. It is no doubt true that the failure to comply with the said provision, in a given case, may automatically have a vitiating effect on the order of penalty if the delinquent had been denied an opportunity to defended his interest. But this is not a case which falls in that category. In the present case, the petitioner was given full opportunity to participate in the enquiry proceeding and adequately defend his interest. He had also cross-examined the banks witnesses without raising any objection as regards violation of procedural safeguards. But this is not a case which falls in that category. In the present case, the petitioner was given full opportunity to participate in the enquiry proceeding and adequately defend his interest. He had also cross-examined the banks witnesses without raising any objection as regards violation of procedural safeguards. It may be the case that the copies of the documents and the list of witnesses were not furnished to him by the Enquiry Officer along with the Charge Memo. But it is difficult to believe that being an employee of the bank, belonging to the rank of a Manager, the petitioner had taken part in the enquiry proceeding being completely unaware of the contents of these documents relied upon by the bank. Rather, it appears from the record that the documents relied upon by the Enquiry Officer are mostly Standing Circulars/Instructions issued by the Bank and a few inter-branch correspondences. Therefore, it is possible that the petitioner was well aware of the contents of such documents and that is the reason he had maintained silence in the matter all along. Since the petitioner has failed to plead and establish prejudice to his interest on the ground of violation of regulation 10A or principles of natural justice, the challenge made to the order of penalty on such ground is held to be unsustainable. 23. Coming to the next ground taken in the writ petition to the effect that the present is a case of no evidence, in order to appreciate the contentions advanced by the petitioner's counsel, it would be necessary to refer to the article of charges brought against the petitioner based on the memorandum of charge sheet dated 13.9.2001. The article of charges annexed as Annexure I to the memorandum dated 13.9.2001, are, therefore, reproduced here-in-below for ready reference. “Article of charges against Shri Nabiruddin Ahmed, Manager, Regional Office, Guwahati. (A) Shri Nabiruddin Ahmed, while working as Branch Manager at Thana Chariali Branch has committed the following acts of omission and commission: (1) Shri Nabiruddin Ahmed gave a false introduction of some persons to open their new HSS accounts within the Bank's branch. As a result of this the culprits succeeded in perpetration of fraud by opening fake accounts and later on they utilized these accounts to encash stolen Refund Orders of ITC Classic Finance Ltd., impersonating the actual beneficiary. As a result of this the culprits succeeded in perpetration of fraud by opening fake accounts and later on they utilized these accounts to encash stolen Refund Orders of ITC Classic Finance Ltd., impersonating the actual beneficiary. (2) He had no control over the affairs of HSS Department and its in-charge, which in turn led to perpetration of fraud. (B) Shri Nabiruddin Ahmed, while working as Branch Manager at Dimapur Branch during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2000 has committed the following acts of omission and commission: (1) He has abused his official position by allowing a DOD limit of Rs. 15.00 lakhs to M/s. Imsong Suppliers against work order/job order. Financial papers submitted by the party do not envisage any Bank loan and no MPBF was available. (2) He disobeyed the instructions of his higher authorities. (3) Shri Ahmed allowed clean advance to M/s. Imsong Suppliers. (4) Shri Ahmed enhanced the CC limit of M/s. Hill Timber Mart from Rs. 4.00 lakhs to Rs. 6.20 lakhs to cover up the already overdrawn position. (5) Shri Ahmed credited the proceeds of one MMDC for Rs. 1.00 lakh taken as collateral security in the account M/s. Hill Timber Mart to show an improved position of the account. (6) In a/c Hill Timber Mart, Shri Ahmed neither made any efforts to bring down the debit balances within earlier sanctioned limit nor even restricted the drawing in the account within his own sanctioned limit. The account has turned sticky. (7) Present debit balances in account M/s. Imsong Suppliers is Rs. 10,74,917-39 (interest charged up to June 2000), and the account has turned sticky. He has, thus, failed to protect the interest of the Bank by not observing the laid down banking norms and by violating the lending norms. He, therefore, failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence. He is charged under regulation 3.1 read with regulation 24 of Central Bank of India, Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulation, 1976 attracting penalty under regulation 4 of the Central Bank of India Officers Employees (Discipline & appeal) Regulations, 1986. Sd/- Illegible (A.B. RUNGTA) Zonal Manager/Disciplinary Authority.” 24. The writ petitioner had submitted his written statement of defense on 17.10.2001 denying the charges brought against him. However, a perusal of his written statement goes to show that he had failed to meet the allegations brought against him by furnishing specific particulars. Sd/- Illegible (A.B. RUNGTA) Zonal Manager/Disciplinary Authority.” 24. The writ petitioner had submitted his written statement of defense on 17.10.2001 denying the charges brought against him. However, a perusal of his written statement goes to show that he had failed to meet the allegations brought against him by furnishing specific particulars. The written statement dated 17.10.2001 is reproduced here-in below for ready reference: “Dated Guwahati the 17th October, 2001 The Zonal Manager, Disciplinary Authority, Central Bank of India, Guwahati Zone. Reg.: Written statement of defence. Ref. : Your letter No. ZO/GUWA/PRS/DAW/239/2001-02/113 dated 13.9.2001. Respected Sir, As advised by you, vide your letter under reference, I submit herewith my explanation in respect of the charges brought against me vide your charge sheet ZO/GUWA/PRS/DAW/239/2001-02/113 dated 13.9.2001. I deny all the charges brought against me. It is unfortunate that the charge sheet has been drawn against me only to deny me the promotion from Scale II to Scale III, as per circular number CO/PRS/2001-02/79 dated 16.7.2001 withheld under sealed cover for reasons not informed to me specifically in spite of my request through various communications to the appropriate authorities through your esteemed self. The charge brought against me and the disciplinary proceedings initiated thereon do not come within the purview of regulation 3(1) of Officers Service Regulation 1976, since the charge do not make out a case against me. With due regards. Faithfully yours Sd/- Illegible Md. Nabiruddin Ahmed, Manager, Central Bank of India, Regional Office, Guwahati.” 25. As noted above, during the disciplinary enquiry, the bank had produced 43 documents besides examining two witnesses, who were also cross-examined by the petitioner. Based on the material produced before him, the Enquiry Officer has recorded independent findings in respect of each of the charges. Since the petitioner has assailed the findings on the ground of those being not based on evidence, a reference to the findings in the Enquiry Report is deemed necessary and is, therefore, reproduced herein below: “Charges in respect of Thanachariali Branch (Dibrugarh) Charge No. (A)1: Referred to in the Article of Charges (Annexure I) relates to false introduction of two new Home Saving Scheme (HSS) accounts, namely HSS A/c No. 5292 and HSS A/c No. 5313 in Thanachariali Branch, which the account holders encashed Stolen Refund Orders of ITC Classic Finance Ltd. impersonating the actual beneficiaries. The Presenting Officer (PO) in support of this charge had produced MEX 1(a)(b) and (c) relating to HSS account No. 5292 of Gita Kundu and MEX 2(a), (b) and (c) relating to HSS A/c No. 5313 in the name of Shefali Saha. In the introduction column of both the accounts CSOE'S signatures appeared as introducer. This was apparent from MEX1 (b) and MEX 2(b). Such introduction clearly indicated the fact that the persons opening such accounts were personally known to the introducer, i.e., the CSO. The P.O. had also produced documents, i.e., MEX 11(a)(b)(c) and (d) which were copies of attendance register where by the P.O. proved the fact that on the date of opening of the said disputed/false accounts the CSOE was present in the branch. Further in the course of examination/cross-examination of MW1, namely, Shri Pabitra Hazarika, who was the Branch Manager at Thanachariali Branch at the time of enquiry had confirmed that he was well acquainted with the signature of CSOE and had confirmed the signature of CSOE in the introduction columns of the said account. He also confirmed that the signature of CSOE in MEX-42, i.e., the specimen signature card of the CSOE tallied with that of the account opening forms. Since in both the accounts the element of fraud was there and bank filed FIR in concerned Police Station, the Police referred the matter to Forensic Science Laboratory (Questioned document) at Guwahati to ascertain the signature of CSOE in the documents. The P.O. produced MEX10 which was a letter received by bank from the officer-in-charge of Dibrugarh Police Station Mr. M. Saikia who informed the bank about the fact that Forensic Science Laboratory had given positive view with regard to the signature of CSOE on the disputed documents. The doubt on the authenticity/genuineness of such document (MEX-10) expressed by the CSOE is not sustainable. Contrary to the presentation of the P.O. the CSOE in his written submission dated 24.9.2001 denied the charge but with no convincing arguments and/or supporting document/documents. When the signature of CSOE in MEX-42 was very much available with the branch, there was no reason for demanding production of signature album by CSOE. In the circumstances stated above, the undersigned is convinced to hold that the charge No. (A)1 is fully proved. When the signature of CSOE in MEX-42 was very much available with the branch, there was no reason for demanding production of signature album by CSOE. In the circumstances stated above, the undersigned is convinced to hold that the charge No. (A)1 is fully proved. Charge No. A(2): Through this charge the management has questioned the ability of the CSOE in managing the affairs of the branch as Branch Manager, This particular charge can be said to have relation with charge No. Al, the CSOE being the Branch Manager is the principal officer of the Branch and he is supposed to have over all control including personnel administration. While defending the charge No. Al, the CSOE has, inter alia, stated in his submissions dated 24.9.2002 that the HSS Department has the prime responsibility ………… CSOE has issued office order ………… CSOE has responsibility to mobilize deposits ………… renewal of documents court attendance, etc., it seems the CSOE has failed to realize the fact that being the principal officer of the Branch it is his prime duty to look into the day-to-day affairs of the branch. The arguments/justifications whatever the CSOE has put forth in this regard is found to have no ground. CSOE has strongly stated that he has not introduced the said two accounts and somebody else has forged his signature. But the fact is that had the CSOE inspected/verified the day-to-day transactions and works of the branch at the close of the business of the Branch, he could have been able to detect the opening of the said disputed accounts with his signature. Considering the facts and circumstances of the whole matter, the undersigned is fully convinced to hold the view that CSOE had no control and/or proper and effective supervision over the affairs of the Branch and, therefore, the charge No. A2 is held as proved. Charges in respect of Dimapur Branch (Nagaland): Charge No. B(1): The allegation that the CSOE as Branch Manager in Dimapur Branch abused his official power and sanctioned a Demand Over Draft facility of Rs. 15 lakhs to M/s. Imsong Supplier & Co. against work order/job order of Air Port Authority of India Ltd. (AAI) where as financial papers submitted by the party do not envisage any Bank Loan. 15 lakhs to M/s. Imsong Supplier & Co. against work order/job order of Air Port Authority of India Ltd. (AAI) where as financial papers submitted by the party do not envisage any Bank Loan. Apparently from this charge it was understood that the CSOE had given such a big loan to a party who was not entitled to as per bank's norms. Without much discussion the undersigned likes to refer to MEX 18 which was a letter dated 16.11.1998 from State Bank of India (SBI) Dimapur Branch who informed CSOE about the financial liability of the party with them. When a particular party is having financial liability with one bank, he is not entitled to any loan facility from other bank. CSOE had allowed the loan violating this norms. CSOE had not denied this fact, rather in his written submission dated 24.9.2002 stated “The discrepancy if any in any financial as well as other papers are always possible for rectification”, with this discussions it can be safely be said that the CSOE had sanctioned the loan violating banking norms. Hence, this charge is proved. Charge No. B(2): As per this charge the CSOE disobeyed instructions of his higher authorities. The fact leading to this charge was that the upper Assam Regional Office at Jorhat being the higher authority/Administrative office had disapproved the sanction of DOD limit which was sanctioned by CSOE against work/job order of AAI to M/s. Imsong Supplier & Co. and instructed to discontinue the same and advised to allow permissible DOD limit against time deposits as well as other liquid securities available with the party keeping required margin. But it was seen vide MEX 27(a), (b), (c), (d) that CSOE went on allowing withdrawal to the party informing vide MEX 20(a)(b) that the outstanding debit balance in that DOD a/c would be adjusted out of party's due receivable from Airport Authority of India Ltd. only. On the contrary it was found vide that letter of Airport Authority of India (AAI) 25.1.2000 (MEX 43) that no dues was payable to M/s. Imsong Supplier & Co. as on that date in respect of that specified work order and there was no agreement between C.B.I. and AAI for the same, hence, no communication will be entertained in this regard in future as stated. as on that date in respect of that specified work order and there was no agreement between C.B.I. and AAI for the same, hence, no communication will be entertained in this regard in future as stated. It is also to be noted that the CSOE had further allowed to open a HSS a/c to that loanee for credit of Rs. 8.80 lakhs and subsequently allowed withdrawal of the same without first trying to adjust the outstanding overdrawn amount of the above mentioned demand over draft account. This clearly indicated CSOE's total lack of concern for safeguarding Bank's fund and he acted in violation of the instructions of his higher authorities. Hence, this charge is considered to be proved. Charge No. B(3) and B(7): These two charges referred to in the charge sheet are nothing but part of charge No. B(1); segregation of which in fact does not serve any purpose. The very purpose of granting the credit facility to the party, i.e., M/s. Imsong Supplier & Co. by CSOE was apparently against work order purportedly received by the loanee from Airport Authority of India (AAI). The CSOE vide MEX22 informed his higher authority that power of attorney was registered with AAI and payment would come to the bank from them. But from the contents of MEX 43, i.e., the letter of AAI to CSOE it was clear that no dues were payable to the loanee from AAI. Moreover the power of attorney executed by the loanee was not registered with AAI. MEX22, MEX25 and MEX43 were most relevant documents to be relied upon to come to a conclusion that the loan sanctioned/disbursed was under cloud and, hence, the very act in this regard on the part of the CSOE was not only illegal but contrary to the pecuniary interest of the Bank. It was clear from MEX24 that CSOE had allowed the loanee to deposit Rs. 8.80 lakh in a new saving account when the balance outstanding in the said loan account was more than 9 lakhs. It was also clear from MEX26 that the CSOE was advised by Regional Office to earmark the said saving account against the said loan account. But the CSOE allowed withdrawal of such amount without first making any adjustment against the loan account. But a man of ordinary prudence would not do so. It was also clear from MEX26 that the CSOE was advised by Regional Office to earmark the said saving account against the said loan account. But the CSOE allowed withdrawal of such amount without first making any adjustment against the loan account. But a man of ordinary prudence would not do so. From the very statement of the account (MEX27) it was clear that the demand over draft account (DOD) in the name of M/s. Imsong Suppliers & Co. was a bad account with an outstanding balance of Rs. 10,74,917.39 as on June 2000. The account being a non-performing asset (NPA) no interest was charged after April 2001. There was no convincing argument/submission from the CSOE to disprove the said fact. On the basis of the above submission the undersigned is constrained to hold the view that the charge No. B(3) and B(7) were proved. Charge No. B(4), B(5) and B(6): All these three charges related to one account, i.e., the cash credit account of M/s. Hill Timber Mart. The loanee had enjoying a cash credit limit (C/C limit) of Rs. 4 lakhs from the branch. It was a fact based on record/supported by documents like MEX41 that the said limit was enhanced by CSOE from Rs. 4 lakhs to Rs. 6.20 lakhs on 3.11.1998 when the debit balance in the account was already Rs. 5,74456, i.e., much above the original sanctioned limit. In the written submission the CSOE stated “It was enhanced to meet the borrower's need arrived at after due processing”. CSOE had also stated “My only short coming was non-execution of the documents in time due to circumstances beyond my control”. Hence, the charge No. B(4) was on admitted fact and could be taken as proved on admission. The charge of liquidation of collateral security, i.e., a fixed deposit called MMDC of Rs. 1 lakhs by CSOE in the account of M/s. Hill Timber Mart [referred to in charge B(5)] was also an admitted fact. In this context, the DEX 14 (document produced by CSOE) may be deferred to. This was a letter written by CSOE to Regional Office by which he admitted the fact that the loanee had not deposited sale proceed and he adjusted the MMDC under lien in the account to bring down the over drawn position in the account. In this context, the DEX 14 (document produced by CSOE) may be deferred to. This was a letter written by CSOE to Regional Office by which he admitted the fact that the loanee had not deposited sale proceed and he adjusted the MMDC under lien in the account to bring down the over drawn position in the account. Charge No. B(6): It is a general charge with regard to a particular account, namely, M/s. Hill Timber Mart where the CSOE was alleged to have not made any effort to bring down the limit to its original sanction. The discussions already made above with regard to charge No. B(4) and B(5) clearly indicated the manner by which the CSOE handled the account when he was the Branch Manager at Dimapur Branch. From such discussion it can simple be inferred that the CSOE had mishandled the account without adhering to the banking norms and flouting the instructions of his higher authorities. In the course of the enquiry proceedings the CSOE could not prove his any sincere effort to bring the account to its original limit, nor was he able to convince/show any material whatsoever to the undersigned about his efforts in this regard. Hence, the element of lack of sincerity in regularizing the account goes against the CSOE. Conclusion : From the above discussions based on record, the under signed comes to the conclusions that each and every charge levelled against the CSOE vide charge sheet No. GUWA/PRS/DAW/239/01-02/113 dated 13.9.2001 is proved. And the undersigned signs this Enquiry Report on this 10th Day of November, 2006. Sd/- Illegible 10.11.2006 (Shri M.R. Marphukan) Inquiring Authority Senior Manager.” 26. In the form of Charge No A(1), a specific allegation had been made that the petitioner had given false introduction to fake account holders thereby aiding them to perpetrate a fraud. The consistent stand of the petitioner has been that those were not his signatures. Since the said allegation casts a serious aspersion upon the petitioner involving moral turpitude, it was incumbent upon the bank to establish the said charge by adducing cogent evidence on record. But from a careful examination of the Enquiry Report dated 17.11.2006 I find that the charge could not be established by the bank even on the principle of pre-ponderance of probability. But from a careful examination of the Enquiry Report dated 17.11.2006 I find that the charge could not be established by the bank even on the principle of pre-ponderance of probability. The Enquiry Officer appears to have based his conclusion merely on MEX-10, which is a communication sent by a Police Officer that the FSL report was positive but neither the said Officer had been examined nor was the FSL report produced before the Enquiry Officer. Not only that, it appears that there was a subsequent FSL report dated 24.12.2003 which was in favour of the petitioner but the said report was also not considered by the Enquiry Officer while recording his conclusions with regard to Charge No A(1). The said omission assumes great significance in view of the fact that the Police had admittedly submitted Final Report in connection with Dibrugarh P.S. Case No. 369/1997 based on the FSL report dated 24.12.2003. There was no other material available before the Enquiry Officer to record a finding that the signatures in the fake accounts belonged to the petitioner. Rather, the conclusions of the Enquiry Officer appears to be wholly based on the ground that the petitioner has failed to give any convincing reply or furnish any document, thereby illegally shifting the onus of proof upon the delinquent. Once, the petitioner has categorically denied his signature in those accounts, the question of giving any explanation or producing documents to establish the same cannot arise since there was no obligation on the delinquent to prove any negative fact. Under the circumstances, the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the finding in respect of Charge No A(1) is without any evidence merits acceptance by this court. 27. Coming to Charge No A(2), which is admittedly connected to Charge No A(1), the allegation levelled thereunder, in the first place, appears to be wholly contradictory to the Charge No. A(1). It defies logic as how the fraud could have occurred due to lack of control of the petitioner over the branch when there is an allegation of direct involvement of the petitioner in commission of the fraud. There is no proper and independent finding of fact recorded by the Enquiry Officer to hold that the petitioner had acted with any ill motive or in contravention of any provisions of the Banking Regulation. There is no proper and independent finding of fact recorded by the Enquiry Officer to hold that the petitioner had acted with any ill motive or in contravention of any provisions of the Banking Regulation. It is no doubt true that regulation 3(1) and (4) of the Regulation of 1976 cast a duty upon every employee of the bank to conduct himself with integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and if an employee is found to have acted in contravention of such standards then it would be just and reasonable to hold him guilty of misconduct. But at the same time it must also be borne in mind that “integrity”, “honesty” “devotion” and “diligence” are expressions carrying wide meaning and are often prone to subjective interpretation. Therefore, in order to sustain an order of major penalty on such ground, a charge containing definite particulars followed by recording of clear findings to show that the employee had acted with a mala fide intent or in a highly negligent manner resulting into serious loss and injury to the interest of the bank, would be absolutely necessary. 28. In the case of Union of India v. J. Ahmed, (1979) 2 SCC 286 , the Supreme Court had the occasion to interpret the words and phrases “misconduct” and “devotion to duty” and after interpreting the aforesaid expressions, it was held that misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive. Mere acts of negligence, errors of judgment or innocent mistake, do not constitute misconduct. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court has further observed that it would be difficult to believe that lack of efficiency or attainment of highest standards in discharge of duties attached to public office would ipso facto constitute misconduct. It was further observed that there may be negligence in performance of duty and a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but the same would not constitute misconduct unless the consequence is directly attributable to negligence or the resultant damage would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high. 29. In the present case there is no dispute about the fact that the petitioner had a supervisory role to play over the entire activities of the branch and there were officials specifically entrusted to look after the HSS Department where the fraud allegedly took place. 29. In the present case there is no dispute about the fact that the petitioner had a supervisory role to play over the entire activities of the branch and there were officials specifically entrusted to look after the HSS Department where the fraud allegedly took place. There is no specific allegation to the effect that there was lapse on the part of the petitioner in performance of any specific duty and that the lapse was intentional. Save and except alleging a role of the petitioner in introducing the fake account holders, which allegation the bank has failed to prove, the allegations in Charge A(2) appears to be totally vague. When the petitioner was merely discharging a supervisory duty over the HSS Department, in the absence of any ill motive on his part, the petitioner could not have been held to be guilty of misconduct with regard to Charge A(2) merely on the ground of not having control over the affairs of the Branch. Having regard to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of/. Ahmed (supra) I am of the view that the conclusion of the Enquiry Officer that the Charge A(2) “was proved” is wholly unsustainable in law and is accordingly declared so. 30. As mentioned above, the Charges A(1) and (2) are inter-connected and for the reasons indicated hereinbefore, it has been held that the findings of the Enquiry Officer with regard to the said two charges are not based on evidence and, hence, cannot be held to be proved in accordance with law. However, it is seen from the record that the Enquiry Officer has recorded independent finding in respect of the remaining seven Charges, i.e., Charge B(1) to B(7) holding that the charges were proved. From a meticulous scrutiny of the Enquiry report, I find that there were sufficient materials available before the Enquiry Officer to arrive at a conclusion that all those seven charges had been proved. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Choudhury that it is a case of “no evidence” would not stand to reason when it comes to Charge B(1) to (7). In other words, I am of the considered opinion that the finding of the Enquiry Officer to the effect that the Charges B(1) to B(7) had been “proved” is based on cogent evidence available on record and, hence, are sustainable in the eye of law. In other words, I am of the considered opinion that the finding of the Enquiry Officer to the effect that the Charges B(1) to B(7) had been “proved” is based on cogent evidence available on record and, hence, are sustainable in the eye of law. Since the ground of perversity of the findings in the Enquiry Report has not been taken by the petitioner, hence, this court need not go into the said aspect of the matter. 31. What needs to be noted herein is that there were as many as 9 charges brought against the petitioner. Except the Charges A(1) and A(2) the remaining seven charges are all distinct and different from each other. The Enquiry Officer has recorded independent findings in respect of each of the Charges which are severable in nature. Therefore, even if it is held that the Charge A(1) and A(2) were not proved on the basis of evidence on record, the Enquiry Report dated 17.11.2006 will still subsist as regard the Charge B(1) to B(7) and can be acted upon by the Disciplinary Authority for imposing major penalty upon the delinquent. An order of penalty based on the Enquiry Report dated 17.11.2006 would, therefore, be sustainable in law, unless of course the penalty imposed is found to be shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. 32. The petitioner was due to retire from service with effect from 30.11.2009 on attaining the age of supperannuation. The major penalty imposed upon the petitioner by the impugned order dated 29.3.2007 is of compulsory retirement from service. Having regard to the facts and circumstances the case, I am of the opinion that the finding with regard to Charges B(1) to B(7) would be sufficient to sustain the penalty imposed by the order 29.3.2007. As such, the impugned order dated 29.3.2007 does not call for any interference from this court. 33. Having regard to the facts and circumstances the case, I am of the opinion that the finding with regard to Charges B(1) to B(7) would be sufficient to sustain the penalty imposed by the order 29.3.2007. As such, the impugned order dated 29.3.2007 does not call for any interference from this court. 33. At this stage it will be relevant to mention here-in that although the petitioner had made an attempt to project that a discriminatory treatment has been meted out to him by submitting that while proceedings have been drawn up against the petitioner, no departmental proceeding had been initiated against Sri A.K. Duarah, Deputy Manager and Sri A.K. Dey, Special Assistant, who were in-charge of the HSS Department, yet, I find from the record, more particularly the Additional Affidavit filed by the petitioner on 29.11.2011, that departmental proceedings had been initiated against both these employees whereafter, penalty was also imposed on them. As a matter of fact Sri A.K. Duarah was dismissed from service in connection with Charge A(2). 34. Let me now deal with the last plea taken by the petitioner pertaining to the question of legality and validity of the orders dated 7.6.2008 and 30.7.2008. As mentioned above, both these order, had been issued on the ground that the amounts due to the petitioner had been appropriated against the losses suffered by the bank. However, it would be significant to note herein that there is neither any statement appended to the Charge Memo indicating any pecuniary loss suffered by the bank due to the misconduct committed by the petitioner, nor is there any finding recorded to such effect in the Enquiry Report. There is no whisper even in the counteraffidavit filed on behalf of the respondents regarding any loss suffered by the bank. By the order of penalty dated 29.3.2007, the Disciplinary Authority also did not forfeit any retirement benefit payable to the petitioner under the Rules. It was long after the order dated 29.3.2007 was issued that these orders forfeiting the gratuity amount of Rs. 3,50,000 and the PF component of Rs. 1,77,000 due and payable to the petitioner had been issued. It would be significant to note here-in that the impugned orders dated 7.6.2008 and 30.7.2008 had been issued at a stage after the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of penalty 29.3.2007 was rejected by the Appellate Authority. 35. 3,50,000 and the PF component of Rs. 1,77,000 due and payable to the petitioner had been issued. It would be significant to note here-in that the impugned orders dated 7.6.2008 and 30.7.2008 had been issued at a stage after the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of penalty 29.3.2007 was rejected by the Appellate Authority. 35. It is further established from the record that the petitioner was not given any opportunity of being heard before the orders dated 7.6.2008 and 30.7.2008 were issued and, therefore, those orders have been evidently issued in violation of principles of natural justice. It further appears that the Zonal Manager of the bank was the Disciplinary Authority in this case but the orders dated 7.6.2008 and 30.7.2008 were evidently issued by the officers below the rank of the Zonal Manager. 36. Regulation 4 of the Regulation of 1976 prescribe the penalties that can be imposed on an employee of the bank for an act of misconduct but forfeiture of gratuity and PF dues are not included in the list of penalties. Naturally, therefore, the bank did not have any authority under the Regulation of 1976 to impose such a penalty upon the petitioner. Moreover, since the major penalty of compulsory retirement was earlier imposed upon the petitioner, any subsequent order forfeiting his retirement dues would be in direct conflict with the order dated 29.3.2007. Gratuity and PF dues certainly cannot be regarded as pay of the petitioner and, therefore, in the opinion of this court, would not come within the preview of regulation 4(d) of the Regulation of 1976. As such, I am of the opinion that in the absence of any provisions contained in the service rules and without there being any determination of actual liability on the part of the petitioner through a process established under the law, no recovery could have been made from the petitioner by issuing the impugned orders dated 7.6.2008 and 30.7.2008. 37. Dealing with the question as to whether the Authority would have the power to forfeit gratuity of an employee, the hon'ble Supreme Court has made the following observations in the case of F.R. Jesuratnam (supra): “2. 37. Dealing with the question as to whether the Authority would have the power to forfeit gratuity of an employee, the hon'ble Supreme Court has made the following observations in the case of F.R. Jesuratnam (supra): “2. We are of the view that gratuity is no longer a bounty but is a matter of right of the employee and it can, therefore, no longer be regarded as a provision in the discretion of the President as provided in the Pension Regulations. Since there is no legal provision empowering the authorities to forfeit the gratuity payable to the employee, the order passed by the Government forfeiting the gratuity payable to the appellant must be held to be bad and must be set aside. We accordingly set aside the order of the High Court as also the order of the Government forfeiting the gratuity of the appellant and direct that gratuity shall be paid to the appellant forthwith. There will be no order as to costs of the appeal. The appeal is disposed of in these terms.” 38. Provident Fund deposits are in the nature of compulsory deposit in view of the definition in section 2(a) of the Provident Funds Act of 1925. By interpreting the provisions of the Provident Funds Act, 1925 as well as section 60(k) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the case of Union of India v. Hira Devi, AIR 1952 SC 227 that such a compulsory deposit cannot be assigned or charged and is not liable to any attachment. Similar view has been expressed in the subsequent decision rendered in the case of Union of India v. Radha Kishan Agarwal, (1969) 1 SCC 225 . What, therefore, follows is that such compulsory deposit in the form of PF dues cannot be attached even in execution of a civil court decree. If that be so, the respondents could not have unilaterally forfeited the PF dues of the petitioner in this fashion by issuing the impugned order dated 30.7.2008. 39. For the reasons stated here-in-above, I am of the unhesitant opinion that the impugned orders dated 7.6.2008 and 30.7.2008 are not sustainable in the eye of law and the same are accordingly, set aside. The amount of Gratuity and PF dues forfeited by the impugned orders, therefore, be refunded back to the petitioner within a period of one month from today. 40. The amount of Gratuity and PF dues forfeited by the impugned orders, therefore, be refunded back to the petitioner within a period of one month from today. 40. Since, the petitioner has been unduely deprived of the fruits of his retirement benefits in the form of Gratuity and PF dues in the manner indicated above, I am of the considered opinion that ends of justice would be met if the respondents are directed to pay interest @ 9% per annum on the amount of Rs. 3,50,000 and Rs. 1,77,000, to be calculated from the date on which the same had become due and payable to the petitioner under the law until the date of refund. The writ petition stands partly allowed. There would be no order as to costs.