JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Heard Mr. Sunil Murarka, the learned Counsel, who has argued on being instructed by Mr. P. Deka, the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Sanjay Kr. Medhi, the learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. A. Das, the learned Counsel for the respondent. 2. This revision under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code (CPC for short), has been filed by the defendant to challenge the concurrent finding by both the courts below, being the judgment and decree dated 10.09.2009, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Tinsukia, in Title Appeal No. 1/2009, thereby upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff, Margherita, Tinsukia, in Title Suit No. 1/2007. 3. The petitioner is the plaintiff in Title Suit No. 72/2005, which was originally instituted before the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tinsukia. Upon enlargement of pecuniary jurisdiction of the Courts of Munsiff in the State of Assam, the proceeding was transferred to the Court of the learned Munsiff, Margherita, Tinsukia, where it was re-registered as Title Suit No. 1/2007. The said suit was filed for ejectment of the respondent- defendant from the suit premises described in Schedule-A and Schedule-B of the plaint, which are two shop rooms ad-measuring about 12 feet X 8 feet and 5 feet X 8 feet respectively, with pucca floors, brick walls with CI sheet roof, standing on a part of the land covered by Dag No. 903 of P.P. No. 19 of Digboi Town (Near Janata Talkies Parking place), Mouza-Makum, Dist. Tinsukia, Assam, from where the respondent- defendant is carrying on his business of wine-shop. 4. The case of the petitioner-plaintiff, as projected in the plaint was that the Plaintiff as Karta of M/s. Adaram Singh Estate (HUF) of Digboi is the lawful owner of the property. On request of the defendant, the plaintiff obtained necessary permission from Digboi Town Committee on 03.05.2001 and constructed the shop premises described in Schedule-A on the vacant land at Janata Talkies Parking place. The defendant gave an advance of Rs.6,000/- and the monthly rent was agreed at Rs.1,000/- per month w.e.f. 01.07.2001. On taking possession of the shop, the defendant started liquor shop therefrom. After adjustment of advance against the monthly rent from July, 2001 to December, 2001, the defendant neglected and failed to pay monthly rent to the plaintiff. The defendant gave an advance of Rs.6,000/- and the monthly rent was agreed at Rs.1,000/- per month w.e.f. 01.07.2001. On taking possession of the shop, the defendant started liquor shop therefrom. After adjustment of advance against the monthly rent from July, 2001 to December, 2001, the defendant neglected and failed to pay monthly rent to the plaintiff. In violation of their agreement, on 04.03.2002, the defendant illegally constructed the shop described in Schedule-B and extended his business therefrom and did not pay any rent. As rent prior to 3 years from filing of suit was barred by limitation, the plaintiff had prayed for decree for (i) ejectment, (ii) recovery of arrear rent of Rs.36,000/- @ Rs.1,000/- from January, 2002 to November, 2005, (iii) recovery of Rs.33,000/- as compensation for unauthorized construction and occupation @ Rs.1,000/- per month from March, 2002 to November, 2005, (iv) recovery of future compensation @ Rs.300/- per day from 01.12.2005 till recovery of vacant and khas possession of Schedule-A and B suit premises, (v) cost and (vi) other reliefs. 5. The defendant contested the suit by filing his written statement. The defendant took a stand of denial of any relationship between him and the plaintiff as tenant and landlord. The defendant denied all statements made in the plaint. It was stated that the suit was bad for non- joinder of (i) Jai Prakash Singh, (ii) Income Tax Authorities including Tax Recovery Officer, (iii) Union of India, etc. A plea was taken that the suit cannot be decreed without declaration of right, title and other consequential relief’s. The stand of the defendant was that the defendant never came in occupation of the tenant premises as a tenant of the plaintiff and, as such, no relationship as landlord and tenant existed between them and that the defendant never paid Rs.1,000/- as monthly rent for Schedule-A premises to the plaintiff. It was projected that the defendant requested Jai Prakash Singh to let out two rooms measuring about 7” X 9’3” and 13’ X 9’3” to him and on 01.04.2001, he paid a sum of Rs.10,000/- to the said Jai Prakash Singh to carry out minimum repairs to the said premises and after repairs, the said premises was handed over to the defendant w.e.f. 01.05.2001 at the monthly rent of Rs.600/- per month and he started his business under the name and style of M/s. City Wine Shop. A written agreement was entered into on 01.01.2002 with Jai Prakash Singh. The defendant had stated that he had also obtained electricity connection in his name. It was stated that the right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the suit property is sub-judice in various courts and suits and, as such, the defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit. It was claimed that not only the Income tax Authorities had appointed the said Jai Prakash Singh as the receiver of the properties of Janata Cinema Hall on 29.10.1975 but he was also appointed as the receiver of the said property by this court by order dated 02.12.1983 passed in Civil Rule No. 1170/1983 and, as such, the said person was running and taking care of the entire property of Janata Cinema Hall. 6. On the basis of pleadings, the learned trial court had framed the following issues for trial:- 1. Whether the suit is maintainable? 2. Whether the defendant paid Rs.6,000/- to the plaintiff for constructing the suit premises described in schedule-A of the plaint and came in occupation of the suit premises as a tenant under the plaintiff at monthly rent of Rs.1000/-? If so. 3. Whether the defendant illegal constructed the premises described in schedule B of the plaint violating the terms of the tenancy? 4. Whether the defendant is default in respect of payment of rent? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree as prayed for? 6. To what relief/relief’s the parties are entitled. 7. In support of their cases, while the plaintiff examined himself as PW-1 and exhibited the following documents, viz., (i) Jamabandi (Ext.1), (ii) Permission for Construction issued by Digboi Town Committee dated 03.05.2001 (Ext.2), (iii) Money receipt (Ext.3), (iv) Complaint dated 07.03.2002 by plaintiff to The Officer In-Charge, Digboi P.S. and The Chairman, Digboi Town Committee regarding illegal construction of shop by defendant from 04.03.2002 (Ext.4), (v) Postal receipt (Ext.5), (vi) Acknowledgement card (Ext.6), (vii) Acknowledgement card (Ext.7), (viii) Certificate by Tax Recovery Officer dated 19.04.1990, regarding payment of all Income Tax and Wealth Tax dues including charges for receiver (Ext.8). The defendant has also examined himself as DW-1 and exhibited the following documents, viz., (i) Money receipt (Ext.A), (ii) Money receipt of ASEB (Ext.B), (iii) ASEB Bill (Ext.C), (iv) Tenancy Agreement (Ext.D), (v) Rent receipts (Ext.E, F and G). 8. The defendant has also examined himself as DW-1 and exhibited the following documents, viz., (i) Money receipt (Ext.A), (ii) Money receipt of ASEB (Ext.B), (iii) ASEB Bill (Ext.C), (iv) Tenancy Agreement (Ext.D), (v) Rent receipts (Ext.E, F and G). 8. On the basis of the appreciation of the evidence on record, the learned trial court held that the PW-1 was aware that the defendant was a tenant under Jai Prakash Singh and, as such, the issue No.2 was decided in favour of the defendant and consequently, the other issues were also decided against the plaintiff and the suit was dismissed by judgment and decree dated 25.11.2008. The said judgment decree was assailed in appeal. The learned appellate court had re-appreciated the 6 (six) issues decided by the learned trial court and in respect of the issue No. (2), it was held that the defendant was never a tenant of the plaintiff and consequently, upheld the decision of the learned trial court on all the issues and consequently, Title Appeal No.1/2009 was dismissed. 9. The concurrent finding of facts as decided by both the trial court and the first appellate court has been challenged in this revision. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned courts below had incorrectly appreciated the facts of the case. It is submitted that the courts below failed to appreciate that the construction of the suit premises described in Schedule-A ad-measuring 12’ X 8’ was made on the basis of permission for construction granted on 03.05.2001 (Ext.2). The respondent had occupied the said suit premises described in Schedule-A w.e.f. 01.07.2001 and after the advance of Rs.6,000/- was adjusted on 31.12.2001, the respondent defaulted in paying rent @ Rs.1,000/- per month from 01.01.2002. The respondent illegally started construction of the suit premises described in Schedule-B on 04.03.2002, pursuant to which complaints were filed before the Police and Digboi Town Committee on 07.03.2002. Therefore, the case projected by the respondent falls within the proximity of time as portrayed by the petitioner, because as per the version of the respondent, he occupied two shops on 01.05.2001. 11. It is further submitted that the case projected by the respondent was totally false and fabricated and, as such, the story-line was inconsistent with the document on record. 11. It is further submitted that the case projected by the respondent was totally false and fabricated and, as such, the story-line was inconsistent with the document on record. By referring to the Tenancy Agreement (Ext.D), it is submitted that in the said agreement, there are unauthenticated interpolations because the agreement was w.e.f. 01.01.2002 for three years upto 31.12.2005, but the words “three years” was over-written by “one year” and “December 2005” is over-written to “December 2002”, with the intention of saving the unregistered agreement from the rigours of Section 17(d) read with section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. It is submitted that the first page of the said tenancy agreement (Ext.D) does not bear the signature of the respondent and moreover, in the said agreement, the purported landlord i.e. Jai Prakash Singh had declared himself to be the “house- owner”, which again contradicts the case projected by the respondent that the said Jai Prakash Singh was a receiver appointed by the Income Tax Authorities on 28.10.1975 and also appointed as Receiver by this High Court by order dated 02.12.1983 passed in Civil Rule No. 1171/1983. It is also submitted that although the petitioner had exhibited Certificate by Tax Recovery Officer dated 19.04.1990, regarding payment of all Income Tax and Wealth Tax dues including charges for receiver (Ext.8) to prove that the receivership of the said Jai Prakash Singh had come to an end, the respondent made no effort to prove that the said Jai Prakash Singh was the court appointed receiver as on 01.01.2002, the date on which Tenancy Agreement (Ext.D) was made. It is also submitted that the burden of proving that the status of Sri J.P. Singh was that of a receiver was on the respondent, which was not duly discharged. It is further submitted that if the said Jai Prakash Singh was a receiver, the Tenancy Agreement (Ext.D) did not disclose such status, rather, as per the same, the said person was the House Owner, which is again an inconsistent stand because the receiver cannot attain the status of the owner unless such status is declared by a competent court of law. Moreover, it is submitted that assuming but not admitting that there was a lawful tenancy agreement (Ext.D), but then there was no pleadings or evidence as to what was the alleged relationship between the respondent and the said Jai Prakash Singh after December, 2002. Hence, after the lapse of the said agreement, the alleged relationship of landlord and tenant has lapsed by efflux of time. 12. It is also submitted that the rent receipts (Ext. E. F and G) as proved by the respondent did not establish anything because it was not signed by the said Jai Prakash Singh and that neither Jai Prakash Singh, nor the person who had signed those alleged rent receipts stood on the witness box to own up the said Tenancy Agreement (Ext.D) and Rent Receipts (Ext. E, F and G). The said money/rent receipts was in the name of Janata Talkies, Digboi, Assam and signed by one Vijay Shankar in his capacity as “for Proprietor/Manager”. It is also submitted that if Janata Talkies was the landlord, the said Jai Prakash Singh, who had signed the tenancy agreement (Ext.D) could not be the landlord. Referring to the tenancy agreement and rent receipts, it is submitted that neither the alleged “Tenancy Agreement”, nor the alleged “money/rent receipts” were proved by the alleged landlord, namely, Jai Prakash Singh and, as such, there is no evidence on record as to whether the said person was covered by the definition of landlord as defined under Section 2(c) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972. It is also submitted that for non-examination of Jai Prakash Singh and for non- proving of signatures in Exhibits-A to G, adverse inference was liable to be drawn by virtue of Section 114 Illustration (g) of the Evidence Act, 1872. 13. It is also submitted that the alleged tenancy agreement dated 01.01.2002 (Ext.D) cannot be accepted as a proof in respect of two suit premises described in Schedule-A and Schedule-B because it is in respect of “the shop” and not “two shops”. It is also submitted that the evidence of the petitioner proving that he had obtained construction permission for shop measuring 12’ X 8’ could not be demolished in course of cross examination of PW or disproved in evidence of the respondent. It is also submitted that the evidence of the petitioner proving that he had obtained construction permission for shop measuring 12’ X 8’ could not be demolished in course of cross examination of PW or disproved in evidence of the respondent. Hence, the petitioner had successfully proved that he was the landlord and as the shop described in Schedule-A was constructed by him, he was the landlord for the respondent. It is also submitted that assuming but not admitting that the said Jai Prakash Singh was a co-owner, being the member of the same HUF, yet neither the respondent proved the said point nor such a status of the said Jai Prakash Singh could disentitle the petitioner to file a suit for eviction of the respondent as a co-owner. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the case of Smt. Kasthuri Radhakrishnan Vs. M. Chinniyan, (2016) 3 SCC 296 . 14. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has submitted that a majority of the issues raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was disproved in course of trial. By referring to the cross examination of the petitioner (PW-1), it is submitted that the PW-1 had stated that he had instituted a suit against Singhasan Tiwari, a tenant, before filing the present suit, but the same was dismissed. He had also admitted filing a suit for evicting other 5 tenants, Shyamal Kumar Roy, Bimal Chandra Debnath, etc., and the decision of the court went against him. He also admitted that the suit land in both suits is still in the name of his father Late Adaram Singh. He had also stated that apart from the suit land of Janata Cinema Hall, there are many other properties in Digboi Town in the name of Late Adaram Singh and he was managing it as Karta. He has stated that his father had died on the year 1971, but none of the properties have come to the name of any of his legal heir. He had further stated that a partition suit, TS 25/75 was instituted by Biswanath Singh and Jai Prakash Singh, sons of his first mother against them, which included the suit land. He has stated that his father had died on the year 1971, but none of the properties have come to the name of any of his legal heir. He had further stated that a partition suit, TS 25/75 was instituted by Biswanath Singh and Jai Prakash Singh, sons of his first mother against them, which included the suit land. Later on, the PW-1 had stated in his cross examination on 04.03.2008 that there was no partition suit pending in respect of land occupied by Jai Prakash Singh, but in his further cross examination, PW-1 had stated that since the year 1975, there is a litigation pending between him and his nephew Jai Prakash Singh, Prakash, son of Late Biswanath Singh and petitioner’s father regarding properties including suit land left behind by Late Adaram Singh. He had also stated that he did not get any declaration of ‘karta’ from any court. He had also stated that there were 25/30 tenants in two storied building of Janata Cinema Hall and that the suit premises were a part of the Janata Talkies. The respondent had also admitted that some tenants named by him were paying rent to Jai Prakash Singh and he never collected their rent. He had stated that the tenants have stopped paying rent after the Income Tax authorities asked them to pay rent to him. He had admitted that Late Adaram Singh had married thrice and had several children. Although he had named several sons and daughters of Late Adaram Singh on 04.03.2008, he had stated in his cross examination on 21.07.2008 that he could not say how many heirs were left behind by Late Adaram Singh. He had stated that he did not have a power of attorney from other heirs of Late Adaram Singh to manage the properties. He also admitted that his nephew Jai Prakash Singh was still the receiver appointed by High Court although Income Tax authorities had released his receivership and that he had not preferred any appeal against the said High Court order. The PW-1 had stated that he did not ask how much rent was collected by Jai Prakash Singh from Janata Cinema Talkies as receiver. The PW-1 had stated that he did not ask how much rent was collected by Jai Prakash Singh from Janata Cinema Talkies as receiver. He had further admitted that he came to know on 07.01.2001 that the respondent was paying rent to Jai Prakash Singh, and that he did not ask how much rent was paid and how much money was received as security. He did not apply for mutation of land in his name although Late Adaram Singh had died in the year 1971. PW-1 stated that the suit rooms were 12ft X 8ft and 5ft X 8ft and he does not know if the suit shop was extended to 13.2ft X 9.3ft and godown to 7ft X 9.3ft. He also admitted that the respondent had obtained electricity connection but he did not file any objection before ASEB in this regard. He had stated that with his tenants he entered into written agreement prepared by advocate. Two copy of agreements were prepared one for him and one for tenant. He issued receipts for advance and rent, but he did not make an agreement with the respondent. He did not file any receipt in court showing rent received for 6 months from the respondent. He further admitted that Town Committee holding for Janata Talkies building was in the name of Jai Prakash Singh. He had also stated that Jai Prakash Singh had the power to undertake repair, alteration and modification of Janata Talkies building as receiver and that he did not apply for injunction before any court against the same. There was no document containing signature of respondent to show that he was the tenant of PW-1. He had stated that 15/20 shops were under him and that he cannot state that for which shop the permission at Ext.2 was received. He had admitted that Ext.3 contained only his signature and did not contain the signature of respondent. He had no proof of sending Ext.5 through Ext.4 or of submitting Ext.4 to the Chairman and SDO through Ext.6 and Ext.7. He had admitted that Ext.3 contained only his signature and did not contain the signature of respondent. He had no proof of sending Ext.5 through Ext.4 or of submitting Ext.4 to the Chairman and SDO through Ext.6 and Ext.7. By relying on the said cross examination, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent had submitted that the cross examination of the PW-1/ petitioner disproved his entire case and, as such, even if there were come deficiencies in the defence of the respondent, this revisional court would be slow in upsetting the concurrent finding of facts as held by both the courts below. 15. On the basis of the submissions made by the learned arguing counsels for both sides, the following points of determination arise for consideration of this Court :– i. Whether the High Court exercising powers under Section 115 CPC has the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence, and if so, to what extent? ii. Whether the concurrent finding of facts as held by both the courts below are sustainable on facts and in law? 16. The power exercisable by a High Court under Section 115 CPC relates to jurisdictional error. Before appreciating the arguments advanced on behalf of both sides, it is deemed necessary to visit the provisions of Section 115 CPC, which is re-produced below:- 115. Revision.- (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decide by any court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears— (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit:— Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. (2) The High Court shall not, under this section vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any court subordinate thereto. (2) The High Court shall not, under this section vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any court subordinate thereto. (3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suitor other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court. Explanation .- In this section, the expression “any case which has been decided” includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a Suit or other proceeding. 17. Both the points of determination have been taken together. 18. This Court in the case of Debashish Majumdar V. M/s. Saha Brothers, (1997) 2 GLT 392, had, inter-alia, held that jurisdiction of High Court is a limited one and that the High Court cannot interfere in finding of law or fact not relating to jurisdiction. However, gross error in the finding may be. In the present case in hand, if the finding recorded by the learned trial court, as upheld by the first appellate court is tested with the statements made by the petitioner as PW-1 in his cross- examination, it is seen that he had admitted that he became aware of collection of rent from the respondent by the said Jai Prakash Singh on 07.01.2001, which gives some credibility to the purported tenancy agreement (Ext.D) and disproves the alleged claim of tenancy of the respondent under the petitioner w.e.f. 01.07.2001. Hence, the entire story of the petitioner falls flat and therefore, the finding of fact as recorded in respect of issue No. (ii) cannot be said to be either perverse or not sustainable on the basis of evidence on record. In Civil Revision, the High Court can only interfere if the finding is wholly perverse, extraneous and manifestly appears to be unjust. If any authority is required on the same, one may refer to the case of Lachhman Dass Vs. Santokh Singh, (1995) 4 SCC 201 . Similarly, in the case of P. Udayani Devi V. V.V. Rajeshwara Prasad Rao & Anr., (1995) 3 SCC 252 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that finding of fact cannot be interfered by a revisional Court. Furthermore, in the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme of India in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Similarly, in the case of P. Udayani Devi V. V.V. Rajeshwara Prasad Rao & Anr., (1995) 3 SCC 252 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that finding of fact cannot be interfered by a revisional Court. Furthermore, in the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme of India in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78 , it has been held that a revisional Court is not entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion over the conclusion of the appellate authority. 19. The herein before referred excerpts of the cross- examination of PW-1 leads to an inevitable conclusion that the petitioner is not aware of the suit property, its measurement and also he could not state which of the shop was constructed on the strength of building permission (Ext.2) granted by the Digboi Town Committee. Petitioner (PW-1) also categorically admits that the Town Committee Holding of Janata Talkies property is in the name of Jai Prakash Singh and that his receivership continued at least till the date of his cross- examination on the strength of order dated order dated 02.12.1983 passed in Civil Rule No. 1170/1983. Moreover, the petitioner (PW-1) even does not know if the suit premises was of a different dimension then as claimed by him. The petitioner (PW-1) had admitted in his cross examination that the said Jai Prakash Singh was a heir to the estate left behind by Late Adaram Singh. Therefore, it is not improbable that the respondent was not inducted as a tenant by the petitioner. The preponderance of evidence is found to be tilting in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner. Therefore, this court is satisfied as regards legality, and propriety of decision rendered by the learned trial court as concurred by the learned first appellate court. In the said case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had further observed that conferment of power on High Court under provisions of Rent Acts is to satisfy itself as to ‘legality’, ‘regularity’ or ‘propriety’ of decision of appellate Court/authority or that it is ‘according to law’. In the said case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had further observed that conferment of power on High Court under provisions of Rent Acts is to satisfy itself as to ‘legality’, ‘regularity’ or ‘propriety’ of decision of appellate Court/authority or that it is ‘according to law’. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the scope of examination of evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is “according to law” and do not suffer from any error of law. In the case of Rukmini Amma Saradamma Vs. Kallyani Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had held that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 20. In the considered opinion of this Court, which is based on documentary and oral evidence on record, the petitioner has not been able to successfully show that the respondent was inducted as a tenant by him because way back on 07.01.2001, the petitioner had knowledge that the respondent was paying rent to the said Jai Prakash Singh and, as such, the petitioner had taken the risk of filing a suit under the provisions of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 to eject the respondent by projecting him to be his tenant, whereas, in his cross- examination, the respondent’s side has been able to successfully demolish the case set up by the petitioner. The learned first appellate court is found to have re-appreciated the pleadings and evidence on record and had arrived at an independent finding to uphold the decision rendered by the learned trial Court. No infirmity is found in the re-appreciation of the matter by the learned First Appellate Court. 21. The learned first appellate court is found to have re-appreciated the pleadings and evidence on record and had arrived at an independent finding to uphold the decision rendered by the learned trial Court. No infirmity is found in the re-appreciation of the matter by the learned First Appellate Court. 21. As a result of the discussions made above, it appears that the points of determination No.(i) has already been well settled by the Supreme Court of India, in the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra) to the effect that conferment of power on High Court under provisions of Rent Acts to satisfy itself as to ‘legality’, ‘regularity’ or ‘propriety’ of decision of appellate Court/ authority or that it is ‘according to law’. This Court is bound by the said ratio. 22. Moreover, from the discussions above, the concurrent finding of facts as held by both the courts below are sustainable on facts and in law. In the opinion of this Court, as the issue No.(ii) relating to relationship of landlord and tenant, which could not be established to exist at any point of time between the petitioner and the respondent, the respondent cannot be held to be a defaulter. The petitioner does not fall within the definition of landlord as defined under Section 2(c) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 and, as such, both the learned courts below have rightly decided the issue No.(iv) relating to whether the respondent was a defaulter in paying rent to the petitioner and consequently, save and except the issue of maintainability, all the issues framed by the learned trial court were decided against the petitioner, which is found to be justified and lawful, being based on evidence on record as indicated above. Thus, the judgments and decree passed by both the learned courts below are found to be sustainable on facts and in law. 23. Consequently, this revision fails, and the same is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own cost. 24. Send back the LCR.