JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner in the present petition has prayed for quashing and setting aside the order of dismissal dated 24.04.2009 and the appellate order dismissing his appeal dated 18.12.2009. 2. Briefly stated, the facts material for adjudication of the present petition may be stated thus: 3. The petitioner was appointed as Account Officer vide order dated 17.05.2001, and he joined the respondent-Corporation on 11.06.2001. He was confirmed as Account Officer in the pay scale of Rs.12000-17500 w.e.f. 11.06.2002. Thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Assistant Manager (Finance) by the order dated 08.04.2005. A vigilance inquiry was undertaken against him in the month of September 2007, when he was working with Gujarat office of the respondent–Corporation. While inquiring in to some financial irregularities in the office of IOC at Ahmedabad, he was inquired by the Vigilance Officer and his statements were recorded on 29.09.2007 and on 18.10.2007. On 19.10.2007, the petitioner was again called and was asked to give further statement on the same date wherein he had admitted his guilt. On the basis of said statements, departmental proceedings were initiated and he was placed under suspension by the order dated 25.10.2007. Simultaneously, a police complaint was also registered by Deputy General Manager, Vigilance to ACB Unit II, CBI at New Delhi u/s. 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 120B, 420, 409, 468, 471, 477A, 201 of the IPC. 4. The departmental inquiry was initiated vide chargesheet dated 30.05.2008 which was issued under Rule 26 of the Conduct and Discipline Rules, 1980. The petitioner replied to the aforesaid chargesheet and denied all charges. 5. The inquiry officer submitted his report to the disciplinary authority, and the disciplinary authority sent a copy of the said report with letter dated 25.01.2009 calling upon the petitioner to submit his representation. The petitioner accordingly submitted his representation on 19.02.2009. 6. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority vide order dated 24.04.2009 dismissed the petitioner from service. The petitioner filed an appeal before the appellate authority i.e. Director, Marketing/ Appellate authority on 23.06.2009. The appellate authority by the order dated 03.12.2009 rejected the appeal of the petitioner. 7. The petitioner accordingly submitted his representation on 19.02.2009. 6. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority vide order dated 24.04.2009 dismissed the petitioner from service. The petitioner filed an appeal before the appellate authority i.e. Director, Marketing/ Appellate authority on 23.06.2009. The appellate authority by the order dated 03.12.2009 rejected the appeal of the petitioner. 7. Learned advocate Mr.Sandip C. Shah appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that since no showcause notice was issued by the disciplinary authority calling upon the petitioner to give his explanation qua quantum of punishment, the same is in violation of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. He has placed reliance on Rule 32(4) of the Indian Oil Corporation, Conduct, Discipline and Appeal rules, 1980 in support of his submission relating to non-issuance of showcause notice qua quantum of penalty. He has stated that there are various penalties specified under the Rules including minor and major, hence, it was incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to call upon the petitioner for submitting his representation against the finding of the inquiry officer and also further issue showcause notice qua quantum of punishment. Since the petitioner was not given any chance to represent against the quantum of punishment which is in clear violation of principles of natural justice the impugned order of dismissal is required to be quashed and set aside. 8. It is also urged by Mr.Shah that the appellate authority while rejecting his appeal has not assigned any reasons, hence the order being nonspeaking order is required to be set aside.. He has also relied on Rule 38 of the said rules, more particularly, Rule 38(2) in support of his contention that the appellate authority is required to consider the findings of the inquiry officer and has to arrive on the conclusion whether the findings are justified or whether the penalty is excessive or inadequate and thereafter pass appropriate orders. 9. Mr. Shah has also submitted that the copy of the preliminary inquiry/vigilance inquiry’s report asked by the petitioner was not supplied to him, hence the same would also amount to the violation of the principles of natural justice which has caused prejudice to the defence of the petitioner. 10. It is further contended that no definite loss is caused to the Corporation as the codelinquents i.e. Mr. 10. It is further contended that no definite loss is caused to the Corporation as the codelinquents i.e. Mr. Anil Joshi and Mr.P.B. Saini has deposited an amount of Rs.71.65 lacs and Rs.8.60 lacs with the respondent authority, hence, in absence of any definite loss, the petitioner cannot be imposed such a harsh penalty of dismissal. 11. Lastly, he has submitted that the entire departmental inquiry was based on the statement made by the petitioner before the Vigilance Officer, Shri B.K.Roy on 18.10.2007 and 19.10.2007 which were made under coercion and the petitioner was forced to admit his guilt. He has stated that Mr.B.K.Roy is not crossexamined in the departmental inquiry. Thus, the departmental inquiry held against the petitioner is unsustainable, as a result the penalty of dismissal is also required to be quashed and set aside. No further contention is raised. 12. Per contra, learned advocate Mr.M.R.Bhatt appearing on behalf of the respondent-Corporation has vociferously opposed the submissions advanced by the advocate Mr. Shah. He has stated that the aforesaid rules do not provide any opportunity of showcause notice qua quantum of penalty. Hence the disciplinary authority was not required to issue showcause notice again calling the petitioner to give his explanation qua quantum of punishment. He has submitted that vide Letter dated 25.01.2009, the petitioner was called upon to give his explanation against the findings of the Inquiry Officer’s report. Thus, no further show cause notice was required to be issued calling upon the petitioner for quantum of penalty. So far as the contention of unreasoned appellate order is concerned, he has stated that the appellate order dated 18.12.2009 is well reasoned order wherein all the contention raised by the petitioner in his appeal are effectively dealt. Qua nonsupply of the preliminary inquiry report is concerned, he has stated that the same is not mandatory under the Rules. No rule provides of supplying the preliminary report or vigilance inquiry report. He has submitted that in the departmental inquiry, no reliance is placed on the vigilance inquiry report as well as the preliminary inquiry report. 13. In response to the submission of the learned advocate Mr. Shah apropos crossexamination of officer Mr.B.K.Roy, who had recorded the initial statements of the petitioner, Mr. He has submitted that in the departmental inquiry, no reliance is placed on the vigilance inquiry report as well as the preliminary inquiry report. 13. In response to the submission of the learned advocate Mr. Shah apropos crossexamination of officer Mr.B.K.Roy, who had recorded the initial statements of the petitioner, Mr. Bhatt has referred to the penalty order dated 24.04.2009 more particularly, para 8 in which it is recorded that Mr.B.K.Roy was crossexamined by the petitioner in the inquiry and during his crossexamination, the petitioner had not brought any contradiction or facts to substantiate that the petitioner had made the statements under pressure. He has also referred to the inquiry officer's report in which the inquiry officer has recorded that none of the family members of the involved officers were interrogated in vigilance investigation, and they were not under any threat or pressure. Questions are posed to the concerned delinquents and whatever relevant questions were asked by the officers the same are recorded and the same bear their signature. Thus the allegation made by the petitioner that the statement recorded by the petitioner was under pressure or duress is incorrect. Mr. Shah has submitted that the allegation made by the petitioner that “When the question of calling my wife and referring the matter to CBI had come, I came under pressure and I had given the statement to Shri B.K.Roy, the then SVMHO” is absolutely baseless. On making such allegation, Shri B.K.Roy was further called for examination by the inquiry officer and he had denied such allegations. 14. Learned advocate Mr. Bhatt has stated that the disciplinary authority while examining the appeal of the petitioner arrived on his own conclusion. After going through the entire evidence, the disciplinary authority has also perused the findings of the inquiry authority and after considering the same, thought it fit to agree with the same. In view of the above submission, Mr.Bhatt has urged that the impugned orders are justified looking to the misconduct of the petitioner. Hence, no interference is required from this Hon'ble Court. 15. I have considered the rival contentions made by the learned advocates for the parties to the lis. 16. In view of the above submission, Mr.Bhatt has urged that the impugned orders are justified looking to the misconduct of the petitioner. Hence, no interference is required from this Hon'ble Court. 15. I have considered the rival contentions made by the learned advocates for the parties to the lis. 16. The petitioner was issued the chargesheet dated 30.05.2008, inter alia, containing four Articles of charges under Rule 31 of Conduct, Discipline and Appeal rules, 1980 of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. The charges contained about the financial irregularity committed by the petitioner when he was working as Assistant Manager (Finance), Gujarat State office. It is alleged that the petitioner had fraudulently released payment of Rs.3,43,040 in name of M/s. Bhavik Bulk Carrier vide cheque No.11320 dated 20.03.2002, payment of Rs. 2,77,323 in name of M/s. Bhavik Bal Carriers vide cheque No.12418 dated 26.08.2002, payment of Rs.4,03,363 in the name of M/s. Shree Ram Enterprise vide D.D. No. 858678 and an amount of Rs. 2,18,181 by depositing “one time voucher loan” in favour of M/s. Shree Ram Enterprise. With reference to the first contention raised by the petitioner that the nonissuance of showcause notice calling upon his explanation qua quantum of punishment is violative of Article 311 of the Constitution of India concerned, The Supreme Court in the case Ajit Kumar Nag Vs. General Manager (P.J.) Indian Oil Corporation Limited, reported in 2005 (7) SCC 764 , has observed that an employee of a Corporation cannot be said to have held a 'civil post' and, therefore, he is not entitled to protection of Art. 311, the Corporation could not be said to be a 'department of the Government and employees of such Corporation were not employees under the Union. The Corporation has an independent existence and the appellant was not entitled to invoke Art. 311. Thus, the violation of Article 311 in the case of the petitioner as canvassed by the Mr.Shah cannot be accepted in light of the observations made by the Supreme Court. 17. At this juncture it will be apposite to refer Rule 32 of the Conduct and Discipline Rule. The same reads as under: Rule 32: Action on the Inquiry Report : 1. 17. At this juncture it will be apposite to refer Rule 32 of the Conduct and Discipline Rule. The same reads as under: Rule 32: Action on the Inquiry Report : 1. The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the Inquiring Authority, may for reasons to be recorded by it in writing remit the case to the Inquiring Authority for fresh or further inquiry and report and the Inquiring Authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 31 as far as may be. 2. Before the Disciplinary Authority arrives at its own conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charge/charges levelled against him after taking into consideration the inquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority shall provided it agrees with the findings of the Inquiring Authority, furnish a copy of the Inquiring Authority's report to the employee to enable him make his representation against the findings in the report within 10 days of the receipt of the inquiry report, if he so desires.” 3. The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiring Authority on any charge, record its reasons for such disagreement. Before arriving at its own conclusion with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to such charge, the Disciplinary Authority shall furnish to the employee his reasons for such disagreement together with a copy of the Inquiry Officer's report with reference to Rule 31. The disciplinary authority shall record its own findings with regard to such charge(s) after taking into account the representation, if any made by the employee. 4. If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the charges is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Rule 29 should be imposed on the employee, it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 33, make an order imposing such penalty. 5. If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the charges, is of the opinion that no penalty is called for, it may pass an order exonerating the employee concerned. 18. A careful scrutiny of the aforesaid rules would reveal that the stage of further showcause notice for quantum of punishment by the disciplinary authority is not prescribed. 18. A careful scrutiny of the aforesaid rules would reveal that the stage of further showcause notice for quantum of punishment by the disciplinary authority is not prescribed. Rule 32(2) contemplates supply of inquiry officers report which enables the delinquent to make representation to the findings in the report. Subrule 4 of Rule 32 speaks of imposition of the penalties after giving due regard to its findings on all or any of the charges. Thus, the aforesaid rules are silent on the aspect of issuance of further showcause notice qua quantum of punishment. What emanates from the aforesaid rules is that an employee is only asked to make his representation against the findings of the inquiry officer's report which the disciplinary authority in the present case has observed and followed. After considering the representation made by an employee against the findings of the inquiry officer's report, the disciplinary authority under the aforesaid rules is not under an obligation to issue a further showcause notice calling upon the petitioner seeking his explanation qua the quantum of punishment. It is within the realm of the disciplinary authority to impose any penalty under the rules looking to the gravity of the charges which are proved. The disciplinary authority is not required to issue showcause notice at every stages. Once an opportunity is afforded to the delinquent employee of making a representation against the findings of the inquiry officer, the disciplinary authority is not further obliged to give further showcause notice qua quantum of punishment under Rule 32(4) of the Rules. It is fundamental rule of interpretation that the courts would not fill up the gaps in statute, their function being jus discre non fiscre i.e. to declare or decide law. The delinquent has the liberty to dispute the findings of the inquiry officer and put forth his case before the disciplinary authority asking it not to impose any of the penalties prescribed under the Rules when he is called upon to give his explanation to the inquiry officer's report. In the present case the delinquent was called upon to make his representation against the findings of the Inquiry Officer’s report vide Letter dated 25.01.2009. Thus, there was no need for issuance of further show cause notice by the disciplinary authority for quantum of penalty when the Conduct and discipline Rules, 1980 of the Corporation do not provide for the same. Thus, there was no need for issuance of further show cause notice by the disciplinary authority for quantum of penalty when the Conduct and discipline Rules, 1980 of the Corporation do not provide for the same. Hence, the contention canvased by Mr.Shah questioning the imposition of penalty on the petitioner sans show cause notice of quantum of penalty being illegal does not merit acceptance. 19. So far as the contention of the petitioners for nonsupply of the vigilance report or preliminary inquiry report is concerned, it is settled law that if the same is not relied upon by the disciplinary authority, it is not liable to be supplied to the delinquent. The petitioner is unable to show that any prejudice is caused to him because of nonsupply of the preliminary inquiry report. The Supreme Court in the case of Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar Vs. State of Maharashtra, 1997 (1) S.C.C. 299 , has observed thus: “The preliminary enquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry conducted after the issue of the chargesheet. The former action would be to find whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated against the delinquent. After fullfledged enquiry was held, the preliminary enquiry had lost its importance.” In the case of Vijay Kumar Nigam Vs. State of M.P., reported in 1996 (11) S.C.C. 599 , the Supreme Court has observed that it is not necessary to supply the copy of the preliminary inquiry report as it is only to decide and assess whether it would be necessary to take any disciplinary action against the delinquent officer and it does not form any foundation for passing the order of dismissal against the employee. 20. In view of the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court it was not necessary for the disciplinary authority to supply the copy of the preliminary inquiry/vigilance report to the petitioner. Moreover, the disciplinary authority in the present case has not relied on the vigilance report in the departmental inquiry, hence, the supply of the same to the petitioner was not obligatory. 21. So far as the contention of the petitioner about the penalty being harsh, as no financial loss is caused to the Corporation is misconceived. The petitioner was charge sheeted for his misconduct of various financial irregularities committed by him along with connivance with other officers. 21. So far as the contention of the petitioner about the penalty being harsh, as no financial loss is caused to the Corporation is misconceived. The petitioner was charge sheeted for his misconduct of various financial irregularities committed by him along with connivance with other officers. It is not necessary that the actual financial loss shall be caused to an institute in order to prove the misconduct. An employee who manifests dishonest attitude or negligence in performing his duty does at his own peril and makes himself liable for facing a departmental proceedings resulting into imposition of penalty. It is not necessary that because of such action, if no financial loss is caused, he could not be penalized. Rule 7 of the Rules,1980 lays down the acts and omissions to be treated as misconduct. Rule 7(1) states about theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the business or property of the Corporation or of property of another person within the premises of the Corporation, Rule7(5) states about acting in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the Corporation. The misconduct of the petitioner can be said to be prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation. 22. The Apex Court in the case of S.B.I Vs. T.J.Paul, reported in AIR 1999 S.C. 1994 , has held thus: “Taking up the definition of 'gross misconduct' in para 22(iv), it is obvious that clause (h) does not apply because the charge is not one of insubordination or disobedience of specific orders of any superior officer. Coming to clause (1) of para 22(iv), the doing of any act prejudicial to the interests of the bank, or gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the Bank in serious loss is gross misconduct. In other words likelihood of serious loss coupled with negligence is sufficient to bring the case within gross misconduct. The Inquiry Officer's finding of 'gross misconduct' on the ground of not obtaining adequate security is, therefore, correct and cannot be said to be based on no evidence as held by the High Court. This can be contrasted with para 22 (vi) (o) under minor misconduct which deals with 'neglect of work and negligence in performing of duties'. In our view, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellants Sri T. R. Andhyarujina is, therefore, entitled to be accepted. This can be contrasted with para 22 (vi) (o) under minor misconduct which deals with 'neglect of work and negligence in performing of duties'. In our view, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellants Sri T. R. Andhyarujina is, therefore, entitled to be accepted. The contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondent ignores the fact that 'gross negligence or negligence likely to involve the Bank in serious loss' would come under major misconduct within para 22(iv)(1). As stated above, even assuming that there is no gross negligence, simple negligence will come under major misconduct if accompanied by 'likelihood' of serious loss and this is clear from para 22(iv) (1). Hence the finding of the Inquiry Officer regarding gross misconduct is correct and could not have been set aside by the High Court. The findings of the Inquiry Officer clearly bring the case under 'major misconduct'. As held in Disciplinary authority cumregional Manager V/s. Nikunia Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69 proof of loss is not necessary.” Thus, the foregoing observation of the Supreme Court proposes that it is not necessary that actual loss is caused to the Institute or to the employer because of the misconduct committed by an employee. An employee serving in an institute is expected of a dignified behaviour. He has to adhere to the disciplinary rules or conduct rules for the sustainance of decorum of institution. In the present case, the petitioner is held guilty of the misconduct of financial irregularity and only because his codelinquents have reimbursed the amount involved in the said proceedings cannot absolve him from the recourse of departmental proceedings, and ultimately, it cannot be said that no penalty can be imposed upon him. Hence, the impugned order of penalty cannot be set aside only on the reason that the Corporation has not suffered any loss. 23. The contention raised by Mr. Shah that the appellate order being a nonspeaking order is also misconceived. A perusal of the appellate order will clarify that the appellate authority has considered the facts raised by the petitioner in his appeal. It is also observed that the appellant has only reiterated his earlier contentions made in representations dated 19.02.2009. The appellate authority has also considered the findings of the inquiry officer and accordingly after due consideration on such findings the appeal was rejected. It is also observed that the appellant has only reiterated his earlier contentions made in representations dated 19.02.2009. The appellate authority has also considered the findings of the inquiry officer and accordingly after due consideration on such findings the appeal was rejected. It cannot be said that the appellate order is bereft of any reasons. If the appellate authority is in agreement to the inquiry officers report and the disciplinary authorities order, it is not incumbent upon him to record reasons in detail. The appellate authority is required to apply his mind to the contentions raised in the appeal of delinquent authority and in the present appellate authority has recorded the contentions raised by the petitioner in his appeal and has also recorded the findings of the inquiry officer on such contention. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the appellate order suffers from total nonapplication of mind. The same meets with the requirement of law and is liable to be sustained. 24. In the case of Chief Executive Officer, Krishna District Cooperative Central Bank Limited Vs. K. Hanumantha Rao (See 2017 (2) SCC 528 , the Supreme Court has held that the jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the present case neither there is any gross violation of Rules nor it can be said the penalty imposed is shockingly disproportionate. The contention raised by Mr.Shah about the nonexamination of Shri B.K.Rao in the disciplinary proceedings is also ill founded since the report of the Inquiry officer reveals that Mr.B.K.Rao was summoned by him and he had explained that no coercive steps were taken by him while recording the statement of the petitioner. 25. The contention raised by Mr.Shah about the nonexamination of Shri B.K.Rao in the disciplinary proceedings is also ill founded since the report of the Inquiry officer reveals that Mr.B.K.Rao was summoned by him and he had explained that no coercive steps were taken by him while recording the statement of the petitioner. 25. From the aforesaid analysis, there can be no scintilla of doubt that the departmental proceedings do not suffer with any lacuna of violation of Conduct/ Discipline and Appeal Rules. The order of dismissal cannot be said to be disproportionate to the proved misconduct of serious financial irregularities. 26. In view of the foregoing observations and analysis, the present petition deserves to be dismissed. The same is dismissed. Rule is discharged.