JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. 1. The claim petition of the original writ petitioner came to be dismissed by the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (for short ‘Tribunal’) by holding that he is not a ‘workman’ as envisaged under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘Act’) and aggrieved thereby filed the instant petition. However, during the pendency of this writ petition, the original petitioner died and vide order dated 18.12.2017, his legal representatives were ordered to be brought on record. 2. The reference made by the appropriate Government reads thus: “Whether the employee Shri Rajinder Sharma S/o late Shri Sehdev Sharma is a workman or not and termination of his services by the Managing Director, Woodville Palace Resorts (P) Limited, Woodville Palace, Raj Bhawan Road, Shimla-2 w.e.f. 01.01.2004 without holding any domestic enquiry and without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and amount of compensation, the above aggrieved workman is entitled to?” 3. The sole controversy involved in the instant case is whether the deceased petitioner was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. 4. The definition of the workman has been amended from time to time and amendment brought into effect vide Amendment Act 36 of 1956, which came into force w.e.f. 29.8.1956, was in force when the reference was made by the appropriate Government. Therefore, any further amendment in the definition of “workman” under Section 2 (s) of the Act is not relevant for the purpose. Section 2 (s) of the Act as prevalent at the time of making of such reference, reads as under: “2(s). “workman” means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person:- (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957). (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison. (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity. (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.” 5. It would be noticed that there was a conflict between three Judges Bench decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in May & Baker (India) Ltd. vs. Workmen, AIR 1967 SC 678 , Western India Match Co. Ltd. vs. Workmen, AIR 1964 SC 472 and Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Co. of India vs. Burmah Shell Management Staff Association, AIR 1971 SC 922 on the one hand and later three Judges Bench decisions in S.K. Verma vs. Mahesh Chandra, (1983) 4 SCC 214 , Ved Prakash Gupta vs. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd. (1984) 2 SCC 569 and Arkal Govind Raj Rao vs. Ciba Geigy of India Ltd. Bombay, (1985) 3 SCC 371 on the other hand with respect to, who is a workman, constraining the Hon’ble Supreme Court to refer the matter to a Larger Bench in H.R. Adyanthaya and Others vs. Sandoz (India) Limited and Others, (1994) 4 SCC 164 . The question was subsequently answered by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in H.R. Adyanthaya and Others vs. Sandoz (India) Limited and Others, (1994) 5 SCC 737 , wherein while dealing with a question as to whether Medical representatives were covered under the definition of “workman” held that in order to fall within the definition, a person must be employed to do any of the categories of work mentioned in the main body of the definition (viz. manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational etc.) and it is not enough that he is not merely covered by any of the four exceptions of the definition. Word ‘skilled’ to be read ejusdem generia to mean skilled whether manual or non-manual and as such, medical representatives are neither skilled workers nor are they ‘technical’ or ‘operational’ workers. Thus, their work is not covered by any type of works mentioned in the main body of the definition and cannot be considered to be a workman. Word ‘skilled’ to be read ejusdem generia to mean skilled whether manual or non-manual and as such, medical representatives are neither skilled workers nor are they ‘technical’ or ‘operational’ workers. Thus, their work is not covered by any type of works mentioned in the main body of the definition and cannot be considered to be a workman. It shall be apt to reproduce the relevant observations of para 24 of the judgment, which reads thus: “24.........Hence the position in law as it obtains today is that a person to be a workman under the ID Act must be employed to do the work of any of the categories, viz. manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory. It is not enough that he is not covered by either of the four exceptions to the definition. We reiterate the said interpretation.” 6. From the aforesaid exposition of law, it is evidently clear that only a person who is employed to do either manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisor nature of work, unless excluded under Clause I to IV of Section 2(s) of the Act, is a “workman” within the meaning of this definition. 7. It is equally well settled principle of law that designation or name of the post is not material while dealing with the question of person being a “workman”. The main duties which an employee is required to perform is the criteria to determine whether he falls within the category of workman or not. Reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.K. Verma vs. Mahesh Chandra and Another, (1983) 4 SCC 214 , Ved Prakash Gupta vs. M/s Delton Cable India (P) Ltd. (1984) 2 SCC 569 and National Engineering Industries Ltd. vs. Shri Kishan Bhageria and Others, AIR 1988 SC 329 . 8. The aforesaid being the legal position, obviously, therefore, the question as posed before this Court is a question of fact which can be determined only on the basis of the pleadings and evidence on record. 9. In the claim petition filed before the learned Tribunal, the petitioner had claimed that he had been engaged as Front Office Manager in the year 1995 by the respondent on salary of Rs. 3,000/- per month subject to periodical enhancement. 9. In the claim petition filed before the learned Tribunal, the petitioner had claimed that he had been engaged as Front Office Manager in the year 1995 by the respondent on salary of Rs. 3,000/- per month subject to periodical enhancement. In the year 2001, he was promoted as Assistant Manager, but the entire supervisory function, affairs and management of the hotel were being discharged by the respondent, whereas the role of the petitioner was only to the extent of obeying the command of his employer. The petitioner worked in the hotel of the respondent till 1st January, 2004 when his services were suo motu, arbitrarily, abruptly and illegally terminated by the employer without assigning any reason. 10. In reply filed by the respondent to the claim petition, preliminary objections were raised to the effect that the petitioner had not approached the Tribunal with clean hands as he was drawing a salary of Rs. 8,000/- per month and was, therefore, not a workman and in addition thereto, his duties were managerial, administrative and supervisory in nature, therefore, also he was not a workman and the services of the petitioner had been dispensed with in accordance with the terms and conditions of the employment and lastly it was averred that since the petitioner was gainfully employed and, therefore, he was not entitled for any back wages. Such contentions were thereafter reiterated in reply on merits. 11. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Tribunal framed the following issues: 1. Whether Shri Rajinder Sharma is a workman? OPP 2. If issue No. 1 is proved, whether the termination of services of petitioner by the M.D. Woodville Palace Resorts (P) Limited, Shimla-2 w.e.f. 1.1.2004 without holding any domestic enquiry and without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified as alleged? OPR. 3. Relief. 12. Since the only question to be determined in this writ petition at this stage is whether the petitioner is a workman under Section 2 (s) of the Act, therefore, this Court would only discuss the pleadings and evidence as is relevant for determining this question because admittedly the learned Tribunal has not gone into other questions in view of issue No. 2 being dependent upon the answer to issue No. 1 (supra). 13. 13. The petitioner appeared as PW-1 and reiterated the contents of his claim petition by asserting that he had been engaged as Front Office Manager by the respondent in 1995 at the monthly salary of Rs. 3,000/- which was enhanced, from time to time. He further stated that he was promoted as Assistant Manager in 2001 at the monthly salary of Rs. 8,000/- besides Rs. 2,000/- for over time. He stated that he used to work with the respondent from 8.00 A.M. to 12.00 P.M. and while doing so, he was not discharging any supervisory function with regard to the affairs and management of the hotel and used to obey the command of his employer. Thereafter, stated that his services were orally terminated by the respondent and neither any notice nor any compensation was paid. 14. Evidently, this was ex-parte statement of the petitioner as the respondent had already been proceeded ex-parte, but was later on permitted to join the proceedings and thereafter cross-examined the petitioner on 23.4.2010. In the cross-examination, the petitioner admitted that at the time when his services were terminated, he was working as Assistant General Manager in the hotel, but denied that his duties were of supervisory nature and that he had been controlling various departments of the hotel such as Kitchen, House Keeping etc. He further denied that the concerned workers in the kitchen or engaged in the house keeping etc. had been asking him to make them available the various articles/goods which had been exhausted/finished. He further denied that he had been placing direct orders to the concerned shops. 15. Now, adverting to the evidence led by the respondent. Sh. Vijay Sharma, General Manager of the respondent, appeared as RW-1 and stated that the petitioner had initially been appointed as Front Office Manager and thereafter promoted as Assistant General Manager. He stated that the duties of the petitioner was to supervise, manage and to look after all the departments in the hotel of the respondent i.e. housekeeping, kitchen, accounts, general repair and maintenance. The petitioner was also responsible to sanction leave/grant the leave to the workers and staff working under him. 16. In cross-examination, RW-1 admitted that the respondent was a Company and registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and had four Directors including M.D. who are managing the affairs of the Company. The petitioner was also responsible to sanction leave/grant the leave to the workers and staff working under him. 16. In cross-examination, RW-1 admitted that the respondent was a Company and registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and had four Directors including M.D. who are managing the affairs of the Company. He further stated that Kanwar Uday Singh was the M.D. of the Company, who had kept the staff to run the Company. He however denied that all appointments in the hotel was being made by the M.D. viz. Kanwar Uday Singh. However, volunteered to state that the appointments were being made by him in the capacity of General Manager. He further admitted that Wood Villa Palace and Hotel are the same. He stated that the petitioner had been appointed by him and at that time no appointment letter was given to him. He further admitted that the promotion and salary of the petitioner were fixed orally by him. He admitted that he was not liable for any profit and loss to the hotel. He further admitted that at the time of initial engagement of the petitioner his appointment was that of Front Office Manager and his salary was of Rs, 3,000/- per month subject to periodical enhancement. He also admitted that the petitioner was promoted as Assistant General Manager in the year 2001. He denied that the entire affairs of the hotel being run under the supervision and direction of Kanwar Uday Singh. 17. Sant Ram Bhardwaj appeared as RW-2 and stated that he was appointed as an Accountant in the year 2003 and the petitioner was working as Assistant General Manager. He further stated that the duties of the petitioner were to supervise, manage and to look after all the departments in the hotel of the respondent i.e. house-keeping, kitchen, accounts, general repair and maintenance. The petitioner was also responsible for purchasing of hotel provisions and other articles. In cross-examination, this witness admitted that he had not brought on record the wages register of the staff w.e.f. 2000 to December, 2003. He admitted that he was working under the directions of Kanwar Uday Singh and Vijay Sharma. He further stated that he was appointed by Kanwar Uday Singh and went on to state that he could not appoint anybody nor was competent to issue directions. He admitted that he was working under the directions of Kanwar Uday Singh and Vijay Sharma. He further stated that he was appointed by Kanwar Uday Singh and went on to state that he could not appoint anybody nor was competent to issue directions. He further admitted that day to day report of the working of the hotel is made by the General Manager and volunteered to state by the AGM. 18. Man Singh who was working as Chef in the respondent-hotel appeared as RW-3. He had been appointed as Helper in the kitchen in the year 1992 and at the time of deposition he was working as Chef. Further stated that the petitioner was working as Assistant General Manager and the department of kitchen was under his supervision and control and he used to give directions to the kitchen staff and other staff in the hotel. He further stated that he used to tell about the requirements of provision to petitioner, who in turn, orders for the same. All the requirements of the kitchen were informed to the petitioner and even the nature of food that was to be prepared, the same was being done on the directions of the petitioner. 19. In cross-examination, this witness feigned ignorance regarding the petitioner working in the hotel since 1992, but stated that the petitioner was working as AGM. He further stated that he was appointed by Sh. Vijay Sharma, G.M. (RW-1). He further stated that he could not state as to who used to purchase kitchen articles from the market. However, he volunteered to state that the staff used to report to AGM regarding the stock of provisions in the kitchen. 20. The learned Tribunal on the basis of the statements made by the respondent witnesses came to the conclusion that the petitioner was performing supervisory, managerial and administrative functions in the respondent-hotel and was thus not a workman as defined under Section 2 (s) of the Act. It is apt to reproduce the relevant reasoning as contained in paras 11 to 13 of the award as under: “..........Reliance is placed on decision reported in 1985 (1) CLR 318 in case titled as Vinayak Baburao Shinde vs. S.R. Shinde in which it was held that: “The word “Supervise” means to oversee, that is to look after the work done by other persons. The word “Supervision” occurring in section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act means supervision in relation to work or in relation to persons. The essence of supervision consists in overseeing by one person over the work of others. This also involves a power in the person overseeing to direct and control the work done by the persons over whom he is supervising. In an industrial establishment normally there are three layers of work. One is the clerical or the manual work which is done by the workman; the second is the supervisory work done by a supervisor; and at a higher level is the work of a manager.” 13. The petitioner had also authority to confirm the booking per letters Ex. RC and Ex. RD and give discounts per bill Ex. RF. There is nothing on record to make out that the petitioner issued these bills under the directions of the respondent or Shri Vijay Sharma, General Manager (RW-1) of the respondent hotel. The duties were supervisory and managerial. The testimony of the petitioner that he was obeying the command of the employer without specifying the nature of duties cannot be construed to hold that he was not discharging any supervisory and managerial duties and that he was not a workman. The non-production of record of wages does not in any manner abrogate the case of the respondent. Ex.RE is the list of employees of the respondent Hotel for the months of September to December, 1998 wherein the payment made to the employees of the respondent including petitioner has been reflected. This fact rather substantiates the case of the respondent that the petitioner was working as Assistant General Manager with the respondent. Thus, it is clear that the petitioner was performing supervisory, managerial and administrative functions in the respondent Hotel and was not a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The issue is answered against the petitioner.” 21. It is more than settled that normally an award passed by the learned Labour Court is not to be interfered with so far as the factual aspects are concerned, however, it cannot be disputed that in case the findings arrived at by the learned Tribunal is perverse, then this Court would definitely not only have the jurisdiction, but would not hesitate to interfere with the same. 22. 22. What is perverse was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a detailed judgment in Arulvelu and Another vs. State Represented by the Public Prosecutor and Another, (2009) 10 SCC 206 wherein it was held as under:- “26. In M.S. Narayanagouda vs. Girijamma and Another, AIR 1977 Kar. 58 , the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett vs. Gough, (1878) 1 LR 331 the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey vs. Godfrey, 106 NW 814, the Court defined perverse as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression perverse has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition PERVERSE:- Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English - International Edition PERVERSE: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap and Another vs. State of U.P. (2003) 1 SCC 761 , the Court observed thus: (SCC p.766, para 8) "8.........We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh vs. The Commissioner of Police and Others, (1999) 2 SCC 10 , the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: (SCC p.14, paras 9-10) "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of perverse has been examined in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal and Others vs. Gopi Nath & Sons and Others, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 316-17, para 7) "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re-appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re-appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 23. What is perverse has further been considered by this Court in RSA No. 436 of 2000, titled Rubi Sood and Another vs. Major (Retd.) Vijay Kumar Sud and Others, decided on 28.05.2015 in the following manner:- “25.........A finding of fact recorded by the learned Courts below can only be said to be perverse, which has been arrived at without consideration of material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in miscarriage of justice, is open to correction, because it is not treated as a finding according to law. 26. If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or even the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the law. 27. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence, which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable persons would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be perverse. 28. 27. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence, which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable persons would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be perverse. 28. Further if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjectures and surmises, the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non application of mind and thus, stands vitiated.” 24. Bearing in mind the aforesaid exposition of law, it would be noticed that the petitioner while filing the petition and while appearing as PW-1 categorically stated that he was the Front Office Manager. He initially engaged as Front Office Manager and at the time of retrenchment of his services had been working as Assistant General Manager. Even though, the nomenclature of his designation does suggest that he would probably managing the affairs of the Company, but he has categoric and specific to the effect that he did not discharge any supervisory functions with regard to the affairs and management of the hotel. 25. That apart, it would further be noticed that even though the specific stand of the respondents in their reply as also in the evidence was that the petitioner, in fact, was working as Assistant General Manager under whose supervision and control the staff of the hotel, more particularly, the staff of the kitchen had been performing the duties. The staff would report about their requirements and it was the petitioner, who would provide the same. In fact, RW-3 goes on to saying that what nature of food to be prepared was on the direction of the petitioner. But surprisingly enough, despite this the respondents being the custodian of the records have practically led no documentary evidence, save and except, placing on record letters Ex. RC and Ex.RD, which only suggest that the petitioner had confirmed the booking in the hotel and bill Ex. RF which only goes to indicate that the petitioner had given some discount in the tariff to the customer. But these documents in no manner would even remotely establish much less prove that the petitioner had been discharging supervisory and managerial functions. 26. RF which only goes to indicate that the petitioner had given some discount in the tariff to the customer. But these documents in no manner would even remotely establish much less prove that the petitioner had been discharging supervisory and managerial functions. 26. In M/s Sikand & Company vs. State of H.P. and Others, (2007) 2 Latest HLJ 763, a Division Bench of this Court while dealing with the question as to whether a store In-charge in that case was a workman wherein his main duties were to purchase, sell and handover spare parts and maintain the record thereof and it was held that merely because the workman may have discharged supervisory and managerial functions off and on, he still has to be treated as a workman and cannot be treated to be working in managerial or supervisory capacity. It was observed as under: “14. A number of documents have been filed by both the parties. After going through the entire evidence, it is proved that basically the employee was a workman though he may have been given the high sounding designation of Assistant Manager. It is apparent that his main duties were as Store in charge in which capacity he used to purchase, sell and hand over spare parts and maintain the record thereof. In such capacity, he also maintained bin cards and cardex register. It is also apparent that in the absence of the Branch Manager, the petitioner/employee at times were doing supervisory functions. However, we are of the considered view that merely because he may have discharged supervisory and managerial functions off and on, this cannot detract from the basic fact that he was working as Store In-charge. In our opinion, the store in-charge has to be treated as a workman and cannot be treated to be working in managerial or supervisory capacity. The Apex Court in Arkal Govind Raj Rao vs. Ciba Geigy of India Ltd. Bombay, AIR 1985 SC 985 held as follows: “Where an employee has multifarious duties and a question is raised whether he is a workman or someone other than a workman the Court must find out what are the primary and basic duties of the person concerned and if he is incidentally asked to do some other work, may not necessarily be in tune with the basic duties these additional duties cannot change the character and status of the person concerned. In other words, the dominant purpose of employment must be first taken into consideration and the gloss of some additional duties must be rejected while determining the status and character of the person. The definition of the expression workman clearly shows that the person concerned would not cease to be a workman if he performs some supervisory duties but he must be person who person must be engaged in a supervisory capacity.” The learned Tribunal has dealt with this question in detail and we feel that the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal holding the employee to be a workman are supported by evidence and material on record and cannot be set aside in a writ jurisdiction.” 27. Even in the instant case, the petitioner may have been given a high sounding designation of Front Office Manager and thereafter as Assistant General Manager, but nonetheless it is apparent that none of the duties performed by him could be said to be either supervisory, managerial or administrative. The evidence led by the petitioner, as discussed above, even though oral, to claim that he was not discharging any supervisory, managerial or administrative duties, has not been successfully rebutted by the respondent and, therefore, the findings rendered by the learned Tribunal can conveniently be held to be perverse. 28. As observed earlier, the learned Tribunal has dismissed the claim petition of the original petitioner only on the ground that he was not a workman, whereas the issue No. 2 has not been decided because the same was dependent upon the findings on issue No. 1. However, since the findings on issue No. 1 have now been set-aside by this Court, the matter is required to be remitted back to the learned Tribunal for rendering findings on issue No. 2 not because that this Court is not competent to do so, but in case such exercise is undertaken by this Court that would obliterate one channel of appeal to the aggrieved party. 29. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the order passed by the learned Tribunal dated 5.1.2012 in Reference No. 60 of 2007 is set-aside with a direction to the learned Tribunal to decide the same as expeditiously as possible and in no event later than 31st March, 2018. 30. The parties through their counsels are directed to appear before the learned Tribunal on 01.01.2018. 31. 30. The parties through their counsels are directed to appear before the learned Tribunal on 01.01.2018. 31. The petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending applications if any, stands disposed of.