JUDGMENT : H.B. PRABHAKARA SASTRY, J. 1. In this appeal, the appellant has challenged the order of the learned single Judge dated 10.08.2017 passed in Writ Petition No.20541/2017, where under the application of the present appellant filed under Order I Rule 10 of CPC, 1908, seeking his impleadment as respondent No.8 was rejected. 2. In this writ appeal, the appellant has taken a contention that the learned single Judge has failed to appreciate that, admittedly, the appellant was the absolute owner in continuous possession and enjoyment of the properties involved in the writ petition, having purchased the same under a registered deed of conveyance dated 11.03.1908, as such, any order in regard to the said property would directly affect the rights of the appellant. Citing a Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2010) 7 SCC 417 , wherein the general rule regarding the impleadment of parties has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the appellant has again stated that his lawful possession of the property involved in the matter for more than 110 years has been ignored by the learned single Judge. Further stating that the reasons given by the learned single Judge while passing the impugned order under consideration are not acceptable, the appellant has prayed for setting aside the said impugned order and to allow his I.A.No.5 filed in the writ petition No.20541/2017. 3. In response to the notice, the respondents are being represented by their counsels. 4. Heard arguments from both side. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant Sri Anshuman Animesh, in his argument vehemently submitted that the action under section 79-A and 79-B of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, against the present respondent Nos.4 and 5 started rolling only upon the complaint lodged by Dr. Rev. Prabhakar Shadrack, who is a District Superintendent of the appellant-Church. It is based upon his complaint before the Assistant Commissioner requesting him to take appropriate action against respondent Nos.4 and 5, the Assistant Commissioner has passed the order which is the subject matter throughout even before the learned single Judge in the writ petition. As such, both before the Assistant Commissioner as well the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, the present appellant ought to have been made a party. It is also his argument that the appellant has been in constant possession and enjoyment of the disputed property since more than 160 years. As such, both before the Assistant Commissioner as well the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, the present appellant ought to have been made a party. It is also his argument that the appellant has been in constant possession and enjoyment of the disputed property since more than 160 years. In view of the said fact, any order that may be passed in any proceeding touching the disputed property would affect the interest of the appellant, as such, the appellant is a necessary as well a proper party in the proceedings including the Writ Petition No.20541/2017. The learned counsel also relied upon a Judgment of our Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2014) 16 SCC 187 and submitted that the said judgment relying upon its previous judgment reported in (2010) 12 SCC 204 has observed the consequence of non-impleading of a proper or necessary party, as such, the present appellant is necessarily required to be impleded. 6. On behalf of respondent Nos.4 and 5 Sri. Anant Mandagi, learned Senior Counsel submitted his argument, wherein, he stated that the appellant has been in the habit of filing frivolous litigations with respect to the disputed property against respondent Nos.4 and 5 and other interested parties, but all those litigations have proved to be futile. However, it is only with an intention to grab the disputed property which is a very valuable property, the appellant has been repeatedly initiating litigations and legal proceedings. Relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (1992) 2 SCC 524 and in MANU/DE/0117/1998, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that those decisions explain as to who is a necessary and proper party in a litigation. In the light of the law under Order I Rule 10 of CPC, interpreted in those two cases relied upon by him, under no stretch of imagination, the present appellant can be considered either as a proper or a necessary party in the Writ Petition No.20541/2017. 7. The summary of the case of the petitioners in the writ petition is that, the present respondent Nos.4 and 5 have purchased the lands bearing survey Nos.971/A, 971/B & 971/C of Belagavi to certain extent from its previous vendors, i.e., from the grantees of the said lands (particularly the legal representatives of one Shivaji Malahar Kulkarni). 7. The summary of the case of the petitioners in the writ petition is that, the present respondent Nos.4 and 5 have purchased the lands bearing survey Nos.971/A, 971/B & 971/C of Belagavi to certain extent from its previous vendors, i.e., from the grantees of the said lands (particularly the legal representatives of one Shivaji Malahar Kulkarni). The said lands were granted to ten persons including the said Shivaji Malahar Kulkarni by the Tahashildar, Belagavi on the date 18.08.1960 as per Annexure-B in the writ petition. The said respondent Nos.4 and 5 had purchased the said lands through various registered sale deeds during the year 2015. The land owners and one Sri Shankar Munavalli had together sold those lands to respondent Nos.4 and 5. One Dr. Rev. Prabhakar Shadrack, who is shown to be representing the present appellant-Church, in the name of Methodist Church in India, Mission Compound, Belagavi had lodged a complaint on 13.05.2016 before respondent No.2 – Assistant Commissioner, Belagavi, Sub-Division, Belagavi, requesting him to initiate proceedings under Section 79-A and 79-B of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, (henceforth, for brevity called as ‘the KLR Act’) against the present respondent Nos.4 and 5, purchasers of the lands. In the said complaint, he had alleged that those two purchasers have purchased the said lands from some of the grantees (Kulkarni Family Members) on different dates in the year 2015, which are all in violation of the KLR Act. 8. On the basis of the said complaint, the Assistant Commissioner, Belagavi, initiated proceedings in KVLR:79A & 79B.C.R-06/2016-17 and issued notices to the respondent Nos.4 & 5 herein to show cause as to why action should not be taken under the provisions of Section 79-A and 79-B of the KLR Act. After due enquiry, the said Assistant Commissioner, Belagavi passed an order on 02.12.2016 holding that respondent Nos.4 and 5, purchasers of the lands, have violated Section 79-A and 79-B of the KLR Act. Exercising the powers under Section 83 of the KLR Act, the said Assistant Commissioner (respondent No.2 herein) further ordered for vesting of those lands to the Government and forfeited those lands free from all encumbrances. 9. Exercising the powers under Section 83 of the KLR Act, the said Assistant Commissioner (respondent No.2 herein) further ordered for vesting of those lands to the Government and forfeited those lands free from all encumbrances. 9. Being aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Commissioner, the present respondent Nos.4 and 5 preferred an appeal in Appeal No.1072/2016 before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bengaluru (henceforth, for brevity referred to as ‘the Tribunal’) making the said Assistant Commissioner as a party to the said proceedings. The Tribunal vide its order dated 15.04.2017 set aside the order of the Assistant Commissioner dated 02.12.2016 and directed him to restore the lands in favour of respondent Nos.4 and 5. Being aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, the State of Karnataka, represented by its Principal Secretary, Revenue Department, Assistant Commissioner, Belagavi and the Tahashildar, Belagavi who are respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 herein preferred the Writ Petition No.20541/2017 before this Court. During pendency of the said writ petition, the present appellant had filed I.A.No.5/2017 under Order I Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (henceforth for brevity called as ‘the Code’), seeking its impleadment in the writ petition as respondent No.8. After hearing both side, the learned single Judge vide his order dated 10.08.2017 passed in the said Writ Petition No.20541/2017 dismissed the impleading application. It is the said order, the impleading applicant has challenged in this appeal by preferring the present appeal. 10. Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, reads as below: “10(2) Court may strike out or add parties. – The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.” 11. In the case of Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd., Vs. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P). In the case of Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd., Vs. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P). Ltd. reported in (2010) 7 SCC 417 , the reliance upon which judgment has been made by the appellants in their memorandum of appeal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held at para No.13 as below: “13. The general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief. Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff. But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order I rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil procedure (“the Code”, for short), which provides for impleadment of proper or necessary parties.” In another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in his argument which is, Ranjan Kumar etc., Vs. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in (2014) 16 SCC 187 , relying upon its previous Judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court at para No.8 was pleased to observe as below: “8. In Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal v. Mamta Bisht and Ors. (2010) 12 SCC 204 this Court, while dealing with the concept of necessary parties and the effect of non-implementation of such a party in this matter when the selection process is assailed, observed thus: ….in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Board of Revenue MANU/SC/0045/1962 : AIR 1963 SC 786 , wherein the Court has explained the distinction between necessary party, proper party and proforma party and further held that if a person who is likely to suffer from the order of the court and has not been impleaded as a party has a right to ignore the said order as it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. More so, proviso to Order 1 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called ‘Code of Civil Procedure’) provides that non-joinder of necessary party be fatal. Undoubtedly, provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable in writ jurisdiction by virtue of the provision of Section 141 Code of Civil Procedure but the principles enshrined therein are applicable. Undoubtedly, provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable in writ jurisdiction by virtue of the provision of Section 141 Code of Civil Procedure but the principles enshrined therein are applicable. (Vide Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat: AIR 1965 SC 1153 , Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot: (1974) 2 SCC 706 and Sarguja Transport Service v. STATE (1987) 1 SCC 5 .” From the above Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear that seeking impleadment in a pending proceeding before a Court cannot be claimed as a matter of right against the wishes of the plaintiff who is dominus litis, however, that general rule is subject to the provisions of Order I Rule 10 of the Code. 12. The learned counsel for respondent Nos.4 and 5 in his argument though at the outset submitted that he does not dispute the right of the appellant to file an application seeking his impleadment in the pending writ petition, however, he submits that, the appellant (applicant in the writ petition) is not a necessary and proper party in the writ petition, as such, the rejection of his application seeking his impleadment by the learned single Judge was proper. In his support, he relied upon two judgments, one from the Hon’ble Supreme Court and another from the High Court of Delhi. In Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others reported in (1992) 2 SCC 524 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the scope of Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code was pleased to observe as below: “6. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 gives a wide discretion to the Court to meet every case of defect of parties and is not affected by the inaction of the plaintiff to bring the necessary parties on record. The question of impleadment of a party has to be decided on the touchstone of Order I Rule 10 which provides that only a necessary or a proper party may be added. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceedings. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceedings. The addition of parties is generally not a question of initial jurisdiction of the Court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case”. In the very same Judgment, at para 10, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was further pleased to observe as below: “10. The power of the Court to add parties under Order I Rule 10, CPC, came up for consideration before this Court in Razia Begum. In that case it was pointed out that the courts in India have not treated the matter of addition of parties as raising any question of the initial jurisdiction of the Court and that it is firmly established as a result of judicial decisions that in order that a person may be added as a party to a suit, he should have a direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation whether it be the questions relating to movable or immovable property.” 13. In Spectrum Technologies USA Inc. Vs. Spectrum Power Generation Co, Ltd., reported in MANU/DE/0117/1998, while dealing with the scope of Order I Rule 10 of the Code, regarding impleadment of the parties and the mode of considering as to who are the necessary parties, the Delhi High Court was pleased to observe that the plaintiff cannot be permitted to expand the scope of suit unnecessarily to confuse the main issue for taking into consideration material relevant as evidence for side issues – A party not interested in denying the rights of the plaintiff is not required to be made a party. 14. From a perusal of the Order I Rule 10 of the Code and its interpretation in the above Judgments, it is clear that there is no absolute bar for a third party seeking his impleadment in a pending litigation instituted by another person against some other. 14. From a perusal of the Order I Rule 10 of the Code and its interpretation in the above Judgments, it is clear that there is no absolute bar for a third party seeking his impleadment in a pending litigation instituted by another person against some other. However, the person seeking his impeadment should convince the Court that he is a proper and necessary party for the proper adjudication of the dispute pending before the Court and that any order that may be passed by the Court in his absence in the pending litigation would adversely affect his interest. It is in those cases, the Court can exercise its discretion by allowing his application and permit him to implead as a party in the pending litigation. It is in this background, we have to analyse whether the present appellant is a proper and necessary party to be arrayed as respondent No.8 in the pending Writ Petition No.20541/2017 before the learned single Judge. 15. It is not in dispute that with respect to the very same property in question several litigations had arisen, wherein the present appellant was also a party in some of them and had made an attempt to implead as a party in some other. From the materials placed before us, it can be seen that, original suit in O.S.No.16/2009 was filed by one Sri Lakshmikanth against the Methodist Episcopal Church in Southern Asia, for the relief of injunction. In the said suit, the present appellant had filed an application for his impleading through Rev. Dr. Prabhakar Shadrack, which application came to be dismissed. In connection with the same suit, writ petitions in W.P.Nos.63748/2009 and W.P.No.59749/2015 were also filed and got dismissed. The Writ Appeal No.100634/2016 also came to be instituted and the same was subsequently dismissed. The present appellant through the very same representative Rev. Dr. Prabhakar Shadrack had also filed other suits in O.S.No.700/2010 and O.S.No.713/2010 before the Civil Court for the relief of declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the very same properties, which is the property in the present appeal and those plaints were also rejected by the Court vide order dated 07.08.2010. Thereafter, once again the said Church filed another suit in O.S.No.1031/2012 for the relief of declaration and injunction, which also came to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code by order dated 13.10.2015. Thereafter, once again the said Church filed another suit in O.S.No.1031/2012 for the relief of declaration and injunction, which also came to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code by order dated 13.10.2015. O.S.No.176/2010 was a suit for partition in which the present appellant was a party. 16. From the above, it is clear that the present appellant was either a party or made an attempt to implead itself as a party in several of the civil litigations pertaining to the property in question. Therefore, consideration in this matter, cannot in any way enter the arena of considering the alleged claim of the appellant about his ownership over the suit property or his alleged possession for about 160 years, or so. In view of the above facts, for recognition or enforcement of his alleged right, title or interest with respect to the said property, independent and appropriate civil litigations have been hoisted by different parties, including the present appellant and separate civil suits have taken care of the same. As such, the scope and ambit of the present appeal is only confined to the scope of the proceeding which, as already observed above is the alleged violation of Section 79-A, 79-B and 83 of the KLR Act. 17. Sections 79-A, 79-B and 83 of the KLR Act reads as below: “79-A.Acquisition of land by certain persons prohibited: (1) On and from the commencement of the [the Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 2015], no person who or a family or a joint family which has an assured annual income of not less than rupees [twenty five lakhs] from sources other than agricultural lands shall be entitled to acquire any land whether as land owner, landlord, tenant or mortgagee with possession or otherwise or partly in one capacity and partly in another. (2) For purposes of sub-section (1),- (i) the aggregate income of all the members of a family or a joint family from sources other than agricultural land shall be deemed to be income of the family or joint family, as the case may be, from such sources; (ii) a person or a family or a joint family shall be deemed to have an assured annual income of not less than rupees [twenty five lakhs] from sources other than agricultural land on any day if such person or family or joint family had an average annual income of not less than rupees [two lakhs] from such sources during a period of five consecutive years preceding such day. 79-B. Prohibition of holding agricultural land by certain persons: (1) With effect on and from the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, except as otherwise provided in this Act,- (a) no person other than a person cultivating land personally shall be entitled to hold land; and (b) it shall not be lawful for, (i) an educational, religious or charitable institution or society or trust, other than an institution or society or trust referred to in sub-section (7) of section 63, capable of holding property; (ii) a company; (iii) an association or other body of individuals not being a joint family, whether incorporated or not; or (iv) a co-operative society other than a co-operative farm, to hold any land. (2) Every such institution, society, trust, company, association, body or co-operative society,- (a) which holds lands on the date of commencement of the Amendment Act and which is disentitled to hold lands under sub-section (1), shall within ninety days from the said date, furnish to the Tahsildar within whose jurisdiction the greater part of such land is situated a declaration containing the particulars of such land and such other particulars as may prescribed; and (b) which acquires such land after the said date shall also furnish a similar declaration within the prescribed period. (3) The Tahsildar shall, on receipt of the declaration under sub-section (2) and after such enquiry as may be prescribed, send a statement containing the prescribed particulars relating to such land to the Deputy Commissioner who shall, by notification, declare that such land shall vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances and take possession thereof in the prescribed manner. (4) In respect of the land vesting in the State Government under this section an amount as specified in section 72 shall be paid. 83. Inquiry regarding illegal transactions: The prescribed authority shall, after a summary inquiry, determine whether the transaction reported to it under section 82 or coming to its notice in any other manner is in contravention of [or is unlawful or invalid under] the provisions of this Act, [as they stood before or as they stand after the date of commencement of the Amendment Act] and make a declaration accordingly. Any transaction so declared to be in contravention of [or is unlawful or invalid under] any of the provisions of this Act, [as they stood before or as they stand after the date of commencement of the Amendment Act] shall be null and void. [The land in respect of which such transaction has taken place shall, as penalty, be forfeited to and vest in the State Government [free from all encumbrances]. No amount is payable therefore].” 18. A reading of the above sections go to show that the said sections impose a bar upon a person who is not cultivating the land personally to hold an agricultural land. However, certain exemptions are given to it. Thus, it is a matter between the acquirer of the land and the revenue authorities wherein a third person has got no role to play. Thus, the scope of Sections 79-A and 79-B is very much limited confining to the holding of a land by a person, who does not cultivate the land personally. As such, the revenue authorities mentioned in the said sections, more so, even the Tribunal has got no jurisdiction to decide any question relating to the right, title or interest or possession of any such property, which is the subject matter of dispute under Sections 79-A and 79-B of the KLR Act. That being the case, if it is the complaint of the appellant before the revenue authorities that respondent Nos.4 and 5 are not the persons cultivating the land personally, as such they were not entitled to hold the land in question, then the concerned revenue authorities, who is the Tahashildar and Assistant Commissioner in the case would consider the complaint and take an appropriate action in that regard. Incidentally, the concerned revenue authorities have initiated and taken action in that regard. Incidentally, the concerned revenue authorities have initiated and taken action in that regard. As could be seen from the complaint at Annexure-D at page 270, wherein Rev. Dr. Prabhakar Shadrack in his capacity as Chairman, Board of Ministry, SIRC, Senior Pastor & District Superintendent, Vice Chairman & Manager, Methodist Educational Institutions is shown to have complained to the Assistant Commissioner regarding violation of Section 79-A of the KLR Act by respondent Nos.4 and 5. The said aspect has already been taken care of initially by the concerned revenue authorities, which action has now culminated into the present writ petition by the revenue authorities against the alleged purchasers of the land and others. The said aspect mentioned in the said complaint dated 30.05.2016 at Annexure-D at page 270 of this appeal is regarding the alleged possession of the property by an organisation called the ‘Medhodist Church in India’. As already observed above, the scope of Sections 79-A and 79-B of the KLR Act does not empower the parties there under to decide the said question of possession of the land by the disputing parties. As such, if it is taken that the complainant in the said complaint is the present appellant, then also it cannot be said that the appellant is a necessary and proper party for adjudication of the matter, which is now pending in W.P.No.20541/2017. 19. Secondly, it can also be observed that the complaint at Annexure-D at page 270 dated 30.05.2016 is shown to have been given by Rev. Dr. Prabhakar Shadrack, nowhere in the complaint he has mentioned his capacity as District Superintendent of the appellant- Church/organisation. As such, a reading of the said complaint go to show that the said Rev. Dr. Prabhakar Shadrack though has made use of the letter head of Methodist Church in India to lodge the complaint, has lodged the complaint in his individual capacity. This finding gains further support by the fact that before the Tribunal, wherein Appeal No.1072/2016 was filed by the present respondent Nos.4 and 5 challenging the order of the Assistant Commissioner, Rev. Dr. Prabhakar Shadrack has filed an interlocutory application bearing I.A.No.II, seeking his impleadment in the said proceeding. In the said application, he has specifically mentioned that the complaint lodged before the Assistant Commissioner was by him in his individual capacity. Dr. Prabhakar Shadrack has filed an interlocutory application bearing I.A.No.II, seeking his impleadment in the said proceeding. In the said application, he has specifically mentioned that the complaint lodged before the Assistant Commissioner was by him in his individual capacity. The said application of the applicant came to be dismissed by the Tribunal by its order dated 07.03.2017. This further makes it clear that the present appellant was different from the alleged complainant before the Assistant Commissioner and that the alleged complainant was also not permitted to be impleaded in the proceeding. In that situation, the stand of the present appellant becomes further weaker to claim its right to be impleaded as a respondent in the litigation. 20. For these reasons, the present appellant cannot be considered as a necessary and proper party in the proceedings in W.P.No.20541/2017. Even though the appellant may contend that the order challenged in W.P.No.20541/2017 has also taken away the land in question under the power of Section 83 of the KLR Act and vested the same with the State Government, which would affect the interest of the appellant, still the scope of the writ petition being confined to Sections 79-A and 79-B of the KLR Act, the appellant cannot be held that he has no other remedy to agitate his rights. As such it is not proper to make use of the order passed under Sections 79-A and 79-B of the KLR Act as a platform for agitating the title or ownership of the disputed property. 21. In the light of the analysis made above wherein it has been noticed that several rounds of litigations have already taken place with respect to the same property under litigation including its title and possession, any permission for impleadment granted to the present appellant would only result in widening the scope of Sections 79-A, 79-B and Section 83 of the KLR Act and gives a scope for the appellant to bring his contention regarding his alleged title and alleged possession over the litigated property for discussion and consideration in the pending writ petition in W.P.No.20541/2017. The scope and parameters of the said writ petition would not allow it. 22. Considering all these aspects, the learned single Judge in his reasoned and elaborate order has rightly come to a conclusion of dismissing I.A.No.5/2017 filed before him in W.P.No.20541/2017 by the present appellant. The scope and parameters of the said writ petition would not allow it. 22. Considering all these aspects, the learned single Judge in his reasoned and elaborate order has rightly come to a conclusion of dismissing I.A.No.5/2017 filed before him in W.P.No.20541/2017 by the present appellant. As such, we do not find any reason to interfere with the said finding given by the learned single Judge and the order passed by him, which is challenged in this appeal. Accordingly, we proceed to pass the following: ORDER The writ appeal stands dismissed.