JUDGMENT : A.K. Rath, J. Defendants are the appellants against a reversing judgment. 2. Plaintiffs-respondents instituted the suit for declaration that defendant no.1 is not the adopted son of Krushna Nayak, father of the plaintiffs and he is not the owner in possession of the suit property left by Krushna Nayak. The case of the plaintiffs is that they are the daughters of late Krushna Nayak. The defendant no.1 is the natural son of defendant no.2. Their father had no son. He got the plaintiff no.1 married to one Dhadi Mohanty. Dhadi Mohanty is residing as illatom son-in-law. After death of their father, the plaintiffs became the owner of the properties left by their father. The defendant no.2 is an agnatic nephew of their father. He snatched away one adoption-cum-gift deed on 21.7.66 from their father. Their father was not aware of the document. During the consolidation operation, they came to know about the alleged adoption-cum-gift deed. With this factual scenario, they instituted the suit seeking the reliefs mentioned supra. 3. The defendant entered contest and filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. The case of the defendants was that Krushna Nayak had adopted defendant no.1 on 29.9.64. There was giving and taking ceremony. He executed an adoption-cum-gift deed in favour of defendant no.1. He had also executed documents in favour of plaintiffs on the same day. 4. On the interse pleading of the parties, learned trial court struck eight issues. Parties led evidence. Learned trial court came to hold that defendant no.1 was validly adopted by Krushna Nayak. Held so, it dismissed the suit. Assailing the judgment and decree of the learned trial court, the plaintiffs filed T.A. No.20 of 1980 before the learned Subordinate Judge, Jagatsinghpur. Learned appellate court held that defendant no.1 is not the adopted son of Krushna Nayak. Held so, it allowed the appeal. 5. The second appeal was admitted on the substantial questions of law enumerated in ground nos.A, B, C and D of the memorandum of appeal. Learned appellate court held that defendant no.1 is not the adopted son of Krushna Nayak. Held so, it allowed the appeal. 5. The second appeal was admitted on the substantial questions of law enumerated in ground nos.A, B, C and D of the memorandum of appeal. The same are: “A. Whether the learned lower appellate court committed a serious error of law in holding that since the natural father of defendant no.1 (defendant no.2) had not executed the adoption deed (Ext.C) and therefore, presumption U/s.16 of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act could not be drawn, the learned trial court committed a serious error in giving due weight to Ext.C as supporting the defence story of adoption of defendant no.1 by late Krushna Naik. B. Whether the learned lower appellate court committed a serious error of law in reversing the finding of the learned trial court that plaintiff no.1 and 2 had appended L.T.I. and signature respectively to the adoption deed (Ext.C) stating the fact that they had consent for the execution of the adoption cum gift deed proving that both of them were aware of the contents of the documents without referring to the aforesaid reasoning of the trial court to kolo that Ext.C is not a genuine document. C. Whether the learned lower appellate court committed a serious error of law in reversing the finding of the learned trial court to the effect that Krushna Naik having executed Ext.A and B in favour of plaintiffs 1 and 2 respectively gifting same of his property to them on the very same day i.e. 21.7.1966 (Ext.C) in which he executed the adoption-cum-gift deed (Ext.C) in favour of defendant no.1 scribed by the very same scribe their favour the execution of Ext.A and B which has not been the plaintiffs Krushna Naik must be taken to have executed Ext.C after fully understanding the proper and contents thereof as he had admittedly done in support of Ext.A and B. D. Whether the learned lower appellate court committed a serious error of law in holding that the suit is not barred by limitation on the ground that the plaintiffs had no knowledge of Ext.C till 7.8.1979 completely ignoring the fact as has been found by the learned trial court that both plaintiff no.1 and 2 had appended their L.T.I. and signature respectively stating the fact that they had consent for the execution of adoption cum gift deed (Ext.C) showing that they were aware of the execution thereof on 21.7.1966 (The date of execution of Ext.C) and that therefore the suit having been filed 1079 was hopelessly barred by limitation ?” 6. Heard Mr. N.K. Sahoo, learned counsel for the appellants. None appeared for the respondents. 7. Mr. Sahoo, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the natural father had not put his signature in the adoption-cum-gift deed, Ext.C. Therefore, no presumption under Sec.16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) shall be drawn that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of the Act. But then, Ext.C can be used as a piece of evidence in support of the defence story of adoption, if the adoption is proved otherwise. There is ample evidence on record that the defendant no.1 is the adopted son of Krushna Nayak. He further contended that Krushna Nayak on 21.7.1966 had executed three deeds, Ext.A, B and C. He had executed deeds vide Exts.A and B in favour of the plaintiffs. Since he had no son, he executed Ext.C. Plaintiff no.1 had given her L.T.I. and plaintiff no.2 had signed on the said deed. He further contended that Krushna Nayak on 21.7.1966 had executed three deeds, Ext.A, B and C. He had executed deeds vide Exts.A and B in favour of the plaintiffs. Since he had no son, he executed Ext.C. Plaintiff no.1 had given her L.T.I. and plaintiff no.2 had signed on the said deed. The deed had been validly acted upon during the life time of the donee. Ext.C was executed with the consent of the plaintiffs. Learned trial court, on a threadbare analysis of evidence on record and pleadings, held that defendant no.1 is the adopted son of Krushna Nayak. On untenable and unsupportable ground, learned appellate court upset the same. He further contended that the plaintiffs were aware of the execution of the deed on 21.7.1966. The suit was filed in the year 1979 and as such barred by limitation. 8. Ext.C has been styled as deed of acknowledgement of adoption. The day and date of adoption has not been mentioned in Ext.C. The defendant no.1 is the only son of defendant no.2. Neither the scribe of the document nor the attesting witnesses has been examined. Radhu Nayak, the natural father of the defendant no.1, had not signed on the deed. 9. The deed of acknowledgement of adoption is not sufficient of the factum of giving and taking. The fact of giving and taking must be proved. In Krushna Chandra Sahu and another vs. Pradipta Das and others, 53 (1982) CLT 335, this Court held that a document acknowledging adoption or containing recitals regarding giving and taking of adoption are not sufficient themselves to constitute legal adoption in the absence of evidence about actual giving and taking of the child. 10. This Court in Bauri Dei and others vs. Dasarathi Sahu and others, 1974 (I) C.W.R. 403 held that the omission of the day and date of adoption in such a document is very vital and the deed of acknowledgement of adoption therefore looses all its significance. 11. In Arakhita Swain vs. Kandhuni Swain, AIR 1983 Ori.199, this Court held that where the registered deed recording an adoption was not signed by the person giving the child in adoption, the presumption under Sec.16 as to there being an adoption in compliance with the provisions of the Act could not be raised as one of the essential condition was wanting. 12. 12. The apex Court in the case of A. Raghavamma and another vs. A. Chenchamma and another, AIR 1964 SC 136 observed that young age of adoptive parents, and prospect of having children, has to be noted. In the absence of special circumstances the only son being taken on adoption appears to be somewhat unusal and improbable. 13. Learned appellate court has rightly held that the defendants failed to prove that the defendant no.1 is the adopted son of Krushna Nayak. 14. The next question crops up as to whether disposition of properties to the defendant no.1 is as a person designata or by reason of his fulfilling particular legal status, e.g., the adopted son of the donor ? 15. The Constitution Bench of the apex Court in the case of Yelamanchili Siva Panchaksharamma vs. Yelamanchili Chinnabbayi (deceased) thereafter Yelamanchili Basavamma, AIR 1967 SC 207 quoted with approval with the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Fanindra Deb Raikat vs. Rajeswar Dass, (1882) 12 Ind App 72 (PC), where it was held: “The distinction between what is description only and what is the reason or motive of a gift or bequest may often be very fine, but it is a distinction which must be drawn from a consideration of the language and the surrounding circumstances.” 16. Taking a cue from Yelamanchili Siva Panchaksharamma (supra), this Court in the case of Raghunath Behera vs. Balaram Behera and another, 1995 (II) OLR-135 held that where a gift or bequest is made to a parson who is described as an adopted son, but such person is not adopted at all or if he was adopted, his adoption is held to be invalid, validity of the gift or bequest depends on the intention of the donor or testator to be gathered from the language of the deed of gift or Will and from the surrounding circumstances. If the intention is to be benefit the donee as persona designata (that is a designated person), the addition of his supposed relationship is merely a matter of description and the gift prevails though description is incorrect. But if the assumed fact of adoption is “the reasons and motive of gift and a condition of it” then the gift cannot take effect if the adoption is pronounced invalid. 17. But if the assumed fact of adoption is “the reasons and motive of gift and a condition of it” then the gift cannot take effect if the adoption is pronounced invalid. 17. On a cursory perusal of Ext.C, it is evident that the gift was made not an account of adoption. Gift was made to a person designata. Even if the adoption has been pronounced not proved, the gift cannot fail. Gift deed has been acted upon. The same is a valid deed of gift. 18. The matter may be examined from another angel. There is no prayer in the suit to set aside Ext.C. In State of Kerala vs. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar, AIR 1996 S.C. 906 , the apex Court held that even a void order or decision rendered between parties cannot be said to be non-existent in all cases and in all situations. Ordinarily, such an order will, in fact be effective inter parties until it is successfully avoided or challenged in higher forum. Mere use of the word "void" is not determinative of its legal impact. The word "void" has a relative rather than an absolute meaning. It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal. It can be avoided. There are degrees of invalidity, depending upon the gravity of the infirmity, as to whether it is, fundamental or otherwise. The apex Court went in depth into the jurisprudential concept of ‘void’ and ‘voidable’ and held thus : “7. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edition, (Reissue) Volume 1(1) in paragraph 26, page 31, it is stated, thus:- "If an act or decision, or an order or other instrument is invalid, it should, in principle, be null and void for all purposes; and it has been said that there are no degrees of nullity. Even though such an act is wrong and lacking in jurisdiction, however, it subsists and remains fully effective unless and until it is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. Until its validity is challenged, its legality is preserved." The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 19. A priori, the judgment of the learned appellate court is set aside. The appeal is allowed. Consequently, the suit is dismissed. No costs.