JUDGMENT : B.R. SARANGI, J. The appellants have filed this intra-Court appeal challenging order dated 21.08.2014 passed by the learned Single Judge in OJC No. 6450 of 2000, whereby the writ petition has been disposed of by relying upon judgment dated 23.12.2008 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 2548 of 2004, by which the direction has been given to the appellants to count the period from 19.09.1996 to 24.10.1999 in respect of the respondent as in service and such period to be reckoned for the purpose of his future promotion. 2. The factual matrix of the case is that the respondent, while working as Development Officer, remained unauthorized absence from the headquarters and committed various irregularities, for which charge sheet was issued against him on 30.12.1995. On completion of enquiry to the charges framed against him and receipt of report, necessary notice for show cause was issued on 06.07.1996, to which the respondent submitted reply on 24.07.1996 and 26.08.1996. The disciplinary authority, after due consideration of the show cause, vide order dated 19.09.1996, imposed penalty of removal from service under Regulation 39(1)b) of the LIC of India Staff Regulations, 1960 (hereinafter to be referred as “Regulations, 1960”). Against the said order of punishment, the respondent under Regulation 40 of the 1960 Regulations, preferred an appeal, which was dismissed on 21.10.1997. The respondent then made a memorial under Regulation 49 of the Regulations, 1960 to the Chairman, LIC of India, who, vide order dated 14.09.1999, set aside the order of the disciplinary authority so also the appellate authority and remitted the matter back to the disciplinary authority with the direction to conduct a fresh enquiry affording reasonable opportunity to the respondent. While doing so, the Chairman also directed that the period from the date of removal of the respondent from service till the date he rejoined to be treated as the period not spent on duty. After accepting such order passed by the Chairman, the respondent submitted his joining report and he was allowed to join in service on 25.10.1999 and discharged his duty. 2.1 Subsequently, challenging the part of the order passed by the Chairman directing for de novo enquiry, the respondent filed OJC No. 6450 of 2000. After accepting such order passed by the Chairman, the respondent submitted his joining report and he was allowed to join in service on 25.10.1999 and discharged his duty. 2.1 Subsequently, challenging the part of the order passed by the Chairman directing for de novo enquiry, the respondent filed OJC No. 6450 of 2000. In the same, the respondent took the ground that the enquiry was not conducted by following the principle of natural justice and since the order of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority were quashed, there was no occasion on the part of the reviewing authority for issuing a direction for de novo inquiry. His further stand was that, if the order of punishment like dismissal from service is set aside, the respondent is deemed to have been continuing in service. The respondent having been permitted to join as Development Officer with effect from 25.10.1999, the fixation of pay of the respondent at the lowest level, though he was a recruitee of the year 1993, such fixation of pay was illegal and not binding in law. Since the respondent was not in a position to work as Development Officer, he made a prayer for the Zonal Manager to post him to discharge his administrative job in Class-III on the terms and conditions to be decided by the Corporation. Since the said prayer was rejected by the Zonal Manager, the respondent challenged its legality and propriety in the writ petition with the prayer to treat the period from 19.09.1996 to 24.10.1999 to be continuing in service and for direction to the appellants to post the respondent in administrative side. 2.2 The Division Bench of this Court, after due adjudication, disposed of W.P.(C) No. 2584 of 2004 by order dated 23.12.2008, the relevant part of which runs as follows: “As we find, in this case the charges are not specific. But the Enquiry Officer has submitted his report on five charges. The Disciplinary Authority has concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, but has taken new ground for imposing the major penalty, which is not legally available to the Disciplinary Authority. When charge has not been framed, punishment cannot be imposed basing upon certain new charges, without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to defend his case. Therefore, the order imposing penalty is not legally tenable. When charge has not been framed, punishment cannot be imposed basing upon certain new charges, without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to defend his case. Therefore, the order imposing penalty is not legally tenable. Once the order imposing penalty goes, the subsequent orders passed by the Appellate Authority and the Reviewing Authority are bound to fail. We would have remanded the matter to the authorities for imposing a lesser punishment but as we find this is the second round of litigation of the petitioner in this Court and the petitioner is out of job since 1995, save and except a brief spell during which he was allowed to serve by the order of the Chairman of the Corporation. In order to cut short the delay, we set aside the impugned order of removal from service passed by the Disciplinary Authority in Annexure-9 so also the affirming orders passed by the Appellate Authority and the Reviewing Authority in Annexures-11 and 12 respectively and direct reinstatement of the petitioner to service without any financial benefit. The seniority of the petitioner shall, however, be maintained and his pay shall be fixed notionally.” 3. In compliance of the aforesaid order, though the respondent was reinstated in service without any financial benefit and his seniority was maintained and his pay was notionally fixed, but he was not granted the benefit for the period from 19.09.1996 to 24.10.1999. Consequentially, the respondent again approached this Court by filing OJC No. 6450 of 2000, which came to be disposed of by the learned Single Judge by order dated 21.08.2014, the effective part of which runs as follows: “In the present writ petition, the petitioner seeks direction directing the opposite parties treating the period from 19.09.1996 to 24.10.1999 as continuing in service. On perusal of the direction in the previous writ vide Para-8, it appears that this Court in allowing the said writ petition while setting aside the dismissal order, the order of the appellate authority and the reviewing authority has already directed that the petitioner shall be reinstated in service without financial benefit and the seniority of the petitioner shall, however, be maintained and his pay shall be fixed notionally. It appears that the relief claimed by the petitioner in the present writ petition has already been covered by the direction of this Court in the previous writ petition. It appears that the relief claimed by the petitioner in the present writ petition has already been covered by the direction of this Court in the previous writ petition. In such view of the matter and since the claim of the petitioner is already protected under the direction in the previous order, no further direction need be issued. It is stated here that in view of the specific direction in the previous writ petition, the opposite parties are bound to count the period from 19.09.1996 to 24.10.1999 in respect of the petitioner as in service and the said period is to be reckoned for the purpose of his future promotions.” Aggrieved by the order directing to count the period from 19.09.1996 to 24.10.1999 as spent by the respondent in service and said period be reckoned for the purpose of future promotion, the appellants have filed the present appeal. 4. Mr. J.K. Rath, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Mr. Karunakar Sahoo, learned counsel for the appellants urged that the respondent is not entitled to get the benefits for the period from 19.09.1996 to 24.10.1999 and, as such, said period should not have been considered for future promotion. It is further contended that in view of order passed on 14.09.1999 by the reviewing authority, wherein it has been specifically mentioned that the period of absence from the date of his removal in terms of order dated 19.09.1996 till date of rejoin his duty pursuant to his order be treated as the period not spent in duty, the direction given for counting the said period for the purpose of promotion cannot sustain in the eye of law. Therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside. 5. Per contra, Mr. M.R. Mohanty, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Ms. Subhashree Mohanty, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the order passed by the learned Single Judge emanates from the order of the Division Bench of this Court dated 23.12.2008 passed in W.P. (C) No. 2584 of 2004, by which the Division Bench of this Court has specifically come to a conclusion that since the charges are not specific and on that basis the inquiry officer has submitted a report and the disciplinary authority, while concurring with the findings of the inquiry officer, imposed major penalty taking new ground which cannot be sustainable. It was further observed by the Division Bench of this Court that when charges were not framed, punishment could not have been imposed basing upon certain new charges without giving an opportunity to the respondent to defend his case. It is further urged that since the Division Bench of this Court, by setting aside the order of removal passed by the disciplinary authority, has already directed the respondent to be reinstated in service without any financial benefit and his seniority to be maintained, the claim of the appellants, that for the period from 19.09.1996 to 24.10.1999 the respondent is not entitled to get the benefit, cannot sustain in the eye of law. 6. Having heard Mr. J.K. Rath, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants and Mr. M.R. Mohanty, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent and since pleadings between the parties have been exchanged, with their consent the matter is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 7. The facts of the case, as delineated above, are undisputed. The only question to be decided in this case is whether the period from 19.09.1996 to 24.10.1999 the respondent is entitled to get the benefits or not. This question also cannot be reopened in view of the fact that the judgment dated 23.12.2008 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in W.P. (C) No. 2584 of 2004 has reached its finality, as the same has not been challenged by the appellants before the higher forum, which fact has also been admitted by Mr. J.K. Rath, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants. Once the judgment dated 23.12.2008 rendered by this Court reached its finality, the benefit accrued thereof has to be extended to the respondent. Particularly when the Division Bench of this Court has come to a conclusion that the charges are not specific but the inquiry officer has submitted his report on five charges, basing upon which the disciplinary authority has concurred with the said finding and has also taken new grounds for imposing major penalty, which is not legally available, therefore punishment so imposed without giving any opportunity to the respondent to defend his case is not legally tenable. Once the order imposing penalty goes, the subsequent order passed by the appellate authority and reviewing authority are bound to fail. Once the order imposing penalty goes, the subsequent order passed by the appellate authority and reviewing authority are bound to fail. Consequentially, the Division Bench of this Court set aside the order of removal from service passed by the disciplinary authority, which was confirmed by the appellate authority, as well as reviewing authority, and directed that the respondent would be reinstated in service without any financial benefits and his seniority would be maintained and his pay would be fixed notionally. Meaning thereby, on reinstatement in service, the respondent may not get the financial benefits, but his seniority has to be retained and his pay has to be fixed notionally. As a consequence thereof, this Court already granted the benefit of continuity of service of the respondent, which has the effect of consequential benefits admissible to the respondent. 8. In J.K. Synthetics v. K.P. Agarwal, AIR 2007 SC (Supp.) 637, while considering the provision of Section 6(6) of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the apex Court held as follows: “There is also a misconception that whenever reinstatement is directed, “continuity of service” and “consequential benefits” should follow, as a matter of course. The disastrous effect of granting several promotions as a “consequential benefit” to a person who has not worked for 10 to 15 years and who does not have the benefit of necessary experience for discharging the higher duties and functions of promotional posts, is seldom visualized while granting consequential benefits automatically. Whenever courts or tribunals direct reinstatement, they should apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances to decide whether “continuity of service” and/or “consequential benefits” should also be directed. Coming back to back wages, even if the court finds it necessary to award back wages, the question will be whether back wages should be awarded fully or only partially (and if so the percentage). That depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” In view of the above, “consequential benefit” to a person does not mean only back wages. It includes much more things beyond back wages, such as promotion, fixation of seniority and grant of financial benefits admissible to the post etc. That depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” In view of the above, “consequential benefit” to a person does not mean only back wages. It includes much more things beyond back wages, such as promotion, fixation of seniority and grant of financial benefits admissible to the post etc. Therefore, if the respondent had been removed from service illegally by the disciplinary authority, which was confirmed by the appellate authority as well as the reviewing authority, but ultimately such order of illegal removal from service having been set aside by this Court allowing the respondent to be reinstated in service without any financial benefit, as he had not discharged the duty for the said period, and directing to maintain his seniority and fix his pay notionally, that itself cannot disentitle the respondent from getting service benefits for the period from 19.09.1996 to 24.10.1999. Since the order of the Division Bench with regard to counting of seniority and fixation of pay of the respondent notionally has reached its finality, the period from 19.09.1996 to 24.10.1999 is bound to be taken into consideration for the purpose of his future promotion. 9. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has not committed any illegality or irregularity so as to warrant interference of this Court. Hence, we find no merits in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed.