JUDGMENT : 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 31st July, 2009 passed by the Respondent No.2, whereby the Government of India refused to refer the industrial dispute to the appropriate Labour Court for adjudication. It has further been prayed for commanding upon the Respondent No.3 to recompute the entire benefits, including retiral benefits, by treating the petitioner's date of birth as 18th September, 1949 in place of 1st January, 1947. 2. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner was appointed as Chargeman, West Modidih Colliery on 1st January, 1973 and at the time of appointment, his date of birth was recorded as 18th September, 1949 in the initial Form-B Register as per the matriculation certificate issued by the Bihar School Examination Board. After the appointment, the Management issued identity card to the petitioner, showing his date of birth as 18th September, 1949. On 17th June, 1987 the Management provided service excerpts to the petitioner with instruction that if he had any objection regarding any particular recorded therein, he was supposed to note his objection. The petitioner came to know that his date of birth was wrongly recorded in the service excerpts as 1st January, 1947 and as such he filed an objection, stating that his date of birth is 18th September, 1949. Thereafter, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Clerk and identity card was also issued to the petitioner, showing his date of birth as 18th September, 1949. Surprisingly, on 14th July, 2006, the Management served superannuation letter to the petitioner, intimating that he would be retiring from service with effect from 1st January, 2007 by treating his date of birth as 1st January, 1947. Thereafter, the petitioner made a representation on 25th August, 2006 before the Project Officer, West Modidih Colliery, stating therein that since his date of birth is 18th September, 1949 as per Form-B, Register No.85 and the identity cards, he would attain the age of sixty years only on 18th September, 2009. Since no order was passed on the said representation, the petitioner raised an industrial dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad and on failure of conciliation, the dispute was sent to the appropriate Government for referring the dispute for adjudication. Since no order was passed on the said representation, the petitioner raised an industrial dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad and on failure of conciliation, the dispute was sent to the appropriate Government for referring the dispute for adjudication. However, the Government of India through the Ministry of Labour vide impugned letter dated 31st July, 2009 refused to refer the dispute, holding, inter alia, that the dispute has been raised at the fag end of service and the claim has not been substantiated by any documentary evidence. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned letter dated 31st July, 2009, refusing to refer the industrial dispute for adjudication, is illegal, as the appropriate Government, while taking decision to refer the dispute under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act') cannot decide the case on merit, rather the dispute is required to be adjudicated by the industrial tribunal on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute. 3. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on the judgments rendered in the cases of Dhanbad Colliery Karamchari Sangh Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (1991) Supp. (2) SCC 10, and Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh & Anr. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in AIR 1989 SC 1565 . 4. Learned counsel for the Respondent No.3 submits that the impugned letter dated 31st July, 2009 does not require any interference of this Court, as the appropriate Government (Ministry of Labour, Government of India) by the said letter has formed an opinion that since the dispute relating to date of birth has been raised at the fag end of service and the claim could not be substantiated by documentary evidence, it would not be just and proper to refer the dispute for adjudication. Learned counsel, while relying on the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondent No.3, submits that in course of conciliation the Respondent- Management produced Form-B Register of West Modidih Colliery under Katras Area of BCCL where he was initially appointed. The said Form-B records the age of the petitioner as 26 years as on 1st January, 1973. Moreover in token acceptance of the correctness of the entry made in Form-B Register, the petitioner also put his signature in English. The said Form-B records the age of the petitioner as 26 years as on 1st January, 1973. Moreover in token acceptance of the correctness of the entry made in Form-B Register, the petitioner also put his signature in English. Similarly, the service excerpts of the petitioner prepared by West Modidih Colliery records the date of birth of the petitioner as 1st January, 1947 and not 18th September, 1949 as has been shown by the petitioner in Annexure-2 to the writ petition. The Respondent- Management also produced the current Form-B of West Modidih Colliery where he was lastly posted. The Form-B also records the age of the petitioner as 26 years as on 1st January, 1973. In view of the said fact, there cannot be any dispute with regard to recording of the date of birth in the statutory records maintained by the Respondent- Management. It has also been averred in the counter affidavit filed by the Respondent No.3 that the petitioner during his entire service period has not produced his matriculation certificate, rather the same was shown to the Management only after he superannuated from service. Therefore, the genuineness of the matriculation certificate of the petitioner is not admitted by the Respondent-BCCL. Under the said factual background, the Government of India (Ministry of Labour) vide impugned letter dated 31st July, 2009 did not find, prima facie, material while forming an opinion that any industrial dispute exists in the matter so as to refer the same for adjudication. 5. Learned counsel for the Respondent No.3, while putting reliance on the judgments rendered in the cases of Rashtriya Chemicals Fertilizers Ltd. & Anr. Vs. General Employees' Association and Ors., reported in (2007)5 SCC 273 ; and Secretary, Indian Tea Association Vs. Ajit Kumar Barat & Ors., reported in (2000)3 SCC 93 , submits that the appropriate Government, while forming an opinion for referring the dispute under Section 10 of the Act, can prima facie see the nature of dispute and the material available before it so as to see whether referring the matter for industrial adjudication is a formality or there really exists an industrial dispute which can be referred for adjudication. It is further submitted that in the writ jurisdiction, the High Court while exercising power of judicial review should not closely examine whether the Government had any material before it in support of forming an opinion under Section 10 of the Act. 6. Though the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 have not filed any counter affidavit, yet learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of India submits that the Government of India, through the Ministry of Labour, while refusing to refer the dispute for adjudication vide impugned letter dated 31st July, 2009, has not committed any error as in the opinion of the Government of India, the present matter was not found fit to be referred for adjudication. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on going through the relevant documents brought on record, it appears that the petitioner was initially appointed in West Modidih Colliery under Katras Area of BCCL and the Form-B (statutory record maintained under Mines Act, 1952) contains the age of the petitioner as 26 years on 1st January, 1973. In the said Form-B Register, the petitioner has also put his signature in English in token of acceptance of the entry made therein. Moreover, the service excerpts of the petitioner prepared by West Modidih Colliery also contains the date of birth of the petitioner as 1st January, 1947. On the other hand, the averment of the petitioner that in the identity card, his date of birth has been shown as 18th September, 1949, which cannot be even prima facie accepted to be the actual date of birth of the petitioner, particularly in view of the fact that the statutory Form-B Register admittedly contains the age of the petitioner as 26 years on 1st January, 1973, which makes it clear that the date of birth of the petitioner is 1st January, 1947. The Respondent No.3 has also stated in the counter affidavit that the matriculation certificate has been shown by the petitioner to the Management only after he retired, though the genuineness of the matriculation certificate has not been admitted. The Respondent No.3 has also stated in the counter affidavit that the petitioner has already been paid his retiral benefits, treating his date of birth to be 1st January, 1947, as has been recorded in the Form-B and service excerpts. The Respondent No.3 has also stated in the counter affidavit that the petitioner has already been paid his retiral benefits, treating his date of birth to be 1st January, 1947, as has been recorded in the Form-B and service excerpts. He has also been paid his gratuity and provident fund and is also receiving his monthly pension. 8. Since the petitioner has averred in the writ petition that Form-B Register, bearing No.85, contains the date of birth of the petitioner as 18th September, 1949, this Court to have its satisfaction, had directed the Respondent No.3- BCCL to obtain Form-B from the concerned office to be produced before this Court. Learned counsel for the Respondent No.3 produces Form-B Register in the Court, which contains the name of the petitioner at Sl. No.85, wherein the age of the petitioner has been written as 26 years as on 1st January, 1973. In view of the said fact, there is no iota of doubt that in the statutory Form-B Register, the age of the petitioner has been recorded as 26 years as on 1st January, 1973, thereby the date of birth of the petitioner has been reckoned as 1st January, 1947. 9. In the case of Dhanbad Colliery Karamchari Sangh (Supra), the workmen claimed that they were not the contract labourers, rather they were direct employees of the principal employer. However, the Government refused to refer the dispute on the ground that the Union failed to establish that the workmen were engaged in the prohibited category of work under Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 and the workmen were engaged by the contractor and not the principal employer and there has been no employer-employee relationship between them. Under the said fact, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the appropriate Government should not have decided the dispute itself instead of referring it for adjudication. The ratio of the said case shall have no application to the facts of the present case, as the Government of India in the present case has not decided the dispute, rather before forming an opinion, whether there exists a dispute or not, it examined the prima facie material available before it and, thereafter, decided not to refer the matter for adjudication. In factual context of the present case, the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh & Anr. In factual context of the present case, the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh & Anr. (Supra) shall also not applicable. 10. Moreover, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rastriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited & Anr. (Supra), in Para-8, has held as under:- “8. It is now well settled that the High Courts will not straightway direct the appropriate Government to refer the dispute. It is for the appropriate Government to apply its mind to relevant factors and satisfy itself as to the existence of a dispute before deciding to refer the dispute. We may refer to the following observations of this Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. V. Union of India; (2006)12 SCC 233 : (Second SAIL case, CLR p.667, para 18) “For the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under Section 10 of the 1970 Act, the appropriate Government is required to apply its mind. Its order may be an administrative one but the same would not be beyond the pale of judicial review. It must, therefore, apply its mind before making a reference on the basis of the materials placed before it by the workmen and/or management, as the case may be. While doing so, it may be inappropriate for the same authority on the basis of the materials that a notification under Section 10(1)(d) of the 1947 Act be issued, although it stands judicially determined that the workmen were employed by the contractor. The State exercises administrative power both in relation to abolition of contract labour in terms of Section 10 of the 1970 Act as also in relation to making a reference for industrial adjudication to a Labour Court or a Tribunal under Section 10(1)(d) of the 1947 Act. While issuing a notification under the 1970 Act, the State would have to proceed on the basis that the principal employer had appointed contractors and such appointments are valid in law, but while referring a dispute for industrial adjudication, validity of appointment of the contractor would itself be an issue as the State must prima facie satisfy itself that there exists a dispute as to whether the workmen are in fact not employed by the contractor but by the management. We are, therefore, with respect, unable to agree with the opinion of the High Court. We are, therefore, with respect, unable to agree with the opinion of the High Court. We would, however, hasten to add that this judgment shall not come in the way of the appropriate Government to apply its mind for the purpose of issuance of a notification under Section 10 of the 1970 Act.”” Further in the case of Secretary, Indian Tea Association (Supra), in Para-7(2) & (3) has held as under:- “7. The law on the point may briefly be summarised as follows: 1. .......... 2. The order of the appropriate Government making a reference under Section 10 of the Act is an administrative order and not a judicial or quasi-judicial one and the court, therefore, cannot canvass the order of the reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial order. 3. An order made by the appropriate Government under Section 10 of the Act being an administrative order no lis is involved, as such an order is made on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. 4. ........ 5. ........” 11. In view of the aforesaid ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is apparently clear that the appropriate Government, while forming an opinion before referring the dispute for industrial adjudication under Section 10 of the Act, has to satisfy itself on the facts and circumstances of the case, whether any industrial dispute actually exists or not. Further, the order of the appropriate Government making reference under Section 10 of the Act is an administrative order and as such the same does not require to be minutely scrutinized by the High Court while making judicial review to examine the propriety of the same, as to what was the material before the Government in support of forming the said opinion. The order under Section 10 of the Act is passed by the Appropriate Government on its subjective satisfaction considering the material placed before it. 12. In the facts of the present case, the statutory Form-B Register contains the age of the petitioner as 26 years as on 1st January, 1973 and thus his date of birth has to be reckoned as 1st January, 1947. 12. In the facts of the present case, the statutory Form-B Register contains the age of the petitioner as 26 years as on 1st January, 1973 and thus his date of birth has to be reckoned as 1st January, 1947. Merely the fact that the identity card was issued to the petitioner, containing his date of birth as 18th September, 1949, cannot reasonably make out a dispute in presence of the statutory Form-B Register. Moreover, since the petitioner has already superannuated from service way back on 1st January, 2007 and has already received his retiral benefits and is receiving monthly pension also, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned letter dated 31st July, 2009 passed by the Respondent No.2 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition). 13. The writ petition being devoid of any merit is, accordingly, dismissed.