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2017 DIGILAW 1447 (ORI)

Ratnakar Mohapatra v. Mayadhar Samantaray

2017-12-13

A.K.RATH

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.K. RATH, J. 1. Plaintiff is the appellant against a reversing judgment. The suit was for declaration of easementary right and permanent injunction. 2. Plaintiff is the owner of plot no.11 appertaining to khata no.76 of mouza-Kundheibenta Sahi, P.S.-Puri (‘A’ schedule land). Defendant is the owner of adjacent plot no.12 appertaining to khata no.22 (‘B’ schedule land). The dispute pertains to eastern boundary of plot no.11 and western boundary of plot no.12 from north to south measuring 82’ x 2’ of land, part of ‘B’ schedule land. The plaintiff asserts that the rain water passes through the aforesaid plot since the time of his vendor’s vendor. According to the plaintiff, the suit ‘A’ land originally belonged to one Suruji Bewa, who constructed her house. She sold the same on 26.12.1958, Ext.1, to Kulamani Rautara. Kulamani sold the property to Rajakishore Singh in the year 1963, Ext.2. Rajakishore sold to Krushna Mohan Rath on 29.2.1964. The plaintiff purchased the house from Krushna Mohan Rath on 31.7.70, Ext.5. The defendant purchased ‘B’ schedule property earlier to the plaintiff. He constructed a house after taking permission from Puri Municipality. 3. The defendant resisted the claim of the plaintiff. According to him, earlier the rain water was flowing through the passage, but was never used as scavenger passage. The plaintiff can make arrangement of ‘Adi’ for free flow of rain water. The specific case of the defendant is that the plaintiff constructed the house 10 to 15 years back and thus no easement accrued in his favour. 4. Stemming on the pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck five issues. Parties led evidence. Learned trial court came to hold that rain water from the eastern side house roof is being discharged over the suit property from the year 1948 when Suruji Bewa was the owner of plot no.11. The said right was being exercised by the successive purchasers including the plaintiff. Held so, it decreed the suit. Feeling aggrieved, the defendant filed appeal before the learned District Judge, Puri, which was subsequently transferred to the court of the learned Additional Sub-Judge, Puri and renumbered as T.A. No.5/23 of 1985. Learned appellate court held that ‘Adi’ has been constructed only after the plaintiff purchased plot no.11 in the year 1970 and the alternative arrangement of Lodha can be made by the plaintiff. The scavenger passage has been approved by the Municipality. Learned appellate court held that ‘Adi’ has been constructed only after the plaintiff purchased plot no.11 in the year 1970 and the alternative arrangement of Lodha can be made by the plaintiff. The scavenger passage has been approved by the Municipality. Municipality has not impleaded as a party to the suit. Held so, it allowed the appeal. 5. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law enumerated in ground nos.2 to 4 of the appeal memo. The same are: “2. For that the learned lower appellate court having rightly held that the rain water from the roof of the plaintiff’s house was falling on plot no.12 of the defendant and from that land the water was being discharged, erred in law in reversing the decision of the learned trial court. It is submitted that the learned Munsif had on correct assessment of the materials on record come to hold that rain water from the roof of the plaintiff’s house was being discharged right from the year 1948 till the date of the suit through the suit passage and was being drained out therefrom. The learned lower appellate court also upheld the finding of the learned Munsif that the rain water from the house of the plaintiff was falling on the land of the defendant which is the scavenger’s passage. (3) For that the learned lower appellate court reversed the finding of the learned Munsif only on a misreading of the evidence of P.W.2. The learned lower appellate court held that P.W.2 had stated that the plaintiff constructed the house over the purchased land and is residing therein and the inference therefrom was that the house of the plaintiff came into existence only in the year 1970. It is submitted that P.W.2 in his deposition had stated that the suit property was a scavenger’s passage and that rain water from the eastern eave of the plaintiff’s house falls over the scavenger’s passage. P.W.2 had also deposed that the house of P.W.1 previously belonged to Suruji Bewa and by successive purchase the plaintiff purchased it from his predecessor, Krushna Mohan Rath. P.W.2 further asserted “that the house of the plaintiff is therefrom the time of Suruji Bewa.” P.W.2 only stated that after purchase the plaintiff had constructed a house on the land. P.W.2 had also deposed that the house of P.W.1 previously belonged to Suruji Bewa and by successive purchase the plaintiff purchased it from his predecessor, Krushna Mohan Rath. P.W.2 further asserted “that the house of the plaintiff is therefrom the time of Suruji Bewa.” P.W.2 only stated that after purchase the plaintiff had constructed a house on the land. The learned lower appellate court had lost sight of the fact that under Ext.5, the registered sale deed, the plaintiff had vacant land and also house. The house in question from which the rain water is being discharged has been there in existence right from 1948. This misreading of the evidence has clearly vitiated the impugned decision. (4) For that the learned lower appellate court grossly erred in law in holding that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties by not impleading the Puri Municipality as a party to the suit.” 6. Mr. Dayananda Mohapatra, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned trial court on consideration of all materials, documents, revenue receipts, the sale deeds arrived at a conclusion that the rain water was falling on the passage which is also used as scavenger passage. The finding of the learned lower appellate court that the ‘Adi’ constructed by the plaintiff from 1970 is an error on record. The suit was for easement in respect of the part of the plot of the defendant, which was admittedly used as scavenger passage. The Municipality is neither a necessary nor proper party to the suit. 7. Per contra, Mr. Bidhayak Patnaik, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law. The learned lower appellate court on a thorough scrutiny of documents held that the ‘Adi’ constructed by the plaintiff was 14 to 15 years old. The same did not exist prior to 1970. Learned trial court brushed aside the evidence of P.W.2, who deposed that the plaintiff purchased his land and constructed a house. Learned trial court has made out a third case. The finding of the learned trial court with regard to enjoyment of easementary right from 1948 is perverse. The same did not exist prior to 1970. Learned trial court brushed aside the evidence of P.W.2, who deposed that the plaintiff purchased his land and constructed a house. Learned trial court has made out a third case. The finding of the learned trial court with regard to enjoyment of easementary right from 1948 is perverse. The plaintiff is not entitled to the relief since there is no pleading with regard to starting period, maturity, transfer of easementary right from original owner to subsequent purchasers and also continuity of right of easement for 20 years ending within 2 years next before the institution of the suit. 8. Learned lower appellate court on scanning of the evidence on record as well as pleadings came to hold that ‘Adi’ had been constructed only after 1970. Therefore the plaintiff had not acquired easementary right over the suit property since he was not in possession or occupation of the suit property for 20 years continuously within two years next before the institution of the suit. Sufficiency or insufficiency is for the appellate court. There is no perversity in the said finding. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 9. In the wake of aforesaid, the appeal, sans merit, deserves dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. No costs.