JUDGMENT : A.K.Rath, J. The plaintiff is the appellant against a reversing judgment in a suit for declaration that the enhancement of licence fee levied by the defendant as mentioned in the notice dated 07.12.1983 is not valid and binding on the plaintiff and for permanent injunction. 2. The case of the plaintiff is that he is in occupation of stall no.3 constructed by the defendant. He is doing his business since 1968 on payment of Rs.30/-towards licence fee. The licence fee has been enhanced to Rs.80/-. He used to pay licence fee regularly. While matter stood thus, on 07.12.1983, defendant issued a notice enhancing the licence fee to Rs.200/-with effect from 01.01.1984. He was directed to execute a fresh lease agreement or in the alternative, to vacate the stall by 01.01.1984. Enhancement of licence fee is contrary to the provisions of the Orissa Municipal Act. The Orissa Municipal Act (in short, ‘the O.M. Act’) and Rules does not authorise the defendant to demand high fee. Levying of fee presupposes the existence of quid pro quo relationship, which is absent. He sent a representation to the defendant on 16.12.1983. But defendant maintained a sphinx-like silence. With this factual scenario, he instituted the suit seeking the relief mentioned supra. 3. The defendant entered contest and filed a written statement pleading, inter alia, that the plaintiff is in occupation of stall no.3. Licence fee was Rs.80/-. The same was enhanced to Rs.200/-. The plaintiff had the option either to pay the enhance licence fee or to vacate the stall. The defendant, council decided to enhance the rate of fee taking into consideration of all aspects. The enhancement of fee is legal and justified. On 07.12.1983, the defendant issued a notice enhancing the licence fee to Rs.200/-with effect from 01.01.1984. 4. On the inter se pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court struck three issues. Both the parties led evidence, oral and documentary, to substantiate their cases. Placing reliance on the decisions in A. Raja Rao Dora v. Dhenkanal Municipal Council and others, 41 (1975) C.L.T. 415, learned trial court came to hold that the demand of enhancement of licence fee is bad as it has ceased to be a fee in the absence of quid pro quo. Enhancement of licence fee by the council is not valid and binding on the plaintiff. Held so, it decreed the suit. Enhancement of licence fee by the council is not valid and binding on the plaintiff. Held so, it decreed the suit. The defendant filed T.A. No. 15 of 1989 before the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, Chatrapur. Learned appellate court held that no notice was served in the Municipality under Sec.349 of the O.M. Act before institution of the suit. It further held that learned trial court applied the ratio of an overruled decision. Held so, it allowed the appeal. 5. The Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law:- “Whether the impugned judgment is bad in law inasmuch as the learned court below did not take into consideration the evidence on record ?” 6. Mr. Ashok Mohanty, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submits that the plaintiff is in occupation of stall no.3 constructed by the defendant. The licence fee was enhanced from time to time. He used to pay the same. All of a sudden, the fee was enhanced to an exorbitant amount. Enhancement of licence fee to the extent of two and half times is bad in law. 7. Per contra, Ms. Soumya Mishra, learned Advocate on behalf of Mr. S.N. Mishra, learned Advocate for the respondent submits that the plaintiff is a licensee. The municipal council took a decision to enhance the licence fee. Accordingly, the fee was enhanced. 8. In A.Raja Rao Dora (supra), the question before this Court was whether the levy of fee under Sec.295 (2) of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 (the Act) was unjustified for non-compliance of the principle of quid pro quo. This Court answered the question in the affirmative and quashed the collection of the fee and restrained the Municipal Council from enforcing the demand. 9. The matter went to apex Court. The apex Court in Dhenkanal Municipal Council and another v. A. Raja Rao and others, AIR 1994 SC 1648 held thus: “07. This Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Mohd. Yasin, (1983) 2 SCR 999 : ( AIR 1983 SC 617 ) referred to the earlier judgments of this Court in Commr. of H.R. & C.E. Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swamiyar, 1954 SCR 1005 : ( AIR 1954 SC 282 ); H.H. Sudhindra v. Commr. for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, (1963) Supp. 2 SCR 302: ( AIR 1963 SC 966 ); Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. of H.R. & C.E. Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swamiyar, 1954 SCR 1005 : ( AIR 1954 SC 282 ); H.H. Sudhindra v. Commr. for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, (1963) Supp. 2 SCR 302: ( AIR 1963 SC 966 ); Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1961) 2 SCR 537 : ( AIR 1961 SC 459 ); H.H. Swamiji v. Commr. Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments Dept., (1980) 1 SCR 368 : ( AIR 1980 SC 1 ); Southern Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals, Trichur v. State of Kerala, (1982) 1 SCR 519 : ( AIR 1981 SC 1863 ) and held as under (at Pp. 620-21 of AIR): “What do we learn from these precedents? We learn that there is no generic difference between a tax and a fee, though broadly a tax is a compulsory exaction as part of a common burden, without promise of any special advantages to classes of tax payers whereas a fee is a payment for services rendered, benefit provided or privilege conferred. Compulsion is not the hall-mark of the distinction between a tax and a fee. That the money collected does not go into a separate fund but goes into the consolidated fund does not also necessarily make a levy a tax. Though a fee must have relation to the services rendered, or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct: a mere causal relation may be enough. Further, neither the incidence of the fee nor the service rendered need be uniform. That others besides those paying the fees are also benefitted does not detract from the character of the fee. In fact the special benefit or advantage to the payers of the fees may even be secondary as compared with the primary motive of regulation in the public interest. Nor is the Court to assume the role of a cost accountant. It is neither necessary nor expedient to weigh too meticulously the cost of the services rendered etc. against the amount of fees collected so as to evenly balance the two. A broad co-relationship is all that is necessary. Quid pro quo in the strict sense is not the one and only true index of a fee; nor is it necessarily absent in a tax.” 8. against the amount of fees collected so as to evenly balance the two. A broad co-relationship is all that is necessary. Quid pro quo in the strict sense is not the one and only true index of a fee; nor is it necessarily absent in a tax.” 8. Applying the above quoted ratio to the facts of the present case we are of the view that the High Court fell into patent error in quashing the fee levied by the Municipal Council.” 10. The plaintiff is a licensee. He is in occupation of the shop room constructed by defendant since 1968. Licence fee was fixed at Rs.30/-, when the plaintiff was inducted as a tenant. The same was enhanced to Rs.80/-. Pursuant to resolution of the municipal council, the defendant issued a notice on 07.12.1983 enhancing to Rs.200/-. The municipal council has jurisdiction to enhance the fee from time to time. No material has been brought before the Court that enhancement of fee is exorbitant and arbitrary. Learned appellate court is right in holding that the learned trial court has applied the ratio of an overruled decision. There is no perversity or illegality in the findings of the courts below. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 11. A priori, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.