JUDGMENT : A.J. SHASTRI, J. The present petition is directed against the award dated 25.09.2007 passed by the Industrial Tribunal at Ahmedabad in Complaint (IT) No. 83 of 2004 in Reference (IT) 137 of 2002 whereby the complaint filed by the respondent herein came to be allowed. 2. The facts of the case are that the respondent was working as an employee in the cadre of Driver in the petitioner Transport Services who was appointed on 09.05.1978 initially on a daily rated basis and thereafter with effect from 01.09.1981 was absorbed in a regular set up as a regular driver. On 10.10.1998, when the respondent was on duty and driving a bus, at around 09:00 pm when he went to fill up the fuel in the bus at fuel pump near Kheripitha Depot at Sarangpur, a passenger was collided with bus as per the charges levelled against the respondent on account of which he sustained injuries and was required to be hospitalised. Resultantly, the respondent was served with a charge sheet bearing No. D.D.R.C/Acci. No. 34 - (1998-99) and proceeded departmentally. After conclusion of departmental inquiry an order came to be passed on 18.03.2004 whereby a penalty order of stoppage of two increments with future effect, came to be passed. It is this order of penalty which was made the subject matter of proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad being Reference (IT) No. 137 of 2002 in which the complaint came to be filed being Complaint (IT) No. 83 of 2004 which was taken up for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad. It appears from the record that this complaint being Complaint (IT) No. 83 of 2004 came to be disposed of by order dated 25.09.2007 by virtue of which the complaint filed by the respondent came to be allowed and impugned order of penalty dated 18.03.2004 came to be set aside and consequently all monetary benefits, which are consequentially payable, are ordered to be paid and it is this order dated 25.09.2007 which is the subject matter of present petition before this Court. 3. Mr. H.S Munshaw, learned advocate for the petitioner has contended before the Court that there appears to be a clear negligence on the part of the respondent driver on account of which the passenger sustained injuries. Mr. 3. Mr. H.S Munshaw, learned advocate for the petitioner has contended before the Court that there appears to be a clear negligence on the part of the respondent driver on account of which the passenger sustained injuries. Mr. Munshaw, learned advocate has further contended that in the course of departmental inquiry to some extent even in the inquiry report simple negligence is found by the authority and therefore such finding ought not to have been interfered with by learned Presiding Officer. While contending this, Mr. Munshaw, learned advocate has also drawn attention of the Court to the statement of the person who sustained injury which is reflecting on page: 44 of the compilation of the petition and thereby has submitted that on account of sheer negligence the passenger sustained injury. To substantiate this statement, Mr. Munshaw, learned advocate has drawn attention of this Court to the panchnama, which is attached to a compilation of the petition at page-46, to indicate the negligence on the part of the respondent and ultimately has contended that when full fledged inquiry was conducted against the respondent and an order of penalty came to be passed considering even the inquiry report and other material, such finding ought not to have been disturbed by learned Presiding Officer and therefore the said order based upon such exercise requires to be quashed and set aside. Mr. Munshaw, learned advocate for the petitioner has then submitted in the alternative that looking to the record, which reflects negligence of the respondent to some extent, he deserves at least some penalty and therefore submitted even to modulate the penalty to some extent and ultimately contended that appropriate order be passed in the present proceedings. No other submissions have been made by learned advocate for the petitioner. 4. To oppose the stand taken by the petitioner, Mr. Hemant Acharya, learned advocate appearing for the respondent has vehemently contended that even during the course of inquiry, it was noticed by Inquiry Authority that passenger was trying to board the running bus on account of which he sustained accidental injury and therefore to that extent even the passenger also can be said to be negligent. Mr. Hemant Acharya, learned advocate appearing for the respondent has vehemently contended that even during the course of inquiry, it was noticed by Inquiry Authority that passenger was trying to board the running bus on account of which he sustained accidental injury and therefore to that extent even the passenger also can be said to be negligent. Mr. Acharya, learned advocate for the respondent has pointed out that the report of Accident Inspector dated 05.11.1998 reflects that as soon as the bus seemed to have proceeded near fuel pump, all the passengers, who were to go to Sarkhej, have rushed towards the bus and tried to board the bus on account of which one of the passengers fell down and sustained injury on his leg and therefore Mr. Acharya, learned advocate for the respondent has contended that in such a situation to hold the respondent solely guilty and penalised is not justifiable. Mr. Acharya, learned advocate has also pointed out that in addition to this report dated 05.11.1998, even during the course of inquiry simple negligence is found on the part of the respondent which in no way would permit the authority to impose such drastic penalty. Apart from this Mr. Acharya, learned advocate has vehemently contended that statement and the panchnama which have been referred by learned counsel for the petitioner have been examined by the competent Court where the criminal case was lodged against the respondent and after detailed examination and adjudication, an order of acquittal, on merits, came to be passed and at the best the said statement of the injured was a police statement and therefore when the competent Criminal Court has acquitted him from the similar charge upon examination, the respondent ought not to have been visited with such drastic penalty with future effect. Mr. Mr. Acharya, learned advocate for the respondent has further contended that the respondent was having 30 years long tenure of blot-less service during which no past incident of such nature had arisen and by now the respondent has already attained the age of superannuation and has retired and therefore in view of the peculiar set of circumstance when the Criminal Court has acquitted the respondent and there appears to be a categorical finding arrived at by learned Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal, who passed an award, in respectful submission of learned advocate for the respondent, no interference of this Court deserves in the present proceedings. Mr. Acharya, learned advocate has also drawn attention of this Court to the catgoric finding of the Tribunal in paras:9 and 10 of the its order and has ultimately contended that this being a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it may not be entertained to dislodge the finding or substitute the view of the Industrial Tribunal and therefore in absence of any perversity or any manifest irregularity resulting in any miscarriage of justice, the impugned order may not be interfered with and has ultimately requested the Court to dismiss the petition. 5. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record and the contentions which have been canvassed, following circumstances are not possible to be ignored by this Court, while exercising extra ordinary jurisdiction. 6. There is a categorical finding arrived at by learned Presiding Officer in the order which are impugned, more particularly paras: 9 and 10 of the order. The said finding is based upon the analysis of evidence and based upon the material which have been led before it and therefore since categorical finding is arrived at the same does not appear to be so perverse which may call for any interference. 7. The said finding is based upon the analysis of evidence and based upon the material which have been led before it and therefore since categorical finding is arrived at the same does not appear to be so perverse which may call for any interference. 7. The statement which has been tried to rely upon of the victim and the panchnama have been examined by the competent Court in a Criminal Case No. 232 of 1999 by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 4, Ahmedabad, who upon examination of every details have passed an order of acquittal which is stated to be undisputedly an order of acquittal on merits and, therefore, such police papers have also been examined by the competent Court wherein the negligence is not proved on the part of the respondent. 8. Even apart from this, if one would peruse the Inquiry Report dated 05.11.1998, at page-11 of petition compilation, in which narration is that when the bus, which was driven by the respondent, was proceeding towards fuel pump, the passengers, who were waiting for the bus, had rushed towards bus and tried to board the running bus. Resultantly, the victim appears to have been fallen down and sustained injuries. The immediate natural conduct of the respondent, who was driver, and the bus conductor need to be seen as both of them immediately took the injured to the hospital and got him treated. This is also undisputedly reflecting from the record of the case and therefore it appears that there might be a minor negligence but still the natural conduct of the respondent also appeared to have been considered by the learned Presiding Officer while arriving at the finding. The overall material brought before him appear to have been examined and ultimately a reasoned order came to be passed. 9. A settled position of law on the issue of exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction is well defined by now in series of decisions and this Court finds that in absence of any other issues raised by learned advocate for the petitioner, the Court is not satisfied with the submissions made by learned advocate for the petitioner and as such this Court does not see any serious infirmity or perversity in the conclusion arrived at by learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal. 10. 10. In view of aforesaid circumstances, which are prevailing on record, there appears to be no material irregularity. The detailed examination of the relevant record, produced before this Court, reflects that there is no such irregularity successfully pointed out by learned advocate for the petitioner which may permit this Court to dislodge the finding or substitute the view which has already been taken by learned Presiding Officer on the basis of the very same material. The other relevant factor is that the respondent was having undisputedly 30 years service and his past service is stated to be not having any misconduct of such a nature and now the respondent has already retired and therefore when the record does not indicate manifest irregularity or perversity of any nature, it is not possible for this Court to accept the case of the petitioner and since the same is devoid of merits, needs to be dismissed. The Court, while coming to this conclusion, is also mindful of well defined scope of extra ordinary jurisdiction sitting in a writ jurisdiction and therefore the following paragraphs of the relevant decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Sameer Suresh Gupta v. Rahul Kumar Agarwal reported in (2013) 9 SCC 374 need to be quoted here under, which are relevant for the purpose. “6. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that article were considered by the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai. After considering various facets of the issue, the two-Judge Bench culled out the following principles: (SCC pp. 694-96, para 38) “(1) Amendment by the Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (I) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not correct at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 7. The same question was considered by another Bench in Shalini Syam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, and it was held: (SCC pp. 347-49, para 49) “(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, ‘within the bounds of their authority’. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 11. In the premise aforesaid, in view of the facts and circumstances stated before this Court and the only contentions which have been canvassed before this Court, the Court is of the view that there is no perversity nor any irregularity committed by Industrial Tribunal while passing the order impugned, and therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed and accordingly the same is missed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, granted earlier shall stand vacated, forthwith. No order as to costs.