JUDGMENT : Alok Aradhe, J. In this appeal preferred under Section 37 of the Jammu and Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 (herein-after referred to as 'the Act-), the appellant has assailed the validity of order dated 2-4-2016 passed by the trial Court by which the application preferred by the appellant under Section 34 of the Act has been rejected and the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal dated 28-12-2014 has been modified insofar as it pertains to grant of interest for the post award period to 6%. In order to appreciate the appellants challenge to the impugned award, few facts need mention which are stated infra: 2. The appellant issued Notice Inviting Tenders (NIT) on 15-3-2005 by which Tenders were invited for grant of contract for construction of Mughal Road from Bafliaz, District Poonch to Shopian (Pulwama) in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The last date of submission of bid was 14-6-2015. The respondent submitted his bid in response to the aforesaid Notice Inviting Tenders (NIT), which was accepted and letter of acceptance was issued on 14-9-2005. Thereafter an agreement dated 8-2-2006 was executed. Under the agreement, the date of commencement of the work in question was 1-3-2006 and the contract was to be executed within a period of three years i.e. upto 28-2-2009. The total contract price as per the original agreement was Rs. 214,40,00,000/-. The relevant extract of general conditions of the contract are reproduced below : '2. The Intended Completion Date for the whole of the works is 3 years after the start of work.'(Cl. 1-1-17 & 27) 'Clause 3.1 of Part I-GCC. 'The language of contract and the law governing the Contract are stated in Contract Data." 'Clause 8(a) of Contract Data reads as 'the law which applies to the Contract is the law of Union of India (Cl.3.1)." 'Clause 11 Employer's Risks. 11.1 The Employer is responsible for the excepted risks, which are (a) insofar as they directly affect the execution of the works in the Employer's country the risks of war invasion act of foreign enemies, rebellion, revolution, insurrection or military or usurped power civil war riot commotion or disorder (unless restricted to the Contractor's employees) natural calamities and contamination from any nuclear fuel or nuclear waste or radioactive toxic explosive or (b) a cause due solely to the design of the Works other than the Contractor's design.' 'Clause 17. The works to be completed by the Intended Completion Date. 17.1 The Contractor may commence execution of the works on the start date and shall carry out the works in accordance with the programme submitted by the Contractor as updated with the approval of the Engineer and complete them by the Intended Completion Date.' 'Clause 21. Possession of the site. 21.1 The Employer shall give complete possession of the site to the contractor fifteen days in advance of the construction programme.' 'Clause 27. Extension of the Intended completion date. 27.1 The Engineer shall extend the intended completion date if a compensation event occurs or a variation is issued which makes it impossible for completion to be achieved by the intended completion date without the contractor taking steps to accelerate the remaining works which would cause the contractor to incur additional cost.' 'Clause 40. Compensation Events. 40.1 The following shall be compensation events unless they are caused by the contractor: (a) The Engineer orders a delay or delays exceeding a total of 30 days. (b) The effects on the contractor of any of the Employer's Risks. 40.2 If a compensation event would prevent works being completed before the Intended completion date the Intended completion date shall be extended. The Engineer shall decide whether and by how much the intended completion date shall be extended.' 3. From the perusal of the aforesaid relevant clauses of the agreement, it is evident that in the event of 'compensation events-or' delays in completion of the works-as envisaged by clauses 11, 12 and 40, the contractor was entitled to 'extension of time in terms of Clause 27 of the agreement. On 25-1-2010 supplementary agreement was executed and as per the supplementary agreement the date of completion of work was 31-3-2011. The value of supplementary agreement was Rs. 126,64,00,000/-. In view of the fact that quantities of various items previously envisaged in the agreement were based on remote survey and topo' sheets, they got increased after the actual ground survey along with approved alignment of the road, the same resulted in 'extension of time-and the contractor was granted total' extension of time-thrice, namely, on 15-5-2011, 25-11-2011 and 15-2-2012 i.e. extension for total of 315 days. The respondent completed the work on 15-2-2012. 4. The respondent completed the work on 15-2-2012. 4. The agreement executed between the parties, contained the arbitration clause and the dispute between the parties was referred to the Arbitral Tribunal comprises of three Arbitrators. The following two dispute/claims were referred for arbitration : (i) Claim in respect of the interest for the delays in certification and delay in making payment for the monthly bills. (ii) Claim in respect of payment of additional costs incurred in the extended period of contract on account of delays not attributable to claimant. 5. The Arbitral Tribunal delivered the award on 28-12-2014. The majority award was given by Presiding Arbitrator and another Arbitrator by which claim of the respondent in respect of dispute No.2 was decreed and a sum of Rs. 78,92,73,307/- (Rupees seventy eight crores ninety two lacs seventy three thousand three hundred and seven only) was awarded along with interest, whereas another Arbitrator gave a dissent award and awarded a sum of 41.1641 crores in respect of dispute No.2. The dispute No.1 was rejected by the Arbitral Tribunal. The Arbitral Tribunal in Paragraph 11 of the award recorded its findings and conclusions as follows : '11. Conclusions and Findings of Arbitral Tribunal : 11.1 The present Contract was entered in to between the parties with the clear understanding that, the whole of the works or the Contract shall be completed within the agreed period of 36 months. 11.2 The respective obligations to be fulfilled by the parties to ensure the satisfactory completion of the project within the stipulated time period was clearly identified and defined under various clauses of the Contract. Therefore, it was necessary and incumbent on their respective parts to adhere to such obligations in letter and spirit. 11.3 If one of the parties fails to live up to its obligations, it would have an impact on the completion time of the contract and the likely consequences flowing therefrom. 11.4 If the claimant was responsible for the delay in completion of the Contract, he is liable to pay the compensation by way of liquidated damages to the Respondent at the rates agreed in the Contract. Such compensation being at Rs.30.62 lacs for every day of delay. 11.5 If the completion of the works are delayed due to the compensation events defined under the contract and not attributable to the claimant and the intended completion period is extended. Such compensation being at Rs.30.62 lacs for every day of delay. 11.5 If the completion of the works are delayed due to the compensation events defined under the contract and not attributable to the claimant and the intended completion period is extended. 11.6 Further, in terms of Clause 3.1, the Contract is governed by law of India and in terms of Indian Contract Act, 1872, the Contractor shall be entitled to additional cost to be paid to him by the Employer if the contract period is extended due to compensation events. 11.7 The legal position emerging from the various case laws filed before the AT also establishes that if there is delay in performance of Contract, the party who is not responsible for such delays is entitled to be compensated for the losses and additional costs by the other party being responsible for the delays. 11.8 It is established from the evidence before the AT, that there were compensation events which had caused delay in completion of the Contract. Against such compensation events, the Claimant had claimed an extension of time for 1267 days. After careful and critical review of the said compensation events, the Engineer had determined extension of time for 635 days. 11.9 As per contract, the complete site was to be handed over 15 days before submission of works programme. Where as a stretch of 21 Km passing through Hirpora wild life sanctuary was not available to Claimant until July, 2007. 11.10 The Engineer had notified the Claimant with copy to the Respondent that the Contract period was extended pursuant to Clause 27 on account of the compensation events. As the compensation events were not attributable to the Claimant, he was also allowed the price adjustment during the full extended period and no liquidated damages were recovered from the Claimant. If the Claimant was responsible for the delays, these benefits could not have been extended to him. 11.11 The Claimant while applying for the EOT had notified the Engineer as well as the Respondent about his intention of making the Claim for the cost. 11.12 Insofar as the records are concerned, the documents placed before the Tribunal would show that the Claimant had submitted the contemporary records to the Engineer along with the Claim and the same records have been submitted to the Tribunal. 11.12 Insofar as the records are concerned, the documents placed before the Tribunal would show that the Claimant had submitted the contemporary records to the Engineer along with the Claim and the same records have been submitted to the Tribunal. The said contemporaneous records/evidence is adequate and sufficient to make the assessment of the claims by the Tribunal. 11.13 The Respondent had also admitted that, if at all the Claimant is entitled for claim, it would be only for 72 days which are the delays attributable to the Respondent. Thus the Respondent admits the entitlement for the additional cost due to compensation events. Whereas, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the Claimant is entitled to the additional cost claimed under each of the subheads 1 to 5 except for claim under subhead 3 and the amounts due under each of the sub-heads have been assessed and determined under para 10 of the award. 11.14 The total extended period of the Contract is for 1081 days and out of which 445 days were on account of the additional works which were necessitated due to the increase in the quantities after final survey resulting in supplementary agreement for Rs. 126.64 crores. 11.15 Accordingly, the AT has determined the additional cost for the total extended period and has given credit against the additional work executed for the time allotted for the said additional work. 11.16 In the computed statements by the Claimant, the ownership cost of the equipment deployed has been calculated including repair and maintenance cost per hour of the equipment deployed. The AT is of the view that repair and maintenance cost per hour should not be included in the ownership cost and the statement has been modified accordingly. 11.17 The details of the additional costs have been determined as detailed in Annexures 1 a & b, 2 a & b, 4 a & b, 5 a & b and the net additional cost payable to the Claimant after the credit has been arrived at in Enclisure 1.' 6. 11.17 The details of the additional costs have been determined as detailed in Annexures 1 a & b, 2 a & b, 4 a & b, 5 a & b and the net additional cost payable to the Claimant after the credit has been arrived at in Enclisure 1.' 6. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed an objection under Section 34 of the Act before the trial Court on 23-3-2015 in which challenge was made to the award inter alia on the following ground : '(a) As per the substituted contract, the stipulated date of completion of the work was envisaged as 31-3-2011 taking into account the complete scope of work including additional quantities. As such no compensation could therefore be granted by the majority award for the period from 1-3-2009 to 15-2-2012. The majority award has awarded compensation for the period from 1-3-2009 to 31-3-2011 and 1-4-2011 to 15-2-2012. This court shall appreciate that the period from 1-3-2009 to 31-3-2011 cannot be treated as extended period because of the reason that by novated contract the stipulated period of completion was envisaged as 31-3-2011. In this matter the original contract has been substituted by a novated contract as such the earlier date of completion 28-2-2009 cannot be revisited by AT. The date of completion has to be taken as stipulated by the novated supplementary agreement. The majority award has committed a grave error in treating the period from 1-3-2009 to 31-3-2011 as extended period. This error goes to the vary root of the matter and is not a trivial illegality. (b) No award could be granted by the majority award for the period with in the contract period treating it as extended period. As is clear from the narration of the dispute No.2 as cited above. The claimant/contractor had demanded the compensation for the extended period of the contract. The period from 1-3-2009 to 31-3-2011 cannot be treated as extended period in terms of the supplementary agreement executed by and between the parties. (c) The award deserves to be set aside being against the terms of the contract. (d) Section 28(3) of the Act of 1997 provisions that in all cases; Arbitral Tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transactions. This is a mandatory provision of law. (d) Section 28(3) of the Act of 1997 provisions that in all cases; Arbitral Tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transactions. This is a mandatory provision of law. Arbitral Tribunal has committed a grave error in deciding the matter against the terms of the contract because the period from 1-3-2009 to 31-3-2011 has been treated by it as extended period. Thus the compensation awarded by majority award for this period is against the terms and the contract. (e) The detail of the various EOT's granted have been given herein above in para 'F' the EOT III was granted for milestone 3. This EOT was granted with the following note. 'The milestones need to be changed in respect of additional work of Rs. 126.64 Crores and time of completion fixed as per supplementary agreement'. (f) The details of extension granted from the stipulated date of completion i.e. 31-3-2011 are given herein above in para G. The EOT extending period of completion up to 15-5-2011 and 108 days extended period of completion up to 15-2-2012 were granted on the following conditions : 1. The EOT shall not be co-related with previous EOT's in any case. 2. No claim shall be entertained on account of idle men and machinery during the period. 3. Financial target shall be rechecked to evaluate short falls with respect to revised to revised milestones. (g) According to aforesaid notes, the earlier date of completion given in the original contract as 28-2-2009 becomes irrelevant and there is no reason to treat this date as date of completion for making an award for extension of time. (h) In the majority award EOT's have been considered for claim of damage and losses on the basis of date of completion as 28-2-2009 which is not tenable since the compensable delays can only be beyond the date of completion as per the novated contract i.e. 31-3-2011 prior to that date there can be no force overstay for the claimant entitling him for compensation. (i) The decision of the majority award is perverse and so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same and the same cannot be sustained in the Court of law. This decision falls short of the standards of reasonableness and is open to challenge in this Court of law. (i) The decision of the majority award is perverse and so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same and the same cannot be sustained in the Court of law. This decision falls short of the standards of reasonableness and is open to challenge in this Court of law. (j) Arbitral Tribunal has committed grave error in giving the following findings in para 9.6 of the majority award. 'This would not have arisen had there been no increase quantities of various items. From the administration requirement, such a large variation in the quantities and the consequent increase in the value of the work required the supplementary agreement to be entered into to avoid any audit or CAG observation. Hence the supplementary agreement entered was only in respect of overcoming the said technical requirement and such agreement would not change the originally agreed terms of contract which was to end on 28-2-2009. I. This finding is based on no evidence. II. In giving this finding, Arbitral Tribunal has taken in to account something irrelevant to the decision. III. Arbitral Tribunal's decision is based on surmises and presumption in as much as it has been found by it that the supplementary agreement was entered to avoid any audit or CAG observation. The fact is that the supplementary agreement was required and was entered into as a novation of the original contract due to ground reality. The variation in quantities was very well known right from the inception of the original contract. The novation of the original contract by supplementary agreement was in accordance with law and no fault can be found in it. IV. The aforesaid finding of the Arbitral Tribunal has resulted in making a majority award of Rs. 78.92 Crores in favour of the claimant/contractor. Accordingly the award is perverse being based on no evidence and Arbitral Tribunal has taken into account something irrelevant to the decision. (k) Accordingly the majority award passed by Arbitral Tribunal is in conflict with the public policy of the state being patently illegal. The award given by Arbitral Tribunal against the dispute No. 2 deserves to be set aside in accordance with law.' 7. (k) Accordingly the majority award passed by Arbitral Tribunal is in conflict with the public policy of the state being patently illegal. The award given by Arbitral Tribunal against the dispute No. 2 deserves to be set aside in accordance with law.' 7. The trial Court vide impugned order dated 2-4-2016 inter alia in respect of dispute No.2 of the respondent held as follows : 'Before adverting upon the dispute No.2 as referred above it would be advantageous to take into consideration Clause 24.1 of the contract agreement executed between the parties, according to which any dispute between the contractor and the employer has to be in the first place referred to the former, who is required to decide the same within a period of 45 days. In the instant case the dispute referred in terms of sub-clause 24.1 of the contract agreement seems to have been rejected by the employer resulting in seeking indulgence of the Arbitral Tribunal for adjudication of the said dispute. It is the case of the claimant/respondent that he was not able to complete the works as planned due to the various delay events not attributable to him for which the claimant applied for extending the time for completion of the works on account of these delay events besides notifying the Engineer/petitioner for his entitlement of consequential additional costs to be added to the contract price. Perusal of the material on record reveals that review and consideration of the application for Extension of Time, shortly referred as EOT culminated in granting the said EOT's from time to time by the Engineer and finally approved by the petitioner herein as mentioned in para 7.3.5 of the award. In terms of the conditions of the contract agreement the claimant put forth the claim of additional costs on the basis of compensation events and extended period of his stay at the project site, which was rejected by the Engineer/the petitioner herein. The claimant/respondent has referred the letter dated 27-5-2011 notifying the petitioner to settle the matter amicably. He has also referred letter dated 17-11-2011 notifying the petitioner his intention, in the eventuality of petitioner's ill response, to get the matter in dispute settled through arbitration as provided under Clause 25 of the conditions of the contract. The claimant/respondent has referred the letter dated 27-5-2011 notifying the petitioner to settle the matter amicably. He has also referred letter dated 17-11-2011 notifying the petitioner his intention, in the eventuality of petitioner's ill response, to get the matter in dispute settled through arbitration as provided under Clause 25 of the conditions of the contract. A cursory glance of the contract conditions reveals that the whole of the work has to be completed within a period of 36 months. The bid price would broadly comprise of two types of costs, one which would be direct costs which would go in to the asset which the respondent would get and the second would comprise of the time related costs which are dependent on the time period allotted for the completion of the work. It further reveals that in case the contractor cannot complete the works within the stipulated time due to his fault, he is liable to pay compensation to the respondent by way of liquidated damages at the rates agreed in the contract, if the Employer is not in a position to fulfil his obligations, the clauses in the Contract require the contract period to be extended which shall be determined by the Engineer. It is further reveals that even though there is no specific provision for payment of compensation in case of delays by the employer, but there is also no specific and categorical provision for prohibiting the payment of compensation in case of the delays caused by the employer to which the present petitioner is in agreement in principle, but contends the entitlement of compensation only for 72 days. Perusal of the record reveals that the claimant has explained each event of the compensation event/delays in his applications along with the relevant clauses under which the said compensation events fall and which entitle him for the overall extension of time of 1267 days for completion of the whole of the works. Record further reveals that the Engineer had made determination of the EOT and had determined an extension of time of 635 days. It also reveals that the overall extension of time beyond the original contract period of 36 months was extended till 15-2-2012. The present contract being the one for which there is a provision for extending the time for completion under various clauses. It also reveals that the overall extension of time beyond the original contract period of 36 months was extended till 15-2-2012. The present contract being the one for which there is a provision for extending the time for completion under various clauses. Section 55 clearly provides that the party who has been compelled to incur loss due to the failure of the other party the former is entitled for compensation. In other words where a party to a contract is unable to fulfil its obligations under contract which has a direct bearing on work to be executed by other party, Arbitrator is vested with authority to compensate second party for extra costs incurred by him as a result of failure of the former. In the instant case the claims under various sub-heads are on account of the consequences of the compensation events. After the meticulous examination of the material on record in light of the law on the subject, I find that the AT has rightly held that the claimant would be entitled to the additional costs under all sub-heads enumerated in para No. 9.12.2 of the award except the sub-head No.3 for financing charges (interest) on account of the delayed recovery of the component of overhead and profits in the extended period of contract with necessary modifications as found necessary by the tribunal. As the extension of time was on account of the compensation events not attributable to the claimant, the Tribunal has rightly held that additional costs have necessarily arisen on account of the extra time that the claimant had to spend at the site for the completion of the works in the extended period. It is evidently clear that had there been no delays the claimant could have completed the whole of the works with the labour deployed by him within the originally stipulated time. As a result of the delays in completion of work the claimant was subjected to additional costs on account of the labour to be deployed in the extended period of contract. So far as the plea of novation is concerned, the term Novation under the Contract Act, 1977 (1920 A.D.) has been illustrated as under :- 'Novation.- A contract may also be discharged by consent, if the party entitled to performance is willing to accept performance is from a third party. So far as the plea of novation is concerned, the term Novation under the Contract Act, 1977 (1920 A.D.) has been illustrated as under :- 'Novation.- A contract may also be discharged by consent, if the party entitled to performance is willing to accept performance is from a third party. In such a case, a fresh contract is substituted in place of the original contract. This is called novation. The substitution of a new contract may be as between the same parties, or as between one of them and a third party though the word novation is strictly applicable to the latter kind. Thus one of the essential requirements of novation as contemplated by Section 62 is that there should be complete substitution of a new contract in place of the old.- Thus in view of the facts and circumstances of the case as enumerated above, the contention of the petitioner that the supplementary agreement was a novation is not sustainable in absence of any plausible reasons. It has not been proved by any cogent evidence on the record that the intention of the parties was to rescind the old contract and not merely to vary it. 'Section 62 of the Contract Act contains the principle of' Novation-of contract. One of the essential requirements of novation, as contemplated by Section 62, is that there should be complete substitution of a new contract in place of the old. It is in that situation that the original contract need not be performed. Substitution of a new contract in place of the old contract which would have the effect of rescinding or completely altering the terms of the original contract, has to be by agreement between the parties. A substituted contract should rescind or alter or extinguish the previous contract. But if the terms of the two contracts are inconsistent and they cannot stand together, the subsequent contract cannot be said to be in substitution of the earlier contract.- On the other hand it has been established by the respondent that the supplementary agreement is the additional part of the original agreement where the time schedule is revised and the original agreement shall remain in force, because some factors do occur which are beyond the control of contractor. In other words it is an additional requirement that is to say it is not novation of contract but is an extension of contract. In other words it is an additional requirement that is to say it is not novation of contract but is an extension of contract. From the evidence on record it has been established by the respondent that it was due to the compensation events for which the Engineer took the responsibility and supplementary agreement was executed between the parties and the extension of time for completion of the work was approved by the Government itself. Be that as it may the additional work was to be considered as per the original agreement and in respect of the extension of time, upon the applications moved by the respondent, EOTs have been granted which as reflected from the record seem to have been approved by the Government. Perusal of the record also transpires that in this case the supplementary agreement is the flow from original one as a consequence upon the compensation events. Furthermore according to the Bill of Quantities basis of payment is actual quantity and the contractor has to conduct the surveys and it is not only pay for work but for all surveys. In another case law State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. ( AIR 2010 SC 1299 ) it has been held that :- '.........in the application for setting aside the award, the appellant set up only grounds viz. waiver, acquiescence, delay, laches and res judicata. The grounds sought to be added in the memorandum of arbitration appeal by way of amendment are absolutely new grounds for which there is no foundation in the application for setting aside the award. Obviously, such new grounds containing new material/facts could not have been introduced for the first time in an appeal when admittedly these grounds were not originally raised in the arbitration petition for setting aside the award. Moreover, no prayer was made by the appellant for amendment in the petition under Section 34 before the Court concerned or at the appellate stage. Moreover, no prayer was made by the appellant for amendment in the petition under Section 34 before the Court concerned or at the appellate stage. As a matter of fact, the learned single Judge in para 6 of the impugned order has observed that the grounds of appeal which are now sought to be advanced were not originally raised in the arbitration petition and that the amendment that is sought to be effected is not even to the grounds contained in the application under Section 34 but to the memo of appeal........' In the instant case as is evident from the record that the petitioner herein has not raised the point of novation before the Arbitral Tribunal, and as such same cannot be raised before this Court in the application under Section 34. Thus in view of the above settled position of law once the arbitrator has dealt with the matter after going through the evidence on record, the Court has no jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act to interfere with finding of Arbitral Tribunal on the issue of novation raised by the petitioner. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the award is against the public policy is also not sustainable under law. On this point I am guided by a case law cited by the learned counsel for the respondent titled Association Builders v. Delhi Development Authority on 25 November, 2014 it has been held as under :- 'When a Court is applying the' public policy-test to an arbitration award, it does not act as a court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award.- Again in case M/s. Navodaya Mass Entertainment Ltd. v. J.M. Combines, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- 'In our opinion, the scope of interference of the Court is very limited. Court would not be justified in reappraising the material on record and substituting its own view in place of the Arbitrator's view. Court would not be justified in reappraising the material on record and substituting its own view in place of the Arbitrator's view. Where there is an error apparent on the fact of the record or the Arbitrator has not followed the statutory legal position then and then only it would be justified in interfering with the award published by the Arbitrator. Once the Arbitrator has applied his mind to the matter before him, the Court cannot reappraise the matter as if it were an appeal and even if two views are possible, the view taken by the Arbitrator would prevail. Reference is made to the case law titled Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. L.K. Ahuja, (2004) 5 SCC 109 . Thus in view of the above case laws in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, I am of the considered opinion that as per requirement there is no fraud or inducement of any violation of Sections 58 or 64 and from the material on record I find that none of the ingredients of public policy has been made out. Hence the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the award is against the public policy is also not sustainable under law. The question as to whether the award is required to be stamped and registered, would be relevant only when the parties would file the award for its enforcement under Section 36 of the Act. Only at that stage the parties can raise the objection regarding the deficiency in stamping or registration and this issue is within the ambit of Section 47, CPC and not covered by Section 34 of the Act. Reference is made to a case law M. Anasuya Devi and another v. M. Manik Reddy and others (2003) 8 SCC 565 . The next point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Arbitral Tribunal has awarded interest @ 12% p.a. in the Award dated 28-12-2014 on the amount of Rs. 78,92,73,307/- from 9-5-2012 up to the date of award upon the basis of statutory provision which had undergone amendment way back in the year 2010 and is thus violative of the statutory provision of law. Perusal of the record reveals that the Arbitral Tribunal has referred to Section 31(7) of K.&K. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 and awarded the interest @ 12% p.a. in favour of the claimant. Perusal of the record reveals that the Arbitral Tribunal has referred to Section 31(7) of K.&K. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 and awarded the interest @ 12% p.a. in favour of the claimant. Since the contract pertains to the year 2006 and the amendment in Section 31 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was made on 20-4-2010, as such the rate of interest as given by the Arbitral Tribunal for the period prior to the passing of award shall remain as it is in view of Section 31(7)(b). Learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued that while awarding future interest @ 15% p.a. Arbitral Tribunal fell in palpable error as the rate of interest cannot exceed 6% on both the counts as sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Section 31(7) of J.&K. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 by virtue of amendment in 2010 whereby upper limit has been fixed 6% without any discretion to the Tribunal to award anything above 6%. Admittedly the award has been passed in the year 2014 while as the amendment has been made in Section 31 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act in the year 2010 meaning thereby that the future interest has been awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal much after the amendment. According to the said amendment the rate of future interest should not exceed 6%, as such, taking the amendment of the Section 31 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act into consideration with its cumulative effect on the facts and circumstances of the present case, the rate of interest on the awarded amount from the date of passing of the award till its realization is fixed as 6%. Viewed as thus after taking into consideration the supervisory role of Court under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 for review of award to ensure fairness, this Court is of considered opinion that there is no violation of fundamental policy of law, justice or morality or the same being in any way patently illegal. The Court is also of the opinion that award of Arbitral Tribunal is not against the public policy and the arbitrator has not gone beyond the terms of the contract and is accordingly upheld except to the extent of future interest as mentioned above.' 8. The Court is also of the opinion that award of Arbitral Tribunal is not against the public policy and the arbitrator has not gone beyond the terms of the contract and is accordingly upheld except to the extent of future interest as mentioned above.' 8. From the perusal of the relevant extract of the order dated 2-4-2016, it is evident that the trial Court has held as follows : (i) The claimant is entitled to additional costs on account of labour to be deployed in the extended period of contract. (ii) The contention of the appellant that supplementary agreement was a 'novation of contract-, is not acceptable in the absence of any plausible reason and it has not produced any cogent evidence that intention of the parties was to rescind the old contract and not merely to vary it. The instant case is not a case of 'novation of contract-but 'extension of contract-. The plea of' novation of contract-was not raised before the Arbitral Tribunal and therefore, cannot be raised in an application under Section 34 of the Act. (iii) No fraud/inducement or the case of violation of Sections 58 and 64 of the Indian Contract Act is made out. Therefore, it cannot be said that the award is contrary to public policy. (iv) There is no violation of fundamental policy of law, justice, morality and the award is neither against the public policy nor is same beyond terms of contract. (v) The rate of interest for post award period was modified to 6% instead of 15%. 9. Learned Advocate General for the appellant submitted that the trial Court ought to have appreciated that the impugned award dated 28-12-2014 was contrary to the specific terms of the contract insofar as it deals with the extended period of contract. It is further submitted that the impugned award is patently illegal as the issues have been decided in cursory and perfunctory manner by the Tribunal. It is further submitted that the inference has been drawn from the document which is not legally permissible. However, the aforesaid aspect of the matter has not been appreciated by the trial Court. It is also argued that main issue of period of 'extension of contract-was decided on the basis of personal knowledge of the dispute which is impermissible in law. However, the aforesaid aspect of the matter has not been appreciated by the trial Court. It is also argued that main issue of period of 'extension of contract-was decided on the basis of personal knowledge of the dispute which is impermissible in law. The trial Court ought to have appreciated that the grounds raised by the appellant in the application under Section 34 of the Act fall within the realm of Public Policy and the case of the respondent was based on no evidence. It is further submitted that the grounds taken before the trial Court have not been adjudicated upon by it and the impugned order suffers from the vice of not only non-application of mind but is cryptic and arbitrary. It is further submitted that the trial Court has misdirected itself on the issues of law and fact. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reference has been made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., AIR 2003 SC 2629 , Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. L.K. Ahuja, (2004) 5 SCC 109 , Security Printing & Minting Corporation of India Ltd. & Anr. v. Gandhi Industrial Corporation, (2007) 13 SCC 236 : (2007 AIR SCW 6854), P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Broker (P) Ltd. v. M/s. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd., AIR 2012 SC 1866 , Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd., AIR 2015 SC 363 and Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : ( AIR 2015 SC 620 ). 10. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, during the course of his submissions, has referred to the award in extenso and has submitted that the Tribunal has explained the difference between the price adjustment/escalation of cost and time related costs and has also dealt with legal basis of the claim and entitlement to additional costs under various sub-heads. It is further submitted that no issue has been raised in respect of 'novation of contract-before the Tribunal and the findings recorded by the Tribunal on the 12 issues framed by it have not been challenged either in the application under Section 34 of the Act or even in the appeal preferred under Section 37 of the Act. It is further submitted that no issue has been raised in respect of 'novation of contract-before the Tribunal and the findings recorded by the Tribunal on the 12 issues framed by it have not been challenged either in the application under Section 34 of the Act or even in the appeal preferred under Section 37 of the Act. It is pointed out that the award is well reasoned, coherent on facts, consistent on reasoning, based on undisputed evidence of documents and is guided by binding judicial precedents. It is further submitted that the parties were given full opportunity to present their cases and due consideration has been given to the material available on record and the appellant has failed to substantiate the plea that the award in question violates any ingredients of Public Policy or the same suffers from legal infirmity. It is further submitted that there is an admission on the part of the appellant that for delay due to compensation events the contractor is entitled to additional costs for 'extension of time-granted by the Engineers. The only stand taken by the appellant in this regard is that the same is payable to the respondent only for a period of 72 days and in fact learned Advocate General has taken a stand that instead of 72 days the additional costs is payable for 321 days i.e. from 1-4-2011 to 15-2-2012. 11. It is also submitted that the submissions of the appellant that instant case is a case of 'novation of contract-is sans substance, as the supplementary agreement itself mentions that it was part of original agreement and its parties, terms and conditions remained unaltered. It is argued that the Arbitral Tribunal is the sole judge of quantity and quality of evidence and its findings cannot be examined like a Court of appeal and the interpretation of contract by the Tribunal is within the realm of its jurisdiction. It is further submitted that even a possible view of the Arbitral Tribunal on the basis of material available on record cannot be interfered with and is not amenable to judicial intervention. It is further submitted that even a possible view of the Arbitral Tribunal on the basis of material available on record cannot be interfered with and is not amenable to judicial intervention. It is also argued that in view of Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the rate of interest awarded by the Tribunal will hold even if it is above 6% and the order of the trial Court in this regard suffers from the error apparent on the face of the record which can be corrected by this Court in exercise of powers under Section 37 of the Act to do complete justice between the parties. 12. While referring to Clause 3 of the original agreement as well as supplementary agreement, it is pointed out that the expression 'other sum payable-covers additional costs that may result because of delay for which 'extension of time-was granted for six times to the respondent pursuant to Clause 27 of the agreement for compensation events. It is further submitted that the arbitrators are well within their right to use public knowledge and trade practices. In support of his aforesaid submissions learned senior counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in cases of MSK Projects (I)(JV) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., (2011) 10 SCC 573 : ( AIR 2011 SC 2979 ); State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd., (2010) 4 SCC 518 : ( AIR 2010 SC 1299 ); Sudarsan Trading Company v. Government of Kerala, (1989) 2 SCC 38 : ( AIR 1989 SC 890 ); Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Sterilite Industries India, (2001) 8 SCC 482 : ( AIR 2001 SC 2933 ); State of Uttar Pradesh v. Allied Constructions (2003) 7 SCC 396 : (2003 AIR SCW 6075); Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. L.K. Ahuja, (2004) 5 SCC 109 ; K.N. Sathyapalan (Dead) By LRs. v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2007) 13 SCC 43 : (2006 AIR SCW 6222); Associated Construction v. Pawanhans Helicopters Pvt. Ltd., (2008) 16 SCC 128 : ( AIR 2008 SC 2911 ), Satna Stone & Lime Co. Ltd. M.P., etc. v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2007) 13 SCC 43 : (2006 AIR SCW 6222); Associated Construction v. Pawanhans Helicopters Pvt. Ltd., (2008) 16 SCC 128 : ( AIR 2008 SC 2911 ), Satna Stone & Lime Co. Ltd. M.P., etc. v. Union of India (2008) 14 SCC 785 : ( AIR 2008 SC 2928 ); Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Gupta Brothers Steel Tubes Ltd., (2009) 10 SCC 63 : (2009 AIR SCW 7191); Ravindra & Associates v. Union of India, 2009 (13) JT 409 ; P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Broker (P) Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities (P) Lts. & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC 594 : ( AIR 2012 SC 1866 ); Navodaya Mass Entertainment Ltd. v. J.M. Combines, (2015) 5 SCC 698 ; Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : ( AIR 2015 SC 620 ); Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 : ( AIR 2003 SC 2629 ); Lata Construction & Ors. v. Rameshchandra Ramniklal Shah & Anr. (2000) 1 SCC 586 : ( AIR 2000 SC 380 ); M. Anasuya Devi v. M.Manik Reddy, (2003) 8 SCC 565 and Madnani Construction Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., (2010) 1 SCC 549 : ( AIR 2010 SC 383 ). 13. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. The Supreme Court in McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 181 : (2006 AIR SCW 3276) while taking note of the decision rendered by it in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644 : ( AIR 1994 SC 860 ) held that an arbitral award can be set aside if it is contrary to fundamental policy of Indian law; the interests of India; or justice or morality. However, subsequently, in the case of ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 : ( AIR 2003 SC 2629 ), the Supreme Court added another ground for exercise of Courts-jurisdiction for setting aside the award i.e. if it is patently arbitrary. In Centrotrade Minerals & Metals Inc. However, subsequently, in the case of ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 : ( AIR 2003 SC 2629 ), the Supreme Court added another ground for exercise of Courts-jurisdiction for setting aside the award i.e. if it is patently arbitrary. In Centrotrade Minerals & Metals Inc. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 245 : (AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 1770) it was held by the Supreme Court that if an award suffers from patent illegality which goes to the root of the matter, the Court can interfere with the award passed by the arbitrator. Thereafter in a recent decision in the case of Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : ( AIR 2015 SC 620 ) the Supreme Court after taking note of various previous judgments rendered by it with regard to scope of interference with the arbitral award held that none of the grounds contained in Section 34(2)(a) of the Act deals with the merits of the decision rendered by an arbitrator. It is only when the award is in conflict with the public policy of India as prescribed in Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act that the merits of an arbitral award are to be looked into under certain specified circumstances. It was further held that the Court would interfere with an award passed by an arbitrator if it is in violation of statute, interest of India, justice or morality, patent illegality, contravention of the Act or terms of the contract. It was also held that the Court hearing an appeal does not act as a Court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award. Thus, an award based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on this score. 14. At this stage, I may advert to the requirement of assigning reasons for decision. in Breen v. A.E.U. (1971) 2 QB 175, Lord Denning has held that giving of reasons for decision is one of the fundamentals of good administration. It constitutes a safeguard against the arbitratiness on the part of decision maker. 14. At this stage, I may advert to the requirement of assigning reasons for decision. in Breen v. A.E.U. (1971) 2 QB 175, Lord Denning has held that giving of reasons for decision is one of the fundamentals of good administration. It constitutes a safeguard against the arbitratiness on the part of decision maker. The obligation to give reasons operates as a deterrent against arbitrary action of adjudicatory bodies and improves the quality of decision making. Unless an adjudicatory body is required to give reasons and make findings of fact indicating the evidence upon which it is relied, there is no way for knowing whether the concerned body genuinely addressed itself to the arguments and evidence adduced at the hearing. It is well known principle that justice should not only be done but should also seen to be done. Unreasoned decisions may be just but they may be not appeared to be just to the parties and the reasoned conclusions on the other hand will have the appearance of justice. The Supreme Court in case of Govt. Branch Press v. D.B. Velliappa, AIR 1979 SC 429 has held that reasons is an essence of right of equality. The decisions of lower adjudicatory bodies are appealable to and or subject to revision by a higher adjudicatory authority. An individual who is entitled to have the decision reviewed by a higher authority may be unable to exercise this right effectively unless he knows the basis on which the original decision has been taken. In the absence of reasons, the statutory right of appeal may become nugatory. In the absence of reasons, the higher forum will be at loss to understand the working of the mind of the inferior Tribunal and it will not be possible for the Court to decide whether there is any legitimate ground for the Court to interfere with the decision of the body. 15. In R. v. Civil Service Appeal Board ex.p. Cunnigham, (1991) 4 All ER 310, R. v. Parole Board ex.p. Wilson, (1992) QB 740 and R. v. Secretary of State for Home Dept. 15. In R. v. Civil Service Appeal Board ex.p. Cunnigham, (1991) 4 All ER 310, R. v. Parole Board ex.p. Wilson, (1992) QB 740 and R. v. Secretary of State for Home Dept. ex.p. Doody, (1993) 3 All ER 92, the following propositions of law have been laid down : (i) When an individual has a right of appeal from the decision of a body, and such a right may be frustrated in the absence of reasons being given by the concerned body, then it must give reasons. (ii) There may exist a legitimate expectation that the deciding authority would give reasons for its decision. This may create an obligation on the concerned body to give reasons which may not exist in the absence of such an expectation. (iii) The obligation to give reasons may arise as an element of natural justice/fairness. There is a growing judicial tendency now to base the obligation to give reasons on natural justice or fairness. (iv) The recording of reasons is a principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person who is adversely affected comes to know as to why his application has been rejected. See Secretary and Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall v. Hawrah Gantantrik Nagrik Samity (2010) 3 SCC 732 : ( AIR 2010 SC 1285 ). Recording of reasons in cases where the order subject to further appeal is important as the Appellate Authority has the advantage of examining the reason that prevailed with the Court or Authority making the order. In case where the lower Court has not determined the question on its own, the Appellate Court may in a given case remit the matter to the lower Court for a fresh and reasoned order. 16. In the backdrop of aforesaid legal position the facts of the case in hand may be seen. The controversy between the parties is whether the additional costs are payable for the total time extended in contract beyond 36 months, which was the contract period stipulated in the original contract agreement. The contract period is stipulated in the original document. From the close scrutiny of the impugned order, it is evident that the trial Court has not adverted its attention to the following issues : (i) An amount of Rs. The contract period is stipulated in the original document. From the close scrutiny of the impugned order, it is evident that the trial Court has not adverted its attention to the following issues : (i) An amount of Rs. 50,54,85,963/- has been awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal on account of additional overhead expenses which has been upheld by the trial Court. However, the objections of the appellant that the aforesaid claim is not admissible in view of expressed stipulation in the 'letter of extension-that the claimant shall not be entitled to overhead expenditure has not been dealt with by the trial Court, while deciding the application under Section 34 of the Act. (ii) The trial Court while deciding the application under Section 34 of the Act has not dealt with the submissions made on behalf of the appellant that the Arbitral Tribunal could not have used personal knowledge while deciding an issue which is impermissible in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of P.R. Shah ( AIR 2012 SC 1866 ) (supra). (iii) The trial Court has failed to take note on written submission filed on behalf of the appellant. The trial Court ought to have taken note of the written submission filed on behalf of the appellant while deciding the application under Section 34 of the Act. (iv) Even though from page 5 to page 7, the trial Court has reproduced the grounds of challenge to the award made by the appellant, yet it has failed to adjudicate upon the objections raised in the application under Section 34 of the Act made vide grounds (a), (b), (c), (f) and (j) while adjudicating upon the application under Section 34 of the Act. Thus, it is evident that the objections raised by the appellant to the impugned award have not been adjudicated upon by the trial Court. The claim No.2 has been dealt with by the trial Court in a casual and perfunctory manner which exhibits non-application of mind. The impugned order insofar as it pertains to claim No.2 is cryptic and suffers from vice of non-application of mind. 17. If this Court examines the claim No. 2 and decides the matter on merits, the same would tantamount to exercising power under Section 34 of the Act which cannot be done in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act. 17. If this Court examines the claim No. 2 and decides the matter on merits, the same would tantamount to exercising power under Section 34 of the Act which cannot be done in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act. It is the duty of the trial Court to deal with the objections raised by the parties on merits which has not been done in the instant case. Besides that, if this Court adjudicates upon the matter on merits, the aggrieved party would be deprived of right to file an appeal. Though this Court is conscious of the fact that remand is going to prolong the litigation between the parties but the same is inevitable in the peculiar fact situation of the case as the trial Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under Section 34 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid conclusion arrived at by this Court, it is not necessary to deal with rival contention made by the parties on merits of issue No.2. 18. In view of the preceding analysis, the impugned order dated 2-4-2016 is hereby quashed. The matter is remanded to the trial Court to decide the same afresh by taking into account the grounds raised by the appellant by a speaking order. To cut short the delay, the trial Court shall decide the objections preferred by the appellant after hearing both the parties within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order passed today. With the aforesaid directions, the appeal is disposed of.