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2017 DIGILAW 1430 (KER)

STATE OF KERALA v. SAJI D. ANAND

2017-11-21

DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN, P.N.RAVINDRAN

body2017
JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. These writ appeals, at the instance of the State of Kerala, calls into question the sweep, ambit and purlieu of the time tested and time honoured Doctrine of Pleasure. This doctrine began its life as a common law rule. It had its origins in England and began as a convention of the British law. Under this doctrine a public servant holds office during the pleasure of the crown and can be dismissed from service by the crown at its pleasure. The civil servant under it is susceptible to dismissal without cause, without being legally competent to claim damages for wrongful dismissal or premature termination. 2. The hyposthsis of this doctrine is traced to the Maxim “Durente Bene Placito” which literally means “during pleasure”. As per this maxim, the tenure of office, except where it is otherwise specifically provided by the statute, can be terminated at any time without any cause being assigned. 3. In these appeals, the State of Kerala has challenged the judgment of the learned Single Judge, wherein the removal of the members earlier nominated by the Government, to three different statutory boards, namely, the Kerala Labour Welfare Fund Board, the Kerala Minimum Wages Advisory Board and the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Board, before expiry of their term of appointment without any cause or reason being assigned for such action, was found to be impermissible and illegal. The essential contention of the appellants is that the writ petitioners are all nominated members to the above mentioned Boards and, therefore, that they hold office only under the pleasure of the Government, thereby consequently being liable to be terminated at any time without assigning any reason. 4. We notice that the learned Single Judge found partially in favour of the appellants while holding that the appointment of the petitioners and other members of the various Boards mentioned above, were at the pleasure of the Government but held that their removal cannot be ordered merely at the pleasure of the Government. The State of Kerala has filed these appeals challenging that part of the judgment as being illegal and unconstitutional. 5. We have heard Sri.K.V.Sohan, learned State Attorney appearing on behalf of the appellants and Sri.Harikumar G.Nair, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in W.A.Nos.74 and 648 of 2017. 6. Sri.K.V.Sohan, learned State Attorney began his submissions singularly relying on the doctrine of pleasure. 5. We have heard Sri.K.V.Sohan, learned State Attorney appearing on behalf of the appellants and Sri.Harikumar G.Nair, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in W.A.Nos.74 and 648 of 2017. 6. Sri.K.V.Sohan, learned State Attorney began his submissions singularly relying on the doctrine of pleasure. According to him, the writ petitioners and other members of the aforementioned Boards had been appointed or nominated by the Government without any qualifications being prescribed for such appointments or nominations and merely by a pick and choose method. According to him, when the statutes that govern these Boards prescribe no qualifications for the appointment or nomination of members to it and when the statutes enable the Government to pick and choose candidates at their own pleasure for being so appointed, it is a clear case of the doctrine of pleasure being attracted. He says that the members of the Boards including the petitioners, were appointed in such fashion, namely, at the pleasure of the Government, they can also be removed by invoking the doctrine of pleasure. 7. The various learned counsel appearing for the various writ petitioners/respondents in these cases, on the contrary, submits that the contentions of the appellants is completely untenable. According to them, each of them were appointed under the provisions of specific Statutes and Rules governing the constitution and functioning of the respective Boards and they say that since all their appointments are as per statutory prescriptions, the doctrine of pleasure would not apply and that they can be removed from their office, before the term for which they were appointed, only following the mandate and procedural imperatives under the relevant Statutes and other applicable Rules and Regulations. 8. We have considered the dialectical contentions. We have also gone through the pleadings quite in detail. 9. From the submissions and pleadings before us, we are certain that the edifice of the State's assertion in these appeals is that the petitioners and other members of the various Boards, with which we are concerned, are appointed by the administration in power of the Government, invoking the doctrine of pleasure. To test this submission, we have to certainly examine the statutes under which these Boards are created. To test this submission, we have to certainly examine the statutes under which these Boards are created. The Statutes and Rules involved in these are as under: (a) W.A.No.60 of 2017 relates to the Kerala Labour Welfare Fund Board which is constituted under the Kerala Labour Welfare fund Act, 1975 and Kerala Labour Welfare Fund Rules, 1977. (b) Writ Appeal No.73 of 2017 relates to the Kerala Minimum Wages Advisory Board, which is constituted under the provisions of Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and the Minimum Wages (Kerala) Rules, 1958. (c) Finally as regards Writ Appeal No.648 of 2017 and Writ Appeal No.74 of 2017 are concerned, they are in relation to the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Board constituted under the Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985 and the Motor Transport Welfare Funds Scheme, 1985. 10. Our examination of the afore mentioned statutes and Rules is intended to explore and find out whether the appointed and nominated members of the Boards under it are made by the Government at their pleasure or under the specific prescriptions of such statutes and Rules. This inquiry is extremely relevant and pertinent because going by the way the Doctrine of pleasure has evolved over the years, if the appointment or nomination of members are made in terms of the statute, the doctrine will cease to have any role to play. It is only if the statutes and Rules are silent as to the method of appointment and removal of members, then alone the doctrine of pleasure would apply. 11. We will now detail, in as brief a manner as it will suffice, the specific provisions of each of the applicable Acts and Rules to the Boards with which we are concerned have. A. The Kerala Labour Welfare Fund Board 12. Writ Appeal No.60 of 2017, as we already mentioned, relates to the Kerala Labour Welfare Fund Board constituted under the Kerala Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1975 and the Kerala Labour Welfare Fund Rules, 1977. Under this Act, the Board is established under Section 4, which provides that, they shall be established under the Board, which will have perpetual succession under a common seal and shall by the said name, sue and be sued. 13. Under this Act, the Board is established under Section 4, which provides that, they shall be established under the Board, which will have perpetual succession under a common seal and shall by the said name, sue and be sued. 13. Section 5 of the Act, thereafter provides for the constitution of the Board consisting of such number of representatives of employers and employees as may be prescribed and such number of officials and non-officials as also may be prescribed. It further provides that, the Government shall appoint one of the members of the Board to be its Chairman and that the number of members of the Board, including the Chairman, shall not exceed 25 in number. The appointment of the Chairman and members, as per Section 6 thereof, is to be mandatorily notified in the official gazette. The term of officers and members is thereafter prescribed under Section 7, which fixes it to be three years from the date of their appointment and makes it explicitly clear that each of them shall be eligible for reappointment, with a proviso added that a member can continue until his successor is appointed. 14. After thus providing for the appointment, Section 8 then incorporates the disqualifications and for removal of members. Since these provisions, as we will explain, assumes great significance in this case, we deem it appropriate to extract Section 8 of the Act as under: 8. Disqualification and removal - (1) No person shall be chosen as, or continue to be, a member of the Board if he:- (a) is an officer or servant under the Board; or (b) is an undischarged insolvent; or (c) is of unsound mind; or (d) has been convicted by a criminal court for an offence involving moral turpitude, unless such conviction has been set aside; or (e) is in arrears of any sum due to the Board. (2) The Government may remove from office any member who;- (a) is or has become subject to any of the disqualification mentioned in sub-section(1); or (b) is absent without leave of the Board for more than three consecutive meetings of the Board. 15. Section 9 of the Act provides for resignation by a member and filling up of casual vacancies. (2) The Government may remove from office any member who;- (a) is or has become subject to any of the disqualification mentioned in sub-section(1); or (b) is absent without leave of the Board for more than three consecutive meetings of the Board. 15. Section 9 of the Act provides for resignation by a member and filling up of casual vacancies. For the first time, it provides that, when a casual vacancy is filled up by an official member, meaning to say, a Government officer, such appointment shall be at pleasure. 16. Once the statute thus sanctions the appointments, disqualification and removal of members under the Kerala Labour Welfare Fund Rules, 1977 provides for the modalities for constitution of the Board under Rule 12 thereof. As per this rule, the Board is to consist of 21 members appointed by the Government, of which 5 are to be the representatives of the employers; 5 to be the representatives of employees; 5 to be Government officials and 6 others who are non-officials, with a proviso added to it that the Government may appoint one or more additional persons to be members so long as the number of members does not exceed 25. This is the scheme under which the Kerala Labour Welfare Fund Board has been created and is to operate. B. Kerala Minimum Wage Advisory Board 17. Writ Appeal No.73 of 2017 relates to the Kerala Minimum Wages Advisory Board created under the Provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and the Minimum Wages Kerala Rules, 1958. 18. The Minimum Wages Act provides for the constitution of an advisory Board under Section 7 thereof. Under the provisions of this Section, the Government shall appoint an advisory Board for the purpose of co-ordinating the work of committees and sub committees appointed under the Act and to advise the appropriate Government generally in the matter of fixing and revising Minimum Rates of Wages and such other things. 19. Section 9 of the Act, thereafter, goes on to fix the composition of committees. As per this Section, the Advisory Board is to consist of persons to be nominated by the appropriate Government representing employers and employees in scheduled employments, who shall be equal in number, and independent persons not exceeding 1/3rd of its total number of members; one of such independent person to be appointed as Chairman by the Government. 20. As per this Section, the Advisory Board is to consist of persons to be nominated by the appropriate Government representing employers and employees in scheduled employments, who shall be equal in number, and independent persons not exceeding 1/3rd of its total number of members; one of such independent person to be appointed as Chairman by the Government. 20. The Minimum Wages Kerala Rules, 1958, made under Section 30 of the Act, provides for the term of office of a member, disqualification, cessation of membership etc. 21. Rule 4 of the Rules provides for the term of office of the Board, which is fixed at two years commencing from the date of nomination of each member with the proviso that notwithstanding the expiry of this term, a member shall continue to hold office until his successor is nominated. Section 4 further provides that, in the case of official members of the Board, meaning the Government officials nominated, they shall hold office only during the pleasure of the Government. 22. As regards cessation and restoration of membership is concerned, Rule 9 of the Rules provides as under: 9. Cessation and restoration of membership-(1) if a member of the Committee or the Board fails to attend three consecutive meetings, he shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), cease to be a member thereof: (2) A person, who ceases to be a member under sub-rule (1) shall be given intimation of such cessation by a letter sent to him by registered post within fifteen days from the date of such cessation. The letter shall indicate that if he desires restoration of his membership, he may apply therefor within thirty days, from the receipt of such letter. The application for restoration of membership, if received within the said period, shall be placed before the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, and if a majority of members present at the next meeting is satisfied that the reasons for failure to attend three consecutive meetings are adequate, the member shall be restored to membership immediately after a resolution to that effect is adopted.” 23. Disqualification of the person to continue as a member is provided in Rule 10 and since this provision would become extremely relevant in our enquiry in this case, we deem it appropriate to extract it under. 10. Disqualification of the person to continue as a member is provided in Rule 10 and since this provision would become extremely relevant in our enquiry in this case, we deem it appropriate to extract it under. 10. Disqualification-(1) a person shall be disqualified for being nominated as, and for being a member of the Committee, or the Board, as the case may be; (i) if he is declared to be of unsound mind by a competent court; or (ii) if he is an undischarged insolvent; or (iii) if before or after the commencement of the Act, he has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude; (2) If any question arises whether a disqualification has been incurred under sub-rule (1) the decision of the Government thereon shall be final. C. Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Board 24. Writ Appeal Nos.648 of 2017 and 74 of 2017 relate to the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Board constituted under the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985 and the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Scheme, 1985. 25. Section 2(a) of the Act defines the Board to mean a Board constituted under Section 6 thereof. As per Section 6, the Board is to be constituted by the Government, by notification in the Gazette, to supervise or carry out the activities financed from the fund. The said section declares the Board to be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal and shall be competent to sue and be sued. After declaring so, the Section goes on to say that the Board shall consist of such number of directors as may be appointed by the Government and shall be chosen in such manner as may be provided in the Scheme. The proviso to sub clause 3 of Section 6 stipulates that the Board shall include in equal number of directors representing the Government, the employers and the employees. Sub Clause 4 thereof then mandates and one of the directors of the Board shall be appointed by the Government to be Chairperson. The prescriptions of the provisions of the Act make it ineluctable that this Board is empowered to administer the fund, namely, the Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund, in such manner as may be specified in the Scheme. Sub Clause 4 thereof then mandates and one of the directors of the Board shall be appointed by the Government to be Chairperson. The prescriptions of the provisions of the Act make it ineluctable that this Board is empowered to administer the fund, namely, the Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund, in such manner as may be specified in the Scheme. We therefore have to go immediately to the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Scheme, 1985 to see how the Board is constituted and how it provides for the term of the Board and its removal and cessation etc. 26. Paragraph 3 of the Scheme provides for the constitution of the Board and prescribes that the Board shall consist of 5 officials nominated by the Government, of whom one shall be from the finance department as its Chief executive officer, 5 persons representing the employers nominated by the Government and 5 persons representing the employees nominated by the Government. It further provides that one of the directors shall be appointed by the Government as the chairperson. Paragraph 4 of the scheme expressly stipulates that the term of office of the Board shall be three years and that it shall continue after the expiry of such term until a fresh Board is constituted. 27. The removal of Directors and cessation of membership is provided in paragraphs 5, 8 and 9 of the scheme. Since again these provisions are the most crucial in our examination of the issues in this appeal, it is necessary to read those paragraphs in whole and for such purpose we extracted those paragraphs as under: (5). Removal of Directors:-Notwithstanding anything contained in the scheme, Government may remove from office any director if in its opinion such Director ceased to represent the interests which he purports to represent in the Board or if the Government are satisfied that a Director that acted against the implementation of the ordinance or of the scheme or against the due the discharge of the function of the Board or of the Chairman or the Office of the fund; Provided that no such Director shall be removed, unless a reasonable opportunity is given to him for making for representation, if any, against the proposed action. (8). (8). Cessation of membership:-(1) If a Director or Chairman fails to attend three consecutive meetings of the Board without obtaining the permission of the Chairman or the Government, as the case may be, he shall subject to the provisions of the sub paragraph(2) ceased to be a Director. (2) A person who ceases to be a Director under sub paragraph(1) shall be given intimation of such cessation by a letter sent to him by registered post with in fifteen days from date of such cessation. The letter shall indicate that, if he desires the restoration of his Directorship he may apply accordingly with in fifteen days from the receipt of such letter. The applications for restoration of Directorship shall be submitted to the Government within the prescribed period and if the Government are satisfied that there was sufficient reason for not attending the three consecutive meetings Government may pass necessary orders restoring the Directorship. (9). Disqualification:- (i) A person shall be disqualified for being appointed as or for being a Director, if, (d) he is declared to be of unsound mind by a competent court; or (e) he is an undischarged insolvent; or (f) he as been sentenced by a criminal court to imprisonment for a period of more than 2 years for any offence involving moral turptude (such sentence not having been reserved) while undergoing the sentence and for five years from the date of expiration there off. (2) If any question arises whether any person is disqualified under sub paragraph(1) it shall be referred to the Government and the decision of Government on any such question shall be final. 28. The provisions of the various Statutes, Rules and Schemes as having been noticed as above, we are now drawn to examine whether the appointment of the members of various Boards involved in this case was at the pleasure of the Government in the first place. The learned State Attorney Sri.K.V.Sohan relying exclusively on the Doctrine of pleasure, supports the power of the Government to remove the petitioners and the members of the various Boards from its membership. He submits very vehemently that the Doctrine of Pleasure applies in its full vigour in this case because the members of the various Boards have not been appointed after a process of identification or selection. He submits very vehemently that the Doctrine of Pleasure applies in its full vigour in this case because the members of the various Boards have not been appointed after a process of identification or selection. He says that none of them had any particular qualification, that had been noticed or taken into account by the Government when they were appointed, meaning to say virtually that the writ petitioners and other members of the Board were not qualified to hold the post of members of the Boards, because they were 'picked and chosen', to borrow as Sri.Sohan's words, to its membership. 29. We have examined this submission quite in detail. As we have stated in the opening paragraphs of this judgment, the principle of Doctrine of Pleasure is edified on the maxim 'durante bene placito'. This doctrine literally means, “during pleasure” and it denotes that the tenure of office of a public servant or an official, except where it is otherwise provided by a statute, can be terminated at any time without assigning any cause or reason. In the cases at hand, it is inevitable that the petitioners have been sought to be terminated from the membership of the Boards without assigning any reason what so ever. The Government does not have a case that any of them has statutorily ceased to be the members of the respective Boards, that any of them has become disqualified because of any reason provided in the applicable Statutes, Rules and Scheme or that they have been removed as directors as per the mandate of the legal prescriptions. On the contrary, the submission of Sri.Sohan is that this is not required because the Government can remove them at any time without assigning any reason, thereby, implying that the Doctrine of Pleasure applies in all such appointments and removals. 30. When the above submission has been made so strongly before us by the learned State Attorney, we are obligated to examine the manner in which the appointments of the writ petitioner have been made to the various boards. The provisions extracted as above with respect to the various Statutes, Rules and Scheme, would make it inescapable that all such appointments or nominations could have been normally done only in the manner prescribed therein. The provisions extracted as above with respect to the various Statutes, Rules and Scheme, would make it inescapable that all such appointments or nominations could have been normally done only in the manner prescribed therein. Interestingly, it is also virtually conceded that all the petitioners and other members of the various Boards had been appointed by the Government invoking the provisions of the Statutes, Rules and the Scheme that provide for such appointment or nomination. When a statute thus provides for the nomination or appointment and where such appointment or nomination is, in fact, made under such provisions, then obviously the Doctrine of Pleasure or the maxim 'durante bene placito' would have no relevance since no such appointment could be done except in terms of such provisions. This is also because, even going by the constitutional scheme of our country, Article 310 of the constitution provides that, the tenure of office of persons serving the Union or States will be under the pleasure of the President of India or of the pleasure of the Governor of the State. However, this is not an absolute rule and is circumscribed by the provisions contained in the next Article, namely Article 311, which provides for several safeguards relating to removal of civil servants. Our Honourable Supreme Court has considered these issues several times before and the foremost judgment in this regard is that of The State of Bihar v. Abdul Majeed ( AIR 1954 SC 245 ), where a constitution bench of the Honourable Court explained the Doctrine of Pleasure in paragraph 13 of the said judgment as under: “The rule that a civil servant holds office at the pleasure of the Crown has its original in the Latin phrase 'durante bene placito' ('during pleasure') meaning that the tenure of office of a civil servant, except where it is otherwise provide by statute, can be terminated at any time without cause assigned. The true scope and effect of this expression is that even if a special contract has been made with the civil servant the Crown is not bound thereby. In other words, civil servants are liable to dismissal without notice and there is no right of action for wrongful dismissal, that is, that they cannot claim damages for premature termination of their services (see Fraser's Constitutional Law, P.126; Chalmer's Constitutional Law, P.186; ..... In other words, civil servants are liable to dismissal without notice and there is no right of action for wrongful dismissal, that is, that they cannot claim damages for premature termination of their services (see Fraser's Constitutional Law, P.126; Chalmer's Constitutional Law, P.186; ..... Senton v. Smith', 1895 AC 229 at p.234 (G); .... 'Dunn v. The Queen' (1896) 1 QB 116 (H)”. 31. The protection given to a regular employee was thereafter extended by the Honourable Supreme Court even to temporary employees in Purshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ), wherein their Lordships in paragraph 12 strongly affirmed that: 12. The position may, therefore, be summarised as follows: In the absence of any special contract the substantive appointment to a permanent post gives the servant so appointed a right to hold the post until, under he rules, he attains the age of superannuation or is compulsorily retired after having put in the prescribed number of years' service or the post is abolished and his service cannot be terminated except by way of punishment for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or any other disqualification found against him on proper enquiry after due notice to him. An appointment to a temporary post for a certain specified period also gives the servant so appointed a right to hold the post for the entire period of his tenure and his tenure cannot be put an end to during that period unless he is, by way of punishment, dismissed or removed from the service. Except in these two cases the appointment to a post, permanent or temporary, on probation or on an officiating basis or a substantive appointment to a temporary post gives to the servant so appointed no right to the post and his service may be terminated unless his service had ripened into what is, in the service rules, called a quasi permanent service. The question for our consideration is whether the protections of Art, 311 are“ 32. Several other judgments followed from the Honourable Supreme Court, most important among them being Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P.( AIR 1955 SC 600 ), Jaswant Sigh v. State of Punjab and Others ( AIR 1991 SC 385 ), Union of India & Another v. Balbir Singh and Another ( AIR 1998 SC 2043 ) and Dr.S.L. Agarwalv. Several other judgments followed from the Honourable Supreme Court, most important among them being Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P.( AIR 1955 SC 600 ), Jaswant Sigh v. State of Punjab and Others ( AIR 1991 SC 385 ), Union of India & Another v. Balbir Singh and Another ( AIR 1998 SC 2043 ) and Dr.S.L. Agarwalv. The General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd., ( AIR 1970 SC 1150 ). In fact, in Doctor S.L.Agarwal (supra) the Honourable Supreme Court has unequivocally held that all members of the civil servants of the Union, all India service and civil service of the State would get the protection of Article 311 of the constitution of India. 33. We have referred to the above judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court, only to drive home the point that the doctrine of pleasure would not be applicable in the cases where the appointment and removal to civil and statutory posts are governed, regulated and modulated by specific statutes providing for such and the term of office of such appointment being statutorily fixed. In other words, the doctrine of pleasure applies only where appointments are made without there being any statutory prescription for it and where the term of such appointment is not fixed or specific. If that had been so, it would certainly concede competence to the Government to remove a person at its pleasure, because the appointment itself is, in such scenario, under its pleasure and the term of such appointment never being stipulated to be for a fixed time or period. 34. At this point Sri.K.V.Sohan, learned State Attorney invites our attention to the judgment of the Honourble Supreme Court in Om Narain Agarwal & Others v. Nagar Palika, Shahjahanpur and Others [ 1993 (2) SCC 242 ] in support of the case of the appellant-State of Kerala. We are afraid, not merely does this judgment not come to the aid of the appellant, but on the contrary, would be otherwise. This is because, the Honourable Supreme Court in the said judgment has found on facts that, the statute involved in the said case provided that the nomination of a member in the Board, which it was concerned, was specifically at the pleasure of the Government. This is because, the Honourable Supreme Court in the said judgment has found on facts that, the statute involved in the said case provided that the nomination of a member in the Board, which it was concerned, was specifically at the pleasure of the Government. Since the statute itself in that case provided that the nomination and removal is at the pleasure of the Government, their Lordships concluded, on the specific facts therein, that the removal was legally held. However, this is not the case in these appeals that we are now considering. 35. In the cases at hand, no where in any of the applicable Statutes, Rules or Scheme, as we have seen above, is a power invested with the Government to appoint persons of their choice at their pleasure. The specific provisions of the Statutes, Rules and Scheme postulate the manner in which each of the members are to be appointed and can be removed. It is only in the case of official members and that too exclusively in the case of Minimum Wages Rules, 1958, that the appointment is shown to be at the pleasure of the Government. This is perhaps for good reason, because the official members of the Board are Government servants and, therefore, it is only logical that their appointment has been shown explicitly to be under the pleasure of the Government. In no other case, as above mentioned, is the appointment or disqualification or removal of a member, prescribed to be at the pleasure of the Government. When the applicable Statutes mandate appointment, removal and disqualification in a particular manner as above, it is perspicuous that the Doctrine of Pleasure cannot apply and that the contentions of the learned state attorney Sri.K.V.Sohan to that extent would have to be completely repelled. We do so, since we are left with no other option. 36. Once we thus find that the appointment of the petitioners was made by the Government, not at their pleasure but under the specific requirements and essentialities of the various Statutes, Rules and scheme as are applicable, it becomes irrefutable that their removal can also be only in the manner and method provided for, under the statutory provisions contained therein relating to cessation, removal and disqualification. The appellant/State of Kerala does not have a case that any of the writ petitioners/respondents herein are in any manner disqualified or susceptible or liable for any conduct or action leading to removal as is mandated under the statutory prescriptions. They do not have a case that any of them have ceased to be in office on account of the reasons enumerated in the statutes. The case of the appellant specifically is that even without this, the petitioners and other members can be removed, because they have been appointed under the Doctrine of Pleasure. 37. We are also cognizant that Sri.K.V.Sohan's submission, that the appointment of the petitioners were at the pleasure of the Government, is on the factual assertion that it was not made based on any valid selection. This submission, we must, say is completely untenable because the relevant Statutes, Rules and Scheme indubitably provide for the manner in which the appointments are to be made. It may be true that none of the said Provisions provide for any educational qualification or professional competence. However, they provide that a person, for being competent to be nominated to the various Boards, will have to fall within the description shown therein and that a person who is not so qualified cannot be worthy of nomination or appointment. When the Statutes provide for some description of the manner in which the appointment has to be done, obviously the appointment does not get the character of an appointment under pleasure, but can be construed forensically only as an appointment under the relevant statutes. In such circumstances, even we have to accept, which perhaps is true, the submission of the learned state attorney that the appointment of the petitioners were not based on any proper selection, it would still not make any difference because the Statutes do not enjoin any such selection and they do not lay down any educational or professional qualifications specifically. Sri.K.V.Sohan, however, still persists in his submissions by contending that the case is different when it comes to nomination of members of the Boards and asserts that a distinction will have to be drawn between appointment and nomination. Sri.K.V.Sohan, however, still persists in his submissions by contending that the case is different when it comes to nomination of members of the Boards and asserts that a distinction will have to be drawn between appointment and nomination. We are unable to find the reasoning behind this submission, because while some of the provisions of the statutes, we have seen above, uses the term 'appointment' and others the term 'nomination', they are all more or less in pari materia and ordain specific requisites relating to appointment and disqualification more or less on the same lines. It does not, therefore, matter whether the word used is 'appointment' or 'nomination', because in any case, such appointment or nomination will have to be done within the parameters prescribed by the Statutes, Rules and Scheme applicable and not otherwise. Therefore, this submission that there is a difference between 'nomination' and 'appointment' would also not be forensically accurate or sustainable. 38. In the summation of our observations as above, we are impelled to find the above appeals to be bereft of merit. We must however, also record that even though the final conclusion of the learned single judge, in the judgment impugned herein, that the removal of the petitioners as members of the various Boards are illegal, it being in violation of the applicable Acts, Rules and Schemes, the findings of the learned judge that the appointments of the petitioners were made by the Government at their pleasure would, for the reasons we already said afore, not hold any forensic worth and would, therefore have to be vacated. We declare that the petitioners and other members of the statutory Boards involved in these appeals have been appointed by the Government only under the specific statutory prescriptions providing for such appointment and, therefore, that the doctrine of pleasure would not apply, leading to a corollary declaration that the removal will also have to be done strictly in compliance with the provisions of the statutes, Rules and Scheme applicable to the respective statutory Boards and in no other manner. The present action of the State of Kerala in removing the petitioners asserting that they were appointed at its pleasure, without assigning any reason what so ever and without following the due procedure for removal or disqualification under the respective Acts, Rules and Scheme are, in our view, completely unacceptable and impermissible and therefore, unconstitutional. The present action of the State of Kerala in removing the petitioners asserting that they were appointed at its pleasure, without assigning any reason what so ever and without following the due procedure for removal or disqualification under the respective Acts, Rules and Scheme are, in our view, completely unacceptable and impermissible and therefore, unconstitutional. In these circumstances, the appeals are dismissed, however, without any order as to costs.