JUDGMENT : A.J. SHASTRI, J. The present petition is directed against an award dated 19.11.2007 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. 11, Ahmedabad in Reference (LCA) No. 1431 of 1998, whereby the respondent was directed to be reinstated with 20% back wages from the date from which the respondent was discontinued from the service. 2. The case of the petitioners is that respondent workman was working as a Sweeper and simultaneously, the duty was to supply water, for a fixed period. As per the statement of claim submitted by the respondent workman, she was engaged in the work w.e.f. 4.6.1982 and the part-time services were allocated under the Training Officer at Principal Examination and Training Office of Social Welfare Department, Old Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar. As per her further assertion in the statement of claim, she was discharging the duties from 10.00 O'clock in the morning till 6.00 p.m. in the evening and was being paid the salary amenable to a part-time employee. Intermittently, the work was being taken of new daily wagers those who were in close proximity of the authority. However, ultimately, orally w.e.f. 30.3.1996 as per the say of the respondent workman, she came to be discontinued, with the result a reference was filed and as such, the dispute was raised before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, who, upon submission of failure report, referred the matter for adjudication before the Labour Court, Ahmedabad. 3. It appears from the record that the claim statement has been submitted by the respondent workman herein at Exh.7, in which a letter of appointment also came to be annexed to meet with the stand taken by the respondent workman, the present petitioners before the Labour Court have submitted a written reply at Exh.8 and denied the contentions raised. It was pleaded by the petitioners that the respondent was merely doing the work of sweeping and supplying the water and was not a permanent employee. It was also pleaded that she was being paid the daily wages as per the prevailing norms. A formal contention also appears to have been taken that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the I.D Act’) is not amenable to the petitioners. It was also submitted hat there was no question of giving any written order or notice pay. It was also pleaded that she was being paid the daily wages as per the prevailing norms. A formal contention also appears to have been taken that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the I.D Act’) is not amenable to the petitioners. It was also submitted hat there was no question of giving any written order or notice pay. It was also pointed out that as per the Resolution dated 22.1.1996 issued by the Social Welfare Department, Gandhingar, whereby as a economy measure, 10% posts have been reduced, resultantly the office at which the respondent was working had to be closed down and, therefore, since the office is closed down and there was no necessity of work, the daily rated employees were not continued and it has also been asserted in the said reply that no other employee was engaged on that work and by submitting such a stand, the reference was contested. 4. Before the Labour Court, the evidence was led vide Exh.9 by the respondent workman, who then submitted a closure pusis at Exh.12 The petitioners have examined one Limbabhai Mavjibhai as a witness at Exh.14 and produced the list of documents vide Mark 22/1 which is a resolution which is tried to be pressed into service and ultimately, at Exh.27 a closure pursis appears to have been given. After that, the Labour Court appears to have adjudicated the entire reference and then, was pleased to hold that the action of discontinuance of the respondent workman on 30.3.1996 is bad, illegal and after setting aside the same, has directed the workman to be reinstated to her original position with continuity of service and with 2 0% back wages as a part of consequential order and later on, cost of Rs. 2000/- has also been imposed upon by the said order which is the subject matter of the present petition. 5. The petition appears to have been entertained by this Court way back in March, 2008, which has ultimately been admitted vide order dated 14.7.2008 and while admitting the petition, this Court has merely stayed the direction with regard to payment of back wages, but has not interfered with the direction to reinstate the respondent workman. 5. The petition appears to have been entertained by this Court way back in March, 2008, which has ultimately been admitted vide order dated 14.7.2008 and while admitting the petition, this Court has merely stayed the direction with regard to payment of back wages, but has not interfered with the direction to reinstate the respondent workman. It appears that thereafter, pursuant to this interim order of July, 2008, the respondent workman undisputedly, as stated by the learned counsel, came to be reinstated and that is how, at this juncture, with this background the petition has come up for final adjudication. 6. Mr. J.K Shah, learned Assistant Government Pleader, appearing for the petitioners, has vehemently contended that the award passed by the Labour Court is not only unjust and arbitrary, but is not in consonance with the material and evidence on record. Learned AGP has further submitted that looking to the findings which have been arrived at, there appears to be a clear error in appreciation of evidence which was led before the Labour Court. It has also been submitted that there are no cogent reasons assigned about the direction contained in the award and in the absence of any justification, such order of directing reinstatement with back wages to the extent of 20%, cannot be passed. It has also been submitted by learned AGP that ultimately the action was based upon the closure of unit in which the respondent workman was working. It has been amply made it clear, as stated by Mr. J.K Shah, learned AGP, that on account of the resolution, as stated above, the office in which the respondent workman was working, had to be closed down, as a result of which the respondent workman was not having work to continue and hence, discontinued and, therefore, there is no illegality or any arbitrariness in the action taken by the petitioners. Learned AGP has submitted that despite the aforesaid fat being clear on record that the office itself has been closed down on account of the economy measure, there was no work left for the respondent workman to offer and as a result of which, discontinuance was inevitable. It is submitted that the Labour Court has not appreciated the issue from this angle and, therefore, the entire finding and the order since based upon non-consideration of material issue, the award deserves to be corrected. It is submitted that the Labour Court has not appreciated the issue from this angle and, therefore, the entire finding and the order since based upon non-consideration of material issue, the award deserves to be corrected. Learned AGP has further pointed out that when the office has closed down, there is not necessity of complying Section 25F of the I.D Act and even otherwise, when the work itself is not available, there was no justifiable reason for the Labour Court to passed the award. Learned AGP has ultimately contended that on account of this situation which is prevailing, the Hon'ble Court has stayed the direction with regard to back wages. However, in due compliance of the interim direction of July, 2008, the respondent was reinstated and assigned the work. Mr. J.K Shah has further contended that looking to the definition of Section 25F of the Act and the situation prevailing on record would not suggest that there appears to be a violation of mandate of the statute and, therefore, the reasons which are assigned by the Labour Court since are not germane, the petition be allowed in the interest of justice. 7. Mr. J.K Shah, learned AGP has further pointed out that apart from this, pursuant to the interim direction of this Court way back in July, 2008, the respondent must have been reinstated and by now, she must have even attained the age of superannuation and, therefore, the petition has left behind only an academic issue. It has been submitted that the grant of back wages even to the extent of 20% is also not justifiable in view of the situation prevailing on record and by pointing out this, learned AGP has ultimately stated before the Court to grant the relief or in the alternative, pass suitable orders in the interest of justice. No other submissions have been made. 8. To oppose the stand taken by the petitioners, Mr. Mox R. Vyas, learned advocate for Mr. Yash Nanavati, learned advocate, appearing for the respondent workman, has vehemently contended that there is no illegality or irregularity of any nature which would warrant the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioners. Mr. Vyas has further pointed out that the reasons which are assigned by the Labour Court are in consonance with the material on record and can never be said to be perverse. On the contrary, Mr. Mr. Vyas has further pointed out that the reasons which are assigned by the Labour Court are in consonance with the material on record and can never be said to be perverse. On the contrary, Mr. Vyas has pointed out that right from 1982 till the discontinuance, diligently and with all honesty, the respondent has discharged her services and catered the need of the department. Mr. Vyas has pointed out that the Labour Court has specifically arrived at a finding that other co-employees, who were working, have been absorbed and accommodated in other departments, whereas it is the respondent workman only, who has been deprived of and that fact has been appreciated by the Labour Court and by considering that, has found that there appears to be a clear discrimination. Mr. Vyas has further pointed out that fact of discharging her services is no longer in dispute at any time. However, it has been found clearly that work is not available, is not a genuine ground. On the contrary, it has been found by the Labour Court that work is available and could have been taken from the respondent from any other department by giving equal treatment. Mr. Vyas has further pointed out that ex-facie, the Labour Court has found the discontinuance action as violative of the mandate of the statutory provisions, more particularly Section 25F of the I.D Act and, therefore, once there is a clear violation of Section 25F of the I.D Act, the natural statutory consequences must follow and, therefore, there is no illegality committed by the Labour Court of any nature which would warrant this Court to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction. Mr. Vyas has pointed out that the award which has been passed is well reasoned order, not suffering from any infirmity or any perversity nor is reflecting any non-application of mind on the part of the Labour Court and, therefore, in such a situation, to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction may not be justified and ultimately requested the Court to dismiss the petition. 9. In addition thereto, Mr. Vyas has pointed out and produced on record a communication dated 20.11.2016 written by the respondent workman pointing out to the Officer of the Social Welfare Department that she being a daily rated peon, has attained the age of 60 years and, therefore, superannuated w.e.f 31.12.2016 and by pointing out this, Mr. 9. In addition thereto, Mr. Vyas has pointed out and produced on record a communication dated 20.11.2016 written by the respondent workman pointing out to the Officer of the Social Welfare Department that she being a daily rated peon, has attained the age of 60 years and, therefore, superannuated w.e.f 31.12.2016 and by pointing out this, Mr. Vyas, learned advocate for the respondent has stated before the Court that now to grant relief of reinstatement is of no consequence and, therefore, 20% back wages which have been awarded cannot be said to be not justified and, therefore, Mr. Vyas has submitted that some lump-sum compensation be determined to be payable to the respondent workman in view of this situation. 10. To meet with this last submission, Mr. J.K Shah, learned AGP has submitted that whatever reasonable amount if alternatively to be determined, the authority will have to pay and accordingly, the learned counsel for the respondent has requested the Court ultimately to determine the lump-sum amount so as to put an end to the present controversy. 11. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective sides and having gone through the material on record in co-relation with the contention raised by the respective sides, the Court is of the opinion that in the background of present situation, the relief of reinstatement has become infructuous at this stage of the proceedings and, therefore, what is to be considered by the Court presently is an issue with regard to relief of back wages. 12. While considering presently the issue which was referred to for adjudication was whether the respondent workman is required to be reinstated to her original post with all consequential wages and there is no issue with regard to seeking of any relief relating to regularization. It has also been found from the record that it is not in much controversy that respondent indeed has worked from 1982 till 1996 where she was orally discontinued and thereafter also, it is not in dispute that pursuant to the interim order, the respondent was taken in work which later on retired on account of attaining the age of superannuation w.e.f 31.12.2016 13. The record of the case indicates that the respondent was working in a department under the authority and control of the petitioners and was continuously discharging the work. The record of the case indicates that the respondent was working in a department under the authority and control of the petitioners and was continuously discharging the work. On examination of record, the Labour Court has specifically found that the work which the respondent was discharging was of a permanent nature and the said aspect is specifically admitted by the witness, who has been examined on behalf of the petitioners. It has also been admitted and undisputed on record that when the office of the petitioner No. 2 was closed down, the other co-employees were accommodated in other departments under the Social Welfare Department of the State of Gujarat and it is only the respondent workman was not accommodated and this aspect has been admitted by the witness of the present petitioner before the Labour Court and, therefore after examination of entire material on record and the deposition which has been led before the Labour Court, the Labour Court has specifically found that there is a clear violation of Section 25F of the I.D Act. As a result of which, consequential order is passed by the Labour Court reinstating the respondent with 20% back wages. 14. The record further indicates that while not granting full back wages, there appears to be assignment of reason to support said conclusion and, therefore, upon overall consideration of material on record, the Labour Court has found that since there is a violation of Section 25F of the I.D Act, the order of reinstatement with 20% back wages is justicable. Now, with these findings specifically arrived at by the Labour Court, if we closely look at the contentions, it transpires that there appears to be no force in the submission of petitioner authorities. In fact, while discontinuing an employee the mandatory procedure which was required to be followed, has not been observed at all and, therefore, when there appears to be a clear violation of the mandates of the statute and, therefore, it cannot be said that any illegality is committed by the Labour Court. 15. In fact, while discontinuing an employee the mandatory procedure which was required to be followed, has not been observed at all and, therefore, when there appears to be a clear violation of the mandates of the statute and, therefore, it cannot be said that any illegality is committed by the Labour Court. 15. In addition thereto, it is further evident from the record that there is no justification as to why the respondent was not accommodated and all other co-employees were admitted and undisputedly accommodated in other departments of the Social Welfare Department of the State authority and, therefore, in the absence of any cogent explanation or justification of any nature on that issue, it appears that the action being not in consonance with the law, no irregularity or illegality is committed by the Labour Court and, therefore, the background of this circumstance it clearly indicates that there appears to be hardly any justification about the petitioners assailing the award which has been passed by the Labour Court. 16. The Court is mindful of the circumstance that it is dealing with a petition in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction, wherein the proposition of exercise of such jurisdiction is by now well defined by catena of decisions and one of such decisions which is relevant to the issue is in case of Sameer Suresh Gupta v. Rahul Kumar Agarwal reported in (2013) 9 SCC 374 . Relevant extract of the said decision are reproduced hereinafter. “6. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that article were considered by the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai. After considering various facets of the issue, the two-Judge Bench culled out the following principles: (SCC pp. 694-96, para 38) (1) Amendment by the Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 694-96, para 38) (1) Amendment by the Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (I) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not correct at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. The same question was considered by another Bench in Shalini Syam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, and it was held: (SCC pp. 347-49, para 49) (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, ‘within the bounds of their authority’. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 17. From the aforesaid situation which is prevailing on record and in addition to the proposition of law laid down by various decisions of the Supreme Court, this Court is of the opinion that relief prayed for in the petition deserves to be modulated, more particularly in view of the fact that on 31.12.2016, undisputedly, the respondent workman has retired from the service. While molding the relief, the Court has found specifically that there is a clear finding on the part of the Labour Court about violation of the mandatory provision of Section 25F of the I.D Act. 18. While molding the relief, the Court has found specifically that there is a clear finding on the part of the Labour Court about violation of the mandatory provision of Section 25F of the I.D Act. 18. It is settled position of law by catena of decisions that statutory mandate of the provisions is to be respected to and there is a violation of mandatory provisions of such statute, consequential effect is to be given. Here in the present case, as stated above, there is a clear violation of Section 25F of the I.D Act, as found by the Labour Court, which the petitioners are not able to justify and as such, the award of 20% back wages cannot be said to be impermissible, harsh or illegal in any nature. This violation results into some consequences upon the petitioners and, therefore, taken in aid a proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court in a decision in case of Vashrambhai Dhanabhai Vegad v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2017) 2 SCC 508 , this Court is of the opinion that lumpsum compensation in this regard would meet the ends of justice. 19. In addition thereto, it has also been observed from the record that there is no justification about non-accommodation of the respondent when the office of the petitioner No. 2 has been closed down on account of some measure. But then there was no justifiable reason not to accommodate the respondent workman particularly when she was discharging her services right from 1982 and others have been accommodated which position is admitted on record reflecting from the deposition of witness of the petitioners and, therefore, in such a situation, the interest of justice demands that lumpsum compensation to be awarded which would meet the ends of justice and this is more so because the oral discontinuance of the respondent workman from 1996 was brought before the Labour Court for adjudication in September, 1998 which struck down in November, 2007 and till that period, without any justifiable reason, the respondent workman was deprived of the work which otherwise ought to have been offered to her along with other co-employees. It appears from the record that it is only when the interim direction came to be issued by this Court in its order dated 14.7.2008, the respondent workman was accommodated and, therefore, practically for a period of more than 10 years, the respondent workman did remain away from the work not on account of her fault. Of course, that is not believed by the Labour Court completely, as a result of which 20% back wages have been awarded. Hence, conjoint consideration of these circumstances would lead the Court to a situation where some compensation deserves to be awarded and accordingly, since the respondent was drawing approximately Rs. 400/- by way of wages per month, therefore, looking to the earning of the respondent while she was working and looking to the passage of time in which she was languishing in litigation, so without being treated as precedent, it appears to this Court that awarding of lumpsum amount of Rs. 30,000/- would meet the ends of justice. 20. Accordingly, the petitioners are directed to pay Rs. 30,000/- to the respondent workman by way of account cheque in her name, within a period of three months hereof. The petition is partly allowed and the impugned award is modified and substituted, in the above terms. 21. If the said amount is not paid within the period as stated above, the respondent is entitled to the said amount with condition and addition of 12% interest on it till the date of realization. 22. Rule is made absolutely to the aforesaid extent.