JUDGMENT BISWANATH RATH, J. - This writ petition has been filed assailing the impugned order vide Annexure-4 passed by the Revisional Authority in Revision Case No.204/97 in exercise of power under Section 36 of the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act, 1972 hereinafter called as the Act. 2. Short background involved in this case is that in the 1927-28 settlement operation the disputed land was recorded in the name of one Nidhi Pradhan in stitiban status. Said Nidhi Pradhan is the father of Narottam and Baidhar and Bansidhar. Narottam being dead is represented by his legal heirs-opposite party No.2(a) to 2(e) 1965-66. Not final settlement and land records all stood in favour of Nidhi Pradhan and ancestors. 78-79 attestation record continued to be in the name of successors in interest of Nidhi Pradhan. The consolidation authorities prepared records in the name of Bikei Sethi following the orders passed in the Objection Case No.995 of 1991 being allowed in his favour by virtue of a registered sale deed No.2005 dated 13.8.1985. It is contended that in the year 1995 a denovo consolidation operation took place and as per the direction of the Director, Consolidation, the suit land was erroneously recorded in the name of Bikei Sethi. It is at this stage, Narottam Pradhan, the predecessor of the opposite party No.2 filed objection Case No.1094/318 under Section 9(3) of the Act on 18.10.1995 praying therein to record the suit land in his name. The C.O. in his order dated 30.1.1996 disallowed the claim of Narottam with the observation that the suit village was finally published under Section 22 of the Act in the year 1988 in Registered Relinquishment Deed No.774 dated 12.2.1979. The objector admitted that though the last settlement records were prepared in the name of Nidhi Pradhan but the said Nidhi Pradhan was not in possession. Nidhi’s father did not also possess the same in order to avoid the future litigations. The entire land extending Ac.11.30 decimals has been relinquished in favour of Hari Hara and others without any consideration money and thus Narottam also lost his title over the suit land. Against this order of the C.O. the predecessor of the opposite party No.2(a) to 2(e), the original opposite party No.2, filed an appeal bearing No.122 of 1996 before the Deputy Director, Bhubaneswar. Against this order of the C.O. the predecessor of the opposite party No.2(a) to 2(e), the original opposite party No.2, filed an appeal bearing No.122 of 1996 before the Deputy Director, Bhubaneswar. The matter was remanded to the C.O., Nimapada for fresh adjudication under the premises that the matter has been concluded without giving opportunity of hearing to the objector. The C.O. again decided the matter deciding the case against the objector. An appeal was carried bearing appeal case No.239/1996. The Deputy Director by his order dated 29.3.1997 disallowed it observing that the present petitioner was possessing the suit land as his residential house for more than 20 years. Accordingly, the present petitioner accrued his right over the disputed property through adverse possession. Consequently, the opposite party No.2 initiated a revision under Section 36 of the Act. The revision was also allowed in favour of the opposite party No.2 resulting the present writ petition. 3. Case of the present petitioner as stood allthrough is that in the 1910-11, the suit land measuring an area of Ac.11.30 dec. was recorded in the name of Kurtibas Pradhan and others. Kurtibas entered into a nominal transaction with Nidhi Pradhan alienating the entire extent of land vide registered deed dated 16.2.1911 when Kurtibas and others were in all actual possession of the land and were paying rent even after execution of the aforesaid deed. On 19.2.1979 the registered deed of relinquishment was executed in favour of Hari Hara, Daitari and Mahadeva and others, the sons and grandsons of the said Kurtibas and others in respect of the suit land by Narottam. The successor in interest of Nidhi Pradhan with an indication of relinquishment deed that the suit property was wrongly recorded in the name of Nidhi Pradhan and there cannot be confirmation of any title on the basis of a Sham transaction. It is claimed that the suit property failed in favour of the Hari Hara in a family partition. Hence, he fought the objection case and got the land recorded in his name. The present opposite party No.2 even though was a party to the Objection Case No.800 of 1979 chose to remain silent even after due service of notice. In the meantime, Hari Hara executed registered sale deed No.2005/13 dated 13.9.1995 in favour of Bikei. Hence, he fought the objection case and got the land recorded in his name. The present opposite party No.2 even though was a party to the Objection Case No.800 of 1979 chose to remain silent even after due service of notice. In the meantime, Hari Hara executed registered sale deed No.2005/13 dated 13.9.1995 in favour of Bikei. The father of the present petitioner and Bikei Sethy filed objection case No.995/1991 for recording the suit land in his name, which was allowed in favour of Bikei Sethy taking into consideration the registered sale deed executed by Hari Hara Pradhan. 4. In assailing the impugned order, Sri Samir Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the revisional Court erred in holding the Sham transaction between the Kurtibas and Nidhi to be a voidable instrument thereby the revisional Court has failed in appreciating the surrounding in the circumstances. In the form of evidence led by the parties, it is stated by the learned counsel for petitioner that the revisional Court has failed in appreciating the difference between a voidable document and a document void ab initio. Placing reliance of decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in a Case in between Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh and Others as reported in AIR 1973 SC 2451 , learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the Consolidation Authority have no authority to adjudicate the voidability in a document. He also places reliance on a decision as reported in 2016 (II) OLR 399 to support his above contentions. Sri Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that the revisional Court has illegally ignored the admission of Narottam-the present opposite party No.2 dead but represented through his legal heirs. In the registered deed of relinquishment where he has admitted that Hari Hara & others are the rightful owners of the suit land. It is also contended that the revisional Court has lost the site of the fact that the opposite party No.2 filed series of litigations leading to the file of revision case without even impleading his brothers as party and even though they are claimed to be the co-owners over the suit land, the revision should have been dismissed for nonjoinder of the necessary party. 5. 5. Miss Mira Ghose, learned counsel for the private opposite parties contended that for the entire background involved in the case, the deed of relinquishment appears to be fabricated and a creation by the Hari Hara and thus not binding on Narottam, Baidhar and Banshidhar. Further as the deed of relinquishment did not have the description of the land, such deed of relinquishment is not valid and cannot confer the title to anybody. With regard to bindingness of the judgment and decree passed in Objection Case No.800 of 1979, Miss Mira Ghose, learned counsel for the private opposite party contended that the order involving the above objection case was not binding for the reason of no notice to Narottam in the said proceeding and the decision cannot be treated to have arrived on the basis of a conciliation. Referring to a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court as reported in AIR 1976 SC 789 she further contended that the orders passed in the previous objection case was violative of the fundamental of natural justice and in absence of copy of the order, no adjudication involving the same is permissible. 6. Considering the rival contentions of the parties, after perusal of the impugned order and keeping in mind the entire background narrated hereinabove, this Court finds, the sole questions to be considered is as to whether the decision of the revisional authority on the basis of a finding that the relinquishment deed is invalid being voidable is justified or not? This Court finds that since the sale transaction is valid and the relinquishment deed for its voidability confer title so long as the same is not set aside by the competent Court of law. Scan of the impugned order, this Court finds the revisional authority had also framed particular issues involving the above particular questions. This Court finds that since the sale transaction is valid and the relinquishment deed for its voidability confer title so long as the same is not set aside by the competent Court of law. Scan of the impugned order, this Court finds the revisional authority had also framed particular issues involving the above particular questions. Deciding the first issue as to whether the sale transaction is valid and Sham, the revisional authority has categorically held that it is not conclusively assertable that the suit plot has been included in the deed and consequently, closed the above issues as such and then jumped to decide the question as to whether the present petitioner accrued right by virtue of their long possession over the disputed property and in deciding such issue came to hold that there is no required number of years of possession to get right through adverse possession by the present petitioner and consequently allowed the revision. For the involvement of an important issue, as to whether the registered deed of relinquishment is void or voidable? This Court observes that for the finding of the revisional authority that the instrument becomes voidable, it had no other alternative than to accept such instrument unless such instrument had been declared to be illegal by the Court of competency, the Act prohibits the competent authority under the Act from ignoring the voidable documents. This Court finds force in such submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the above observation of the Court also gets the support of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in a case in between Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh and Others as reported in AIR 1973 SC 2451 . Further also a catena of decision of this Court as reported in 1986 (Vol.II) O.L.R. 173, 1986 (CLT) 261, 86(Vol.2) OLR N.C. 38, 2008 (Supl.II) OLR 695 and 73(1992) CLR 276 Since this particular instrument creates a right in favour of the petitioner, this Court finds the findings of the revisional authority in this regard is contrary to law and consequently, while interfering in the revisional order, this Court sets aside the same and allows the writ petition. For the finding on the issues of bindingness of a voidaible document on the consolidation authority, the questions as to whether the present petitioner had the required number of years to get his right by way of adverse possession become irrelevant. 7. The writ petition stands allowed and in the circumstances, parties to bear their respective costs. Petition allowed.