ORDER : Rule. 2. Mr.D.Nagaraj, learned AGA waives notice of Rule. 3. With the consent of learned Advocates appearing for both the sides, the petitions are finally heard. 4. As the common order of the Tribunal is under challenge, both the petitions are simultaneously considered. 5. The short facts of the case appear to be that the petitioners who were earlier in Government service but thereafter, joined the KMPL which was the unit of KDDC. Thereafter Government Dairy was brought under KDDC. The said organization is merged with Karnataka Milk Federation. The petitioners retired from service of Karnataka Milk Federation. Some of the employees of Milk Federation were paid pensionary benefits including employees who resigned the job earlier, but some of the employees including the petitioners herein were not paid the pensionary benefits. Therefore, the dispute was raised before the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal by preferring application Nos.2626 to 2275/2004 and allied matters, wherein so far as the petitioners are concerned, they were party at Sl.Nos.74 and 75 in the first batch of the matter. The Tribunal ultimately vide its order dated 01.07.2004 after having found that the final decision deserves to be taken by the respondents, directed at paragraph 8 which reads as under: “8. Therefore, we think it appropriate to issue a direction to the Respondents to consider the claim of the Applicants regarding the entitlement of pensionery benefits as sought for in these Applications, particularly having regard to the correspondence ending with Annexure-A15 dated 03.09.2002.” 6. It appears that thereafter the decision was taken but the pensionary benefits were denied. Therefore, once again the litigation was raised before the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’ for the sake of brevity) by preferring application Nos.2336-2394/2006 and in the said litigation both the petitioners were parties at Sl.Nos.26 and 27. The Tribunal ultimately passed the order in the said litigation on 08.06.2009 and issued following direction at paragraph-10, which for ready reference is reproduced as under: “10. In the result and for the reasons stated above, we allow all these applications and quash the Government Order bearing ----in other language----- 2004 dated 4-3-2005 and the endorsement bearing No-----in other language-------dated 28-3-2005 issued by the 2nd respondent (Annexure A9). The applicants shall be considered as government servants until their retirement and all pensionary benefits as per rules shall be given to them. The applicants shall be considered as government servants until their retirement and all pensionary benefits as per rules shall be given to them. However, before granting the pensionary benefits, the retirement benefits given to them by the Karnataka Milk Federation shall be deducted.” (Emphasis supplied) 7. It appears that thereafter, once again the endorsements dated 31.05.2014 and 02.06.2014 were issued by the respondents denying the pensionary benefits to the petitioners herein. Under the circumstances, the petitioners approached before the Tribunal by preferring application Nos.4985/2014 and 5472/2014. The Tribunal in the said applications passed the impugned order whereby the Tribunal took a different view than what was taken by it in the earlier litigation for entitlement of the pension and has dismissed the applications. Under the circumstances the present petitions before this Court. 8. We have heard Mr.Sanjeeva Murthy U.S., learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr.D.Nagaraj, learned AGA for the respondents. 9. There cannot be any dispute on the proposition that once there is an interparty decision of a competent forum, the said decision is binding on both the sides. At the same time, another principle that the Tribunal is bound by its own decision unless modified by the higher forum is also well established. 10. Useful reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in case of Smt.V.S.Krithika vs. The Director, Director of Lokashikshana (Mass Education) and Another) reported at ILR 2016 KAR 3788, wherein this Court in terms held at paragraph Nos.8 and 9 as under: “8. In our view, the contention cannot be countenanced for two reasons. One is that, the Tribunal was bound by its own order and the second is that when this Court observed, in consideration of the case of the petitioner on merits, would mean, any other grounds available for denial of the benefit of regularization than the ground which was already concluded by the Tribunal. In any case, if one considers the principle of constructive res judicata, then also a contention which ought to have been raised is deemed to have concluded. In any case, this Court has dismissed the petition and passed the order dated 22nd November, 2013. Under these circumstances, we find that the contention raised by the learned Government Advocate cannot be accepted. 9. In any case, this Court has dismissed the petition and passed the order dated 22nd November, 2013. Under these circumstances, we find that the contention raised by the learned Government Advocate cannot be accepted. 9. In view of the above, the only answer is that, the Tribunal could not take a contrary view than the view already taken earlier in its own order, which was not interfered with by this Court. It is hardly required to be stated that, if a quasi judicial authority is permitted to take a different stand than was taken inter se between the same parties in the earlier decision, the sanctity of the order of the judicial forum or quasi judicial forum will be lost, apart from the aspect that such is even otherwise not permissible in law.” 11. In light of the aforesaid, if the facts of the present case are further examined, following aspects are undisputed: The petitioners herein in the earlier litigation of Application Nos.2336-2394/2006 had succeeded to the extent that a specific direction was issued by the Tribunal, the relevant of which reads as under: “The applicants shall be considered as government servants until the retirement and all pensionary benefits as per rules shall be given to them. However, before granting the pensionary benefits, the retirement benefits given to them by the Karnataka Milk Federation shall be deducted.” The aforesaid makes it clear that so far as their entitlement to be treated as Government servants and their entitlement for all pensionary benefits as per the Rules, it was specifically ordered in favour of the petitioners by the Tribunal. Then the question may arise as to whether it was open to the respondents-authority to make endorsements denying the eligibility for entitlement of the pensionary benefits to the petitioners or not? 12. In our view, the answer has to be necessarily in negative for the simple reason that there was interparty decision of the Tribunal and it was not open to the respondents to nullify the decision of the Tribunal by contending that the petitioners were not entitled for the pensionary benefits. However, perusal of the order passed by the Tribunal shows that it has practically reviewed its earlier decision dated 08.06.2009 by the impugned order so far as it relates to the rights of the petitioners, in the absence of any review application filed on behalf of the respondents. 13. However, perusal of the order passed by the Tribunal shows that it has practically reviewed its earlier decision dated 08.06.2009 by the impugned order so far as it relates to the rights of the petitioners, in the absence of any review application filed on behalf of the respondents. 13. In our view, as the Tribunal was bound by its own decision dated 08.06.2009 passed in Application Nos.2336-2394/2006, it was not open to the Tribunal to reexamine the facts on the premise that the petitioners at one point of time had resigned as the Government servants and thereafter joined the Federation. 14. In our view, such is barred by the principles of constructive res judicata. The contention which ought to have been raised by the Government at the relevant point of time when the order dated 08.06.2009 was passed, is deemed to have been concluded and thereafter it is not open to the parties to the proceeding to raise a new contention and to nullify the binding effect of the decision of the judicial forum. 15. But Mr.D.Nagaraj, learned AGA attempted to contend that it was a fraud on facts played by the petitioners. He submitted that if a fraud is played by a party to the proceeding, the same can be looked into in the subsequent litigation also, even if there is interparty decision of the judicial forum. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs., Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others reported at AIR 1994 SC 853 and therefore he submitted that the view taken by the Tribunal cannot be said to be illegal, since the Tribunal on facts found that the petitioners were not entitled for the pensionary benefits and therefore the endorsements so made by the authority is not illegal. 16. We may record that the ground of fraud as sought to be contended by learned Additional Government Advocate was not even pleaded or prayed before the Tribunal. Therefore, the ground of fraud can hardly be said as available to the respondents for supporting the order passed by the Tribunal. Further the decision upon which the reliance has been placed by the learned AGA in case of S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (supra) is of no help to the respondents for two reasons. Therefore, the ground of fraud can hardly be said as available to the respondents for supporting the order passed by the Tribunal. Further the decision upon which the reliance has been placed by the learned AGA in case of S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (supra) is of no help to the respondents for two reasons. One is that there was no contention of fraud raised before the Tribunal and the another is that in the decision of the Apex Court the plea of fraud was raised after passing of preliminary decree but before the final decree. Whereas such is not the fact situation in the present case. In the present case, the decision interparty is in operation since 2009 and the socalled distinction of facts is canvassed for the first time when original applications came to be filed by the petitioners. Even as per the earlier decision dated 30.03.2010 which has been referred to by the Tribunal, the authority had resolved to file review application before the Tribunal and it is not the case of the respondents that thereafter any review application was filed. The resultant situation would be that the right to file review application, if any, stood abandoned and there is conscious acquiescence of right to file review application, if any. If no review application was filed, it would not be open to the respondents who were party in the earlier litigation to take up the stand of their own by distinguishing the facts and then to conclude that the petitioners would not be entitled to the pensionary benefits. On the contrary, such a stand on the part of the respondents would not only run counter to the earlier decision of the Tribunal but if it is taken to its logical end, such may also result into a breach and noncompliance to the order passed by the Tribunal. We leave it at that. 17. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal cannot be sustained nor any endorsements made in contravention to the earlier decision of the Tribunal dated 08.06.2009 can also be sustained. We leave it at that. 17. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal cannot be sustained nor any endorsements made in contravention to the earlier decision of the Tribunal dated 08.06.2009 can also be sustained. Hence, both the impugned endorsements as well as the impugned order of the Tribunal are set aside with a direction to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioners for pensionary benefit within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order and the monetary benefits shall accordingly be released within one month therefrom. 18. Petitions are allowed to the aforesaid extent. Considering the facts and circumstances, no order as to costs.