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2017 DIGILAW 1467 (PAT)

Gopal Singh v. State of Bihar

2017-11-15

ANIL KUMAR UPADHYAY, RAJENDRA MENON

body2017
ANIL KUMAR UPADHYAY, J.:–All the three appeals arise out of the common judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 16.2.2016 and 19.2.2016 respectively passed in S.Tr. No. 1166 of 2000 arising out of Pandarak P.S. Case No. 64 of 2000, whereby the Additional Sessions Judge-II, Barh convicted the appellants for offence under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and appellants Raju Singh, Uday Singh, Gopal Singh have been convicted under Section 27 of the arms Act as well and they have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and fine of Rs. 20,000/- for offence under Section 302 and in default of payment of fine rigorous imprisonment for 8 months and appellant Rajo Singh, Gopal Singh and Uday Singh have been sentenced rigorous imprisonment for four years and fine of Rs. 5000/- for offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act and in default of payment of fine rigorous imprisonment for eight months. 2. The prosecution case in short is that the informant, Neeraj Kumar gave fardbeyan alleging therein that on 8.7.2000 he along with his father Permanand Singh was returning from his field and when both reached near house of Ragho Pandit, saw Lacho Singh, Gopal Singh, Raju Singh and Uday Singh sitting, meanwhile the accused persons confined his father and Lacho Singh caught collar of his father, abused and told him to solve the land dispute, then his father told that it will be solved by punches. Lacho Singh thereafter ordered to kill him upon which Gopal Singh, Uday Singh and Raju Singh drew the pistol from waist and Gopal Singh fired on the back of his father who started to run then Raju Singh fired and caused injury on below right hand of elbow and chased to the informant to kill him but he escaped. His father raised alarm of Bacho-Bacho and fell down near the house of Dularchand Sao. Thereafter accused persons fled away. Tanik Singh and Ram Niwas Singh saw the accused from some distance. His father was taken to hospital where he was declared dead by the doctor. 3. The police after investigation submitted charge sheet against the appellants, the additional Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and thereafter committed the case to the Court of Sessions, the Sessions Judge framed the charge and on the appellants pleaded not guilty, they were put on trial. 4. 3. The police after investigation submitted charge sheet against the appellants, the additional Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and thereafter committed the case to the Court of Sessions, the Sessions Judge framed the charge and on the appellants pleaded not guilty, they were put on trial. 4. In the instant case the prosecution has examined altogether 9 witnesses. They are as follows: P.W.1,Tanik Singh, P.W. 2 Ram Niwas Singh, P.W.3 Niraj Kumar (Informant), P.W.4 Kamal Kishore Singh, P.W.5 Suresh Singh, P.W.6 Eknath Singh, P.W.7 Dr. Dilip Kumar Singh, P.W.8 Bachu Prasad, and P.W.9 Arun Kumar Sah. 5. The learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Barh, on scrutiny of the evidence adduced by the parties and on consideration of the submission of the parties, convicted the appellants in the manner indicated above. 6. Mr. Rakakant Sharma, Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants in Cr. Appeal No. 399 of 2016 and 204 of 2016 has submitted that the present case, as per the prosecution, is an offsuit of the land dispute and as per the fardbeyan the deceased was done to death for adopting recalcitrant attitude in solving the land dispute. At the very outset he has drawn the attention of the Court to the first information report. He pointed out that the fardbeyan was recorded on 8.7.2000 at 2.30 PM in the emergency ward of sub-divisional hospital, Barh. In the fardbeyan the informant has alleged that Gopal Singh, Uday Singh, Lacho Singh and Raju Singh took pistol out of their waist and Gopal Singh fired on his father which caused injury on his back and thereafter Raju Singh fired from his pistol which hit the elbow of right hand of his father. On receiving injury his father reached old house of Dularchand Sao crying for help and fell down. The incident was seen by one Tanik Singh and Ram Niwas Singh. In the fardbeyan Sanjay Kumar and Nilmani Pd. Sharma have been cited as witnesses. He further submitted that from the formal FIR it would appear that the incident took place at 9.15 at Pandarak, Surajpur Tola 1 KM away from the police station but the formal FIR was lodged at 5.00 p.m. In the said FIR the time of receipt of information by the police is 10.30, the formal FIR was drawn on 8.7.2000 and reached the office of the ACJM on 12.7.2000 and as such Mr. Sharma submitted that in the present case there is inordinate delay of four days in reaching the FIR to the ACJM which is a fatal in the instant case. He submitted that the inordinate delay of four days in reaching the FIR to the ACJM creates serious doubt about the manipulation in the prosecution case. 7. Mr. Sharma submitted that from the fardbeyan, it is evident that the deceased was initially taken to the hospital at Pandarak and he was treated there for nearly 20 minutes. The hospital is situated adjacent to the police station but it is mysterious as to why not fardbeyan was recorded while the deceased was undergoing treatment at Pandarak hospital and from where the police station was just opposite direction of the hospital. 8. Mr. Sharma submitted that the prosecution has made pick and choose of witnesses in the case. He submitted that in the instant case in the fardbeyan Sanjay Kumar and Nilmani Pd. Sharma have been cited as witnesses but they were not examined in this case. 9. Mr. Sharma submitted that in the present case the IO was not examined and in the absence of the examination of the IO the prosecution has suffered prejudice. He submitted that the witnesses who claimed to be eye witnesses are the informant, Tanik Singh, P.W. 1, Ram Niwas Singh, P.W. 2. Referring to the deposition of these three witnesses he highlighted that there are apparent contradiction in the account of the deposition of these witnesses. P.W. 1 Tanik Singh has stated in para-5 of his deposition that he reached the place of occurrence and saw the deceased lying. P.W. 2 in para-9 onwards has stated that when he reached the place of occurrence he saw the deceased Parmanand Singh lying on the earth. Referring to para-9 of his statement Mr. Sharma submitted that he stated that for the first time he reached the place of occurrence and saw no one nearby where the deceased Parmanand singh was lying. This witness in his deposition totally belies the story of the informant that P.Ws. 1,2 and 3 have seen the occurrence and the commission of actual crime. Referring to the deposition of P.W.3 the informant, Mr. Sharma highlighted from deposition of this witness that the informant in the fardbeyan has claimed that the incident was seen by P.Ws. This witness in his deposition totally belies the story of the informant that P.Ws. 1,2 and 3 have seen the occurrence and the commission of actual crime. Referring to the deposition of P.W.3 the informant, Mr. Sharma highlighted from deposition of this witness that the informant in the fardbeyan has claimed that the incident was seen by P.Ws. 1 and 2 wherein in his deposition in the court in para-9 he has categorically stated that neither before the occurrence or thereafter on that day he has seen the P.Ws. 1 and 2 and for the first time he claims that he has seen Tanik Singh and Ram Niwas Singh at the time of cremation of his father. 10. Mr. Sharma has submitted that P.Ws. are at variance in their statements under Section 161 or 164 Cr. P.C. and in the evidence before the court. Mr. Sharma referring to the deposition of the prosecution witnesses highlighted the variance in their statements and submitted that prosecution case is not reliable and the appellants have been made accused in this case only due to previous enmity. 11. Mr. Akhileshwar Prasad Singh, Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant in Cr. Appeal No. 314 of 2016 has also argued on the same line and raised the plea of improvement in the prosecution case after due deliberation as afterthought. He submitted that the inordinate delay of four days in reaching the formal FIR to the court of ACJM renders the prosecution case under serious cloud. 12. Mr. Rama Kant Sharma as well as Mr. Akhileshwar Prasad Singh have focused on the point of delay in sending the FIR as crucial in the instant case. They referred to various judgments of the Apex Court on the aforesaid point and submitted that in view of the well settled principles of law on the point of delay in sending the FIR, the prosecution case is liable to be disbelieved. They referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the cases of State of Punjab Vs. Tarlok Singh: (1972) 3 SCC 869 , para-5 and Ishwar Singh Vs. They referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the cases of State of Punjab Vs. Tarlok Singh: (1972) 3 SCC 869 , para-5 and Ishwar Singh Vs. State Of U.P. AIR 1976 SC 2423 , paras 5 and 9 to substantiate their submissions that the prosecution case is liable to be disbelieved in view of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in those judgments where the Apex Court noticing the delay of even few hours in sending the FIR to the Court was the ground for disbelieving the prosecution case. In the instant case the distance of the police station is hardly 10-12 KM yet there was delay of four days and as such the prosecution case is liable to be disbelieved. 13. Mr. Ajay Kumar Thakur, appearing on behalf of the informant of the case has supported the judgment of the trial court and argued that the prosecution has established the guilt of the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt. The three eye witnesses are consistent on the point of identification of the accused in the matter of commission of the crime. He submitted that there is absolutely no dispute as to the death of the deceased. There is no dispute that death is caused due to the fire arm injury. The minor discrepancy in the version of the prosecution witnesses and the non-examination of the IO cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case. He submitted that during the pendency of the trial the IO died and as such he was not examined and the appellants have not suffered any prejudice on account of non-examination of the IO of the case. 14. Mr. Thakur referring to the deposition of D.W. 5 Kanhaiya Singh has submitted that this witness of the defence has explained the genesis of the occurrence. This witness in so many words admits the basic prosecution case of commission of the crime. 15. Mr. Ramakant Sharma in his reply submitted that in fact in the instant case the trial prolonged on account of the fact that PW 6 Eknath Singh absconded and that is the reason the trial was put on hold and for the laches of the prosecution the appellants have suffered prejudice. 16. Having heard Mr. Ramakant Sharma and Mr. Akhileshwar Prasad Singh, Senior Advocates appearing on behalf of the appellants and Mr. 16. Having heard Mr. Ramakant Sharma and Mr. Akhileshwar Prasad Singh, Senior Advocates appearing on behalf of the appellants and Mr. Ajay Kumar Thakur appearing for the informant and Mr. S.C.Mishra, for the State and going through the deposition of the witnesses, we find contradiction in the account of the eye witnesses as to the manner of commission of offence and also noticed that the prosecution has not explained the reason for the delay in sending the FIR to the ACJM after four days of the recording of the formal FIR. The formal FIR was drawn on 8.7.2000 but it was produced before the Court of ACJM only on 12.7.2000 and the distance between police station and the ACJM court is only approximately 10-15 KMs. We find substance in the submission of the appellants in this regard as the judgment cited on behalf of the appellants support the case of the appellants. For ready reference the relevant paras of the judgments of the Apex Court on which learned counsel relies are quoted below:— Para 5 of the Judgment of State of Punjab Vs. Tarlok Singh, reported in (1972) 3 SCC 869 is quoted herein below for ready reference:— “5. First, the High Court noticed the suspicion created by the circumstance that the copy of the First Information Report purported to have been lodged at 3.45 p.m. did not reach the AIR 1976 SC 2423 Magistrate at Dasuya till 8 a.m. the next day, even though it was sent through a special messenger. The distance between the scene of occurrence & Dasuya was only 15 or l6 miles. The inference sought to be drawn is that, in fact, the report was not lodged at 3.45 p.m., but at a much later hour, after the police had arrived at the scene of occurrence and there were consultations to decide what version should be put forward and who should be implicated for the murder. The prosecution, in fact, made no attempt to explain this delay. Such delay, thus, caste doubt on the prosecution version that the Report was lodged at 3.45 p m. without lapse of unnecessary time.” Para 5 and 9 of the judgment of Ishwar Singh Vs. the State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2423 are quoted herein below for ready reference:— 5. Mr. Such delay, thus, caste doubt on the prosecution version that the Report was lodged at 3.45 p m. without lapse of unnecessary time.” Para 5 and 9 of the judgment of Ishwar Singh Vs. the State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2423 are quoted herein below for ready reference:— 5. Mr. Frank Anthony appearing for appellant Ishwar Singh submitted that in affirming the Judgment of the trial Court, the High Court also overlooked certain important aspects of the case that the Sessions Judge had failed to consider. He pointed out that the F.I.R. which is stated to have been lodged at 9.05 A. M. on February 14, 1973 was sent out from the police station the next day, February 15; the time when it was despatched is not stated, but it appears from the record that the Magistrate received it on the morning of February 16. The Court of the Magistrate was nearby, which makes it difficult to understand why the report was sent to him about two days after its stated hour of receipt at the police station. Section 157 of the Cr.PC, 1898 as well as of 1973 both require the first information report to be sent "forthwith" to the Magistrate competent to take cognizance of the offence. No explanation is offered for this extraordinary delay in sending the report to the Magistrate. This is a circumstance which provides a legitimate basis for suspecting, as Mr. Anthony suggested, that the first information report was recorded much later than the stated date and hour affording sufficient time to the prosecution to introduce improvements and embellishments and set up a distorted version of the occurrence. In this case the suspicion hardens into a definite possibility when one finds that the case made in Court differs at least in two very important particulars from that narrated in the F.I.R. Mahabir Singh, who lodged the first information report, stated in-Court that he had invited some people to his house to effect a settlement between him and Ishwar Singh, and that he had also sent Ghanshyam to call Ishwar Singh there. The F.I.R. does not mention anything like this. From the F.I.R. it appears as if the accused persons came uninvited to his house, demanded why he had demolished the drain, and started assaulting him and the other persons who were present there. The F.I.R. does not mention anything like this. From the F.I.R. it appears as if the accused persons came uninvited to his house, demanded why he had demolished the drain, and started assaulting him and the other persons who were present there. It is also difficult to understand why Mahabir should invite anyone to his house for a settlement, if really Ishwar Singh had permitted him to demolish the drain as he claimed. Further, the F.I.R. does not mention that Mahabir and Satyapal wielded lathis in their defence when attacked and that this resulted in some of the accused getting injured; but that is what both Mahabir (P.W. 1) and Satyapai (P.W. 2) stated in their evidence in Court. These variations relate to vital parts of the prosecution case, and cannot be dismissed as minor discrepancies. In such a case, the evidence of the eye-witnesses "cannot be accepted at its face value", as observed by this Court in Mitter Sain v. State of U.P. 9. We have pointed out that the trial Court in convicting the appellants overlooked certain significant features of the case, namely, the inordinate and unexplained delay in despatching the first information report to the Magistrate; the difference in the account given by the prosecution witnesses and as appearing from the first information report of the occurrence; the absence of any statement in the first information report as to the injuries received by some of accused, and the non-examination of material witnesses. The High Court in affirming the Judgment of the trial Court also failed to advert to these circumstances. We do not therefore think that the case against the appellants has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The appeals are accordingly allowed and the Order of conviction and the sentences passed on the appellants are set aside We direct that the appellants be set at liberty forthwith.” 17. On scrutiny of the case of the appellants at the touch stone of the principles of the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments we are of the view that the delay creates reasonable doubt about false implication of the appellants in a case of background of land dispute. We also find that prosecution has not been able to explain the reason for non-examination of the fardbeyan witness, Sanjay Kumar and Nirmal Prasad Sharma in the instant case. We also find that prosecution has not been able to explain the reason for non-examination of the fardbeyan witness, Sanjay Kumar and Nirmal Prasad Sharma in the instant case. We also find variance in the version of the witnesses who were cited as eye witness. In addition thereto the most crucial fact which we have noticed in the instant case failure of the trial court in the matter of examination of the appellants under Section 313 Cr.P.C. All the accused were posed stereo typed questions and none of the accused were confronted with adverse materials and circumstances appearing in the trial. In addition thereto the most crucial fact which we have noticed in the instant case failure of the trial court in the matter of examination of the appellants under Section 313 Cr.P.C. All the accused were posed stereo typed questions and none of the accused were confronted with adverse materials and circumstances appearing in the trial. In fact the trial court has made a mocry of the mandatory provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C. For ready reference the question posed to the appellants under Section 313 Cr.P.C. which is carbon copy is quoted below for ready reference:— mn; flag iz'u %& D;k vki us lkf{k;ksa dk Ck;ku lquk gS\ mÙkj %&th gk¡A iz'u %& vki ds fo:} lkf{k;ksa dk lk{; gS fd vki us fnukad 08-7-2000 fnu 'kfuokj le; 9-15 cts lqcg esa] iaMkjd xkao fLFkr lqjtiqj Vksyk jk?kks iafMr ds ?kj ds lkeus lwpd ds firk ijekuUn falag dks xksyh ekj dj gR;k dj fn;s\ D;k dguk gS\ mÙkj %& th ugh A iz'u %& lQkbZ esa D;k dguk gs\ mÙkj %& funksZ"k gS A Uday (signature or Mark of the accused) yk{kksa flag iz'u %& D;k vki us lkf{k;ksa dk C;ku lquk gS\ mÙkj %&th ugh iz'u %& vki ds fo:} lkf{k;ksa dk lk{; gS fd vki us fnukad 08-7-2000 fnu 'kfuokj le; 9-15 cts lqcg esa] iaMkjd xkao fLFkr lqjtiqj Vksyk jk?kks iafMr ds ?kj ds lkeus lwpd ds firk ijekuUn falag dks ?ksj dj xksyh ekj dj gR;k dj fn;s\ D;k dguk gS\ mÙkj %& th ugh iz'u %& lQkbZ esa D;k dguk gs\ mÙkj %& funksZ"k gSA iz'u %& vkids fo:} vkjksi ,oa lk{; gS fd vkius vkns'k fn;k fd lHkksa dks tku ls ekj nskA mÙkj %& th ughA Laksho Singh (signature or Mark of the accused) xksiky flag iz'u %& D;k vki us lkf{k;ksa dk C;ku lquk gS\ mÙkj %&th gk¡ iz'u %& vki ds fo:} lkf{k;ksa dk lk{; gS fd vki us fnukad 08-7-2000 fnu 'kfuokj le; 9-15 cts lqcg esa] iaMkjd xkao fLFkr lqjtiqj Vksyk jk?kks iafMr ds ?kj ds lkeus lwpd ds firk ijekuUn falag dks ?ksj dj xksyh ekj dj gR;k dj fn;s\ D;k dguk gS\ mÙkj%& th ugh iz'u %& lQkbZ esa D;k dguk gs \ mÙkj %& funksZ"k gSa iz'u %& vkids fo:} vkjksi ,oa lk{; gS fd yk{kksa flag ds vkns'k ij ijekuUn dks xksyh ekj fn;s tks mlds ihB esa yxhA Gopal Singh (signature or Mark of the accused) jktw flag iz'u %& D;k vki us lkf{k;ksa dk O;ku lquk gS\ mÙkj %&th ugh iz'u %& vki ds fo:} lkf{k;ksa dk lk{; gS fd vki us fnukad 08-7-2000 fnu 'kfuokj le; 9-15 cts lqcg esa] iaMkjd xkao fLFkr lqjtiqj Vksyk jk?kks iafMr ds ?kj ds lkeus lwpd ds firk ijekuUn falag dks xksyh ekj dj gR;k dj fn;s\ D;k dguk gS\ mÙkj %& th ugh iz'u %& lQkbZ esa D;k dguk gs\ mÙkj %& funksZ"k gS A iz'u %& vkids fo:} lk{; gS fd ijekuUn flag Hkkxus ij fiLrkSy ls xksyh ekjk tks nkfgus gkFk ds dwgwuh is yxkA mÙkj %& th ughA Raju Singh (signature or Mark of the accused) 18. The Apex Court has occasion to discuss the object behind examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Apex Court held out that failure on the part of the court not to confront the accused with all adverse situation goes to the root of the case and vitiates the entire trial. Reference in this connection may be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sukhjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab: (2014) 10 SCC 270 , paras 11 to 14 are relevant which are quoted below:— “ 11. In this context, we may profitably referto a four-Judge Bench decision in Tara Singh Vs. The State [ AIR 1951 SC 441 ] wherein, Bose, J. explaining the significance of the faithful and fair compliance of Section 342 of the Code as it stood then, opined thus: "30. I cannot stress too strongly the importance of observing faithfully and fairly the provisions of Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is not a proper compliance to read out a long string of questions and answers made in the committal court and ask whether the statement is correct. Aquestion of that kind is misleading. It may mean either that the questioner wants to know whether the recording is correct, or whether the answers given are true, or whether there is some mistake or misunderstanding despite the accurate recording. In the next place, it is not sufficient compliance to string together a long series of facts and ask the accused what he has to say about them. He must be questioned separately about each material circumstance which is intended to be used against him. The whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him. The questioning must therefore be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. Even when an accused person is not illiterate, his mind is apt to be perturbed when he is facing a charge of murder. He is therefore in no fit position to understand the significance of a complex question. Fairness therefore requires that each material circumstance should be put simply and separately in a way that an illiterate mind, or one which is perturbed or confused, can readily appreciate and understand. He is therefore in no fit position to understand the significance of a complex question. Fairness therefore requires that each material circumstance should be put simply and separately in a way that an illiterate mind, or one which is perturbed or confused, can readily appreciate and understand. I do not suggest that every error or omission in this behalf would necessarily vitiate a trial because I am of opinion that errors of this type fail within the category of curable irregularities. Therefore, the question in each case depends upon the degree of the error and upon whether prejudice has been occasioned or is likely to have been occasioned. In my opinion, the disregard of the provisions of Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is so gross in this case that I feel there is grave likelihood of prejudice." 12. In Hate Singh Bhagat Singh Vs. State of Madhya Bharat [ AIR 1953 SC 468 ], Bose, J. speaking fora three-Judge Bench highlighting the importance of recording of the statement of the accused under the code expressed thus: "8. Now the statements of an accused person recorded under Sections 208, 209 and 342, Criminal PC. are among the most important matters to be considered at the trial. It has to be remembered that in this country an accused, person is not allowed to enter the box and speak on oath in his own defence. This may operate for the protection of the accused is some cases but experience elsewhere has shown that it can also be a powerful and impressive weapon of defence in the hands of an innocent man. The statements of the accused recorded by the Committing Magistrate and the Sessions Judge are intended in India to take the place of what in England and in America he would be free to state in his own way in the witness-box." 13 The aforesaid principle has been reiterated in Ajay Singh Vs. State of Maharashtra [JT 2007 (8) SC 644 : 2007 (12) SCC 341 ] in following terms: "14. The word "generally" in sub-section (1)(b) does not limit the nature of the questioning to one or more questions of a general nature relating to the case, but it means that the question should relate to the whole case generally and should also be limited to any particular part or parts of it. The word "generally" in sub-section (1)(b) does not limit the nature of the questioning to one or more questions of a general nature relating to the case, but it means that the question should relate to the whole case generally and should also be limited to any particular part or parts of it. The question must be framed in such a way as to enable the accused to know what he is to explain, what are the circumstances which are against him and for which an explanation is needed. The whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him and that the questions must be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. A conviction based on the accused's failure to explain what he was never asked to explain is bad in law. The whole object of enacting Section 313 of the Code was that the attention of the accused should be drawn to the specific points in the charge and in the evidence on which the prosecution claims that the case is made out against the accused so that he may be able to give such explanation as he desires to give." 14. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, there can be no scintilla of doubt that the when the requisite questions have not been put to the accused it has caused immense prejudice to him, more so, when there is no evidence to establish his complicity in the alleged abduction.” 19. The cumulative effect of breach of mandatory provisions of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, inordinate delay in sending the FIR and non-examination of IO of this case and in the absence of IO the prosecution has not made an effort to mark the case diary as Exhibit as there are many discrepancy in the version of the witnesses, in their statement before the police and its improvement in the Court has caused prejudice to the appellants. 20. In the totality of the fact situation, we are of the considered view that the conviction of the appellants in the attending facts of the case is unsustainable. 20. In the totality of the fact situation, we are of the considered view that the conviction of the appellants in the attending facts of the case is unsustainable. Accordingly, we allow all these appeals and set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 16.2.2016 and 19.2.2016 respectively passed in S.Tr. No. 1166 of 2000 arising out of Pandarak P.S. Case No. 64 of 2000, by the Additional Sessions Judge-II, Barh. 21. Since the appellants are in jail, we direct them to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.