JUDGMENT : C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J. 1. The award dated 5.07.2011 in O.P.(MV).No.1718 of 2010 passed by the Principal Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kozhikode is under challenge in this appeal preferred by the claimants therein. According to them, the compensation granted is much short of 'just compensation'. The claimants are the legal heirs of one Muralikrishnan who died in the motor vehicle accident that occurred on 1.6.2010 at about 6 a.m. and led to the filing of the aforesaid claim petition. He was a passenger in the autorickshaw bearing Reg.No.KL-11/AF-794 which was then proceeding from Wayanad to Perumugham. At the place of accident, the lorry bearing Reg.No.KA-21/A-6259 dashed against the autorickshaw and Muralikrishnan had sustained serious injuries. He was taken to Medical College Hospital, Kozhikode from where he breathed his last. It is in the said circumstances that the aforesaid claim petition was filed under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act seeking a total compensation of Rs.6 lakhs. The Tribunal, as per the impugned award, granted an amount of Rs.5,19,000/- as compensation with interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of the petition till realisation. It is seeking enhancement of the quantum of compensation that the captioned appeal has been preferred. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned senior counsel appearing for the third respondent insurance company. It is to be noted that as per the impugned award, the Tribunal had directed the third respondent insurance company to satisfy the award and at the same time, granted it liberty to recover the entire compensation from the first respondent, owner of the autorickshaw. Though the first and second respondents who are respectively the owner and driver of the offending vehicle, viz., the autorickshaw, entered appearance and contested the matter before the Tribunal, despite the service of notice in this appeal, they have not chosen to enter appearance and resist the matter. 3. Upon hearing the learned counsel on both sides, we are of the view that this Court has to consider the question as to who are to be made liable to pay compensation and whether the Tribunal was justified in ordering pay and recovery in the light of the facts and circumstances obtained in this case in the light of the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Anjana Shyam [2007 (3) KLT 993 (SC)] and a Division Bench decision of this Court (in which one among us (C.T.Ravikumar (J)) was a member) in Indira Gopinatha Menon and Others v. Managing Partner, Arya Bhangy Motors and Others [ 2016 (4) KLT 42 ]. 4. At the time of the accident, as against the permitted capacity of passengers viz., 3+1, including the driver, there were four passengers in the autorickshaw besides the driver. The claim petition from which this appeal arose was enquired into along with two other claim petitions preferred by persons who also got injured in the same accident. In other words, out of the four passengers who were travelling in the autorickshaw at the time of the accident, only three of them, including the victim in this case, viz., Sri. Muralikrishnan sustained serious injuries filed claim petitions. Seeking compensation for the death of Muralikrishnan, the appellants had preferred O.P. (MV)No.1718 of 2010. O.P.(MV).Nos.1830 and 1831 of 2010 are the other claim petitions moved by the other injured persons. We may hasten to add that there is nothing on record to show that the 4th passenger had claimed compensation alleging sustainment of injuries in the accident. At any rate, there is no such submission from the counsel for the third respondent-insurance company. The third respondent insurer admitted the accident and also the valid insurance coverage of the offending vehicle. But at the same time, it is contended by the third respondent in its written statement that since the autorickshaw was overloaded at the time of accident, there occurred violation of the policy conditions and permit and therefore, it is not liable to indemnify the first respondent. Virtually, the Tribunal had accepted the said contention and held that in view of the violation of the policy conditions by taking passengers in excess of the permitted capacity, the third respondent is not liable to indemnify the insured owner of the autorickshaw. Obviously, it is the said conclusion that made the Tribunal to grant liberty to the insurance company to recover the entire compensation payable under the award after satisfying the award. True that the first and second respondents herein, who are respectively the owner and driver of the autorickshaw had not entered appearance to contest in this proceedings. Obviously, it is the said conclusion that made the Tribunal to grant liberty to the insurance company to recover the entire compensation payable under the award after satisfying the award. True that the first and second respondents herein, who are respectively the owner and driver of the autorickshaw had not entered appearance to contest in this proceedings. The learned senior counsel appearing for the third respondent insurance company contended that in the absence of an appeal by the first respondent or a cross-objection by him or in the absence of any such specific ground raised by the appellant, it is not proper or justifiable for this Court to go into that question. But, according to us, such reasons shall not fetter the power of this Court to invoke the power under Order XLI, Rule 33, C.P.C to do complete justice between the parties. A grave error of law committed by the Tribunal even after taking note of the factual situation by wrongly applying the binding decisions or by not applying the binding decisions can be interfered with if it resulted in miscarriage of justice and to do complete justice between the parties. In such circumstances, this Court cannot simply ignore the said grave mistake or patent error committed by the Tribunal and we are of the view that in such circumstances, we should keep reminded of the salutory maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit'. Bearing in mind the said aspects, we will proceed to consider the said issue. 5. We have already adverted to the undisputed and indisputable facts relevant for considering the aforesaid aspects. In short, the position is that as against the permitted capacity of 3+1 including the driver, at the time of the accident, there were four passengers in the autorickshaw in addition to the driver. Whether the insurer could seek exoneration of its liability to indemnify the insured owner in respect of the number of permitted passengers when it admits valid insurance coverage of the vehicle at the time of the accident on the ground that at the time of the accident the number of passengers exceeded the permissible limit? This issue is no longer res integra in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Anjana Shyam's case (supra). This issue is no longer res integra in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Anjana Shyam's case (supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court had held that the insurance taken out for the number of permitted passengers could alone determine the liability of the insurance company in respect of those passengers. The Apex Court also held that in terms of section 149 of the M.V.Act, the duty of the insurer is only to satisfy judgment and award against persons insured in respect of the third party risk. The Apex Court held further as follows:- “S.149 of the Act speaks of judgment or award being obtained against any person insured by the policy and the liability of the insurer to pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder subject to any claim the insurer may have against the owner of the vehicle. Section 149 could not be understood as compelling an insurance company to make payment of amounts covered by decrees not only in respect of the number of persons covered by the policy itself but even in respect of those who are not covered by the policy and who have been loaded into the vehicle against the terms of the permit and against the terms of the condition of registration of the vehicle and in terms of violation of a statute.” True that the Hon'ble Apex Court had held further that the Act only imposes an obligation to take out insurance to cover third party risks and in case of stage carriages, the passengers to be carried in the vehicle can be understood only as passengers authorized or permitted to be carried in the vehicle concerned. The practical and proper course open when an accident had occurred while the vehicle was boarded by more passengers than the permitted capacity is to hold the insurance company liable and to make it to deposit the amounts covered by the number of higher awards equal to the number of permitted passengers, in the vehicle concerned. This decision was referred to by this Court in Indira Gopinatha Menon's case (supra). It was held that even in case of overloading, the insurer is liable to indemnify the insured owner in respect of the number of passengers/riders permitted to be carried in the vehicle concerned. This decision was referred to by this Court in Indira Gopinatha Menon's case (supra). It was held that even in case of overloading, the insurer is liable to indemnify the insured owner in respect of the number of passengers/riders permitted to be carried in the vehicle concerned. Further, it was held that if the accident occurred due to overloading of the vehicle in violation of the statutory provisions and conditions of insurance policy and permit, that could not be a reason for the insurance company to disclaim the liability in its entirety and in such circumstances, the liability of the insurance company to indemnify the insured owner should be limited to the number of passengers/riders permitted to be carried in the vehicle concerned. As noticed hereinbefore, it is the admitted case that at the time of the accident, the autorickshaw in question was having valid insurance coverage. Going by the conditions of the policy in question, the permitted number of passengers in the vehicle was 3+driver. True that at the time of the accident, one more passenger was there in the autorickshaw. But at the same time, the common judgment and award would reveal that only three among the injured passengers preferred claim petition seeking compensation for the injuries sustained by them in the accident. Nothing was on record to show that the fourth passenger in the vehicle had also claimed compensation alleging sustainment of injuries in the accident in question. When that be the undisputed position, the mere fact that the Tribunal had failed to consider the binding precedents in the given sets of facts would not and could not be a reason to grant liberty to recover the amount awarded from the insured owner. When such binding precedents are squarely applicable to the facts obtained in this case, the failure on the part of the Tribunal in applying the dictum in those binding decisions to the facts obtained in this case can only be taken as a patent error committed by the Tribunal. When such a patent illegality or legal error is committed by the Tribunal and when it has come to the attention of this Court and if they are perceivable from the indisputable and undisputed factual position obtained from the evidence on record, this Court is bound to set right such mistakes or error of law imbibing the spirit of the provisions under section 168 M.V.Act. Ignoring such vital aspects and granting liberty to effect recovery would tantamount to exoneration of the insurance company from the liability to indemnify, which is not legally available to it, in law, in view of the factual and legal position. In such circumstances, we are of the view that when such an illegality had crept in the award passed by the Tribunal, being the first appellate Court, this Court is having the power coupled with a duty especially in the light of the salutory maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, to undo the wrong. 6. When the law applicable, as mentioned above, is clear and it is squarely applicable in the given circumstances obtained in a case, the question is whether it could be corrected by invoking the appellate power available under Order XLI Rule 33, C.P.C. The fact that the said power can be invoked even in appeals arising from awards passed by Claims Tribunals cannot be disputed. In the contextual situation, it is relevant to refer to the decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of Madras in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ramachandran (1992 ACJ 813 (Madras). It was held therein that Order XLI, Rule 33, C.P.C is applicable to the Claims Tribunal cases and that once the matter comes before the High Court in appeal against the award of the Tribunal, the said provision is applicable just like any other first appeal which comes before the Court. True that this question was not pointedly raised by the appellant. In fact, it is purely a matter between the respondent and the co-respondent. The question is whether in such circumstances, the appellate power under Order XLI Rule 33, C.P.C can be applied. This question also is no longer res integra in view of the Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in Panna Lal v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1963 SC 1516 ]. The Apex Court held thus:- The wide wording of O.41 R.33 was intended to empower the appellate court to make whatever order it thinks fit, not only as between the appellant and the respondent but also as between a respondent and a respondent. It empowers the appellate court not only to give or refuse relief to the appellant by allowing or dismissing the appeal but also to give such other relief to any of the respondents as “the case may require”. It empowers the appellate court not only to give or refuse relief to the appellant by allowing or dismissing the appeal but also to give such other relief to any of the respondents as “the case may require”. In Dhangir v. Madan Mohan ( AIR 1988 SC 54 ), while referring to Order XLI, Rule 33, C.P.C, the Apex Court made the following observation:- “The appellate court could exercise the power under R. 33 even if the appeal is only against a part of the decree of the lower court. The appellate court could exercise that power in favour of all or any of the respondents although such respondent may not have filed any appeal or objection. The sweep of the power under R. 33 is wide enough to determine any question not only between the appellant and respondent, but also between respondent and corespondents. The appellate court could pass any decree or order which ought to have been passed in the circumstances of the case. The appellate court could also pass such other decree or order as the case may require. The words "as the case may require" used in R. 33 of O. 41 have been put in wide terms to enable the appellate court to pass any order or decree to meet the ends of justice. What then should be the constraint ? We do not find many. We are not giving any liberal interpretation. The rule itself is liberal enough. The only constraints that we could see may be these : That the parties before the lower court should be there before the appellate court. The question raised must properly arise out of judgment of the lower court. If these two requirements are there, the appellate court could consider any objection against any part of the judgment or decree of the lower court. It may be urged by any party to the appeal. It is true that the power of the appellate court under R. 33 is discretionary. But it is a proper exercise of judicial discretion to determine all questions urged in order to render complete justice between the parties. The court should not refuse to exercise that discretion on mere technicalities.” 7. It is true that the power of the appellate court under R. 33 is discretionary. But it is a proper exercise of judicial discretion to determine all questions urged in order to render complete justice between the parties. The court should not refuse to exercise that discretion on mere technicalities.” 7. It is thus clear from the decision in Panna Lal's case (supra) and Dhangir Madan Mohan's case (supra) and also from the provision under Order XLI Rule 33, C.P.C that this power is exercisable even in respect of a party who could have filed cross objection under Order XLI Rule 22 but had not done it or not filed an independent appeal. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in State of Punjab v. Bakshish Singh [ (1998) 8 SCC 222 ] that a reading of Order XLI Rule 33, C.P.C would make it clear that the appellate court has got wide power to do complete justice between the parties and it would enable the appellate court to pass such decree or order as ought to have been passed or as the nature of the case may require notwithstanding that the party in whose favour the power is sought to be exercised has not filed any appeal or cross objection. For all these reasons, in view of the indisputable and undisputed position of law, we are of the view that the decisions of the Apex Court in Anjana Shyam's case (supra) and Indira Gopinatha Menon's case (supra) are squarely applicable to the facts obtained in this case. On such application of the dictum in those decisions to the indisputable and undisputed facts obtained in this case, it has to be held that the Tribunal had committed an illegality in granting liberty to the third respondent insurance company to recover the entire amount payable under the award after satisfying the award. In such circumstances, we vacate the said finding and hold that the third respondent insurer is liable to indemnify the insured owner of the vehicle viz., the first respondent, in the case on hand. 8. We will now proceed to consider the question whether the appellants herein are entitled to get enhanced compensation. The main grievance of the appellants is that the Tribunal had erroneously estimated the monthly income of the deceased while calculating dependency compensation. The deceased was aged 45 years at the time of the accident. 8. We will now proceed to consider the question whether the appellants herein are entitled to get enhanced compensation. The main grievance of the appellants is that the Tribunal had erroneously estimated the monthly income of the deceased while calculating dependency compensation. The deceased was aged 45 years at the time of the accident. In the claim petition, it was specifically averred that he was a coolie earning Rs.9,000/-per month. True that the appellants had not adduced evidence to establish those averments regarding occupation and income. Hence, the Tribunal had no option but to fix the monthly income notionally. In the said circumstances, it cannot be said that the Tribunal had committed illegality in fixing the monthly income notionally. 9. The next question is whether the fixation of the monthly income as Rs.4,000/-invites interference in view of the relevant facts and factors obtained in this case. The deceased Muralikrishnan was aged 45 years at the time of accidental death. The Tribunal had wrongly adopted the multiplier by taking the same applicable to the age group of 45-50 years viz., 13'. The proper multiplier applicable in this case is 14' which is applicable to the age group of 41 to 45 years. Reverting to the question whether the fixation of the monthly income is to be interfered with, we are of the considered view that two aspects of relevance were not given due regard by the Tribunal. The accident had occurred on 1.6.2010. The case of the appellants is that the deceased was a coolie and he was earning Rs.9,000/-per month. In the contextual situation, we are of the view that the decision of the Apex Court in Ramachandrappa v. Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Ltd. [ (2011) 13 SCC 236 ] can act as guidance in the matter of fixation of monthly income of the deceased who was a coolie. In that case, in respect of a coolie who met with an accident in the year 2004, the Hon'ble Apex Court took the monthly income as Rs.4,500/-. The accident in question occurred about six years since the accident involved in Ramachandrappa's case. The deceased was aged only 45 years at the time of the accident. In such circumstances, we are of the considered view that it is only reasonable to fix the monthly income of the deceased as Rs.8,000/-. We do so. The accident in question occurred about six years since the accident involved in Ramachandrappa's case. The deceased was aged only 45 years at the time of the accident. In such circumstances, we are of the considered view that it is only reasonable to fix the monthly income of the deceased as Rs.8,000/-. We do so. In view of the number of surviving dependent family members, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased has to be 1/4th of the income of the deceased. It was correctly done by the Tribunal. In short, a re-assessment of compensation for loss of dependency is required by substituting the multiplicand as also the multiplier. On such re-assessment, the amount payable towards loss of dependency is Rs.10,08,000/-(8000x12x14x3/4). The Tribunal had already granted an amount of Rs.4,68,000/-under the said head. Subtracting the said amount, the appellants are entitled to get Rs.5,40,000/-additionally under the said head. It is granted. 10. After perusing the schedule of compensation, we are of the view that the appellants are entitled to get an upward modification of the quantum of compensation on certain other heads as well. Under the head compensation for loss of estate and loss of consortium, the Tribunal had granted only an amount of Rs.10,000/-each. According to the appellants, an upward modification is required as regards compensation granted under the aforesaid heads and also with regard to the amount granted towards funeral expenses. In the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi [2017 (4) KLT 662 (SC)], the sums of compensation grantable towards funeral expenses and loss of consortium is Rs.15,000/-and Rs.40,000/-respectively. In such circumstances, we are inclined to grant an additional compensation of Rs.12,000/-towards funeral expenses and Rs.30,000/-additionally towards loss of consortium. In the light of the said decision, an amount of Rs.15,000/-is payable towards loss of estate. The Tribunal had already granted an amount of Rs.10,000/-. Hence, the appellants are entitled to get an amount of Rs.5,000/-additionally under the said head. Towards loss of love and affection, taking note of the relationship between the deceased and appellants 2 to 4, we are inclined to grant an amount of Rs.20,000/- additionally. We do not find any reason to interfere with the compensation awarded under other heads. In the result, this appeal is allowed as hereunder:- The appellants are entitled to get an additional compensation of Rs.6,07,000/-. We do not find any reason to interfere with the compensation awarded under other heads. In the result, this appeal is allowed as hereunder:- The appellants are entitled to get an additional compensation of Rs.6,07,000/-. The said amount of additional compensation will carry interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of the petition till realisation. The third respondent shall deposit the said amount along with interest as also the compensation granted under the impugned award with interest at the rate of 7% per annum as ordered by the Tribunal, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Before releasing the amount to the appellants, the Tribunal shall realise the balance court fee payable, in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.