ORDER : Mohammad Rafiq, J. 1. All these criminal miscellaneous petitions seek to assail orders passed by the trial court, whereby the applications filed by the petitioners under Section 467 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for dropping the criminal proceedings against them in the trial for offence under Section 28 of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961, (for short, ‘the Act of 1961’), have been rejected. A learned Single Judge of this court, in view of the conflicting opinion of different single benches as to whether or not the offence under Section 28 of the Act of 1961 is continuing one, by order dated 13.07.2007 has made a reference for authoritative pronouncement. In all these matters, the complaints were filed by the Secretary, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Alwar, that the accused firms by not making payment of the market fee to the Mandi Samiti have violated provisions of Section 17 of the Act of 1961, and were liable for punishment under Section 28 of the Act of 1961. Learned Magistrate, in all these cases, took cognizance and issued process against the petitioners. The petitioners thereupon filed application for dropping the proceedings of trial and for discharging them from the said offence. According to the petitioners, since the offence under Section 28 of the Act of 1961 is punishable with imprisonment of three months and fine, which may, in regard to offence under sub-section (1), extend to five hundred rupees, and in regard to offence under sub-section (2), may extend to one thousand rupees. The complaint, having been filed after expiry of limitation of one year, was, as per Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., liable to be dismissed as time barred. It was argued that the offence under Section 28 of the Act of 1961 is not continuing offence and the offence being not continuing one, complaint ought to have been filed within one year. 2. In order to better appreciate the dispute, it is considered apposite to reproduce Sections 17 and 28 of the Act of 1961, which read thus, “17. Power to collect market fees. 2. In order to better appreciate the dispute, it is considered apposite to reproduce Sections 17 and 28 of the Act of 1961, which read thus, “17. Power to collect market fees. – The market committee shall collect market fees from the Licences in the prescribed manner on agricultural produce bought or sold by them in the market area at such rate as may be specified by the State Government, by notification in the official gazette, subject to a maximum of Rs 2/- per hundred rupees worth of agricultural produce. [Provided also that Mandi Fee leviable on the sale or purchase of Mustard Seed shall be Rs. 1/- on one hundred rupees.] [Provided also that Mandi Fee leviable on the sale or purchase of Oil Seeds shall be Rs. 1/- on one hundred rupees.]” “28. Penalty of contravention of certain provisions. – (1) Whoever contravenes the provision of section 4 shall, on conviction, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 months and with fine which may extend to two thousand Rupees and in case of continuing contravention, with a further fine which may extend to five hundred rupees for every day during which the contravention is continued after the first conviction. (2) Any person who intentionally evades the payment of any market fee payable under section 17 shall, on conviction, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months and with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. The Magistrate shall, in addition to any fine which may be imposed, recover summarily and pay to the market committee, the amount of market fees due and may, in his discretion, also recover summarily and pay to the market committee such amount, if any, as he may fix as the cost of prosecution. The Magistrate shall, in addition to any fine which may be imposed, recover summarily and pay to the market committee, the amount of market fees due and may, in his discretion, also recover summarily and pay to the market committee such amount, if any, as he may fix as the cost of prosecution. (3) Whoever obstructs the secretary or officer authorised for the purpose by the State Government, in entering any shop, godown, factory or any place or taking out the copies of entries in the accounts, registers or other documents or seizing the documents under section 27-B shall, on conviction, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which mat extend to three months or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees or with both; and in case of subsequent contravention, with simple imprisonment for a period upto three months and with a fine which may extend to one thousand rupees for every such contravention. (4) Whoever contravenes any provision of this Act shall, if no other penalty is provided for the offence in this Act, be punished with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees.” 3. A perusal of Section 17 of the Act of 1961 shows that the market committee has been empowered to collect market fees from the Licencees in the prescribed manner on agricultural produce bought or sold by them in the market area at such rate as may be specified by the State Government, by notification in the official gazette, subject to a maximum of Rs.2/- per hundred rupees worth of agricultural produce. Sub-section (2) of Section 28 of the Act of 1961 provides that any person, who intentionally evades the payment of any market fee payable under section 17 shall, on conviction, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term, which may extend to three months and with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. The Magistrate shall, in addition to any fine which may be imposed, recover summarily and pay to the market committee, the amount of market fees due and may, in his discretion, also recover summarily and pay to the market committee such amount, if any, as he may fix as the cost of prosecution. 4. A learned Single Judge of this court in Raj Kumar Vs. 4. A learned Single Judge of this court in Raj Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan – 1985 RLW 451, while relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. Dev Karan Nansi – AIR 1973 SC 908 , in para 8 to 12 of the report, held as under :- “8. Coming to the case in hand, the clinching question is whether the non-payment of market fee by the trader on the price of the sale of the market produce is or is not a continuing offence? Section 28 (2) of the Act lays down that any person who intentionally evades the payment of any market fee payable under section 17 shall, on conviction be punished with simple imprisonment for a term that may extend to three months and with a fine which may extend to 1000 rupees. This sub-section, thus, explicitly casts a duty on a person that includes a trader, to pay the market fee. Clause 26 of the bye-laws framed by the Samiti lays down that the trader shall intimate the fact of sale to the Samiti by a written slip on the very day the sale has been made will and make the payment of the market fee on Monday of every week. This provision again casts a mandate on the trader to pay the market free. The scheme envisaged in the bye-laws leaves no room for doubt that the sale and purchase of the market produce comes to the knowledge of the Samiti only when they are intimated to it and not otherwise. The provisions in the bye-laws do not show that the sales and purchases are to be made by a trader in the presence of any representative of the Samiti. As such, the sale and purchase made by a trader in the market area cannot automatically come to the knowledge of the Samiti. This knowledge it gets only from the slips to be submitted by a trader. Clause 26 of the bye-laws further lays down that in case the market fee is not paid on Monday in a week, the trader will pay a penalty at the rate of one paisa per rupee on the amount of market fee from the date of default till he pays. Thus, this penalty continues for the whole period covering from the date of default till the actual payment is made. Thus, this penalty continues for the whole period covering from the date of default till the actual payment is made. Here again, the emphasis, as shown by this penalty clause, is on the traders duty to pay the market fee within the prescribed period. The payment of market fee is, thus, a positive act to be carried out by the trader. 9. One of the tests to find out whether a wrong is a continuing wrong or not, is that it should be seen whether the wrong is the result of the breach of a positive duty or a negative duty. If the wrong-doer is called upon to do nothing in law, it is a case of negative duty. But where a positive duty has been cast and that duty has not been carried out, it is a case of the breach of the positive duty. Thus where the wrong consists of a breach of positive duty, the wrong will be a continuing one so long that duty has not been discharged. The failure to discharge this positive duty should be taken to be a continuing wrong during whole time the failure or breach lasts. If the duty is a continuing one and the omission to discharge that duty is an offence, that offence, that offence should be taken to be a continuing offence. 10. Here, as discussed above, the law casts a duty on a trader to pay the market fee. This duty is so sacrosanct that in case of its breach it carries a penal provision for the payment of penalty at the rate of one paisa per rupee on the market fee from the date of default till it is paid. This makes the offence of non-payment of market fee a continuing offence. 11. The Preamble of the Act shows that it was enacted for the better regulation of buying and selling of the agricultural produce and the establishment of market for agricultural produce. The Act is a piece of welfare legislation which is in the interest of both the trader and the producer of agricultural produce. The Act reveals that the money available by means of the collection of market fee is a major source of the income of the Samiti. If this source of income is jeopardised or is defected in one or the other way, the functioning of the samiti may become extremely difficult. The Act reveals that the money available by means of the collection of market fee is a major source of the income of the Samiti. If this source of income is jeopardised or is defected in one or the other way, the functioning of the samiti may become extremely difficult. The Welfare activities of Samiti, which are in the interest of producers and the traders, may come to a stand-still in the absence of funds. Therefore, keeping in view the object and purpose of the Act, which is to ensure the welfare of the producers as well as the traders, it can be said without the least hesitation that the offence of not paying the market fee is of continuing nature. The accused were under a legal obligation to pay the market fee on the due date. Their failure to pay the market fee makes it a continuing offence for the entire period till it is paid. 12. Since the offence involved is a continuing offence, it falls out side the inhibitory mandate in section 468 Cr.P.C. Section 472, Cr.P.C. makes an exception in the case of a continuing offence. For a continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation runs at every moment of time during which the offence continues. Thus Section 472 of the Act is a proviso to the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C. If an offence is governed by Section 472 for the purpose of limitation, the stringent provision contained in Section 468, Cr.P.C. are not applicable. The offence the non-payment of market fee in the instant case, as held above, is continuing offence. As such, it is governed by Section 472 and not by the provisions of Section 468, Cr.P.C. for the purpose of limitation. The cognizance of the offence, therefore, cannot be said to be time barred.” 5. Subsequently, another learned Single Judge of this court in M/s. Sri Om Industries & Oil Mills Ltd. & Others Vs. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti – 1997 RCC 587, took a contrary view and held that the offence under Section 17 of the Act of 1961 is not a ‘continuing offence’. Subsequently, another learned Single Judge of this court in M/s. Sri Om Industries & Oil Mills Ltd. & Others Vs. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti – 1997 RCC 587, took a contrary view and held that the offence under Section 17 of the Act of 1961 is not a ‘continuing offence’. Relevant portion reads thus, “Here it may be pointed out that the offence contemplated by Section 17 of the Act was not a continuing offence within the meaning of Section 472 Cr.P.C. In a continuing offence the cause of action for filing a complaint continues to arise or accrue day after day or month after month, as the case may be, until the default or facts constituting that offence disappear. For example, kidnapping is a continuing offence. It continues to remain an offence till the kidnapped lady (sic) is recovered from the possession of the kidnapper. But abduction is not a continuing offence because the threat to use or use of criminal force disappears as soon as such threat or use of criminal force leads to the abduction of the person threatened. In the case of abduction, the offence is complete at the point of time the person is abducted as a result of the threat to use or use of criminal force against him.” 6. Similar view was expressed again by the same learned Single Judge in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Bhawani Mandi Vs. State – 1997 RCC 512 (Suppl.). In Para 10 of the judgment, the learned Single Judge observed thus, “10. In the instant cases the offence of not paying the market fee on a transaction of sale or purchase of agricultural produce is complete as soon as such transaction takes place and the period of limitation, as prescribed u/S.468(2) Cr.P.C. commences to run. In Para 10 of the judgment, the learned Single Judge observed thus, “10. In the instant cases the offence of not paying the market fee on a transaction of sale or purchase of agricultural produce is complete as soon as such transaction takes place and the period of limitation, as prescribed u/S.468(2) Cr.P.C. commences to run. Merely because the fine leviable had a reference to the period of non payment of fees and thus the computation of fine was to be made with reference to the period during which the amount of fee was not paid the offence u/S. 28 of the Act did not become a “continuing offence” within the meaning of the term u/S. 472 Cr.P.C. computation of amount of fine Rs.500/- per day u/S. 28(2) simply has a reference to the period of non-payment of the market fee and helps to measure the effect of the wrongful act which stood completed on non-payment of the market fee at a prescribed point of time and does not make the offence under that provision a continuing offence.” 7. Learned Single Judge in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Bhawani Mandi, supra, in deciding as to whether or not the offence under Section 28 of the Act of 1961 is a ‘continuing offence’, relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Balkrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare & Others Vs. Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan and Others – AIR 1959 SC 798 , wherein their Lordships held as under, “It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act caused an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury.” 8. Aforementioned judgment of the Supreme Court appears to have arisen out of a criminal case. 9. The Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury.” 8. Aforementioned judgment of the Supreme Court appears to have arisen out of a criminal case. 9. The Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran Nenshi and Another, supra, was dealing with a case where the respondents failed to furnish to the Chief Inspector the annual returns for the year 1959 by the 21st of January, 1960. Section 66 of the Act of 1952 provides that any person who, without reasonable excuse the burden of proving which shall lie upon him, omits to make or furnish in the prescribed form or manner or at or within the prescribed time any plan, return, notice, register, record or report required by or under this Act to be made or furnished shall be punishable with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees. Section 79 of the Act of 1952, provides that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act, unless complaint thereof has been made within six months of the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed, or within six months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector, or in any case where a Court of inquiry has been appointed by the Central Government under section 24, within six months after the date of the publication of the report referred to in sub-section (4) of that Section, whichever is later. The explanation of said Section provides that if the offence in question is continuing, the period of limitation shall be computed with reference to every point of time on which the said offence continues. Regulation 3 of the Metalliferous Mines Regulations, 1926 requires the owner, agent or manager of every mine to forward to the District Magistrate and to the Chief Inspector annual returns in respect of the preceding year in the form prescribed therein on or before the 21st January in each year. 10. The argument that was raised before the Supreme Court was that a complaint having been filed more than a year after the default, was barred by limitation. 10. The argument that was raised before the Supreme Court was that a complaint having been filed more than a year after the default, was barred by limitation. It was held by the Supreme Court that it would depend upon the question if the offence was covered by substantive part of Section 79 of the Mines Act, 1952. In that case, the complaint was required to be filed within six months from the date of alleged default and therefore the complaint would be clearly time barred. If the offence is of the former kind, the complaint in regard to it would be clearly time barred. It would not be so if, the offence is of the kind, often called a continuing offence, in which event the Explanation to Section 79 would operate. In that context, their Lordships in para 5 and 9 of the report observed as under:- “5. continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance, occurs and recurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues and therefore constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all. … 9. Reg. 3 read with Section 66 of the Mines Act makes failure to furnish annual returns for the preceding year by the 31st of January of the succeeding year an offence. The language of Reg. 3 clearly indicates that an owner, manager etc. of a mine would be liable to the penalty if he were to commit an infringement of the Regulation and that infringement consists in the failure to furnish returns on or before January 21 of the succeeding year. The language of Reg. 3 clearly indicates that an owner, manager etc. of a mine would be liable to the penalty if he were to commit an infringement of the Regulation and that infringement consists in the failure to furnish returns on or before January 21 of the succeeding year. The infringement therefore, occurs on January 21 of the relevant year and is complete on the owner failing to furnish the annual returns by that day. The Regulation does not lay down that the owner manager etc. of the mine concerned would be guilty of an offence if he continues to carry on the mine without furnishing the returns or that the offence continues until the requirement of Reg. 3 is complied with. In other words, Reg. 3 does not render a continued disobedience or non-compliance of it an offence. As in the case of a construction of a wall in violation of a rule or a bye-law of a local body, the offence would be complete once and for all as soon as such construction is made, a default occurs in furnishing, the returns by the prescribed date. There is nothing in Reg. 3 or in any other provision in the Act or the Regulation which renders the continued non-compliance an offence until its requirement is carried out.” 11. The Supreme Court in that context held that the offence in that case fell within substantive part of Section 79 and was not a continuing offence under explanation attached to it. The appeal was therefore dismissed. 12. The Kerala High Court in Rani Joseph Vs. Registrar of Companies – 1995 CriLJ 3832, was dealing with a case where the complaint was filed under Section 162 of the Companies Act for violation of certain provisions of the said Act. These complaints were sought to be quashed by filing criminal miscellaneous petition. The cognizance on the complaint was taken by the Magistrate and the process was issued to the petitioner, who was Managing Director the Company. The same was challenged before the High Court on the ground that the complaints are time barred by law of limitation, hence should not have been taken cognizance by the learned Magistrate. The cognizance on the complaint was taken by the Magistrate and the process was issued to the petitioner, who was Managing Director the Company. The same was challenged before the High Court on the ground that the complaints are time barred by law of limitation, hence should not have been taken cognizance by the learned Magistrate. The High Court noted that Section 159 of the Act makes it obligatory on the part of the company to prepare and file with the Registrar a return containing the particulars specified in Part I of Schedule V regarding the various items enumerated thereunder. Section 162 of the Act deals with penalty and interpretation. Going by Section 162 (1) of the Act, if a company fails to comply with any of the provisions contained in Sections 159, 160 or 161, the company, and every officer of the company who is in default, shall be punishable with fine which may extend to fifty rupees for every day during which the default continues. Section 220(1) of the Act mandates that after the balance-sheet and the profit and loss account have been laid before a company at an annual general meeting as aforesaid, there shall be filed with the Registrar within thirty days therefrom or where the annual general meeting of a company for any year has not been held, there shall be filed with the Registrar within thirty days from the latest day on or before which that meeting should have been held in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Section 220(3) of the Act says that if default is made in complying with the requirements of Sub-sections (1) and (2), the company, and every officer of the company who is in default, shall be liable to the like punishment as is provided by Section 162 for a default in complying with the provisions of Section 159, 160 or 161. Argument before the High Court was that since alleged offences were liable to be punished with fine only, the trial court was not justified in taking cognizance of the offences beyond the period of six months from the date of commission of the offence as it is barred by limitation. Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which deal with limitation regarding cognizance of the offence, was pressed into service to advance the argument. Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which deal with limitation regarding cognizance of the offence, was pressed into service to advance the argument. This argument was resisted by the opposite party which maintained that the offence which give rise to the complaint is a ‘continuing offence’ and so far the provisions of Section are not complied with, the offence must be held to be ‘continuing’ one and therefore Section 468, Cr.P.C., is not applicable and Section 472 of the Cr.P.C. would apply. The Kerala High Court, while relying on judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran, supra, and Bhagirath Kanoria Vs. State of M.P. - AIR 1984 SC 1688 , held that the offences, which are the subject-matter of the complaints, for violation of the provisions of Sections 159 and 220 of the Act, are continuing in nature and until and unless the legal requirements contained therein are complied with, the company and the personnel in charge of the company, are liable to be prosecuted and the complaints are not liable to be quashed on the ground of limitation. 13. Ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran, supra, was further followed and reiterated in Bhagirath Kanoria Vs. State of M.P., supra, in which again, the question was whether a particular offence is a ‘continuing offence’? The Supreme Court in the light of law that has been discussed in its earlier pronouncements, held that ‘continuing offence’ is one, which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance occurs and recurs, there is the offence committed. As held by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran, supra, the distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues and, therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In Bhagirath Kanoria Vs. As held by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran, supra, the distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues and, therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In Bhagirath Kanoria Vs. State of M.P., supra, the Supreme Court held that the question whether a particular offence is a continuing offence must necessarily depend upon the language of the statute which creates that offence, the nature of the offence and, above all, the purpose which is intended to be achieved by constituting the particular act as an offence. 14. Adverting now to the provisions of Section 28(2) of the Act of 1961, it provides that any person who intentionally evades the payment of any market fee payable under section 17 shall, on conviction, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term, which may extend to three months and with fine, which may extend to one thousand rupees. This Section thus casts duty on a person that includes a licensee or trader to pay the market fee. Bye laws of the Samiti also requires the trader to make payment of market fee which thus again casts a duty on trader to pay the market fee. It must be therefore held to be a ‘continuing offence’. 15. The binding decision of a Single Bench of this court in Raj Kumar, supra, was not cited before another Single Bench deciding the case in M/s. Sri Om Industries & Oil Mills Ltd. & Others Vs. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, supra. The Supreme Court in Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority – (2015) 3 SCC 49 , held that a Single Bench of the High Court is bound by prior decision of another Single Bench of the same High Court. The Supreme Court in State of M.P. Vs. Mala Banerjee – (2015) 7 SCC 698 held that a Bench should ordinarily follow the decision of a Coordinate Bench or else, it should forward the matter to the learned Chief Justice for constituting a Larger Bench in case the reasoning and conclusion of the Coordinate Bench is not acceptable. 16. The Supreme Court in K.P. Manu Vs. Mala Banerjee – (2015) 7 SCC 698 held that a Bench should ordinarily follow the decision of a Coordinate Bench or else, it should forward the matter to the learned Chief Justice for constituting a Larger Bench in case the reasoning and conclusion of the Coordinate Bench is not acceptable. 16. The Supreme Court in K.P. Manu Vs. Scrutiny Committee for Verification of Community Certificate – (2015) 4 SCC 1 , has held that when a binding precedent is not taken note of and the judgment is rendered in ignorance or forgetfulness of the binding authority, the concept of per incuria comes into play. The Supreme Court therein relied on its earlier decision in A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak and Another – (1988) 2 SCC 602 , and in para 42 of the report their Lordships held as under:- “42. … ‘Per incuriam’ are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned, so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found on that account to be demonstrably wrong.” 17. In view of the above, it must be held that the judgment rendered by the Single Bench of this Court in Raj Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan, supra, has taken a correct view that the offence under Section 28(2) of the Act of 1961 is a ‘continuing offence’ and that it falls outside the mandate of Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. For a ‘continuing offence’, a fresh period of limitation runs at every moment of time during which the offence continues. Thus, Section 472 of the Cr.P.C. makes this as an exception to Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. Consequently, the stringent provision of the limitation contained in Section 468 Cr.P.C. would not apply thereto. 18. The reference is answered accordingly.