JUDGMENT Vivek Singh Thakur, J. (Oral) - These appeals and Cross Objections arising out of common award passed by learned District Judge, Bilaspur in Land Reference Petitions Nos. 144 and 146 of 2008 involves common questions of law and facts and are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. Brief facts of the case, necessary for deciding these appeals and cross objections, are that land of respondents/cross objectors, situated in village Tepra, Sub Tehsil Namhol, District Bilaspur was utilized for construction of Tepra Kuhal Katal road and Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') issued, subsequent thereto, on 2.9.2006, was published in official gazette as well as in two daily newspapers on 28.7.2006, whereafter, completing codal fomalities, Land Acquisition Collector passed a common award No. 13 dated 11.10.2007 with respect to land of respondents/cross-objectors by assessing market value of acquired land on the basis of classification of land as under:- Classification of land Rate per Bigha 1. Kohali Aval Rs.2,18,356.00 2. Kohali Doem Rs.1,99,089.00 3. Anderli Aval Rs.1,60,556.00 4. Anderli Doem Rs.1,25,233.00 5. Baharli Aval Rs. 80,728.00 6. Bharli Doem Rs. 38,533.00 7. Khariyater & Banjer Rs. 19,267.00 3. Respondents/Cross-objectors had preferred land references under Section 18 of the Act mentioned supra, against the award of Land Acquisition Collector before learned District Judge, who on the basis of material before him, had enhanced the compensation by awarding uniform rate of Rs. 7.00 lakhs per bigha for all categories of land, irrespective of its classification, along with other consequential benefits in accordance with provisions of the Act. The said award is under challenge in these appeals and cross objections. 4. I have heard learned Deputy Advocate General as well as learned counsel for respondents/cross-objectors and have also gone through the entire record of the case. 5. Both these reference petitions were clubbed together by learned District Judge and evidence has been led only in the lead case. Five witnesses have been examined on behalf of respondents/cross-objectors. PW1 Babu Ram, Registration Clerk, office of Sub Registrar-cum-Naib Tehsildar, Sadar Bilaspur has proved execution and registration of sale deed of the land measuring 0-1 bigha (1 biswa) situated in mauja Tepra, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur by PW2 Garja Ram in favour of PW3 Kuldip for a consideration of Rs. 50,000/-. Five witnesses have been examined on behalf of respondents/cross-objectors. PW1 Babu Ram, Registration Clerk, office of Sub Registrar-cum-Naib Tehsildar, Sadar Bilaspur has proved execution and registration of sale deed of the land measuring 0-1 bigha (1 biswa) situated in mauja Tepra, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur by PW2 Garja Ram in favour of PW3 Kuldip for a consideration of Rs. 50,000/-. In cross examination, he has expressed his ignorance about the fact that PW2 has sold his land for lesser consideration than amount of consideration shown in the sale deed. He has shown his inability to tell actual sale value of land in question at that time. 6. PW2 Garja Ram, vendor has endorsed the execution of sale deed Ext. PW1/A on 24.11.2004 for the reason that he was in dire need of money on account of marriage of his daughter. He has denied the suggestion that sale consideration was lesser than that of shown in sale deed and higher sale consideration has been depicted in sale deed to claim higher compensation. PW3 Vendee, in his statement, has also reiterated the versions of PWs 1 and 2 and further stating that land in question was purchased by him as it was abutting to his land. 7. Land owner, PW4 Kanshi Ram has also been examined on behalf of all land owners. He, in his statement in Court, has deposed that vehicular traffic on the Namhol-Bahadurpur road, constructed in the year 1986, was started in the year 1988 and for construction of the said road their land was utilized and the value of their land was about Rs. 50,000/- per biswa at that time, various trees standing on their land were also uprooted and they were sowing cash vegetables in the said land and further that Cellular Companies are paying Rs. 4000/- per month for raising tower upon their land. He has prayed for compensation w.e.f. 1988. He has alleged that stones excavated from their land were also utilized by the department for raising retaining walls during construction of road. In cross examination, he has denied all suggestions including the suggestion that road was not constructed in the year 1986 and adequate compensation in accordance with law has been awarded keeping in view the nature and market value of the land. However, he admitted that towers by Cellular Companies were installed later on after construction of the road. 8. In cross examination, he has denied all suggestions including the suggestion that road was not constructed in the year 1986 and adequate compensation in accordance with law has been awarded keeping in view the nature and market value of the land. However, he admitted that towers by Cellular Companies were installed later on after construction of the road. 8. Appellants/respondents have not chosen to lead any oral or documentary evidence, except tendering the sale deed Ext. RA dated 18.1.2003 pertaining to the land situated in village Tayaman, Pargana Bahadurpur, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur. 9. In the light of aforesaid oral and documentary evidence and also settled law of land, merits of rival contentions of parties are to be assessed. 10. For purpose of acquisition in present case i.e. construction of road, classification completely looses significance as the acquired land is to be used as a single unit for construction of road. It is well settled that at the time of determining of market value of land for acquisition, the purpose for which the land is acquired is relevant and not nature and classification of land and where nature and classification of the land has no relevance for purpose of acquisition, the market value of the land is to be determined as a single unit irrespective of nature and classification of the land. Therefore, award of uniform rate to all kinds of land under acquisition as a single unit irrespective of their nature and classification by learned District Judge does not warrant interference. (See H.P. Housing Board vs. Ram Lal, reported in 2003(3) Shim. LC (64), Union of India vs. Harinder Pal Singh, reported in 2005(12) SCC 564 and in case Gulabi vs. State of H.P. reported in 1998(1) Shim. LC 41 and Executive Engineer and another vs. Dilla Ram Latest HLJ (2008)2 HP 1007.) 11. The State of Himachal Pradesh has preferred these appeals on the ground that impugned award has not only been passed by ignoring sale deed Ext. RA produced by the appellants pertaining to the same village but also taking into consideration the sale deed Ext. PW1/A pertaining to small chunk i.e. one biswa of land, giving abnormal hike in the market value of the acquired land. During arguments, learned Deputy Advocate General has contended that learned District Judge has deducted only 30% of the market value arrived at on the basis of Ext. PW1/A pertaining to small chunk i.e. one biswa of land, giving abnormal hike in the market value of the acquired land. During arguments, learned Deputy Advocate General has contended that learned District Judge has deducted only 30% of the market value arrived at on the basis of Ext. PW1/A whereas deduction of 40% to 50% was required to be made on the basis of pronouncements of the Court. 12. Plea of State that at the time of determining market value of land in question learned District Judge should have considered the sale deed Ext. RA tendered in evidence by the State is not sustainable for the reasons; (a) that the said sale deed was executed in 18.1.2003, whereas date of publication of Notification under Section 4 of the Act in Rajpatra is 2.9.2006 and sale deed produced by respondents/cross-objectors Ext. PW1/A is dated 24.11.2004; (b) that the sale deed Ext. RA pertains to a different area i.e. village Tayaman, whereas Ext. PW1/A pertains to the same village Tepra, land of which village is in question for acquisition. The sale deed Ext. PW1/A is more proximate than Ext. RA in time with respect to Notification under Section 4 of the Act and also in location with the land acquired by appellants/non-objectors. Ext. PW1/A is proximate to the time and location as required under law for an exemplars'' sale deed to be taken into consideration for determining of market value of the land to be acquired. 13. Learned District Judge has deducted 30% from the market value calculated on the basis of exemplar''s sale deed Ext. PW1/A by relying upon judgment of Apex Court in Kaushlya Devi Bogra and others vs. Land Acquisition Collector Aurangabad, reported in AIR 1984 SC 892 on the ground that when large tracks are acquired, the transaction in respect of small properties do not offer a proper guideline and valuation in transaction related to smaller property cannot be taken as real basis for determining the compensation for large tracks of property and therefore, for determining market value of large property on the basis of sale transactions for smaller property, a deduction should be made. Learned District Judge has also placed reliance upon the judgment of Coordinate Bench of this Court in case State of H.P. and another vs. Sanjeev Kumar and another reported in 2010(2) SLJ (HP) 1225 wherein after relying upon pronouncements of Apex Court in The Collector of Lakhimpur vs. Bhuban Chandra Dutta reported in AIR 1971 SC 2015 and Kaushalya Devi Bogra''s case supra, a deduction of 30% was permitted on the ground that the sale deed of smaller piece of land was relied upon for determining the price of large area in question under acquisition. 14. On contrary, on the basis of cross objections filed on behalf of respondents/cross-objectors, learned counsel for them contended that learned District Judge has committed a mistake by deciding market value of the acquired land after deducting 30% from the rate of land proved on the basis of sale transactions Ext. PW1/A as according to him, it is settled that exemplars'' sale deed cannot be discarded on this ground that it is of small piece of land and it also cannot be a ground to make deduction from the market value of land proved on the basis of such sale transaction. 15. Learned counsel for respondents/cross-objectors has relied upon judgment of this Court in case Union of India vs. Joginder Singh and other connected matters reported in Latest HLJ 2009 (HP) 416, wherein it is held that no deduction is required to be carried out in an exemplar''s sale transactions pertaining to the very same village having proximity of the time of acquisition where it is proved that land in question is having the same advantage as the land in example''s sale deed has and also that big chunk is not to be seen in relation to area of acquired land but in relation to the individual holdings. In the present case, there is no iota of evidence on this count. Therefore, 30% deduction from the market value of land proved by exemplars; sale deed has correctly been made by the learned District Judge. Judgment in Sanjeev Kumar''s case supra, relied upon by learned District Judge for 30% deduction, is based on the pronouncement of the Apex Court and is also later in time and therefore, learned District Judge has not committed any error in relying upon the said judgment. 16. Judgment in Sanjeev Kumar''s case supra, relied upon by learned District Judge for 30% deduction, is based on the pronouncement of the Apex Court and is also later in time and therefore, learned District Judge has not committed any error in relying upon the said judgment. 16. Learned counsel for respondents/cross-objectors have also relied upon pronouncement in case G.M. Northern Railway vs. Gulzar Singh and others reported in 2014(3) Shim. LC 1356 wherein no deduction was permitted for determining the market value of land under acquisition on the basis of exemplar sale deed of smaller plot. Perusal of this judgment shows that in that case, it was proved on record that land involved in exemplar''s sale deed was in close proximity with the land under acquisition having the same potential, whereas in the present case, neither in reference petitions nor in deposition of the witnesses examined in the Court on behalf of respondents/cross-objectors, it has been stated that land under acquisition was having quality and potential equivalent to the land involved in exemplars'' sale deed. Therefore, ratio of law based on different facts as laid in Gujar Singh''s case supra is not applicable in present case. 17. It is also contended on behalf of State that learned District Judge has committed mistake by allowing only 30% deduction whereas deduction upto 40-50% was required to be made for development. Heavy reliance has been placed on judgments passed in cases titled as Indian Council of Medical Research vs. T.N. Sanikop and another reported in 2014(16) SCC 274 & Major General Kapil Mehra and others vs. Union of India and another reported in 2015(2) SCC 262 wherein deduction upto 75% has been held to be permissible. 18. Plea of the State on this issue is misconceived. In present case, acquisition is not for the purpose of developing a Housing Colony, setting up a commercial unit or any other purpose of like nature which may have resulted development of area on the cost of the State. In the judgments relied upon by the appellant-State, the deductions were allowed for two purposes i.e. (a) deduction for providing development infrastructure and (b) deduction for developmental expenditure/expense and these deduction have been explained by the Apex Court in case titled Chandrashekar (dead) by LRs and others vs. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2012)1 SCC 390 , which is as under:- "19. Based on the precedents on the issue referred to above it is seen, that as the legal proposition on the point crystallized, this Court divided the quantum of deductions (to be made from the market value determined on the basis of the developed exemplar transaction) on account of development into two components. 19.1 Firstly, space/area which would have to be left out, for providing indispensable amenities like formation of roads and adjoining pavements, laying of sewers and rain/flood water drains, overhead water tanks and water lines, water and effluent treatment plants, electricity substations, electricity lines and street lights, telecommunication towers etc. Besides the aforesaid, land has also to be kept apart for parks, gardens and playgrounds. Additionally, development includes provision of civic amenities like educational institutions, dispensaries and hospitals, police stations, petrol pumps etc. This "first component", may conveniently be referred to as deductions for keeping aside area/space for providing developmental infrastructure. 19.2 Secondly, deduction has to be made for the expenditure/expense which is likely to be incurred in providing and raising the infrastructure and civic amenities referred to above, including costs for levelling hillocks and filling up low lying lands and ditches, plotting out smaller plots and the like. This "second component" may conveniently be referred to as deductions for developmental expenditure/expense. 20. It is essential to earmark appropriate deductions, out of the market value of an exemplar land, for each of the two components referred to above. This would be the first step towards balancing the differential factors. This would pave the way for determining the market value of the undeveloped acquired land on the basis of market value of the developed exemplar land. 19. In the present case, acquisition is for the purpose of construction of road and therefore, deduction price of development on the basis of either of the aforesaid two components is not applicable. 20. Prouncements of the Apex Court in case Atma Singh (dead) through LRs and others vs. State of Haryana and another reported in (2008)2 SCC 568 relied upon by appellant-State is also not applicable in the present case as in that case land was acquired for setting up a Sugar Factory and deduction upto 10% for development of the site was permitted, keeping in view the substantial profit from the Sugar Factory to be earned by beneficiary of acquisition. 21. 21. It is further contended that the land of respondents/cross-objectors was utilized for construction of road in the year 1988 but the same was not acquired at that time and it was only in pursuance to direction of the High Court, the State had initiated acquisition proceedings in the year 2006 and therefore, on the basis of pronouncements of the Apex Court, it is further contended that respondents/cross-objectors are also entitled for rent/damages for use and occupation of their land by the State for road in question since 1988 till the date of publication of Notification under Section 4 of the Act i.e. 28.7.2006. 22. In para 5 of reference petition preferred under Section 18 of the Act, it is specifically averred that State had acquired the land of respondents/cross-objectors in pursuance to direction passed by this Court. In reply thereto, filed by State and Land Acquisition Collector, this fact is not denied specifically but stated that the contents of this para are wrong, whereas in reply on behalf of the State, acquisition of land and determination of compensation by Land Acquisition Collector vide impugned award is admitted and rest of contents of para are denied in general without specifically denying the fact related to direction of the High Court. 23. In para 4 of the reference petition, respondents/cross-objectors have categorically stated that possession of land was admittedly taken in the year 1988 but no interest on compensation amount from the actual date of taking over possession of the land was granted. In reply to that, Land Acquisition Collector has only stated that contents of said para are wrong and hence denied. Similarly, in reply to the said para by the State, it is stated that contents of this para are denied being incorrect with further averments that compensation has been paid as per law. In rejoinder, respondents/cross-objectors have reiterated their claim set up in the reference petition. 24. Plea of the respondents/cross-objectors regarding taking possession of their land for construction of road in the year 1988 categorically averred in reference petition, has neither been specifically denied nor replied in response to the reference petition. Respondents/cross-objectors have also substantiated their plea by leading oral evidence with respect to the said fact, whereas appellants/State has chosen not to lead any oral or documentary evidence in this regard. Respondents/cross-objectors have also substantiated their plea by leading oral evidence with respect to the said fact, whereas appellants/State has chosen not to lead any oral or documentary evidence in this regard. Specific plea of land owners, taken in reference petition supported by their oral evidence has not been rebutted by appellant-State either in reply or by leading oral or documentary evidence. It is settled law that denial simplicitor of a fact is not sufficient to rebut the plea of either party. Denial must be specific and supported by evidence. In present case, as discussed above, neither averment made in reference petition has been rebutted in reply thereto nor oral evidence of respondents/cross-objectors has been repelled by leading any cogent evidence on behalf of the State. Therefore, plea of respondents/cross-objectors taking of possession of land in question for construction of Namhol-Bahadurpur road in the year 1988 is duly proved. 25. Admittedly, notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 28.7.2006 and published in official gazette on 2.9.2006 Land Acquisition Collector or learned District Judge has not awarded any rent or damages for utilization of land of respondents/cross-objectors since 1988 till 2.9.2006. The said rent/damage was required to be determined by the Land Acquisition Collector at the time of announcing award for compensation. 26. Learned counsel for respondents/cross-objectors have also placed reliance upon the pronouncement of the Apex Court in case Balwan Singh and others vs. Land Acquisition Collector and another reported in (2016) 13 SCC 412 wherein after considering and relying upon judgment passed in cases R.L. Jain (D) by LRs vs. DDA reported in (2004)4 SCC 79 , Madishetti Bala Ramul vs. Land Acquisition Officer reported in (2007) 9 SCC 650 and Tahera Khotoon vs. Land Acquisition Officer (2014) 13 SCC 613 , land owners in the similar circumstances were awarded an additional interest by way of damages at the rate of 15% per annum from taking the actual possession till the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act. 27. In present case, there is no specific date on record with respect to taking of possession by the State in the year 1988. Therefore, respondents/cross-objectors are awarded additional interest @ 15% per annum on the market value of land fixed by reference Court, since 1.1.1989 till the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act i.e. 28.7.2006 as damages for utilization of land for road. Therefore, respondents/cross-objectors are awarded additional interest @ 15% per annum on the market value of land fixed by reference Court, since 1.1.1989 till the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act i.e. 28.7.2006 as damages for utilization of land for road. 28. In view of the above discussion, appeals filed by the State are dismissed and the Cross objections filed by respondents/cross-objectors are allowed in the above terms and impugned award is modified to that extent. The State is directed to calculate the damages accordingly by 31st January, 2018 and pay the same on or before 30th April, 2018 to the respondents/cross-objectors.