Infopark (Kerala) v. Billmoria & Company Ltd. , Mumbai
2017-12-06
K.SURENDRA MOHAN, MARY JOSEPH
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : K. Surendra Mohan, J. 1. This appeal is directed against an order dated 27/01/2011 in Arb. O.P. No. 1726 of 2009. The Original Petition was filed by the appellant herein under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short) seeking to set aside an award passed by the Arbitrator on 25/08/2009. As per the order appealed against, the District Court has dismissed the Original Petition holding that there were no grounds to set aside the arbitral award. The aggrieved appellant is before us. The appellant is a fully owned Government Society. It has an Info Park at Kakkanad, Ernakulam District. The work of construction of an IT building, having an area of 2 lakhs sq. ft. and a service yard of 17600 sq.ft spread over ground plus nine floors was awarded to the respondent Contractor as per work order dated 25/08/2003, they being the lowest tenderer. Though the time limit for completion of the work was specified as nine months, the period was subsequently extended and the construction was finally completed only in October, 2005. After completion of the work, the respondent filed O.S. No. 729 of 2006 before the Sub Court, Ernakulam putting forward a number of claims against the appellant. During the pendency of the suit, the parties agreed to have the disputes settled through arbitration. Accordingly, both parties submitted the agreed terms of reference. The name of Justice K. John Mathew, a retired Judge of this Court, was suggested by both parties. The Sub Court thereupon appointed Justice K. John Mathew as Arbitrator and referred the terms agreed to by both parties, for arbitration. 2. The Arbitrator entered upon the reference, considered the respective contentions of the parties and passed an award dated 25/08/2009. As per the award, the Arbitrator found that there was initial delay on the part of the appellant in handing over the site and in supplying the drawings of the work. Therefore, the action of the appellant in levying and recovering liquidated damages from the respondent was found to be unjustified. Accordingly, the amounts so recovered were directed to be refunded. The Arbitrator further found that the Contractor was entitled to escalation of price with respect to steel and therefore held the respondent entitled to recover an amount of Rs. 30,87,655/-.
Therefore, the action of the appellant in levying and recovering liquidated damages from the respondent was found to be unjustified. Accordingly, the amounts so recovered were directed to be refunded. The Arbitrator further found that the Contractor was entitled to escalation of price with respect to steel and therefore held the respondent entitled to recover an amount of Rs. 30,87,655/-. It was challenging the said award under Section 34 of the Act that Arb.O.P. No. 1726 of 2009 was filed, as stated above. 3. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that, the finding of the Arbitrator holding the appellant responsible for the delay was wrong. According to the appellant, it was the respondent who was responsible for the delay. The delay was caused mainly due to the deficiency in management of the construction and the project by the respondent. There was no advance planning even for procurement of crucial items like, reinforcement steel, electrical equipments, fire fighting equipments etc. The entire work was given on sub-contract to others and the co-ordination between them was very bad. The construction equipments used were very old and resulted in break down on many occasions. The labour force was inadequate and the work was carried out only during day time though the contract had stipulated for working during the night also, since the entire work was to be completed within 9 months. A floor of 25000 sq.ft was cast in 12 or 13 pieces. A contractor with adequate resources could have cast 20000 to 25000 sq.ft in a single continuous pore. It was contended that day-to-day work of planning had no relation to the overall execution plan. Only a limited quantity was planned and executed on daily basis. On many occasions even that could not be achieved. Delay occurred in the procurement and installation of the electrical equipments, firefighting equipment and fire alarm system. There was delay in procurement of reinforcement steel. Similar delays occurred in other matters also. It was therefore contended that, the Arbitrator had erred in holding the appellant responsible for the delay. 4. The respondent filed objections disputing the contentions put forward by the appellant. According to the respondent, the appellant was trying to have all the issues that were decided by the Arbitrator re-opened and agitated again before the District Court. Such an exercise was not permissible.
4. The respondent filed objections disputing the contentions put forward by the appellant. According to the respondent, the appellant was trying to have all the issues that were decided by the Arbitrator re-opened and agitated again before the District Court. Such an exercise was not permissible. What the appellant was trying to achieve was to have the District Court consider all the issues involved, as in a first appeal. The scope of interference with an award under Section 34 of the Act was limited. It was contended that even if two views were possible on a particular aspect, the Court would decline to interfere. According to the respondent, the Arbitrator had gone into the contentions of the parties elaborately and had entered findings on the basis of the materials on record. A de novo consideration of all the issues was not called for under Section 34 of the Act, it was contended. 5. The District Court considered the respective contentions and found that the matter had been referred for arbitration on the agreement of the parties. The Court further found that the scope of enquiry under Section 34 of the Act was very limited. The correctness or reasonableness of the findings entered by the Arbitrator could not be gone into. In spite of the above, on a reading of the award, the learned District Judge found that the Arbitrator had gone into the terms of reference properly and had entered findings that were supported by the materials on record. It has been found that though a time limit for completion of the work was initially stipulated, the said time limit had been extended by the appellant, thereby indicating that time was not the essence of the contract. The District Court found that the appellant had no case that the subject matter of the dispute was not capable of settlement by the Arbitrator or that the award was in conflict with the public policy of India. Therefore, the Original Petition has been dismissed. 6. According to Adv. Anil Thomas, who appears for the appellant, there was illegality/error of law writ large on the face of the award that is under challenge, as well as in the order of the District Court.
Therefore, the Original Petition has been dismissed. 6. According to Adv. Anil Thomas, who appears for the appellant, there was illegality/error of law writ large on the face of the award that is under challenge, as well as in the order of the District Court. It is contended that, both the Arbitrator as well as the District Court proceeded as if the dispute referred by the Sub Court as per its judgment in O.S. No. 729 of 2006 represented the "agreed terms of reference". The Arbitrator committed an error of jurisdiction in traversing outside the scope of the contract. There was a patent illegality in not considering the relevant terms of the contract. There was violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law. There was non-compliance with the principles of natural justice since a fair and reasonable hearing was not granted to the appellant by the Arbitrator. Non-application of mind is writ large on the face of the award. Therefore, according to the counsel, both the arbitral award as well as the order of the District Judge are liable to be set aside by this Court. 7. An argument is built up on the basis of the observations of the Apex Court in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cheriyan Varkey Constructions Pvt. Ltd. 2010 KHC 4498 : (2010) 8 SCC 24 : 2010 (3) KLT SN 83 : ILR 2010 (3) Ker. 917 : 2011 (2) KLJ NOC 17 wherein, the Apex Court has criticized the manner in which Section 89, Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) has been worded. The Apex Court has observed that, formulation and reformulation of the terms of settlement is a process that has to be undertaken after a settlement is arrived at. Therefore, to attempt such an exercise before a reference is clearly out of place. It is the contention of the learned counsel that, both the Arbitrator as well as the District Court mistook the terms of settlement formulated by the Sub Court to be "agreed terms of reference". Therefore, it is contended that the award of the Arbitrator as well as the order of the District Court requires to be interfered with. It is further contended that Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC for short) does not stipulate a reference to the Arbitrator on "agreed terms of reference" formulated by the Court.
Therefore, it is contended that the award of the Arbitrator as well as the order of the District Court requires to be interfered with. It is further contended that Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC for short) does not stipulate a reference to the Arbitrator on "agreed terms of reference" formulated by the Court. What was to be referred to the Arbitrator was "the dispute between the parties". A further contention is put forward that the general law in Section 89 CPC would have to yield to the provisions contained in the Arbitration Act, since the special law would override the general law. 8. According to the learned counsel, the Arbitrator has committed an error of jurisdiction in traversing outside the scope of the contract. Specific clauses in the contract are referred to in order to point out that escalation in the prices of the materials used was not permissible to be claimed by the Contractor. The Arbitrator has ignored the specific provisions of the Contract and has awarded escalation in price of steel to the Contractor. Another contention put forward is that there is "patent illegality" on the face of the award since policy infraction has not been taken note of by the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator has not considered the true scope of the contract, qua the terms of the contract and the intention of the parties. There is contravention of the substantive law of India for the reason that the specific provisions of the Arbitration Act as well as the terms of the contract have been ignored in allowing the claims of the contractor. It is also contended by the learned counsel that, there has been a violation of the "fundamental policy of Indian law" by the Arbitrator which has not been taken note of by the District Court while passing the order appealed against. 9. Per contra, Senior Counsel Sri. K.L. Varghese, who appears for the respondent points out that the attempt of the counsel for the respondent is to persuade this Court to go into all the aspects decided by the Arbitrator, afresh. Such a fresh consideration of the various issues that were agreed to be referred for arbitration by the parties is not permissible in law, it is contended.
Such a fresh consideration of the various issues that were agreed to be referred for arbitration by the parties is not permissible in law, it is contended. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the power under Section 34 of the Act to interfere with an arbitral award is limited and circumscribed by the various grounds specified therein. Placing reliance on the observations of the District Court in the order appealed against, it is contended that, the petition filed by the appellant before the District Court was drafted as if it were an appeal memorandum. The "agreed terms of reference" referred to by the learned District Judge was to the terms of reference submitted by the parties before the Sub Court in O.S. No. 729 of 2006. Since the parties had agreed to have the disputes referred for arbitration and had submitted before the Court, the terms on which such reference could be made, it is contended that, the appellant is bound by the reference. In other words, it is not open to the appellants to turn around and question the terms of reference on the grounds urged in the appeal. The appellate jurisdiction that is available to this Court under Section 37(1)(b) of the Act is also similarly circumscribed by the grounds contained in Section 34 of the Act. According to the learned counsel, no attack on the ground of "public policy" was raised or argued before the District Court. The finding of the District Court that the appellant had no case on the basis of public policy shows that such a ground was neither pleaded nor argued before the Court below. In the appeal memorandum before this Court also, it is pointed out that, no such ground has been raised. 10. The dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. case (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case for the reason that, no terms of settlement was formulated by the Court in the present case. What has been referred to the Arbitrator was the agreed terms of reference submitted by the parties before the Court. After having agreed to have the disputes settled through arbitration, and after having submitted the agreed terms of reference, it is not open to the appellant to question the procedure adopted by the Sub Court, at this stage. 11.
What has been referred to the Arbitrator was the agreed terms of reference submitted by the parties before the Court. After having agreed to have the disputes settled through arbitration, and after having submitted the agreed terms of reference, it is not open to the appellant to question the procedure adopted by the Sub Court, at this stage. 11. The contention put forward by the counsel for the appellant, characterized as "error of jurisdiction in traversing outside the scope of contract" is only a feeble attempt to seek a reappraisal of the factual issues and the terms of the contract, all of which fall within the realm of the terms referred for arbitration. The said aspects cannot form the subject matter of consideration in a petition filed under Section 34 or an appeal filed under Section 37 of the Act. Referring to the contention on the question of "patent illegality", the learned Senior Counsel points out that no such ground was either raised or argued before the District Court. Therefore, according to the learned Senior Counsel, there are absolutely no grounds for interference with the award of the Arbitrator. Placing reliance on the award, it is pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel that, all the issues have been dealt with elaborately and conclusions have been drawn on the basis of the materials available on record. It is therefore contended that, there are absolutely no grounds for interfering with the order appealed against. 12. Heard. Both sides have advanced elaborate arguments with the support of various decisions. The counsel for the appellant, as already noticed above, has canvassed for the proposition that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 34 of the Act is unlimited, insofar as interfering with the award of an Arbitrator on grounds of public policy is concerned. According to the appellant, the Arbitrator has traversed outside the express terms of the contract in awarding escalation to the respondent. The Arbitrator has therefore, by his conduct, vitiated the award justifying an interference therewith. The Senior Counsel who appears for the respondent meets the above contention by pointing out that no grounds of attack based on public policy was either pleaded or put forward before the District Court. Nor has a ground been taken in the Appeal Memorandum in this case also.
The Senior Counsel who appears for the respondent meets the above contention by pointing out that no grounds of attack based on public policy was either pleaded or put forward before the District Court. Nor has a ground been taken in the Appeal Memorandum in this case also. For the above reason, it is contended that no such ground could be put forward for the first time at the time of arguments. Apart from the above, it is the case of the learned Senior Counsel that the parties had entered into the contract assuming the quantity of steel that was necessary for completion of the work to be 1300 MT for the main building and 50 MT for the Diesel Generator/Sub Station works, totaling 1350 MT. The total quantity of steel that was used in the construction work came to 2353 MT. The price of steel that was Rs. 16,000/- per MT, had gone up to Rs. 22,746/- per MT during the period. Therefore, both the quantity of steel as well as the price of steel had exceeded the expectations of the parties. In other words, there was an escalation in both the quantity of steel required as well as the price thereof, which was not in the contemplation of the parties at the time of entering into the contract. Since the work was completed by the respondent/contractor after putting the appellant on notice of the said facts, it was only appropriate that the escalation was granted. The Arbitrator has further found that it was the appellant who was responsible for the delay and therefore, there was no justification for recovery of liquidated damages from the respondent for the delay in completion of the work. Both the above aspects being questions of facts on which the parties had agreed to have a settlement through arbitration, it is not open to the appellant to question the same at this point of time. 13. As already noticed above, after the completion of the work, the respondent had filed O.S. No. 729 of 2006 before the Sub Court, Ernakulam putting forward various claims against the appellant. However, during the pendency of the suit, the parties agreed to have the disputes settled through arbitration. Accordingly, both parties submitted agreed terms of reference. The name of the Arbitrator was also agreed to by the parties.
However, during the pendency of the suit, the parties agreed to have the disputes settled through arbitration. Accordingly, both parties submitted agreed terms of reference. The name of the Arbitrator was also agreed to by the parties. It was on the basis of the said agreement that the Sub Court had referred the matter for arbitration. In other words, the parties agreed to prefer the forum of Arbitration to that of the ordinary Civil Court. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the contention now attempted to be put forward by the counsel for the appellant on the basis of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. case (supra). According to the learned counsel for the appellant, it was the dispute between the parties that ought to have been referred to the Arbitrator for determination, as held by the Apex Court in the above decision. Therefore, it is contended that the reference by the Sub Court itself was wrong and that an award passed on the basis of such a reference was unsustainable. However, we notice from a reading of the judgment of the Apex Court that what has been found fault with therein is regarding the stipulation in Section 89(1) of the CPC that "the Court may reformulate the terms of the possible settlement and refer the same" for arbitration. The Apex Court has held that, there was no scope for the Court to arrive at such "terms of the possible reference" before any adjudication was conducted. In the present case, the Sub Court has not undertaken any such exercise. In the present case, both parties agreed to resolve the dispute through arbitration. Thereafter, they submitted the terms of reference on which there was agreement between the parties. What it did was to refer the terms of reference submitted by both parties to the Arbitrator for adjudication. Since the appellant had agreed to the said course of action, it is not open to them to go back on the said agreement and to attack the procedure as bad in law. In view of the above, we are not satisfied that there is any infirmity in the award as sought to be made out by the learned counsel for the appellant, on the basis of the decision in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. case (supra). 14.
In view of the above, we are not satisfied that there is any infirmity in the award as sought to be made out by the learned counsel for the appellant, on the basis of the decision in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. case (supra). 14. Another contention vigorously pursued by the counsel for the appellant is that, the award of the Arbitrator is in violation of the terms of the contract and that for the said reason the fundamental policy of Indian law has been violated. It is pointed out that specific provisions in the contract provided that the Contractor would not be entitled to claim escalation and also that liquidated damages would be levied and recovered for the delay caused by the Contractor. In negativing the action of the appellant in levying and recovering liquidated damages, and awarding escalation to the contractor, the Arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction, it is contended. The counsel also supports his contentions with the aid of decisions. 15. In the first place, as rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, no such ground was taken up before the District Court in the petition that was filed for setting aside the award under Section 34 of the Act. No such point was also argued. The above fact is evident from the following observation of the learned District Judge in the order appealed against: "Petitioner could not also advance a case that the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration or that the award is in conflict with the public policy of India. A reading of the allegations in the OP would show that the real grievance of the petitioner is that the findings arrived at by the Arbitrator are erroneous and findings ought to have been made in favour of the petitioner. In fact that is why the OP is drafted as if an appeal memorandum. I am satisfied that petitioner could not advance any legitimate ground prescribed by Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996." In view of the above, the contention now put forward in this appeal at the stage of arguments, for the first time, is liable to be rejected for the said reason alone. However, we shall consider the contention put forward on the merits also. 16.
However, we shall consider the contention put forward on the merits also. 16. The scope of the expression "public policy of India" has been explained by the Apex Court in Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. 2003 KHC 1068 : (2003) 5 SCC 705 : AIR 2003 SC 2629 : JT 2003 (4) SC 171. Paragraph 31 relevant in the above context is extracted hereinbelow: "31. Therefore, in our view, the phrase "public policy of India" used in Section 34 in context is required to be given a wider meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term "public policy" in Renusagar case it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. The result would be - award could be set aside if it contrary to: (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality, or (d) in addition, if it is patently illegal. Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair or unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court. Such award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void." 17. Therefore, it is the above test that has to be applied in determining whether the award is sustainable or not. 18. We have been taken through the award of the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator, who was a former Judge of this Court, has gone into the issues threadbare and has considered the contentions put forward by the parties, elaborately. We are of the opinion that there is no infirmity in the said award warranting an interference therewith. 19.
18. We have been taken through the award of the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator, who was a former Judge of this Court, has gone into the issues threadbare and has considered the contentions put forward by the parties, elaborately. We are of the opinion that there is no infirmity in the said award warranting an interference therewith. 19. As we have already noticed, the contentions strenuously put forward by the counsel for the appellant before us is that, the terms of the contract between the parties have been given a go by, by the Arbitrator to grant relief to the respondent. However, the terms of a contract would have to be understood in the light of the conduct of the parties also, as held in McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. 2006 KHC 1292 : (2006) 11 SCC 181 : JT 2006 (11) SC 376. Paragraph 112 relevant in the above context is extracted for convenience of reference. "112. It is trite that the terms of the contract can be express or implied. The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant factor in the matter of construction of a contract. The construction of the contrast agreement is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators having regard to the wide nature, scope and ambit of the arbitration agreement and they cannot be said to have misdirected themselves in passing the award by taking into consideration the conduct of the parties. It is also trite that correspondences exchanged by the parties are required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of construction of a contract. Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the arbitrator to determine, even if it gives rise to determination of a question of law (See Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. v. UNGC and D.D. Sharma v. Union of India.)" The Arbitrator in the present case has taken note of the fact that though there was a specific term in the contract that the construction had to be completed within a period of nine months, the appellant had extended the time limit thereafter, clearly indicating that time was not considered to be the essence of the contract by the parties.
The Arbitrator has also found that since the quantity of steel required and the cost thereof had exceeded the contemplation of the parties, the respondent was entitled to be compensated for the escalation in quantity as well as cost. Especially so, since performance thereof, though belatedly by the respondent was accepted. Therefore, the Arbitrator has found that the parties had by their conduct given a go by to the express terms of the contract. The said conclusion cannot be held to be so unjustified as to shock the conscience of the Court. We are reminded of the caution that the Apex Court has sounded in the decision in Associated Builders v. Delhi Development Authority 2014 KHC 4742 : (2015) 3 SCC 49 : 2015 (1) KLT SN 58 : AIR 2015 SC 620 . Paragraph 33, relevant in the context, reads as under: "33. It must clearly be understood that when a Court is applying the "public policy" test to an arbitration award, it does not act as a Court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award. Thus an award based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on this score. Once it is found that the arbitrators approach is not arbitrary or capricious, then he is the last word on facts. In P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd., this Court held : (SCC PP.601-02. Para 21) "21. A Court does not sit in appeal over the award of an Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or re-appreciating the evidence. An award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) of the Act. The Arbitral Tribunal has examined the facts and held that both the second respondent and the appellant are liable. The case as put forward by the first respondent has been accepted.
An award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) of the Act. The Arbitral Tribunal has examined the facts and held that both the second respondent and the appellant are liable. The case as put forward by the first respondent has been accepted. Even the minority view was that the second respondent was liable as claimed by the first respondent, but the appellant was not liable only on the ground that the arbitrators appointed by the Stock Exchange under Bye-law 248, in a claim against a non-member, had no jurisdiction to decide a claim against another member. The finding of the majority is that the appellant did the transaction in the name of the second respondent and is therefore, liable along with the second respondent. Therefore, in the absence of any ground under Section 34(2) of the Act, it is not possible to re-examine the facts to find out whether a different decision can be arrived at." Having gone through the award of the Arbitrator, we find that there are no grounds to interfere with the same, as sought to be made out by the counsel for the appellant. 20. We remind ourselves of the fact that we are sitting in appeal filed under Section 37 of the Act challenging an order refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act. The limits of interference with an award of an Arbitrator under Section 34 of the Act is limited and confined to the grounds stipulated by the said provision. The parties have, as in all cases where disputes are referred to be settled through arbitration, decided in this case also to have their disputes settled through arbitration. In other words, they have chosen the method of arbitration for the settlement of their disputes in preference to the ordinary course of adjudication through a Court of law. They also agreed on the Arbitrator. Having agreed to the terms on which the arbitration was to be conducted and having chosen the Arbitrator who was to decide their disputes, it shall not be open for them later, to turn around and question the entire procedure as done in the present case.
They also agreed on the Arbitrator. Having agreed to the terms on which the arbitration was to be conducted and having chosen the Arbitrator who was to decide their disputes, it shall not be open for them later, to turn around and question the entire procedure as done in the present case. The Apex Court has in Tarapore and Company v. Cochin Shipyard Ltd., Cochin 1984 KHC 47 : (1984) 2 SCC 680 : 1984 KLT SN 47 : AIR 1984 SC 1072 laid down the above principle in unmistakable terms which holds the field, even today. The relevant portion in paragraph 16 of the judgment reads as under: "...With the ever-widening expansion of international trade and commerce, complex questions of Private International Law, effect of local laws on contracts between parties belonging to different nations are certainly bound to crop up. Arbitration has been considered a civilized way of resolving such disputes avoiding Court proceedings. There is no reason why the parties should be precluded from referring a specific question of law to an arbitrator for his decision and agree to be bound by the same. This approach manifests faith of parties in the capacity of the Tribunal of their choice to decide even a pure question of law. If they do so, with eyes wide open, and there is nothing to preclude the parties from doing so, then there is no reason why the Court should try to impose its view of law superseding the view of the Tribunal whose decision the parties agreed to abide by. Therefore, on principle it appears distinctly clear that when a specific question of law is referred to an arbitrator for his decision including the one touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, the decision of the arbitrator would be binding on both the parties and it would not be open to any of the two parties to wriggle out of it by contending that the arbitrator cannot clutch at or confer jurisdiction upon himself by misconstruing the arbitration agreement." We notice that the order of the learned District Judge against which this appeal is filed has proceeded to consider the issues in the proper perspective. The learned District Judge has rightly dismissed the petition filed by the appellant. We find no grounds to interfere with the said order or the award of the Arbitrator.
The learned District Judge has rightly dismissed the petition filed by the appellant. We find no grounds to interfere with the said order or the award of the Arbitrator. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.