Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 1435 (GAU)

Liakat Ali v. Hon'ble Gauhati High Court

2017-11-14

NELSON SAILO, UJJAL BHUYAN

body2017
JUDGMENT : UJJAL BHUYAN, J. Heard Mr. P.K. Goswami, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. D.R. Gogoi and Ms. B. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. S.K. Medhi, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. A. Das, learned counsel for the Gauhati High Court. 2. Grievance of both the writ petitioners being identical, the two writ petitions were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 3. Both the petitioners were Judicial Officers belong to the Assam Judicial Service who were compulsorily retired from service in exercise of powers confer red by rule 20 of the Assam Judicial Service Rules, 2003 read with FR 56(b), which is under challenge in the two writ petitions. 4. For the sake of convenience and for appreciation of the lis in the proper perspective, facts highlighted in WP No. 2732/2007 (Liakat Ali v. Gauhati High Court) are briefly narrated hereunder. WP(C) No. 2732/2007 5. Petitioner was selected for appointment to Grade III of Assam Judicial Service vide Notification dated 5.3.1986 issued by the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Judicial Department pursuant to which he joined on 9.4.1986 as Second Class Magistrate at Nagaon. After rendering service as Magistrate and Munsiff in different places, petitioner was promoted to Grade II of Assam Judicial Service in April, 1999 and was posted as Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate at Dhemaji. In the year 2004, he was transferred to and posted as Civil Judge (Sr. Division)-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge, Kokrajhar. 6. While the petitioner was working at Mangaldoi as Munsiff No. 1, a contempt case was registered against him, being Contempt Petition (C) No. 515/1994, alleging willful non-compliance to an order dated 7.10.1994 passed in Civil Revision No. 478/1994. Vide order dated 6.5.1999, petitioner was held guilty of contempt and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month with fine. However, in Contempt Appeal (C) No. 4/1999 filed by the petitioner, the above order dated 6.5.1999 was set aside by a Division Bench vide judgment and order dated 19.1.2000. 7. Vide order dated 6.5.1999, petitioner was held guilty of contempt and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month with fine. However, in Contempt Appeal (C) No. 4/1999 filed by the petitioner, the above order dated 6.5.1999 was set aside by a Division Bench vide judgment and order dated 19.1.2000. 7. Though a show cause notice dated 20.2.2001 was issued to the petitioner by the Registrar (I&E), Gauhati High Court with certain charges pertaining to the allegation of contempt, after submission of written statement by the petitioner on 4.6.2001 and after holding of departmental proceeding for some time, petitioner was informed by the Registrar (I&E), Gauhati High Court on 31.3.2004 that the disciplinary proceeding drawn up against him was dropped. 8. In the meanwhile, Registrar (I&E), Gauhati High Court vide letter dated 16.3.2002 had sought for option from the petitioner as to whether he was willing to opt for ad-hoc promotion from Grade II to Grade I in the Assam Judicial Service against the post of Ad-hoc Addl. Sessions Judge of Fast Track Courts, Assam. According to the petitioner, though he had given his option, the offer to him was withdrawn on the ground of pendency of disciplinary proceeding at that point of time. 9. By communication dated 8.1.2003 of the Deputy Registrar (Aptt), petitioner was intimated about adverse remark recorded in his Annual Confidential Report (ACR) for the year 2001. Petitioner was graded as ‘average’. Quality of his judgment was assessed as average and quantity of work was found to be not sufficient. 10. Petitioner submitted explanation on 7.2.2003. In his explanation, amongst other things, he stated that out of the total of 460 cases in his roster during the reported period he had disposed of 332 cases, rate of disposal being 72.17%. 11. Petitioner did not receive any reply or order from the Gauhati High Court regarding modification or up-gradation of his ACR grading. 12. For the year 2002, petitioner was again graded ‘average’. While the quality of judgment was assessed as average, quantity of work was found to be poor. 13. This was communicated to the petitioner on 20.5.2003 by the Deputy Registrar (Apptt.). This time also petitioner submitted his explanation on 30.6.2003 explaining amongst others that there were a total of 531 cases in his court out of which 391 cases were disposed of, percentage of disposal being 73.63%. 14. 13. This was communicated to the petitioner on 20.5.2003 by the Deputy Registrar (Apptt.). This time also petitioner submitted his explanation on 30.6.2003 explaining amongst others that there were a total of 531 cases in his court out of which 391 cases were disposed of, percentage of disposal being 73.63%. 14. According to the petitioner, he had not been communicated any decision of the High Court following his above explanation. 15. In the year 2003 also, petitioner was graded ‘average’ with the remark “disposal inadequate”. Petitioner was also not found fit for promotion to higher grade. This was communicated to the petitioner on 15.6.2004 by the Deputy Registrar (Apptt.). As on previous occasion, petitioner submitted explanation to the High Court on 26.7.2004 stating that during the reporting period 681 cases were pending out of which 539 were disposed of, percentage of disposal being 79.14%. During this period 569 witnesses were examined in contested cases apart from 58 witnesses in uncontested cases. 16. However, petitioner did not receive any communication from the High Court. 17. By notification dated 29.11.2004 issued by the Registrar General, Gauhati High Court, petitioner was confirmed in Grade II w.e.f. 1.11.2003. 18. Petitioner was granted benefit of Assured Career Progression scheme at stage 1 of the time scale of pay and was re-designated as the Senior Civil Judge vide Circular dated 29.4.2006 issued by the Registrar (Vigilance). 19. Be that as it may, Registrar (Judicial), Gauhati High Court by his letter dated 18.5.2007 informed the Legal Remembrancer and Secretary to the Government of Assam, Judicial Department that High Court was pleased not to allow the officers in Grade II and Grade III of Assam Judicial Service mentioned in the said communication to continue in service in accordance with rule 20 of the Assam Judicial Service Rules, 2003 and FR 56(b). Petitioner's name appeared at serial No. 2, who was then serving as Civil Judge-cum-Asstt. Sessions Judge, Kokrajhar. 20. Thereafter, Legal Remembrancer and Secretary to the Government of Assam, Judicial Department issued Notification dated 31.5.2007 compulsorily retiring 9 Judicial Officers from their service, including the petitioner at serial No. 2. It was mentioned in the said Notification that it was issued in exercise of powers conferred under rule 20 of the Assam Judicial Service Rules, 2003 (‘2003 Rules’) and FR 56(b) and on the recommendation of the Gauhati High Court. It was mentioned in the said Notification that it was issued in exercise of powers conferred under rule 20 of the Assam Judicial Service Rules, 2003 (‘2003 Rules’) and FR 56(b) and on the recommendation of the Gauhati High Court. It was also mentioned that the officers compulsorily retired were entitled to 3 months salary in lieu of notice. 21. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision taken, present writ petition has been filed. 22. The writ petition was admitted for hearing on 11.6.2007. 23. Though this case is pending for more than 10 years, no affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Gauhati High Court. WP(C) No. 2740/2007 24. In this case, petitioner was appointed to Grade III of Assam Judicial Service on 19.7.1988 whereafter he joined as Judicial Magistrate, Second Class at Dibrugarh. After serving as Magistrate and Munisff at different stations, petitioner was promoted to Grade II vide Notification dated 19.12.2000 issued by the Registrar General, Gauhati High Court. On such promotion, he was posted as Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bongaigaon. 25. Like the petitioner in WP(C) No. 2732/2007, petitioner was also graded ‘average’ with the remark poor disposal rate in his ACR for the year 2001 which was communicated to him on 23.12.2003 by the Deputy Registrar (Apptt.). Petitioner submitted his representation on 27.1.2004 but according to him there was no response. This was followed in his ACR for the year 2002 where also he was graded ‘average’ with the remark not fit for promotion. His representation dated 19.7.2004 was not responded to. In the meanwhile, petitioner was confirmed in Grade III w.e.f. on 4.3.1993 vide Notification dated 29.11.2004 issued by the Registrar General, Gauhati High Court. 26. Registrar General in his communication dated 18.5.2007 informed the Legal Remembrancer and Secretary to the Government of Assam, Judicial Department that High Court was pleased not to allow the petitioner to continue in service in accordance with rule 20 of the 2003 Rules and FR 56(b). This was followed by the Government Notification dated 31.5.2007 as alluded to herein above compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service with immediate effect under the aforesaid provisions with 3 months salary in lieu of notice. 27. Hence, the writ petition. 28. This case was admitted for hearing on 11.6.2007. 29. High Court had filed affidavit in this case on 30.11.2010 to which petitioner has filed reply. Submissions 30. Mr. 27. Hence, the writ petition. 28. This case was admitted for hearing on 11.6.2007. 29. High Court had filed affidavit in this case on 30.11.2010 to which petitioner has filed reply. Submissions 30. Mr. P.K. Goswami, learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits that since the petitioners have been compulsorily retired from service by invoking the powers conferred under rule 20 of the 2003 Rules and FR 56(b), the exercise of such power would have to be judged strictly on the anvil of the said provisions. Referring to rule 20 of the 2003 Rules, he submits that the language of the said provision is very clear. Review of career progress and attributes of judicial officers has to be carried out by a committee consisting of 3 Senior Judges headed by the Chief Justice of the High Court. If such a committee considers in public interest that a particular officer should be retired from service, he shall be compulsorily retired by giving him 3 months notice in writing or 3 months pay and allowances in lieu of notice. He submits that the committee of Judges which had reviewed the career progress of the petitioners and which had recommended compulsory retirement was not constituted as per rule 20 inasmuch as it was not headed by the Chief Justice. Therefore, recommendation of such committee is non est in the eye of law. He, further, submits that the prime consideration for invoking such power is public interest. But, nothing is discernible from the impugned order as to how the High Court came to the conclusion that compulsory retirement of the petitioners were in the public interest or compulsory retirement of the petitioners would be in the public interest. He, further, submits that adverse ‘average’ grading in the ACRs were belatedly communicated to the petitioners and no decision were taken on their representations against such adverse gradings. At least, petitioners were not informed by the High Court as to what decisions were taken. Therefore, the High Court could not have acted upon such adverse ACRs of the petitioners. He has also made detailed submissions regarding difficulties faced by the petitioners, particularly the petitioner in WP(C) No. 2732/2007, while participating in the departmental proceeding. Mr. At least, petitioners were not informed by the High Court as to what decisions were taken. Therefore, the High Court could not have acted upon such adverse ACRs of the petitioners. He has also made detailed submissions regarding difficulties faced by the petitioners, particularly the petitioner in WP(C) No. 2732/2007, while participating in the departmental proceeding. Mr. Goswami has placed reliance on a number of decisions and submits that impugned decisions are not in the public interest and, therefore, cannot be sustained having regard to the mandate of rule 20 of the 2003 Rules. In support of his submissions, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on a number of decisions. 31. On the other hand, Mr. S.K. Medhi, learned senior counsel appearing for the High Court submits that High Court has not filed affidavit in the case of Liakat Ali because the affidavit filed in the case of Jalal Uddin Ahmed would cover both the cases as the issue involved in the two cases is the same. It is also submitted that representations submitted by the petitioners were considered and rejected on 27.9.2004 but no record is available regarding such decision taken or regarding communication of such decision to the petitioners. No prejudice was caused to the petitioners by invocation of rule 20 of the 2003 Rules as such an order of compulsory retirement is not an order of penalty. Further submission is that High Court had acted in the best interest of the institution and, therefore, this court may not interfere with such decision of the High Court. Mr. Medhi also submits that there is substantial compliance of rule 20 of the 2003 Rules as the committee's recommendation received the approval of the Full Court presided over by hon'ble the Chief Justice. Therefore, there is no error or infirmity in the decision taken and both the writ petitions should be dismissed. 32. On a query by the court, Mr. RK. Goswami, learned senior counsel submits that in the ordinary course both the petitioners would have retired from service on attaining age of 58 years in the year 2013. Discussion 33. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received the due consideration of the court and all the decisions cited at the Bar have been considered. 34. RK. Goswami, learned senior counsel submits that in the ordinary course both the petitioners would have retired from service on attaining age of 58 years in the year 2013. Discussion 33. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received the due consideration of the court and all the decisions cited at the Bar have been considered. 34. Since the issue involved in the two writ petitions centres around rule 20 of the 2003 Rules, it would be appropriate to advert to the same at the outset, which is extracted hereunder: “20. Retirement in public interest. — (1) There shall be a committee consisting of three senior Judges, headed by Chief Justice of the High Court to review the career progress and other attributes of all Judicial Officers. (2) This review will be undertaken when the concerned officers attain the age of 50 and 55 years. If the committee considers that in public interest the officers should be retired from service, he shall be compulsorily retired by giving him a notice of not less than 3 months in writing or 3 months pay and allowances in lieu thereof: Provided that nothing in sub-rule (2) shall be considered as preventing consideration for compulsory retirement of a member of the service at any time other than those mentioned therein.” 35. A careful analysis of rule 20 would go to show that it deals with retirement of judicial officers belonging to Assam Judicial Service in public interest. As per sub-rule (1), there shall be a committee consisting of three senior Judges headed by the Chief Justice of the High Court to review the career progress and other attributes of all judicial officers. Sub-rule (2) says that such review will be undertaken when the concerned officers attain the age of 50 and 55 years. If the committee considers that in public interest the officers should be retired from service, they shall be compulsorily retired by giving them notice of not less than 3 months in writing or 3 months pay and allowances in lieu thereof. As per the proviso, an officer can also be compulsorily retired at any time other than 50 or 55 years. Therefore, the requirement of rule 20 of the 2003 Rules is, firstly, there must be an assessment of the career progress and other attributes of all Judicial Officers. As per the proviso, an officer can also be compulsorily retired at any time other than 50 or 55 years. Therefore, the requirement of rule 20 of the 2003 Rules is, firstly, there must be an assessment of the career progress and other attributes of all Judicial Officers. This assessment or review must be carried out by a committee of 3 senior Judges headed by the Chief Justice of the High Court. Secondly, this exercise must be carried out when the concerned officer attains the age of 50 and 55 years, respectively though as per the proviso, such an exercise can also be carried out any time other than at the above two stages. The third aspect of the matter is that if the committee considers in the public interest that an officer should be retired from service, then he should be compulsorily retired. The crucial consideration here is “public interest”. Lastly, once such decision is taken, the concerned officer should be compulsorily retired by following the procedure either by giving him a notice of not less than 3 months in writing or 3 months pay and allowances in lieu thereof. 36. Having discussed the above, let us now examine the record. 37. The record discloses that following an order of hon'ble the Chief Justice dated 7.11.2006, Registrar (Judicial), Gauhati High Court had issued Notification dated 8.11.2006 stating that hon'ble the Chief Justice was pleased to constitute a committee consisting of three hon'ble Judges mentioned therein to evaluate the performance of all the Judicial Officers of the North Eastern States. 38. At this stage, it may be noted that during the aforesaid period, all the North Eastern States were under the jurisdiction of the Gauhati High Court being the common High Court and accordingly the committee was constituted to evaluate the performance of all the Judicial Officers of the North Eastern States. In so far petitioner Liakat Ali is concerned, we find that barring the year 1991 when it was remarked that he was a hard working officer, from 1988 to 1997 petitioner was graded as ‘average’. In 1998 he was graded as ‘good’ and fit for promotion. From 1999 to 2003 he was again graded as ‘average’. In 2004 and 2005 he was graded as ‘good’. Insofar ACR gradings for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003 are concerned, petitioner had submitted representations against such gradings. In 1998 he was graded as ‘good’ and fit for promotion. From 1999 to 2003 he was again graded as ‘average’. In 2004 and 2005 he was graded as ‘good’. Insofar ACR gradings for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003 are concerned, petitioner had submitted representations against such gradings. Though it is stated that such representations were rejected by the High Court on 27.9.2004, neither any resolution nor any order to that effect are found available in the record. On the other hand, Mr. Goswami, learned senior counsel for the petitioners has asserted that petitioners had not received any communication from the High Court in this regard. 39. The committee so constituted, which has been referred to as the Assessment Committee for evaluation of Judicial Officers at the age of 50 and 55 years, held its meeting on 22.12.2006. In the case of Liakat Ali, the committee remarked that his performance was highly unsatisfactory for which he was superseded in the matter of promotion on several occasions. The officer's reputation in almost all stations where he had been posted was extremely poor. On due evaluation of his service record, committee found that in spite of repeated opportunities granted, the officer had failed to improve the quality and quantity of his work which was “far below average”. The committee, observed that continuance of Liakat Ali was not conducive towards the good reputation and image of the judiciary and, therefore, he should be compulsorily retired. 40. Similar recommendation was made in the case of petitioner Jalal Uddin Ahmed. 41. Recommendation of the Assessment Committee was placed before the Full Court of the High Court in its meeting held on 4.5.2007. 42. The recommendation for compulsory retirement of the two petitioners along with two other Grade II officers was approved. 43. Before examining the above recommendation of the Assessment Committee and approval of the Full Court, we may at this stage refer to the Assam Services (Confidential Rolls) Rules, 1990 (‘1990 Rules’), framed in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to article 309 of the Constitution of India. Rule 5 thereof lays down the procedure for writing confidential reports and rule 6 deals with review of confidential reports. Rule 5 thereof lays down the procedure for writing confidential reports and rule 6 deals with review of confidential reports. As per rule 5(1), a confidential report assessing the performance, character, conduct and qualities of every employee shall be written for each financial year, ordinarily within two months of the close of the said year at the latest. Rule 6(1) says that the confidential report shall be reviewed by the reviewing authority ordinarily within one month of its being written. As per rule 10, where a confidential report contains an adverse or critical remark, it should be communicated to the concerned employee together with a substance of the entire confidential report within one month of its acceptance by the accepting authority. Certificate of such communication should be recorded in the annual confidential report. Rule 11 provides for representation against adverse remarks within 60 days from the date of receipt of the adverse remarks. Rule 12 deals with consideration of representation against adverse remarks. As per rule 12(1), the reviewing authority shall consider such representation and pass necessary orders as far as possible within 3 months thereof either rejecting the representation or toning down the remark or expunging the remark. The employee shall be informed accordingly. Be it stated that the aforesaid 1990 Rules were framed much before the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in Dev Dutt v. Union of India, (2008) 8 SCC 725 . 44. A careful analysis of the relevant provisions of the 1990 Rules as alluded to herein above would go to show that adverse remarks are required to be communicated to the affected employee or officer within one month of its acceptance by the accepting authority. But we find that adverse remarks were communicated to the petitioners after more than one year in both the cases. That apart, the requirement of rule 12 regarding consideration of representation against adverse remarks and informing the concerned employee or officer about the decision taken was not adhered to in the instant case. 45. Reverting back to rule 20 of the 2003 Rules vis-a-vis the recommendation of the Assessment Committee dated 22.12.2006, we find that instead of hon'ble the Chief Justice heading the committee mandated under rule 20, 3 senior Judges were nominated by the hon'ble the Chief Justice to constitute the committee. Though Mr. 45. Reverting back to rule 20 of the 2003 Rules vis-a-vis the recommendation of the Assessment Committee dated 22.12.2006, we find that instead of hon'ble the Chief Justice heading the committee mandated under rule 20, 3 senior Judges were nominated by the hon'ble the Chief Justice to constitute the committee. Though Mr. S.K. Medhi, learned standing counsel for the High Court, would like to contend that there is substantial compliance of rule 20 inasmuch as hon'ble Chief Justice had nominated the 3 senior Judges and the recommendation of the committee was approved by the Full Court headed by the hon'ble Chief Justice, we are afraid; we can accept such contention of the learned standing counsel. It is a well settled and a well recognised principle of administrative law that when law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner; it has to be done in that manner alone and in no other manner. It is a salutary principle of administrative law which has been recognised by the superior Courts in India and has been religiously followed. 46. The origin of this rule is traceable to the English decision in Taylor v. Taylor which was followed by the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 , where it was stated that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. This rule was thereafter applied with approval by the Supreme Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 322 , and since then has been regularly applied. 47. Rule 20(1) of the 2003 Rules is very specific. Review of the career progress and other attributes of Judicial Officers has to be carried out by a committee of 3 senior Judges headed by the Chief Justice of the High Court. This rule does not provide for delegation of authority or nomination by the Chief Justice. This rule mandates that the committee should be headed by the Chief Justice and logically should comprise of two other senior Judges to complete the composition. The 2003 Rules, which still holds the field, were framed in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to article 309 of the Constitution read with article 234 thereof in consultation with the Gauhati High Court. The 2003 Rules, which still holds the field, were framed in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to article 309 of the Constitution read with article 234 thereof in consultation with the Gauhati High Court. Therefore, we are of the unhesitant view that the constitution of the committee vide the Notification dated 8.11.2006 was not in conformity with the requirement of rule 20(1) of the 2003 Rules. If that be so, then recommendation of such a committee would be non est in the eye of law. Subsequent approval of the recommendation of such a committee by the Full Court would not clothe such decision with legitimacy since the decision itself is void ab initio. 48. We are also constrained to observe that in so far assessment of the petitioners are concerned, more particularly Liakat Ali, it appears to be quite off the record. Record discloses that for most part of his career Liakat Ali was graded ‘average’. But as per the committee, his quality and quantity of work was “far below average”. In service jurisprudence, more particularly in matters relating to gradings in ACR, a grading of “far below average” has a different connotation altogether and cannot be equated with the grading ‘average’ which was the grading given to the petitioner. That apart, in the immediately preceding two years, i.e., 2004 and 2005, petitioner had shown marked improvement which is discernible from the improvement in his grading in these two years from ‘average’ to ‘good’. 49. At this stage we would like to observe that assessment of an officer's suitability for promotion to the next higher grade and assessment of an officer's continued utility for him to be retained in service at the stage of 50 and 55 years are two different things. Both assessments would have to be carried out by applying different yardstick. Just because an officer is not found suitable for promotion, it would not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that the said officer is not fit to be retained in service. 50. We also do not find any materials on record to justify observation of the committee that the reputation of the petitioner Liakat Ali is extremely poor; at least this is not borne out by the record which is before us. 50. We also do not find any materials on record to justify observation of the committee that the reputation of the petitioner Liakat Ali is extremely poor; at least this is not borne out by the record which is before us. Therefore, we are constrained to hold that the view taken by the committee that continuance of Liakat Ali would not be conducive to the good reputation and image of the judiciary and, therefore, he should be compulsorily retired from service appears to be subjective in nature and not backed by the materials on record, having a distinct stigmatic flavour. 51. We have already discussed that the key expression finding place in rule 20 of the 2003 Rules is “public interest”. It is the sine qua non for invoking the power under rule 20. If the committee considers that in the public interest an officer should be retired from service at the stage of 50 or 55 years, then he shall be compulsorily retired. This is also the requirement under FR 56(b), which says that notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, i.e., Fundamental Rules and Subsidiary Rules, the appropriate authority may, if he is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so, retire a Government servant after giving him notice of not less than 3 months in writing or 3 months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice after he has attained 50 years of age or has completed 25 years of service, whichever is earlier. Therefore, formation of opinion in the public interest assumes critical importance. What then is “public interest” or what is the meaning of the expression “public interest”? To answer this question, we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Lever Employees Unionv. Hindustan Lever Ltd., 1995 Supp (1) SCC 499. That was a case where the Supreme Court was considering amalgamation of two companies under section 394 of the Companies Act, 1956. In that context, the expression “public interest” appearing in that section came up for consideration. Supreme Court held, thus: “5.********* What would be public interest cannot be put in a straitjacket. It is a dynamic concept which keeps on changing. In that context, the expression “public interest” appearing in that section came up for consideration. Supreme Court held, thus: “5.********* What would be public interest cannot be put in a straitjacket. It is a dynamic concept which keeps on changing. It has been explained in Black's Law Dictionary as: “Something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, or as the interests of the particular locality which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by citizens generally in affairs of local, State or national Government.” It is an expression of wide amplitude. It may have different connotation and understanding when used in service law and a yet different meaning in criminal law than civil law and its shade may be entirely different in company law. *********” 52. We may now refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Baldev Raj Chadha v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 321 , wherein it is stated that when an order of compulsory retirement in the public interest is challenged, the State must disclose the materials so that the court may be satisfied that the order is not bad for want of any material whatever which to a reasonable man reasonably instructed in law would be sufficient to sustain the grounds of “public interest” justifying forced retirement of the public servant. Supreme Court held as under: “8. This takes us to the meat of the matter, viz., whether the appellant was retired because and only because it was necessary in the public interest so to do. It is an affirmative action, not a negative disposition, a positive conclusion, not a neutral attitude. It is a terminal step to justify which the onus is on the Administration, not a matter where the victim must make out the contrary. Security of tenure is the condition of efficiency of service. The Administration, to be competent, must have servants who are not plagued by uncertainty about tomorrow. It is a terminal step to justify which the onus is on the Administration, not a matter where the victim must make out the contrary. Security of tenure is the condition of efficiency of service. The Administration, to be competent, must have servants who are not plagued by uncertainty about tomorrow. At the age of 50 when you have family responsibility and the sombre problems of one's own life's evening, your experience, accomplishments and fullness of fitness become an asset to the Administration, if and only if you are not harried or worried by “what will happen to me and my family?” “Where will I go if cashiered?” “How will I survive when I am too old to be newly employed and too young to be superannuated?” These considerations become all the more important in departments where functional independence, fearless scrutiny, and freedom to expose evil or error in high places is the task. And the ombudsmanic tasks of the office of audit vested in the C&AG and the entire army of monitors and minions under him are too strategic for the nation's financial health and discipline, that immunity from subtle threats and oblique overawing is very much in public interest. So it is that we must emphatically state that under the guise of “public interest” if unlimited discretion is regarded acceptable for making an order of premature retirement, it will be the surest menace to public interest and must fail for unreasonableness, arbitrariness and disguised dismissal. To constitutionalise the rule, we must so read it as to free it from the potential for the mischiefs we have just projected. The exercise of power must be bona fide and promote public interest. There is no demonstrable ground to infer mala fides here and the only infirmity alleged which deserves serious notice is as to whether the order has been made in public interest. When an order is challenged and its validity depends on its being supported by public interest the State must disclose the material so that the court may be satisfied that the order is not bad for want of any material whatever which, to a reasonable man reasonably instructed in the law, is sufficient to sustain the grounds of “public interest” justifying forced retirement of the public servant. Judges cannot substitute their judgment for that of the Administrator but they are not absolved from the minimal review well-settled in administrative law and founded on constitutional obligations. The limitations on judicial power in this area are well-known and we are confined to an examination of the material merely to see whether a rational mind may conceivably be satisfied that the compulsory retirement of the officer concerned is necessary in public interest.” 53. This position was reiterated in Rajat Baran Royv. State of West Bengal, (1999) 4 SCC 235 . Conclusion and decision 54. The up-shot of the above discussion is that the impugned order of compulsory retirement of the petitioners cannot be legally sustained. Resultantly, recommendation of the Assessment Committee dated 22.12.2006, Full Court decision dated 4.5.2007, communication of the High Court dated 18.5.2007 and impugned Government Notification dated 31.5.2007 in respect of the petitioners Liakat Ali and Jalal Uddin Ahmed are hereby set aside and quashed. 55. Since in the ordinary course petitioners would have superannuated from service in the meantime, we direct that upon quashment of the above recommendation, decision, communication and notification, petitioners would be entitled to all consequential benefits to which they would have been entitled to had they been in service. 56. Both the writ petitions are accordingly allowed. 57. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 58. Record produced by Mr. S.K. Medhi is returned back.