JUDGMENT : Mohammad Rafiq, J. Both these appeals raise identical questions of law and facts, therefore, are being decided together. Special Appeal (Civil) No.29/2016 has been filed by the Employees Provident Fund Organization, Regional Office, Jaipur, (for short, ‘the EPFO’) praying for modification in the order of the Company Court dated 12.02.2016 by deleting the direction given therein, for not disbursing the amount of provident fund to the employees until they vacate the land of the liquidated company, the disbursement of which was directed by order of this court dated 05.01.1996 in Company Application No.1/1996 and further, for setting aside the order dated 26.08.2016. Special Appeal (Civil) No.2/2017 has been filed by Soot Mill Colony Kachchi Basti Vikas Samiti challenging the order dated 27.01.2017, by which its application for recall of order dated 12.02.2016, as mentioned above, has been dismissed with costs of Rs.20,000/-, to be paid to the Rajasthan State Legal Services Authority, Jaipur, within 75 days from the date of order. Further prayer is made for a direction to the respondents to regularize the quarters and small huts where the members of the applicant are residing against the dues of the employees. 2. Mr. Deepak Goyal, learned counsel for the EPFO, submitted that this court in Company Petition No.10/1980 passed winding up order of M/s. Jaipur Spinning and Weaving Mills Limited, Jaipur, on 03.12.1982. The appellant EPFO filed a Company Application No.27/1996 before the Company Court with an averment that it had submitted claim in the office of the Official Liquidator in respect of dues of provident fund payable to the employees of the liquidated company. The Official Liquidator, vide letter dated 27.02.1992 informed the appellant that the claim of the appellant against the company has been allowed to the tune of Rs.14,35,839/- as a preferential claim under Section 530(f) of the Companies Act, 1956, and that further claim of Rs.5,93,866/- was allowed as ordinary claim. This court in S.B. Company Application No.1/1996 passed a suo motu order under Section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 on 05.01.1996, thereby directing full payment of the claim settled by the Official Liquidator to the employees of the company towards arrears of their salary. This court in S.B. Company Application No.1/1996 passed a suo motu order under Section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 on 05.01.1996, thereby directing full payment of the claim settled by the Official Liquidator to the employees of the company towards arrears of their salary. Apart from Sections 529A and 530 of the Companies Act, 1956 (for short, ‘the Act of 1956’), Section 11 of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for short, ‘the Act of 1952’) also provides for the priority of the payment of contribution over other debts. The Official Liquidator, while issuing a letter dated 27.02.1992, failed to consider the effect of Section 11 of the Act of 1952 because the entire claim of the provident fund was required to be treated as a preferential claim. This court decided the aforesaid application on 06.09.1996 with the direction that the provident fund has specifically been included under Section 530 of the Act of 1956 and therefore the claim of appellant would, to the extent of Rs.14,35,839/-, be treated as preferential and be considered as such while making payment to other preferential creditors. 3. It is contended that the appellant-EPFO has been regularly requesting the Official Liquidator since 1997 to make payment of the preferential claim of Rs.14,35,839/- but the Official Liquidator has not released the amount due to a lack of funds and always assured that whenever funds would become available, the payment would be made on a priority basis. Finally the Official Liquidator, during the pendency of the aforesaid application, made payment on 11.02.2016. The Application No.10/2016 was disposed off by the impugned order of the Company Court dated 12.02.2016 as infructuous but with the direction “that from amongst the amounts remitted by the Official Liquidator under his letter dated 11.02.2016, no disbursement be made to the workers entitled thereto unless they have vacated the land of the company in liquidation as per directions of this Court on 05.01.1996 in Company Application No.1/1996.” 4. Mr. Deepak Goyal, learned counsel for the appellant, has argued that this court in the aforesaid order could not impose the condition of not disbursing the due amount of provident fund to the concerned employees. There is no provision under the Act of 1956 empowering either of the Official Liquidator or the Company Court to withhold the payment of provident fund to the employees. There is no provision under the Act of 1956 empowering either of the Official Liquidator or the Company Court to withhold the payment of provident fund to the employees. It is not part of the obligation of the EPFO to ensure that the land of the company, on which the concerned employees have been squatting for a long time, should be got vacated before disbursing the payment of the provident fund. These two are distinct and separate disputes. Section 10(1) of the Act of 1952 clearly provides that any amount standing to the credit of any member in the fund or of an exempted employee in a provident fund, shall not in any way be capable of being assigned or charged and shall not be liable to attachment under any decree or order of any court in respect of any debt or liability incurred by the member or the exempted employee. Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act of 1952 further provides that neither the official assignee appointed under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 nor any receiver appointed under the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, shall be entitled to have any claim on, any such amount. Learned Company Judge was therefore not justified in restraining the EPFO from disbursing the amount of the provident fund to the employees, who were lawfully entitled thereto. 5. Mr. R.P. Garg, learned counsel for appellant in Special Appeal No.2/2017, argued that the appellant Soot Mill Colony Kachi Basti Vikas Samiti (for short, ‘the appellant-samiti’) is a registered samiti and former workers/employees of M/s. Jaipur Spinning and Weaving Mills Limited are its members. In that capacity, they were allotted quarters or the open space for residential purpose over the land of the company comprising of Khasra no.142 of village Bassi Sitarampura. Many of the employees have raised such construction out of their own hard earned money and have been residing there for last several decades. There are about 240 pucca quarters, tin shades with varandas and about 150 small huts. The members of the appellant-samiti are residing in those quarters and small huts ever since the company has been wound up. The members of the appellant-samiti are earning their livelihood by working as labourers or rickshaw pullers etc. They have no other alternative place to go. The members of the appellant-samiti were working with the company when it was earning profits. The members of the appellant-samiti are earning their livelihood by working as labourers or rickshaw pullers etc. They have no other alternative place to go. The members of the appellant-samiti were working with the company when it was earning profits. Even then, their due amount of provident fund, bonus etc. was not paid to them. Had their dues been paid in time, the members of the appellant-samiti would have easily purchased residential plots in and around Jaipur in late 1980’s and early 1990’s because at that time, the dues of each of the workmen was around Rs.10,000/- or so, and the land prices were quite cheap. In fact, the members of the appellant-samiti had been residing in the quarters/hutments ever since they were allotted to them by the company, under the hope that their possession would be regularized against their dues, as the land price at that time, was approximate to the amount due to them. 6. Mr. R.P. Garg, learned counsel further argued that the members of the appellant-samiti cannot be said to be unauthorized occupants or trespassers over the land in dispute. Learned Company Judge was wholly unjustified in not recalling the order dated 12.02.2016, which was passed without any jurisdiction for not disbursing the provident fund dues to the employees till they vacated the land of the liquidated company. Earlier order dated 05.01.1996 was passed by learned Company Judge without having regard to aforementioned circumstances and even without any notice or opportunity of hearing to the members of appellant-samiti. The application of the appellant for recall of the aforesaid order has been illegally rejected by the impugned order dated 27.01.2017. Learned Company Judge was not justified in rejecting that application on the premise that similar Company Application No.3/1989 filed by the Labour Colony Kachchi Basti Vikas Samiti, was dismissed by order dated 17.12.1986, whereagainst appeal and review petition were also filed and the same were dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court. It is submitted that that application was filed by one Shankar Lal in the name of the Labour Colony Kachchi Basti Vikas Samiti, who unauthorisedly occupied the land of the Company and raised illegal construction. The appellant-samiti and its members were not party to the aforesaid proceedings and did not consent to filing of the aforementioned application by the said Labour Colony Kachchi Basti Vikas Samiti. The appellant-samiti and its members were not party to the aforesaid proceedings and did not consent to filing of the aforementioned application by the said Labour Colony Kachchi Basti Vikas Samiti. Value of the land at the time when dues of the members of the appellant-samiti were not cleared, was approximate or less than the amount due to the workmen and now the respondents are insisting upon getting the land vacated only because its price has appreciated enormously. The Government has a policy of regularizing many other kachchi bastis on the same analogy. Possessions of the members of appellant-samiti ought to be therefore regularized against dues by also computing the amount of interest accrued on the sum payable to them. 7. Learned counsel argued that learned Company Judge was wholly unjustified in imposing the costs of Rs.20,000/- on the appellant-samiti, whose members are in fact are hand to mouth and are not even able to maintain their families. They can ill afford to pay such a huge amount towards costs. 8. Learned counsel, in support of the arguments, has relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Jyoti Chit Fund and Finance and Others, AIR 1976 SC 1163 , to argue that the amount in the hands of Government due to employee towards provident fund and pensionary benefits, is not liable for attachment. Learned counsel has also relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Sarup Gupta Vs. Bishun Narain Inter College and Others, AIR 1987 SC 1242 , and submitted that when the permission was granted by the company to some of the employees to raise construction over the land allotted to them and such employees had spent substantial amount in raising such construction, without any objection of the company, the license became irrevocable and the company thereafter could not revoke the license. 9. E-converso, Mr. Gaurav Sharma Saraswat, learned counsel for the Official Liquidator, while opposing both the appeals, argued that learned Company Judge was perfectly justified in restraining the EPFO from disbursing the amount of provident fund to the employees because they have been squatting over the land of the company since long and despite specific and repeated directions of this court, have not vacated the same. The EPFO has no locus to question the correctness of the order passed by learned Company Judge in a dispute inter se between the company in liquidation and its former employees. The earlier application filed by the workers through one Shankar Lal in the name of Labour Colony Kachchi Basti Vikas Samiti, claiming himself to be its Secretary, with the prayer that the members of the samiti, who were residing in the premise of Jaipur Spinning and Weaving Mill Limited, should be allowed to purchase the portion, which is in their occupation, was rejected by the Company Court by detailed order dated 17.12.1986. Learned counsel submitted that in fact, the Company Court in its order dated 05.01.1996 clearly directed that payment of the dues shall not be made to any ex-workman, who himself or through any of his relative or otherwise, is occupying any of the premise of the company. The Official Liquidator shall obtain an affidavit from such an employee that he or any of his relative or any person on his behalf, was not occupying any premise of the company including quarter. The directions were given for eviction of the trespassers with the help of police authorities, but unfortunately, the aforesaid order has not been complied with till date for want of help from the State administration, especially the police. Learned counsel argued that the order dated 17.12.1986 was challenged by Labour Colony Kachchi Basti Vikas Samiti before the Division Bench in an appeal, which has been dismissed by judgment dated 11.10.2011 and thereafter review petition filed seeking review of the Division Bench judgment was also dismissed by order dated 26.09.2016. When the unauthorized occupants/trespassers of the land of the liquidated company failed in the first round of litigation, they have now initiated the new proceedings in a different name by taking shelter of the innocuous order passed by the Company Judge directing the EPFO not to make payment of the provident fund itself to the ex-employees till they vacated the land of the company. 10. Learned counsel argued that direction of the learned Company Judge not to make payment of provident fund amount to ex-employees of the company till they vacated the land of the liquidated company cannot be said to be affected by the provisions of Section 10(1) of the Act of 1952 as it is neither assignment nor charge. 10. Learned counsel argued that direction of the learned Company Judge not to make payment of provident fund amount to ex-employees of the company till they vacated the land of the liquidated company cannot be said to be affected by the provisions of Section 10(1) of the Act of 1952 as it is neither assignment nor charge. It can also not be described as attachment in the meaning of Section 10(1) of the Act of 1952. Learned counsel, in support of the arguments, has relied on judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Municipal Corporation Vs. Jagdamba Dutt, 2000 (2) LL.J. 1610 . 11. Mr. Gaurav Sharma, learned counsel for the Official Liquidator, has in the course of arguments, referred to various provisions of the Companies Act to highlight the powers of the Company Court and argued that the Company Court in passing the impugned order has fully acted within its jurisdiction. Learned counsel in support of his arguments also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Smt. Abhilash Vinodkumar Jain Vs. Cox & Kings (India) Ltd., (1995) 3 SCC 732 . 12. We have given our anxious consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. 13. A Company Court can certainly enforce its orders to recover possession of the land of the company in liquidation but the question of seminal importance that arises in this case is whether in that process, the Company Court can direct the EPFO not to disburse the amount of provident fund, which has been deposited by the Official Liquidator with EPFO towards the dues payable to former workers of the company in liquidation. Before however embarking on that discussion, we must first decide the objection as to the locus of the EPFO to question correctness of the order passed by the Company Court. In the cited case of Union of India Vs. Jyoti Chit Fund and Finance and Others, supra, the Union of India, by way of special leave before the Supreme Court, challenged the order of the Delhi High Court, which had dismissed its revision petition against the order of the Executing Court, overruling contention of the State objecting to the attachment of certain provident fund and pension dues held by the Union of India on behalf of Rajya Sabha Secretariat in trust for the judgment-debtor, of those who had been employed in the Rajya Sabha Secretariat. The first court held that the Union of India had no locus standi to object to the attachment by the decree-holder on the score that an outsider to the suit without ‘interest in the attached money’ has standing to intervene dispute of the attachability even if the sum was clearly immune from attachment in law. The Executing Court held that the Union of India has every interest in the attached property so as to entitle it to make an application under Order 21, Rule 58 CPC. Even if the attachment has been wrongly made, it is for the judgment-debtor to make an application to the court for releasing the provident fund or the compulsory deposits. The High Court upheld that order by observing that "the Government has no interest in the attached money and therefore no standing to come to court. The judgment-debtor may file objections for release of the attached money.” The Supreme Court, however, overruled that objection and held that, “11. We may state without fear of contradiction that provident fund amounts, pensions and other compulsory deposits covered by the provisions we have referred to, retain their character until they reach the hands of the employee. The reality of the protection is reduced to illusory formality if we accept the interpretation sought. We take a contrary view which means that attachment is possible and lawful only after such amounts are received by the employee. If doubts may possible be entertained on this question, the decision in Union of India Vs. Radha Kissen Agarwala & Another, AIR 1969 SC 762 , erases them. Indeed our case is an afortiori one, on the facts. A bare reading of Radha Kissen makes the proposition fool-proof that so long as the amounts are Provident Fund dues then, till they are actually paid to the government servant who is entitled to it on retirement or otherwise the nature of the dues is not altered. What is more, that case is also authority for the benignant view that the government is a trustee for those sums and has an interest in maintaining the objection in court to attachment…” 14. What is more, that case is also authority for the benignant view that the government is a trustee for those sums and has an interest in maintaining the objection in court to attachment…” 14. We are, therefore, not inclined to uphold the objection as to the locus of the EPFO in questioning the correctness of the order passed by the Company Court, more so, when the workers themselves have challenged the very same order, albeit also with the prayer to recall the same, the EPFO therefore cannot be nonsuited on the ground of locus. 15. Section 10 of the Act of 1952 has provided that amount standing to the credit of any member in Fund shall not in any way be capable of being assigned or charged and shall not be liable to attachment by any order of the court in respect of any debt incurred by such member. The word “attachment” has not been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure or elsewhere but an order of attachment is generally passed for achieving a limited purpose to either compel appearance of a defendant or seize his property for the payment of debt or to prohibit/prevent him from transferring, alienating or creating any kind of charge or encumbrance in the property or in this case the money sought to be attached. We are inclined to hold that though of course the order impugned herein does not amount to creating any charge or making any charge over the amount or making any assignment of the amount payable to the workers. But in our view, it does tantamount to attachment of the amount of provident fund payable to them. However, what we have to decide is whether the embargo imposed by Section 10 on the powers of any “court” under “any decree or order” in respect of passing such an order in respect of any debt or liability incurred by the member of the firm, would be applicable even to a Company Court under the Companies Act. 16. The Supreme Court in EPFO Vs. 16. The Supreme Court in EPFO Vs. Official Liquidator of Esskay Pharmaceutical, (2011) 10 SCC 727 , was called upon to consider the question in appeals filed by the Provident Fund Commissioner whether priority given to the dues payable by an employer under Section 11 of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, is subject to Section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 in terms of which the workmen's dues and debts due to secured creditors are required to be paid in priority to all other debts. The Supreme Court held that if two special enactments contain provisions which give overriding effect to the provisions contained therein, then the Court is required to consider the purpose and the policy underlying the two Acts and the clear intendment conveyed by the language of the relevant provisions. There is no gainsaying the fact that the provident fund dues payable by the employer by virtue of Section 11(2) of the EPF Act shall be deemed to be the first charge on the assets of the establishment and shall notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, be paid on priority over all other debts. But in the present case, the dispute is not that the Official Liquidator (read in place of the employer) has failed to deposit amount of provident fund with the EPF or is otherwise in default of making such payment. So far as obligation of the employer to pay and deposit with the EPF of the amount of the provident fund is concerned, the same stands discharged. But the question that arises in the factual context of the present case is whether the Company Court, having directed the Official Liquidator to deposit provident fund dues of the workers with the EPFO, would now be justified in directing it to withhold such payment to the workers till they vacate the premises of the company in liquidation, unauthorizedly occupied by them. In our considered view, the Company Court would fully be justified in making this direction because the workmen are merely licensees of the company over the premises in question, which it can at any time revoke, depending on exigency of time. 17. Apart from provisions of the Easement Act, we shall presently deal with various provisions of the Companies Act to highlight the reach and extent of the powers of the Companies Act. 18. 17. Apart from provisions of the Easement Act, we shall presently deal with various provisions of the Companies Act to highlight the reach and extent of the powers of the Companies Act. 18. Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (for short, ‘the Act of 1882’), provides that the employees of the company, when they were allotted quarters, could at best be said to be licensees, which license could be revoked by the employer at any point of time. “License” has been defined in Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, to mean when one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, but the right is called a license. Reference in this connection may also be made to Section 62(g) of the Act of 1882, according to which, a license would be deemed to be revoked when license is granted to licensee as holding a particular office, employment or character, and such office, employment or character ceases to exist. 19. Coming now to the provisions contained in the Companies Act, 1956, its Section 445(3) provides that as soon as the order of winding up is passed, the same shall be deemed to be ‘notice of discharge’ to the officers and employees of the company except when the business of the company is discontinued. Section 456(1) of the Act of 1956 requires that where a winding up order has been made or where a provisional liquidator has been appointed, the liquidator or the provisional liquidator, as the case may be, shall take into his custody or under his control, all the property, effects and actionable claims to which the company is or appears to be entitled. Section 456 (1A) further provides that any liquidator or the provisional liquidator, as the case may be, shall take into his custody or under his control, any property, effects or actionable claims to which the company is or appears to be entitled for the purpose of the liquidation. Section 456 (1A) further provides that any liquidator or the provisional liquidator, as the case may be, shall take into his custody or under his control, any property, effects or actionable claims to which the company is or appears to be entitled for the purpose of the liquidation. The liquidator or the provisional liquidator, as the case may be, may by writing request the Chief Presidency Magistrate or the District Magistrate, within whose jurisdiction such property, effects or actionable claims or any books of account or other documents of the company may be found, to take possession thereof, and the Presidency Magistrate or the District Magistrate may thereupon after such notice as he may think fit, to give to any party, take possession of such property, effects, actionable claims, books of account or other documents and delivery possession thereof to the liquidator or the provisional liquidator. Sub-section (2) of Section 456 provides that all the property and effects of the company shall be deemed to be in the custody of the Court as from the date of the order for the winding up of the company. 20. Here in the present case, the company was ordered to be wound up way back on 03.12.1982. As per sub-section (1A) of Section 456 of the Act of 1956, the Official Liquidator is entitled to take into his custody or under his control, any property, effects or actionable claims to which the company is or appears to be entitled, and he may for that purpose request the District Magistrate within whose jurisdiction such property is situated, to take possession thereof and the District Magistrate, after such notice, as he may think fit to give to any party, take possession of such property. As per Section 456(2) pending these proceedings all the property and effects of the company are deemed to be in custody of the court from the date of winding up order is passed. 21. As per Section 456(2) pending these proceedings all the property and effects of the company are deemed to be in custody of the court from the date of winding up order is passed. 21. Section 468 of the Act of 1956 inter alia provides that the Company Court may, at any time after making a winding up order, require any contributory for the time being on the list of contributories, and any trustee, receiver, banker, agent, officer or other employee of the company, to pay, deliver, surrender or transfer forthwith or within such time as the court directs to the liquidator, any money, property or books and papers in his custody or under his control to which the company is prima facie entitled. Section 630 of the Act of 1956 makes unlawful detention of the company’s property an offence, which provides that if any officer or employee of a company (a) wrongfully obtains possession of any property of a company; or (b) having any such property in his possession, wrongfully withholds it or knowingly applies it to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles and authorised by the Act of 1956, he shall, on the complaint of the company or any creditor or contributory thereof, be punishable with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees. Sub-section (2) of Section 630 provides that the court trying the offence may also order such officer or employee to deliver up or refund, within a time to be fixed by the Court, any such property wrongfully obtained or wrongfully withheld or knowingly misapplied, or in default, to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years. Notwithstanding the bar created by Section 10 of the Act of 1952 and Section 630(1)(a), the powers of the Company Court in this situation would be regulated by special provisions contained in Section 537 of the Act of 1952. The embargo created by Section 10 on the powers of any court under any decree or order, in respect of passing such an order in respect of any debt or liability incurred by the member of the firm would not curtail the power of the Company Court in securing possession of the land of the company in liquidation. The embargo created by Section 10 on the powers of any court under any decree or order, in respect of passing such an order in respect of any debt or liability incurred by the member of the firm would not curtail the power of the Company Court in securing possession of the land of the company in liquidation. Thus, the Companies Act for this purpose would in the factual context be a special legislation keeping in view the purpose of the relevant provisions therein. It shall therefore prevail over the embargo so created by Section 10 of the Act of 1952. 22. In Municipal Corporation Vs. Jagdamba Dutt, supra, the Punjab and Haryana High Court was dealing with a case wherein the respondent retired as an electrician a decade ago and he was allotted a quarter by the Municipal Corporation. While the respondent was in service, he raised substantial construction by spending a considerable amount thereon and was not prepared to vacate the same. The appellant - Municipal Corporation, Amritsar, withheld his amount of provident fund, gratuity and encashment of earned leave on the plea of adjustment of the amount that he had to pay by way of house rent/penalty. The Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court, in para 18 of the judgment, held as under:- “18. Reverting to the facts of the present case, we cannot help but return a firm finding that the petitioner herein has taken undue advantage of the service benefits that were admissible to him at one stage. Having occupied a quarter allotted to him by the employer, he was duty-bound to restore its possession immediately or after a couple of months when he superannuated. Quite to the contrary, he is treating the quarter allotted to him by his employer as his personal property. He has spent a considerable amount in not only renovating the quarter but making further construction thereon and is not even shy in openly proclaiming that he shall not vacate the same. For restoration of possession to the Municipal Corporation, he challenges the employer to vindicate its stand in appropriate proceedings that may take years but insofar as post retiral dues are concerned, he wants this Court to immediately issue a writ of mandamus directing the employer to pay the same. His conduct, in our view, is most reprehensible and unbecoming of a good officer/official. His conduct, in our view, is most reprehensible and unbecoming of a good officer/official. Further by his own act and conduct, he has put his employer to an immense loss which may be far more commensurate to his own dues. Surely, he is not entitled to the discretionary relief from us under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.” 23. In the cited judgment of the Supreme Court in Smt. Abhilash Vinodkumar Jain Vs. Cox & Kings (India) Ltd., supra, the legal representatives of the deceased officer or employee were occupying property of the liquidated company, it was held that expression “officer or employee” in Section 630 of the Act of 1956 would even cover the legal representatives or heirs of past officer or employee after his death by deeming fiction. The court has to examine whether the petition is based on explicit right of the company to retain property and if so it should proceed under Section 630 of the Act of 1956. It was observed that the court must prevent perpetration of legal fraud. 24. In the present case, the order of the learned Company Court having been issued as far back as on 05.01.1996 that no dues shall be paid to ex-employees/workers of the company in liquidation or any of their relatives, who themselves or through any of their relative or otherwise, are occupying any of the premises of the company, is perfectly justified. The Company Court had already rejected the application of the ex-workers of the company through one Shankar Lal in the name of the Labour Colony Kachchi Basti Vikas Samiti for allowing them to purchase the portion which was in their possession, by detailed order dated 05.01.1996 and thereafter further directed by order dated 17.12.1996 that no payment of dues shall be made to any exworker of the company or his relative occupying any premise of the company till he vacates the same. The order of the Company Court dated 17.12.1996 was challenged by the aforesaid Labour Colony Kachchi Basti Vikas Samiti before the Division Bench, which has dismissed their appeal vide judgment dated 11.10.2011 and also Review Petition vide order dated 26.02.2016. The order of the Company Court dated 17.12.1996 was challenged by the aforesaid Labour Colony Kachchi Basti Vikas Samiti before the Division Bench, which has dismissed their appeal vide judgment dated 11.10.2011 and also Review Petition vide order dated 26.02.2016. The respondents are therefore justified in contending that the workers having failed to secure any favourable order in one round of litigation, now many of the ex-workmen of the company either themselves having the possession or parted with possession of the disputed quarters/hutments in favour of the strangers, have initiated second round of litigation by filing the fresh application in the name of Soot Mill Colony Kachi Basti Vikas Samiti only with a view to prolonging their unauthorized occupation over the land of the company. Impugned order therefore cannot be described as a fresh order but in reiteration of the order already passed earlier. The Company Court therefore cannot be held to have exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order. Besides, the Company Court in the impugned order has not as such directed withholding of payment of the provident fund to any of the employee/workman of the company in liquidation. It has merely put a condition that such amount shall not be disbursed to them unless they have vacated the land of the company in question as per earlier direction dated 05.01.1996. The direction of the Company Court to that effect in the facts of the present case cannot be faulted. The application filed by the Soot Mill Colony Kachi Basti Vikas Samiti for recall of the order dated 12.02.2016 and for a direction to the respondent to regularize the possession of the former employees/workmen of the company in liquidation over the disputed land in the shape of quarters and hutments has rightly been rejected by the Company Court. Learned Company Judge, in our view, would be justified in even requisitioning police help afresh from the State administration to get its order to secure vacant possession of the disputed land, complied with. 25. In the light of the view that we have taken of the matter, both the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed.