JUDGMENT : A.K. RATH, J. 1. The plaintiff is the appellant against an affirming judgment. The suit was for declaration that the notice issued by the Notified Area Council (Civil Township), Rourkela under Sec. 273-A of the Odisha Municipal Act is invalid and for permanent injunction restraining the Notified Area Council authorities from demolishing the structure. 2. The case of the plaintiff was that the suit land was lying fallow. In January, 1954, he reclaimed the same and constructed a shop room. He is in possession of the suit land openly, peacefully and uninterruptedly. The N.A.C., defendant was constituted on 01.08.1955. The defendant lodged prosecution under Sec.297 of the Orissa Municipal Act (in short, ‘the O.M. Act’) against him. He was acquitted in the case. While matter stood thus, on 20.09.1983, the defendant served a notice on him under Sec.273-A of the O.M. Act alleging non-construction of the structure and for demolition. He appeared and filed show cause stating therein that the said structure was in existence prior to the commencement of the N.A.C. In support of his plea, he also produced documents and R.O.R. However, the defendant issued final notice on 24.04.1984 calling upon him to demolish the structure. It was further pleaded that Sec.273-A of the Act is not applicable to his case inasmuch as he constructed the structure before the N.A.C. came into existence. There was no alteration of the said structure. With this factual scenario, he instituted the suit seeking the relief mentioned supra. 3. The case of the defendant was that the suit land was Bhogra land which belonged to the holder of the village office namely Maguni Chandra Dwibedi. There was a proceeding between the village officer and the State in respect of the said plot in the year 1956. The said case was disposed of in the year 1958. Claim of the plaintiff that he is in possession of the suit land and raised structure in the year 1954 is a myth. There was a temporary market in the said area. People used to collect bazaar tax from the persons, who were selling their commodities including the plaintiff. There was no construction upto the stage of preparation of draft R.O.R. in the major settlement. Since the plaintiff made construction over the suit land without permission, notice was issued under Sec.273-A of the O.M. Act. Show cause filed by the plaintiff was not accepted. There was no construction upto the stage of preparation of draft R.O.R. in the major settlement. Since the plaintiff made construction over the suit land without permission, notice was issued under Sec.273-A of the O.M. Act. Show cause filed by the plaintiff was not accepted. The authority had issued the final notice requiring the plaintiff to demolish the structure. The notice cannot be said to be illegal. In view of the provision under Secs.273-A and 274 of the O.M. Act, the proceeding against the plaintiff became final. 4. Stemming on the pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck nine issues. Both parties led evidence, oral and documentary, to substantiate their cases. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in the Sashibushan Rath vrs. State of Orissa and another, 39 (1973) CLT 530, learned trial court held that a complete code, almost parallel to what exists in civil code, has been prescribed by the Statue. In view of the same, the only remedy is by way of an appeal under Sec. 274 of the O.M. Act. It further held that the notice had been served on the plaintiff and he was provided opportunity to submit show cause. Order of demolition was passed, since the plaintiff failed to submit show cause to the satisfaction of the Executive Officer. Thus no case is made out that the Executive Officer had not acted according to the fundamental principles of judicial procedure and violated the provisions under the O.M. Act. It further held that the provisions of O.M. Act shall apply. Held so, it dismissed the suit. The unsuccessful plaintiff challenged the judgment and decree before the learned Additional District Judge, Rourkela in T.A. No. 02 of 1990, which was eventually dismissed. 5. The Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law:- “Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit in question ?” 6. Heard Mr. N.P. Pattnaik, learned counsel for the appellant. None appears for the respondent in spite of valid service of notice. 7. Mr. Pattnaik, learned counsel for the appellant submits that there is no expression of the provisions under the O.M. Act ousting the jurisdiction of Civil Court. Heard Mr. N.P. Pattnaik, learned counsel for the appellant. None appears for the respondent in spite of valid service of notice. 7. Mr. Pattnaik, learned counsel for the appellant submits that there is no expression of the provisions under the O.M. Act ousting the jurisdiction of Civil Court. The Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and to examine as to whether the provisions of the O.M. Act have been complied with or the statutory tribunal has acted with the confirmation of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. He further submits that the plaintiff has made the construction in the year 1954. The N.A.C. was constituted in the year 1955. The provisions of the O.M. Act will not apply to any construction made before the N.A.C. was constituted. There was neither any addition, alteration, reconstruction or construction for initiation of the construction under Sec. 273 of the O.M. Act is bad in law. The order was passed without affording opportunity of hearing to the plaintiff. The Executive Officer had not examined the case in proper perspective. The order is based on no evidence. 8. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sashibushan (supra) held:- “11. It is well known that ownership in property has several characteristics. The owner of the property can dispose of the same in any manner he likes. He can even destroy the property. He can also use the property in any manner he likes, unless his act causes an injury to another actionable at law. Thus, in common law, the owner of the property has the right to put any construction on his land as he chooses. There is no liability in common law prohibiting him to make a construction on his own land in any manner he chooses. Such a liability has now been created under the Act by Secs.273-A and 344, and for enforcement of such liability, the statue has also provided a remedy. The provisions are that before any construction is put on a land within the area of N.A.C. permission of the N.A.C. is mandatory. Plans for construction of the building are to be submitted for approval of the N.A.C. When a building is constructed without permission and approval of the plan, it is plan to the N.A.C. to issue notice to the owner to get the same dismantled. Plans for construction of the building are to be submitted for approval of the N.A.C. When a building is constructed without permission and approval of the plan, it is plan to the N.A.C. to issue notice to the owner to get the same dismantled. The owner gets an opportunity to show cause and to be heard. He has a right of appeal. If the provisional order is ultimately confirmed after hearing, the owner gets a reasonable notice for removal of the unauthorised construction before the final order of the N.A.C. is put into execution. Thus, a complete code, almost parallel to what exists in Civil Code, has been prescribed by the Statue.” It was further held:- “13. xxx xxx xxx The dictum of Willes J. was referred to and accepted in paragraph 8 in Bhulabhai State of M.P. After examining all the relevant decisions on the point, their Lordships laid down the following propositions of which the relevant ones may be extracted below: “(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the Special Tribunal the Civil Courts’ jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Xxx xxx xxx.” 9. The Privy Council in the case of Secretary of State v. Mask & Co., AIR 1940 P.C. 105 held that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. Even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 10. Even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 10. Thus the Civil Court has jurisdiction to examine into cases where provisions of Act have not complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 11. The contention of Mr. Pattnaik, learned counsel for the appellant that the provisions of O.M. Act do not apply, since the same was made prior to constitution of N.A.C. in the year 1955 is difficult to fathom. 12. Sec. 5 (a) of the O.M. Act postulates:- “5. Effect of the Act to areas, included within, or excluded from, a Municipality-When, by a notification referred to in Sub-section (5) of Section 4, any area is (a) included in a Municipal area, all the provisions of this Act and of the rules, bye-laws, notifications or orders made thereunder which, immediately before such inclusion were in force throughout such Municipal area shall be deemed to apply to such area unless it is otherwise directed in and by the said notification; or (b) Excluded from a Municipal area all the provisions of this Act and of the rules, by-laws, notifications, or orders made thereunder which, immediately before such exclusion, were in force in the area so excluded shall cease to apply to such area on and from the date of publication of the said notification.” 13. On a bare perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is crystal clear that when a notification is issued under Sub-sec.(a) of Sec.5 of the O.M. Act including an area in municipality, all the provisions of this Act and of the rules, bye-laws, notifications or orders made thereunder which, immediately before such inclusion were in force throughout such Municipal area shall be deemed to apply to such area unless it is otherwise directed in and by the said notification. Admittedly, the construction was made over a piece of land of N.A.C. In view of Sec.5 of the O.M. Act, the provisions of O.M. Act shall apply. 14. Admittedly, the construction was made over a piece of land of N.A.C. In view of Sec.5 of the O.M. Act, the provisions of O.M. Act shall apply. 14. The next question arises as to whether the plaintiff has any right to make construction over a land belonging to N.A.C. The plaintiff cannot make any construction over the land of N.A.C. without taking prior permission. Rightly, the proceeding under Sec.273-A was initiated by the Municipality. The Executive Officer, N.A.C. had issued notice to the plaintiff on 15.09.1983, vide Ext.A asking him to submit show cause. The order dated 15.09.1983 reveals that the plaintiff had made construction without obtaining permission from the Executive Officer in contrary to the provisions of the O.M. Act. He was directed to demolish the structure vide Ext.B. The Executive Officer held that the plaintiff has constructed the shop illegally. Preliminary order was confirmed. Thus it cannot be said that the provisions of the O.M. Act have not been complied with or the Executive Officer has acted not in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 15. In the wake of the aforesaid, the appeal, sans merit, deserves dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.